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Theses and Dissertations l. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 


1972 


From blackout at Pearl Harbor to spotlight on 
Tokyo Bay: a study of the evolution in U.S. 
Navy public relations policies and practices 
during World War Il. 


Klinkerman, Robert Dale. 


University of Wisconsin 


http://hdl.handle.net/10945/16155 


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0 KNOX appointed — and published — scholarly author. 
LIBRARY Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School 
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LIBRARY 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIF. 93940 














"ROM BLACKOUT AP PEARL HARBOR TO SPOTLIGHT ON TOKYO BAY: 





A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION IN U.8. SAVY PUBLIC KELAT LOKS 
POLICIUS AKD PRACTICES DURING WORLD WAR II 


یې 
R. DALE KLINKERMAN‏ 


A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of ihe 


requirements for the degree of 


MASTER OF ARTE 
(Journalism) 


at the 
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 


1972 


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LIBRARY 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIF. 93940 


(O Copyright By 
Re Dala Klinkermhn 
1972 


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"il know in time of peace that Public Relations in 
the concept of the leaders of the Navy occupies a very 
&ubordinate place. That's very unfortunate becauae they 
have te change their thinking entirely when they get into 
wer, and it's sometimes Gitficult for tham to do that.” 


T Tràáànk Knox 





PRE PACE 


Shortly after graduating fron the U.S. Nava) 
Officer Candidate School in 1554, I became scquainted with 
the rellicking and satirical humor of William Brinkley's 

the Katex (New York, 1956), a best-selling‏ و 


novel about Navy pubiic relations activities in the Pacific 





toward tho close of World War if. 

Brinkley served ag & young Nevy public relations 
officer on Guam in 1945. His hilarious descriptions of 
"paper-clip^throwing" anà "booze-órinking" Navy officers 
assigned to coddle correspondonts and manicure the Navy's 
image at war's enê ace not particularly flattering. Yet. 
s one reads his work, the clear impression comes across 
that by the tise the battleship Miseauri sailed inte Tokyo 
Bey, the Navy had هم‎ rether sophisticated end dynaecic public 
relations program in action. 

This was not the case at the beginning of the war, 
as indicated in the following passage from the hooks 

Before Feari Harbor, reporters seldom came around 

the Wavy, ar those who did were treated as identified 
enemy agents dedicated to filching its innermost 
Secrets. Even fer a considerable time after Pearl 
Bégbor an admiral might go along for months having to 
de nothing but fight the war and never encounter & 


reportez. But by the beginning of 1945 the Navy's 
attitude had undergone a wondrous change. The H&vy, 


۷ 


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vi 
abruptly falling in love with the power of the press, 
had opened the flooigetes ani reperters were descending 
like schools of happy Larnacles on the Pacific 
Fleet. (P. 44) 

î» an aspiring young public information officer 
myself (the duty title was changed in June 1945), I was 
most curious in 1954 as to what caused the almost 18O0-degres 
turn the Navy public relations ship took during World 
War II. Whe gave the erders to the helmemen? What kind of 
fuel in the form of techniques am? methods waa used? How 
far and where did it go after completing the turnebout? 

às a full-fledged Ravy public affairs officer 
(another title change in 1964) pursuing graduate study at 
the University of Wisconsin in 1962, I had the Opportonity 
to satisfy my curiosity. Encouraged by Professor Scott HN. 
Cutlip, © foremost authority on public relations history, 
aré urged on by & Xavy public affairs colleague, 

Lieutenant Commander Ton Scovel, who broke s&il before me 
with a study of Nevy public relations prior to World War ii, 
Xš ventured forth into the shoal waters of what seemed to be 
myriad boxes of files stuck away in musty corners of 
federal repositories in the Washington, D.C., aroa. The 
task was formidable; for many of these dusty boxes had 
Sever been opened before, eni meaningful indexing was 
almost nonexistent. At times, i had apprehensions ever tho 
efficacy of attempting a study of such wide scope in a 
Master's thesis. But the archivists were so halpful and 


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vii 
the topic so interesting that I plunged forward with only 
passing trepidation. The experience has been personally 
very rewarding. 

Without the aid of certain archivists, librarians 
and record~keepers, the research phase of tho thesis would 
have been untenable. If particularly wish to thank the 
foliowing individuals for their invaluable assistance in 
identifying and locating pertinent Mavy recoróst 
Dr. Dean C. Allard, heaó of tho Operational Archivos 
Branch, Neval History Division of the Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations, and his sable staff--HMr. Bernard 
Cavalcante, Hrs. Mildred Maysux, Mrs. Mae Beaton and Mrs, 
Barbare Gilmore; Hr. P. 8. Meigs and Nr. W. B. Greenwood of 
tha Navy Department Library; Mr. Clayton Janes, Chief of 
Section One of the Reference Service Branch, Washington 
Hational Records Center, Suitland. Md.; Mr. Karry Schwartz, 
Staff mewber of the National Archives; and Mee. Wilear Dey, 
File Supervisor for the Navy Department Office of Informa- 
tion. A special vote of thanks is due Hrs. Mildred Beruch, 
Chief of the Recerds and Reference Unit, Office of the 
Secretary of the Navy, for her help in gaining permission 
for me to screen the restricted set of personai papers of 
James Forrestal on deposit at the National Archives. 

To Rear Admiral E. M. Eller, USS (Retired), former 
Girector of the Office of Naval Hiatory,. end his information 
anc administrative assistant, Hiss T., I. Mertz, I wish to 


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viii 
express my appreciation for initial advice and counsel on 
the direction the study should take. In this regard also, 
Be. Harold Nelson of the University of Wisconsin rendered 
valuable aid, especially in the arsas of proper enphasis 
and possible limitations in scope. 

I aa Óeoply grateful to many participants in the 
World War II Navy pubiic relations story who shared their 
experiences with me in personal end telephone interviews. 
I owe a particular debt of gratitude toe Rear Admiral 
Harold B. (Min) Siller, publie relations officer for 
AGwmiral Chester 9", Nimitz and Navy Director of Information 
at the close of tha war. Admiral Miller not only gave 
freely of his time in several interviews, but alse gener” 
ously made availeble cortain personal files which addeó & 
anique and vital perepective to the thesis. Others who 
proviced firsthand information were Miss Helene Philibert. 
Nr. Daniel B. Kimbeil., Mra. H. R. Thurber, Lieutenant 
Commander Gilbert Shaw, VSCG, and the following retired 
Navy officers: Viee Admirel W. G. Beecher, Jro, Rear Admiral 
Robert W. Berry, Captains Jay B. Smith and Hareld 8. Say, 
and Commander Merle Macbain. 

My sincerest appreciation ia extended to Captain 
Kenneth W, Wade, USN (Metired), ond Commander J. ۷۰ Stier- 
men, JE.’ USK, for their understanding sand encouragement 
Curing a very critical stage of the effort. 

To Professor Cutlip. who as my thesis advisor 








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ix 
steered and guided me throughout with patience and wisdor, 
and to the Other membere of xy thesis comolttee, Professors 
Douglaa Jones and Williem Blankenwburg. I au especially 
indebted for advice, counsel and assistance, 

A special salute is given to interim typists Sharen 
Palmer, Susan Shusway, end Evelyn and Kathy Groenke, and to 
Mts. Lioye Renneberg fer her ceptible preparation of the 
final manuseript. 

My lasting gratitude is expressed to the U.S. Navy 
for providing we with the opportunity to obtain a graduate 
Gegree. 













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TABLE OF CONTENTS 


Chapter Page 
le INTAODUCT LON B سا‎ * 44 * ۰ € 2 e 2 2a 2 * 9 e & 1 
The Silent Service Tradition . . . ه د‎ è e 3 
Navy Fublic Relations Prior to 
Rox id Wax ii @ v = w * @ 2 * + e ® * © e 4 
Rim and Scope of Study «a سے‎ e v ه ه د د ده‎ v 7 
۳۵۵99۵6۵ و‎ o د‎ e ےہ‎ >o è o ù saos ooo oo را‎ 
II. ORGANIZATION FOR WAR ,. . . ہو # ه ده © م ده‎ 19 
From Isolationism to Preparedness . مه‎ e » e 20 
Frank Knox Taras tho Haim. . مب‎ « e s 23 
Emvy Public Relations Begins to Mobilize a 24 
Uniformed Civilians Pe, 
سب6‎ Function @ + +e سا‎ & iF € a 2 a 26 
Bervice Consistent With Security". د ےا ےج‎ = 29 
سب ې‎ OensOrShip وه هه د سوه رد‎ ooo 20 
Publicity gan on British Ships in 
یسک انت‎ Porte > ع هد هد = سی‎ oo ew ve o 33 
Additional Restrictions anê Some 
Pesitive Steps . د عد‎ s we هه ه په ده د دص‎ 35 
Betablishment of the Office of 
Public Rejations & E e z a . te @ » اس‎ a v 3e 


Hava] District and Fleet Public 


Pam a 42‏ یې oo l‏ یب71 رہ 
The Specter of a Separate Air Force os ee 44‏ 
Censorship of Outgoing Comauniceationg . . . 45‏ 
Organizational and Personnel Changes oso 47‏ 
Blueprint on the Eve of Poari Harbor . . « 49‏ 
51 هه ه ھ ها اع اش د ےب FocthOteR‏ 

III. THE FIRST YEAR OF BOSTILEITICS > è 2 o ه مم‎ 58 
The Pesrl Harbor Baws Blackout . . هه + ه‎ 59 
"Aid and Comfort to the Enemy" . ..... 69 
Havy Gecurity Messures . . . e e c ə e o o 62 
Establishment of the Office of 

0-999-00 ه وه ه ېښ ص د ښ دص ه ۵ دږ د د د‎ f Gå 
Liaison With Other Government 

iInformetion Agencies à & 9 o ù 9 o و "^ ھی‎ $7 


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xí 


Page 
Knox Takes Steps to inform Public > . . . عص‎ 69 
New Public Relations Faces end Functions . 76€ 
Aémirsi King, A Formidable Obstacle . . سے‎ 02 
German Submarines Stir Up News 
Comntrovereéy «. « ی می ھر‎ ewe ew we we 9 9 9. مه ده‎ 37 
Firet Casualty List asd initial Policy 
1001 06-0-0009" ده هده‎ cos 20 95 


Accreditation of War Corresponóoenté . مدد‎ 1008 
Establishment of the Office of War 

Information 1. ه ده دص د د د ده ه ه ده‎ ll i04 
Good News First. Then the Bad .. هو هال هوه هم‎ 107 
Captain Lovette Succoedg Admiral Hepburn . i18 
Other Personnel and Organizational 

hanyet د‎ = è e ax د ص د ده د د‎ e هو * * ده و‎ 118 
Special #ublic Relations Tools and 


ADI 0 -ں‎ 09090 9 131 
Publicity on Kew Ghip Construction . . و و‎ 133 
A New Direction to the War . e e « « e >s c 138 
Footnote @ * 2 & a 5 ¥ 2 ¥ + + ® * a * 3 x 140 


PROHd DZNCNSIVL TO OFFENSIVE . 4 ه ده د‎ è è ه ه‎ 151 


Press and Public Reaction AssessSod . . ». 153 
Lig of Sacurity Lifts Slightly مهه‎ ۰ 154 
inprovement in Navy Releasing Procedures 
Rota $ * e 5 E * * * ® * * € ك‎ € * o + d i56 
A More Creative Publice Relaciones 
سا * ® * 9 ع7 چجڈ‎ e *» * & € * + a اب‎ 260 


Recruiting Prives and Other Promotional 


NINOS A e» o» پچ‎ ww ew mS 164 


industrial incentive Programm و ج * 9 ٹپ‎ $» 9 169 
Public Relations Manual Promulgated .. . ə 173 
Qutback in Public Zelstions Pergonnel . و‎ e 174 
Scope of Office of Public Relations 

nivi . . à » « ېږ & 5 » يی ع‎ S w » s 170 


A Wost Coast Director Ned » بي‎ a .» يي ده‎ € i82 
Liaison With Ketion Picture Industry end 





Nuowsrecl Releases و‎ s o s» oroo oso i84 
Visiting" Correspondente Accredited te 
Pacific Fleet * * * i - + e * ss په‎ ^- * Y v* 135 


President Directs Closer Cooperation 

With Ow I * * v + * S * + + * * - ® + * a 190 
Churchill "Scoop" Triggers Mew Attacks 

Qn GG. Military ھ © 9 »^ 9 پ‎ o ده © ^*^ هوه‎ © i33 
Tarawa, À Turning Peint « . ه ه ه د ږ د مه وه‎ 197 
Knox Soolós King About Submerine 

— DUEXTETRS. oe د يد ده د‎ @ £00 
A Changes in thea Censorship Code 8 45 » 5*5 204 


Chapter 


IV. 








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Chapter 


The Beginnings of a Public Relations 


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Forrestal's Public Relations Fnilosophy 


Merger Threat purs Navy to Action 


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Pearl Harbor Investigations ہے‎ 
The Mormandy Invasion . . e ə o 
The Marianas’ Campaign . . . o 
A Porios of Boul-Bsarching .. 
inspection Trip to the Pacific 
A Forward-Looking Policy مدرم‎ 


“Pull Speed Ahead” in the Pacifi 
Reorganizstion of the Office of 


فاه هم و «-. Public Relations‏ 


A Request for Additdenal Personnel 
$pociaj Activities oR the Mone Front 


Navy Public Relations Policy Statexents 
Pleet Woocstown News Center Established 


PAecoilsées for Iwo dima and Oxinewa 
Trusan’s Views on Unification Zvoks 

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Publishers Flock to the Pacific , 


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l 


CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 


When asked early in World War II to state a public 
relations policy for the Ravy. Admiral Ernest J. King 
succinctly replied: “Don’t tell them enything. When it's 
Over, tell them who won. at 

it was a “tongue-in-cheek” remark by the Havy's 
crusty military chief, yat not as facetious ae it sounded. 
it was indicative of Ernie King’s true feelings on how the 
war should be fought--ané won, in a climate of strictest 
security. 

The Navy took @ fearful beating at Pear] Harbor., 
Yet. the fleet remained the nation's first line of defense 
in the immediate months following the attack, desperately 
waging delaying actions in both tha Atlantic and Pacific. 
It was not surprising that security became such a trenchant 
watchword for Admiral King. He wes opposed to the publica- 
tion of any data which might tip off tho enemy as to the 
strength and disposition of his thin line of sea forces. 

The @dmiral's reaction wae not due entirely to the 
contingency situation, however. In many respects, it wag a 
manifestation of what could be termed a “security symdrome" 


i 


| 
؟‎ æ 
DEUM دس‎ - 


Aiügee, * «- AP CX اه ات نت‎ lw. hee made 
سس‎ 
poss au um cni de ah wow" دازي انس‎ 
+ یب ې‎ mdi) وسو نوغ‎ 

4 ے ——— uL.‏ 
وسو داباهم هنند oe P" fed‏ ادت مه اد سف 
wine eve fI‏ ما دیل اا وی ai: md an allin‏ 
مم e Kr‏ — مور 

qudd mr‏ پس د مه | ASAS‏ وار اس اسر 
mm‏ ممه 
mk‏ ——— ہد چو 
سفوغوں نموم موننلمسم غو اس سے رود م انس عرد 
miie e y a lama a padalos m ses ۶‏ 
مهحهدمه sdi‏ ققسندی1 pim‏ لف سو یساس أت ديت -pai [aq‏ 
ع Sit i aut SEE‏ اس وات 
| و > ضا ean te wll‏ دیس 
"4 سوینی wb 9 alevàd-m com me s‏ 
sedo wand gum‏ ع ev‏ سا 
a Me v V GR‏ نس د مساب are‏ 
 —‏ 5 





in Havy thinking, which had its roots in theo tactical 
necessity for secrecy cn the high seas. Probably te a 
greater degree than İn ary other form of military activity, 
Success in naval war fare depends on the element of 
surprise. in the vastness of the oceans. where a 7O~ship 
task force can operate in an area tho size of a pinpoint on 
& global map, steajith in maneuvering ís a vital ingredient 
for winning battles. Years of indoctrination in this 
intrinsically vaiueble operational tactic have contributed 
to @ tendency on the part of many naval officers to Bake 
security the primary consideration in other areas of 
activity as weli, such as theo release of information. 

Historically, wares @lways have been troublesome for 
the nation's information policy-makers. The age-old 
conflict between the people's right to know anë the neces- 
sity for military security inevitably complicates any plan 
for an oxvderly anc free flow of wartime information. Yet, 
paradoxically, the vital med to kasp the public informed 
in war has Leon responsible for an increased sophistication 
in government information pragrams. 

Such wae the cass in the U.S., Navy during World 
War II. Achairal King’s initial security~-eriented approach 
to the release of information eventually gave way to an 
elaborate public relations mechanism which actively anc 
aggressively publicized the Kavy’s war rele, particularily 
in the last year of the conflict. 


تو سس مدد 
سم همر مومسم تد s F'uéd uf)‏ ې ني ۰ 
erp‏ موت مې ده Dc pa‏ ان qasshlbe Wo‏ مت افو 
a a‏ نس جمپوموھ ro rws ai) a‏ 

menfe meee’ am) dc av -» 34 — quen‏ 5 ۲ ينج 
هوه هوم مس وسم بر مسر 5s asta wd cw‏ » پر سس مر دہ 
اسن "ملق dibal‏ ك تاو له م bite‏ خو bom‏ اسح 
eal‏ تنس ءي عنمب سه نټب تنم ده adm!‏ 
3مهدعمعملتفا می سوب مېمووودسنس؛ vet A Ma)‏ جم حر مم :ا 
که * adem oj pethis oaa poo Tr few ed x maf‏ 
کان به شعن سی سالك لآ کید re panes‏ 

حصصه ای عم سورد مسن سد الك asirni Se eels‏ 

7 اا he‏ دا د اجن توس بس بس 
ub‏ دة 4 minna‏ و نلو-صسقوي. e,‏ کې دنا 
موند ابی فب موو د دنو نب adj Rem aem‏ سمه 
ان هه ملسم سه ال نسو[ مدان مسر نونسم سې پادی 
کہ کت مسقل کی Qo em eni‏ سجلس نوہ ستوتھ, صد 
افك 11851 ای له ساپ سر سم جال اسسما 
2 — دی هم عهوووهسا راید نموف 
— که للا مع دا تد ص تکرح ا 












Wheat were the forces behin this evolutionary 
process? First ang foremost, it would seem that s funóa- 
mental change in attitude in the sea service toward the 


public relations function wes easential. 





Traditionally. the Navy has been known as the 
"silent service. ”? Ita ships anc men ply the seven seas 
thousands of miles from shore. in splendid isolation from 
the prying eyes of civilization. In such an environment. 
&s remote as the nether world of Heptune, the qualities of 
strong dedication to duty, independence of thought and 
fierce pride in one's accomplishments naturally evolve. To 
brag about his deeds, however. is somehow beneath the 
dignity anê decorum of the true Navy man. The recoré 
should “apeak for itself*® without the benefit of promotion. 

The silent sarvice tradition also is anchored in 
the old days of sail, when lack of communications caused 
lengthy delays in the transmission of news from abroad and 
at sea, 

Even when speedier communications emerged at the 
turn of the century, the custom of silence continued for 
another reason--fear of reprisal from higher authority. 
"Few naval officers had any desire to stick their foot in 
their mouth. Quotations which reached the press often 


resulted in demands for explanations. A head stuck above 





«aim w :٭-میبم:؛ہ ې ومد‎ Ana m ad SG 
,سف نو یس مجم ہہ یم جوم بإب‎ as واک واه‎ 


` ® 


UIA "T‏ جص لد 
e‏ سنس سه سی مس mE yig m‏ ووہے جرد 
~l paiia Ro eee?‏ ووسہتب. نم عونەصاب m4 Do) maL‏ 
دمه mee ig‏ .ڑا جنینتعسصنتطص دب وسو ود — fmm‏ 
مه مته مه د هون موله ور میوست. Pe sustilouy wid‏ 
ودوم wus wyata i mmm) qb ne col sevilla‏ 
الو رون جو وید اک ۱۷ oF .oofews‏ 
هوی mms a rwe «EA alê roan‏ مول ott‏ 
وسن موه غه swede ios‏ ایب Rat‏ سا ېمر ګچص. 
د oa ol oe Oaa a‏ اھ hamum‏ 44 
١٨١ "wb Me "D‏ سال wns ob molguos Qe fomi sony‏ 
LJ BSc NEN ELE‏ 
HL 2.4‏ 

— oca my rm سو‎ samme وستارت‎ um سد‎ 
و‎ Meas naa Mo ree oD سل سب يسا‎ 
م صر در‎ saigid at (na he »ompesen ماد‎ 
of oag aapi, malay, — — 


















water was a target for a ready د يرون‎ 

As late es 1925, Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, 
chief spokesman for the newly emerging naval air force, was 
criticized severely by the Navy Department for trying to 
counteract in the presa the onslaught against néval avie~ 
tion by General Billy Mitchell. “As you know, to the 
average Naval officer the word ‘publicity’ is anatnena, "^ 
Moffett wrote concerning the censure. "I was brought up to 
hate it myself, and still hete it." 

The silent service label is somewhat overdrawn, 
though. No government agency. and especially no military 
service, can operate in a vacuum It is dependent upon the 
support of the public and its elected leaders for its 
sustenance. The 8۷7 has acquiesced to this politica] 
reality since its inception and at times has proven itself 
quite adept at bringing to the attention of the public and 
Congress the necessity for seapower and the consequent need 
for ships and men to project it. It has, however, shunned 
Such politicking except when it considered it to be 


3 in the same spirit. it has avoided 


absolutely essential. 
formal public relations endeavors as being somehow د‎ 


psychological vielation of the silent service tradition. 





There have been notable exceptions in Navy history 


to this negative public relations approach. Significantiy, 





۸۰ ې‎ eee a mh ووي‎ à mee مایت‎ 
MIU 2l همي یی‎ et. 
=i papas iei manapi pa a a aa ات‎ 
سے يديوه‎ rami مسهوراخصسي)م‎ ay غه پچنډی‎ hà ۱-8 

as so vi vor A wA Dis Dried و د‎ 

Ai amaes دی‎ ‘erbaivees* ice ca وواریښو‎ — —⸗ 
u p "eed ete ٣ awe «lr larmes were “۰۹و‎ 
ودين وين آنا ہس رر‎ 2) wet 

" "تت چې وزیي اټ اون ند مموسکدد ومس متاس 
asilia on LAI te ywi H -- yansi‏ 
le‏ سه ېسه ته ه 90900 a a ۳۱۳۵۵04 ai Pi‏ 
فو ما ati‏ ستمانه ا له اس ۲ جو ری 
— — کم مس نوه مونب سس نه وق نو 

0 مل oar ems m dbo ima ab‏ مہم روس 
هة غه ااام نه حلص صم مط سه سوبت نت 
e‏ افد rei liie‏ سوت ims‏ ر منود نمسم uma‏ 
ۍ کلہم فلہ ad Aem‏ جك سدم dl‏ اف veer s‏ وو جنسټا 
n‏ 
کشت یوی" ne‏ هت ونټ dà piriga‏ ہ۔ سم 
صما تلد ای اه دس ساس مسټږه د 

emolskieso solvit ruelir at? tn وهو لمولسا دقمت سر‎ 


و — - 








































many of theese have occurred in times of war. 

During the Civil War. Secretary of the Navy Gideon 
Welles. a former newspaper editor, distributed cammuniques 
to reporters in Washington; and Admiral Farragut embarked 
& correspondent in his flagship to report eyewitness 
accounts of the capture of Kew Orleans. 

In the Spanish->merican War, correspondents freely 
embarked in Navy ships off Cuba, and à fleet of press 
dispatch boata darted back and forth from Key West to file 
stories. In Manila Bay, there were reporters on hang with 
Admiral Dewey to record his famous order to the captain of 
the Olympia: “You may fire when ready. Gridley?” 

Admiral Mahan’s books send articles on seapower at 
the turn of the century, &lthough not written for public 
relations purposes in the strict sense of the term, dió 
much to enlighten the American people cn naval policy anc 
its international implications. 

in the early 1900s, spurred on by Presidant 
Theodore Rooseveit's shipbuilding program, the Navy insti- 
tuted a publicity campaign to aid recruiting. It also 
supported the formation of the Bavy League, a civilian 
erganization dedicated to educating the public on the need 
for a strong sea services., During thie period, too, 
President Roosevelt utilized Heavy ships for international 


port visits and naval reviews. This policy of “showing the 


1 

ww ha تله‎ Ul .ا لضا ست‎ a 

سش تب مه 1 ار .اکن 6ات با زویو اس تشم 
ee,‏ تفت ae‏ 
له ات نه ساوت ت او اسب ادج 
5 ودوومهورستهند لر بدا woe vı legan?‏ وع 
واش ٨6‏ له سوس دد سو ances‏ 
edi o ۲‏ سپ نت ضاء vl wed ot^ camo‏ 
ات دی اس وې دص اش سا حل با بس 
"a0 1 1 1 1 JT. T —‏ 
معحومي. کم sw) ye lidn‏ سرب وموم سه dris NEN‏ 
فتاه اس که اخ با جه م io ule un s»‏ 
vem vO baio odi‏ دم sube ned»‏ سای ۱۲ 
ہد m vee He weldifed Soe «Rud & AREA 162ÍafA‏ 
ته silia wd sidii pia dali anme wb fe wu)‏ 
ندیه پس‌ضص دږ ود «L3 Ve a a‏ معا Bii‏ 
ضف بد سا نیت نت بيخت معموت Bio Yallog Jeves ad‏ 
"2 که کا یل من میا الق 
-i3&a) wv ^E adiens qmod Lula —‏ 
ام «سوسنب» عه waa Yi  a^dilesses hia‏ 
a e oiia‏ عا له „alilala & .mujeel qwe‏ 
G‏ ا سدقم سا ولل nth ts‏ سی 
ه 4 pande‏ سد منت sic? ei‏ يلمد ye?‏ 
Senha‏ قصمههوم٤٤٥‏ ایند اجس inimesi mA aude‏ 
دو ینو ومد ling da aiya daaa‏ 























x‏ خر کے سے 


flag” culeinated in the ‘round the world cruise of the 
Great White Fleet in 1908.° 

Still, kefore World War I, the Navy had very little 
in the way of an organized public relations function. In 
1912, an officer of its General Sourd suggested that a 
special office be set up in the Navy Department for public 
information. He was given & polite reply, but no acticn 
wae taken on his proposal. 

With the outbreak of war in Europe and the 
resultant submarine menace in the Atlantic, public interest 
in naval affairs suddeniy increased. Secretary of the Havy 
Josephus Daniels, à newapaper publisher, started holding 
Gaily press conferences in his office. Soon after the 
United States declared war on Germany, Daniels eatablished 
& Havy News Sureaa and staffed it with civilian experts who 
reported directly to him. The bureau's main duties were to 
service the Washington press and cooperate with the 
Comittee on Public Information, earlier appointed by 
President Wilson and headed by journalist George Creel. 

Following World War I, the Navy relapsed somewhat, 
but not completely, into its silent service tradition. The 
News Bureau continued to function on a much reduced scale 
until it was replaced in 1922 by an information section in 
the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). This small office 


was manned by only four persons, three naval officers anc a 








mt) bc e Cpu s) غه دوس‎ a banan? “HEP 
۱ موم سد صم ام اجو‎ 

jesti yav nas çamë mir ٤ gem Mira oon A 8 08. 
منود دنه ونود سس نی‎ pe Po que acr خم‎ 
— — نص د( ودم دا‎ ap i") 
ومن‎ em dew len seres ٩ ۷۷ قمع ...ان سم‎ 
ي دم مه عنہ ومچدادد :۔‎ 

- "ره جا ټم دد mi ate‏ اسیو همه aù‏ 

ہووئ قد Gilding stad [5^ wo mà am mimp‏ حوب وروز 
Met mp‏ د سوه معمتاعغفټ ووېم عمکااصن 
هرن ach oaith sid ni pandae‏ —— 
a‏ دید حمموروم سر ‘Teh on‏ من نه و ندب 
tà Tad, Aur resent ama ۱۳۵ 6‏ معا وال دنت wte vicos‏ 
ټومبم سمل ہو ہنے dT‏ ات و eum seize cim‏ دې 
e ee eC‏ ق A‏ مع ناډ ېیروسد مه 
7ھ acai‏ مس رس wn aul pi‏ — 
ہیر اوللسطوع Q2 cam cue‏ 2 هوب بحم mime‏ 
سوه ود وس لبوید پعه اح r isles cimen majia‏ 
و e‏ سرزم هم سم مه د سوه مود صرب 
PS m Ln A E " ^" tis‏ دنت ده 

























civilian assistant.’ ‘he Information Section continued 
with the same meager staff and very limited funde until 
shortly befere World War II. In 1939, it was renamed the 
Public Relations Branch ef ONI. At the same time, subsidi- 
ery offices to handle public relations were activated ín 
all naval districts. This action indicetec a growing 
awareness by the Navy that an expanded information function 
wes necessary in light of the increasing international 


tensions. 





The Navy was not alone among the military services 
in being elow to recognize the impertance of public 
relations. Scott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Center contend 
that while "today's top military man provide a leadership 
responsive to public opínion . . . this trend represents a 
sharp break from the insulation which largely prevailed 
until World War II." 

It was almost a foregone conclusion that the public 
relations function in the nation's armed forces would be 
upgraded during the war. There were drastic changos in 
practically all aspects of the military system. Rapid 
weapons modernízetion, the emergence of zir power as a 
decisive military strategy, and monumental logistics prob- 
lems involving global supply lines were just z few of the 


factors which served to revamp military procedures and 


m"—————— کی‎ oman aL 
Limu saca ہے اغسزبہ‎ ise مات بت نس ماس اوا‎ 
ای سنا ماس‎ NMG E o I eee es recs 
کاو ےت ہر جو ہے ہت .سم جدر-‎ CANTE eect bee 8 
سس‎ Gy brata شاو‎ 
— cL E. ui Jewel ومس‎ EIS 
سوا‎ od aee oup Gee, o> ققد‎ quem io vd سب بس‎ 
tn att زبمووسمد مر‎ ate ©. اې ته رنیم‎ A 
لتر ين‎ 

aml L ee 0 - 
saute ۱ =) see cd FOR eer oped EE - 
“ig Pa sme md ff Gmásqoewz p? eols amas v 
نم ده‎ dE ند مسا کش‎ . ayat وھ‎ 
نله "واه بې دنہ ېپ وابد د اص اي‎ pas} 
^ emo سے‎ aie, | , بر موز وروت‎ voiman: 
















deed qute‏ هني رہ wücym^à desee EAS‏ .مد لہ 
ELA rl‏ 

ے٭ owe‏ قنعمتہ omh a‏ سه d‏ د در 
لام مرکا ,اه ois‏ مد مسن سپ سس په 





concepts, including those of public relations. 

The great influx of reservists and other civilians 
to active duty hed a momentous impact on the precess. The 
magnitude of the influence of these “uniformed civilians" 
can be imagined when one considers that the Navy alone grew 
from an average personnel strength before the war of 
108,000 officers and men to a peek of 3,403,000 during the 
wer.” This tremendous manpower increase created a host of 
recruitinc problems with attendant public relations 
implications. Accitionally, more than in any past war, an 
outlet had to be provided for the human cesire to seek 
xecognítion for battle exploits. 

There also was a massive personal involvement in 
the conflict by the American people who remained on the 
home front, resulting in heightened demands for war news by 
the press and the public. This appetite for information 
had to be satisfied, since the armed forces were absolutely 
Cependent on industrial and other comestic support. 

The effects of public opinion, the needs and views 
of the news media, and related prassures from higher levels 
of goverment @®11 were inetrumental in helping to shape the 
nation’s wartime information policies. Major technological 
advances ín communications since the last war, giving the 
news meGia expanded opportunities and techniques for 
reporting, compounded the process. In addition, political 


anc social changes between tho two ware made World War II a 





maa ral? lian, 20 mir اما ولجم‎ P 
— — ووه الم ما‎ ۲ 
T ناج‎ epos que qni armen û Bag په‎ 
"EmALLLOAS Garma” ai Ib avn! سا دغه‎ desing 

wei, anie أ لټ وم‎ elem e ae en ga «f - 
نش پد‎ à shes — —— 
موه همه لوم ہی‎ 00, *e dog s pt رو 0ه وردنسبو عم ہے‎ 
ذه‎ fear — — —— 
molj aits ——— get eres 
ور ہے عم‎ umm s) نامدای فاسان‎ 
سم ہز سمم‎ 7-0 
lh mem AA Camu) avdane a mm ala aT ر‎ 
نت درف‎ Pee vo aie mii. am vé jolpleeo a 
مې‎ am — — انم حصوما ےہ صیماسہے‎ mob 
سس‎ 
سورومری‎ wi yank ked Po ته‎ Lal eRe دم‎ NDA 

he eredi) m‏ وت ریہ u Cer a QA) Dqo‏ وسو 
uiv Se‏ "۱۳ 
٥‏ پووستتسنطة Afta) m (O‏ دلب 
-ب-پ- وسح qi‏ سخنادهل. چه اا فصعئ 
سو مرا ا agen‏ ہہ سے بد «ûe quem cz‏ هو à 1) we»‏ 
























Struggle for humen minds in a “new and revolutionary 
sanse. "° 

Such forces, necessitating ag they did à restruc- 
tucíng of public relations practices and procedures, were 
bound to have an effect on military attitudes toward the 
function ès weil., Two cantral questions mey be posed, 
however, concerning any such attitudinal change in the Navy. 
Was there truly وه‎ &@lterinu of opinion toward public 
relations in the Navy's professional officer corps? And, 
if so, was it genuine and abiding. or merely a temporary 
&ccosxaodation with the dynamics of war? 

A Zull investigation of these questions was beyond 
the scope of this study, sinco it would involve research 
inte postwar Navy attitudes. However, there is some 
evicance from the wartime experienee to indicate that the 
Ravy’s military letdersnip “went aleng with the World 
War il public relations tide,” seo to speak, only because 
Gof compelling circumstances which left it with little other 
choice. Vincent Davis states thet while many changes dic 
oceur in the Navy during the war, “a number of the basic 
attitudes and perspectives that were formed within the 
Navy's officer corps during the half century before the 

stack ہو‎ Year] Haxbor were only partially modified by the 
wartime experience," 

The primary objective ef this thesis hea been to 


document the changes that oveurred in U.S. N&vy public 


Wee ser p aa shtir Smd SA AOIS‏ ود و سوه 

ee مس‎ 

nby t Ad pt a pha aaa a a M 
wá? trey emetic piii xe ۳ بو سس د‎ wa 
مه پوټ‎ e ara A ww Ife Ps cien 
لم اف وم‎ aparu ند ادماامفئ‎ oom Wm ole eee, 
biia iest mp TO MMR دص‎ UP, Mad qu 

پهوديیم له غه عسم اه بب تناس وودہ: ‏ :سرچھ؛ پس 
vob MÀ‏ سفن m gaai >e w rb‏ عدب oh‏ و axem‏ 
قهومسسوددبخه ووه ته هپس pw ta‏ 

۷ء۷ لواو مفو افلس ےہ سوہ جسحریود مون kraj‏ 
vat‏ تا فا ای سس ذو amds‏ 
سصسسس<س۳س۳< سس 

سه ک وان رمام + خن > یس زی arta! (ths eye‏ 
ة6 عو سا ات تل او سا زار وی 
«اساماهه. feme"‏ هدم دو Uè apb gea tidy m) Sue‏ 
ts ce Gee‏ سب دس بې سېا د متخ وان «lem se)‏ 
هوو لسالس سب نوی د وو مم wy ate‏ 
کاخ at? od ojtitém qfAbécm, tee c ۹ GO‏ 
وف dibdey quet EE cd r EK GepulHO AE‏ — — 

















19 
relations policies and practices during World War If; and, 
in so doing, to investigate any causal relationships 
between these changes and basic Navy attitudes toward the 
public relations function. 

It is hoped that this study also may provide some 
insight into the proper role of public affairs in the Navy 
and the other U.S. military services today. While such an 
evaluation has not been attempted here, it is suggested that 
any account of one service's experience with the necessity 
and desirability of a viable program to inform anó infilu- 
ence the public in an all-out war might serve as a useful 
leboratory setting for future anaiyses of governsent 
information programs. Such examinetions are especially 
pertinent today in the wake cf widespread criticism of 
U.S. Government, and particularly U.S. military, handling 
of public affairs in connection with the war in Southeast 
Asia. ** 

in concentrating on the evolutionary aspects of 
Navy public relations in World War II, the following 
hypothesis waa explorede 








implicit in thís supposition is the contention that 





a 
سای‎ QR) a ba um gata i34 x4 a math Dry 915 
AD (dms ات حمم سر سوا ټ‎ Web ta eben صسی هف‎ 
tho عد دے-م‎ wa VLLA 
mma Giren سس‎ aaa Cree LG تت ۵ه غه «-——- مامد‎ ۳ 
سم‎ mg ss miiia Lise, "6 سنہ‎ leu ade mmb 24piudi 
= sma sligh mI اهمه ۍود دت‎ m 
دسمبد۲‎ 
Tigran war aar -—— m m بنسېی کے‎ ume ده‎ UN qRS 
- مهتم دي وما‎ a demam ber a Wo wédddanté bob هع‎ 
De wm سه نه‎ Son tee — ab ALLONS WC 8 
Ja sGr صد ںی‎ pragati» VU GaP mw! of vébet an 
ان د ,ا, سر ندممی۔. لسو تلاس‎ LL ^  ——ibnsnid 
۱ را‎ =e دنه و و‎ d MD هقف‎ ۵ 


هو سا 


iG Tyee Gai tae * es! ےہ‎ clone a) 
et ږام نو ٤6ص ځېریج کټ‎ dà (bom ات‎ eine 





li 





the Navy initially emphasized the information aspects of 
ite program over the broader range of public relations 
activities designed to mold favorable public opinion. Kot 
until it conceived thet its very existence was threatened 
by plans to merge the armed forces after the war did the 
Beca service engage in specific “image~building" techniques. 

The roles played by certain individuals in the 
World War II Navy public relations story were extremely 
important. In particular, the personal information 
phílosophies of Admiral King and the two wartime Navy 
secretaries, Frank Xnox and Janes Forrestel, hed 8 major 
impact on the direction and scope of the Navy's information 
efforts. To a lesser degree. the personalities and skills 
of those performing the function, especially the civilians 
recruited from the mass media and associated fields, else 
had a definite bearing on the operation. 

in this regard, a secondary objective, but one 
integrally related to tha primary goal, has been to trace 
the development of the central, field and fleet organiza~ 
tions established to implement the Navy's wartime public 
relations policies. Gpecial attention has been given the 
Navy's Office of Public Relations in Washington, D.C., 
since this centralized unit figured prominently in formu” 
lating many information policies as well as setting uo 
procedures for their application. 


Several questions arose during the examination of 





u 
fo oops صوودحیود‎ 50 mame LALA EDE edt 
ods 660 Gre دى‎ i-e ww — Au — اک‎ ۵۳4 VU 
اموه ام ده‎ leo e n Ont M. سے ہے‎ 
رېه دې ےت دس‎ 
ee Oe اس وم‎ g O «naa! 
wree s bi jagoi) mL سه‎ K—- AK aI 534 
دسبص+صسسسسس«_«_«۳‎ 




















سپ BAMAS MÀ‏ جسن د سام ون ۱۱4 کو جم 
ert? EE IM P eu‏ 
ینمو وووحق سم c^) memo md c^‏ نس ےم جورن Aig‏ 
8 قوج وح سرن سریسیںوب یو هول هټ . 
emie‏ فد ce € veces deoa) als wi iss meh‏ 
اوننې وس وندسی وہ پا التانسه وم O p piesa OF Laon‏ 
— فوسوز وب نم ومومو ودې دمه — (Ao‏ 

















12 
these organizations. What methods and techniques did they 
employ? Which media of communications were used? What was 
the naturae of their relationships with representatives of 
the news media ané various public organizations? How 
important were their interfaces with other government 
information agencies, such as the Office of Censorship end 
the Office of War Information? To what extent did they 
coordinate their activities with the public relations 
offices of the other military services? 

This last inquiry broached the subject of inter- 
Service rivalry and its impression on the information func- 
tion in all the armed forces during the war. Conflicting 
ideas among the services on how the war should be waged 
naturally haê significant public relations overtones. یڅ‎ 
is an arsa deserving sore extensive observation. It has 
been dealt with here only to the extent in which certain 
incidents reflecting interservice rivalry indueed specific 
Wavy public relations responses. Over-call, despite 
occasional disagreements between the Army and Navy in such 
matters ag accreditation of correspondents, the servicas 
cooperated with each other quito well ín the public rela- 
tions arena. 

In the final analysis, events in any war have the 
9reatest inpact on policies and actions. During World 
War Ii, there were definite cause and effect connections 


between specific battles and campaigns and public relations 





له 


sasas MEE‏ ما مال عمسا «اتنفة سنوت tthe‏ ہي- ہرود یس ہو 
M oom‏ 1 1 | 1————" 
RAY EER Booey‏ من او tm— 922^. Gilde ma‏ 
patte wiy t5 a=1:39‏ د رین ٗصوبسہ 

<page! ۱١ وم‎ sdi Aopoa alos ta PC 
aeg ues D epum cm سے م۔‎ ar» Mond nap wir mm OL 
Bh) 4) — mijt - آپبأوسأس بس‎ em airtel غه غه دجه‎ 
uiaro isie, s dw سے ہو بب‎ coat doi Mose anes 
سوریںں‎ mm ANI ila i ermal id cela ead 
حس‌سسس‎ yra 
mla sido ms si Ija aip uae AG HAAS Ke 
— 

Mr miu amia sew watajoq we sübwwi ومومو‎ 
unii goePio 5! x» dads ab cue وو‎ ER 0 


13 
directives and procecures, particularly with regard to the 
release of information. Therefore, it has been both 
advantageous and necessary to treat the entire aubject 
Within the context of the operational history of the 
conflict. 

Any evolutionaxy theme implies progress. Due to 
the infeasibility of conducting surveys, content analyses 
ox other scientific measurements within the framework of an 
already expanded study, no attempt has heen mace to 
quantify results of the Navy's wartime information program 
in terme of večin exposure or public impact. The variety 
anc types of efforts to publicize the avy have been 
emphasized over the amount of publicity gained or its 
effectiveness. UWowaver, certain indicators of effectiveness 
“~guch as media comment. public opinion polis and internal 
evaluations--have been included, permitting a limited gauge 
to be mace of the success of the Navy's efforts. 

À key definition in tho thesis is that of "public 
relations function." Cutlip and Center define the term as 
“the planned effort to influence public opinion through 
socially acceptable performance based upon two-way communi- 


cation. *2? 


With sowe qualifications, this is the basic 
concept of the function asec here. As already stated, the 
major thrust of the Wavy’s program early in the wer was 
directed at informing the public rather than influencing 


opinion. Also, there was not a8 much emphasis at that time 


14 
am بي‎ Clem sd Ean ake amy پویسمانسمت‎ hei? uri uidi 
‘oct waa یه سر‎ Muni تت,‎ a هسل‎ 
mi? دروم ے‎ (eo مود مد‎ ê Ve un Va" AD 
^o 516 
ar ہے‎ ne eo a footer ېي‎ ۳٧ 
سن‎ mama mira ot ean to ورزورس‎ EGA نه‎ 
اسه ۲۱-۱۷ ان —-- ۔ مس‎ a D 
سس«‎ Clete 
چے ر(سا لد رکم پس ږا‎ ity at! "s "fans 0017 
پس بش پوس‎ -megu ulas © Smaps l Je o له‎ 
mU AS o E 
پږي‎ exp quati ce. Te summ تلت‎ ero iie 
— TIE MU d 
ima*atai au aljo Se tiio وج‎ aiSUm am eee 
اعم مب‎ qim 0 
certs ووېم‎ a do aas atf To ws ef 9f 
slide. to nvr ol eee ac) صمو وا درک هل‎ ٢ ۳۴ 
e ao خی پا سوب هردس به عوضوم وسے‎ 
بعد لتسزد‎ si Abs سو جس سد دوجوم‎ 
سس‎ we سرسسع‎ w^ وود فا ےہ دہ نہ سھ۔‎ 








14 
on “two-way* cowaunication, although the need to measure 
the public pulse was recognize at high levels in the Navy, 
and a prasa ami public opinion analysis section did exist 
in the Office of Public Relations. The criterion of 
“acceptable performance" was considered by those directing 
the Navy's program as being essential to an effective 
effort. However, during World War II this criterion was 
Sometimes taxon for granted because public support of 
military performance was usualiy enthusiastic, despite 
press and other criticism of specific strategies and 
tactics. There were inetances, however. when per formance 
became a matter of concern for public relations personnel. 

The term “public relations” is used by the author 
because that was the citle given to the fanction in the 
Navy immediately prior to and throughout most of the war. 
The name wae officially changed to “public information" in 
June 1945, and the function is currently referred to in the 
Navy as "public affairs." Although the distinction between 
“public relations" a8 describing the over-all function and 
“sublic information“ ag applying to the provision of data 
to the news media arul the public was apparent during the 
war, the two terms often Were used interchangeably. 

The methodology employed in thia study consisted 
mainly of historical analysis of primary source documents 
relating to the subject. This original material was supple- 


mented by personal and telephone interviews with various 


1 
فع “ye”‏ ہ۷ل ٹہ home d) d da‏ دی naa‏ 
هه المت وها هه تس د يله نسل ام الك م 
Ue MES (db‏ ا اقات ناسا شا لا موم 
MAREC WP aD‏ سی بس دس حت مسيم نو 
ahe ° mami ee MET‏ وسم anu: ye‏ لوصوو لس 
دق سو C‏ پا س اش مور ای یه کد 
شتا فسات اناس نوا سس T]‏ لع 1072۸ح anl‏ 
اسا Gey ah ad)‏ سودت بحرت هور ٠٩‏ 
3 یم سی ante inet soha‏ ةعس 
iewwowrng enibrale‏ 
7 ېی فاج پښدی س‌ووم- اه سما هې sacrum «d»‏ 
كا ا ج بت ااه ماس s vi‏ دم ل فك 
ea‏ نات ول ب نف کاس is e dace‏ ہے 
هه د تو اه ایو سے نه مت تسا si‏ 
نه له wif dE‏ تاب لن حه ف بد له وب 
TIR ea‏ 
olay wy end‏ ود كمون 
aid tem Cilia dm QU UD‏ بد کل سے ووس سلسم ني 
Udagan Dao Sd Aë A i‏ 
— — — — 
ہے ےا ہے ہے 
ee‏ 

تسس لت لزور 

















































aot 


individuals who ware oither directly associated with the 
Navy’s wartime information program or had knowledge of its 
Operation. Other than newspaper and magazine articles, & 
few unpublished manusgeripts and brief references in several 
books, there is a dearth of secondary literature pertaining 
to the topic. A moare detailed discussion of reference 
material is contained in the “Hote on Sources" at the end 
of the thesis. 

& chronological narrative moce of presentation was 
Chosen for ite sequential value in developing the evolution- 
acy thame. 17759 poriod covered is from July 1940 to 
September 1945 with some overlapping at beth ends. 

in the next chapter, wa shail teke a look at the 
mobilization of the Navy's public relations pregram on à 
Wartime basis. Chepter Thiee deals with the handicaps of 
censorship aid security under which the program operated 
Guring the first year of the war and the subsequent criti- 
cism leveled at the Navy for withholding and managing the 
news. The middie years of the war are covered in Chapter 
Four, with the emphasis on expansion and reorganization of 
the Navy's information effort and the gradual improvement 
in the war's outlook for the Allies. Chapter Five brings 
our story to its successful conclusion, chronicling the 
tremendous revitalization of Navy public relations ander 


Secretary Forrestal in the final year of hostilities. 


ei ۲ 
Aji bo aiao OAR cO Giu m هت ند نت‎ ami raw لا‎ 
— — M: 
بي چا‎ 05 (4 Po o9 —— ““ — — 
رآ‎ 
` بر —— ومس سیا ټنسسس سی سوه‎ 
ae © ee” att et نه نسښیعټ‎ e 
e ojiire t سے‎ 4 | 
ceca cv) cho am —  ےھنہتسپچو ډه‎ uM "man 
كمون يدون ين‎ od A ooma وت جو سمیدہ‎ in 
— — — 
w د د بت‎ e e e — 

نس سوک aan‏ 
قفو e A‏ سب دزم یې نت تا پم ووس بصيو 
من لک خی پس عا شب مې مد جس ope‏ مویور- 
وت alee!‏ مه دس هم s pp xa milkan mê‏ 
e‏ > ممکې ومهم oi impe mu xe» w^ l6‏ کر 
XOU‏ سنے یف وت نم سوہ مہ ما ما ملع lv‏ 
rR we‏ سس 
POO POET ES‏ ' نود 

ee‏ به aiao oltaru Rit‏ وليب ہو 
سب سن سد لب دس mana‏ 
ویو panky ata mi pean,‏ مو مه PLA‏ 


aes m‏ ای en‏ یس ټسټ يی . س یې 




































Ie is tine now to give the signal, “All engines 


Let wus examine the prewar climate be fore 


ahead, flanki” 
Pearl Harber. 





17 


BOTZS TO CHAPTER I 


"Col, 2 Robert Debs Heinl, Jr.. USMC (Ret.), 
| ۳ تھ‎ ry 2nd Quetetiona (Annapolis, 
— 1966) P 


Although this label was applied specifically to 
the submarine service in World War II, there are numerous 
references to its usage in describing the Navy in general, 
The Navy's own training manual for enlisteó journalists 
states that prior to World War I "the Navy adhered to the 
‘silent service’ tradition in its relationships with the 
American people." (U.S. Havy Department, Bureau of Naval 
Personnel, Journalist l &.C, Washington, 1961, p. 5). See 
also, Lt. Cmdr. L. Rohe Walter, USNR, — Relations in 
War and Peace." 1.8. Naval Institute Proceedings. 9 608 
(1943). 








3nadm . Harold B. Niller, USN (Ret.), “typewriters 


and the Navy," Shipmaka (October 1965), 11. 


4jtr.. RAdm, William A. Moffett, UBN, to Capt. 
Powers اک‎ dite - اسم ہے‎ i6, 1925, (estet ín Vincent 
Davis, Fo ۱ YEA... ^ 25 
(Chapel Hill, o 1962 1, 46-7. 


e 


Hereafter cited ےہ کب‎ 


Davis. Policy. 81. The apolitical nature of naval 


officers is stressed in more detail in a later book by 
Vincent Davis, 4 ونع ال يهم 2 کا‎ (Chapel Hill, M.C., 1967), 
RASS. Hereafter cited as Davis. مم رتتصۃھ‎ Davis contends 
that seafaring son everywhere have B senso of isolation and 
independence which sets them apart from the rest of 

society. 


F. Donald Scovel, USN, "Heim's A'Loe,"‏ ںہ یڈ 
unpublished Master's thesis. University of Wisconsin, i968,‏ 
Pp. 2-37 paasim.‏ 
^t he civilian information assistant was Miss Helene‏ 
Philibert, who continued in that capacity for the Navy‏ 
Department until after World War IX. The background‏ 
presented here on Navy information activitiog from 1912 to‏ 
World War II is from "History of Navy Public Relations," a‏ 
talk by Miss Philibert at the U.S. Navy Public Relations‏ 
Course, Washington, D.C., July 23, 1946. A mimeographed‏ 
copy is contained in U.S. Navy Department, Office of‏ 





٢ 





















"mr" سم ده‎ a oh 
=e ۱ 5 eal 
۲۳۱۰۰ ۱۳ ۳ ٩ — * 
— — وس‎ ae 
ERE m — | 
fees ot? weet Feat ll? ates ده‎ — 


wie urn conan 
.۔ جس‎ — 





18 


Information, "Historical Records of the Bavy Office of 
Information, 1919-1951," Jeb Order 61°A-27460, Item 10, 
Box 157, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. 


“scott Me Cutlip and Allen H. Center, Effective 
e 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, Nee» 1971), 
609. 
3 Adm. Ernest J. King, VON. U8. Navy sf War. 
1941-1945 (Washington, 1946), 4 and 217. 
10 


lester G. Hawkins, Jr. and UCM $. —— 
"OWl--Org&nization and Problems," BADE g 
7:16 (1943). 


Linavis, Long, 157. 


1.2 بروج‎ a discussion of public affairs problems that 
have arisen over United States involvement in Southeast 
Asia, seo Dale Minor, The Information War (New York, 1970). 


13 








Cutlip and Center, 





^ 





—— — a * ar 











CHAPTER II 
ORGANIZATION FOR WAR 


Hevy public relations functioned in an austere 
climate during the two decades following World War I. 
Pacifiam, isolationism and public apathy toward the military 
were the prevailing moods of a nation preoccupied with 
internal arfairs. 

AÓed to this restreint were Severe economic 
pressures. There simply was not enough money to operate 
more than a token information program. “It was easier to 
get the Chief of Naval Gperations to talk to the press than 
it was to get requisite supplies with which to make copies 


of his statements,"* 


Claimed Miss Helene Philibert, a4 
مهد‎ public reiations assistant for the Navy from 1917 
to 1947. 

In 1937, a survey of information activities in 
forty-three federal government offices revealed that the 
Navy and War Departments were among eighteen agencies 
scoring below average in four measured categories of public 


relations practice. 2 


In the Navy, emphasis was placed upon 
regponse rather than creativity. The director of the 
information Section in the Offica of Naval Intelligence 


19 





















— 


E 


. — — 


سم 
| 
era — -‏ دا 





سے دن > 
سپ ل ال اب 


ولاس وسردم شه ee‏ 
aiian ie mkt E‏ ودې ee treed‏ سویت 
یوي galiisvwag i?‏ سمت دده مهمه پیسوجنعه چاوه 
سس ہس 

— — سیب‎ ml IID دہ لگ‎ — 
asss ند‎ ree meee سس‎ 
ws miae سين‎ I)^ «Tet. sebtee--—ol s & amd! sow 
يدم‎ pesay saa ar Liva cf -meàbf$eseo Lev ده‎ ak ad) few 
بارا ده موی مول‎ e e lp Pep cf Bw P) 
عو مغ رجہ دم سی ٭‎ lal) "۰ وهوووموږوی‎ aif ود‎ 























ce oF 
sk esbihviium südkAibwUlas to weesee & TES: at " 
ciidug fo سسبعب نی‎ uat له‎ egedue mela è 
روس یر و چک موه‎ gen لہ فم‎ "ambianta 
ma pa vussi عات‎ — — 
کل لد وکا ود وما تسر تاوت‎ 

br 





۳ 
"— 


= 





20 
(ONI) wrote to a University of Wisconsin professor in 1938: 
"Ihis department conductes no publicity campaigns, being 
concerned specifically with the dissemination of factual 
information. "" 

ActuBlly, the Navy did appreciably more than just 
dispense information between the two woxid wars. The 
flight o£ the BC~4 in 1919 and other efforte in the 1920s 
to promote naval aviation in the contest with Billy Mitchell 
were special projects initiated to cultivate public 
support. Also, correspondents were embarked in fleet 
exercises and on flying reviews; cooperation was extended 
te feature motion picture end newsreel producers; anà o 
task force of some thirty ships wes sont to New York in 
1939 for the World‘s Fair. For the most part, however, 
"»ropagandizing" was left to the civilisn arm of the Navy. 
the Mavy مت وھ‎ ^ 


From .iaoclationita. to kreparccne sa 

The austerity fer the Navy's public relations 
progra» ran parallel to hard times for the kavy itself, 
Some of the most valuable units of the fileet had been 
ecrappec following the Washington Naval Limitations Confer- 
ence in 1922. Subsequently. the size of the Navy was 
reduced even below treaty strength. 

in 1933, however, & gradusi upewing in neval 
fortunes bogan., President Franklin D. Roosevelt, an old 


friend of the sea service, allotted $238 million of the 








نا 
اف مسب ته د سند Be‏ مهن پو وود له MDI‏ 
دپدچسصسصسصسصسصسصسسدچ 
 ِ‏ 1 
قویسوئ۔, ہت ام طا سس وح yeu, ons «nom‏ 
یرس ادات ریسم ہی سب a «ane Vee‏ 
ase 2a ages‏ جهه د عه sedeo ww EJIE‏ سر ہی smeul Wia‏ 
نه صسصسصسصسعسسسس۲ ۳ 
وب مو نہ وو- 2×۸ عله اسا بې و موه رس لاد 
سووسدد۔ imi? 1) Garam rimi mmr ma AAJ‏ 
مر ووصت له پغعه یو عت — ^ de cep msc‏ & 
وو Op gao a Do a‏ مو سه عم û fr a‏ 
oma OX — — — — ME‏ —— — 
شا نصا Allay sir pr Ag p‏ مت .د ته سو 
رف ما نمض" 
۵ وی Pe‏ ۱ 
9 “بے رسای wiiaee e." AP GNE‏ مصاع 
pm‏ غه پس مهود له لن دسا فت ې vend‏ .مه 
Led‏ که 
قاتا “ag ier e mae û aaa‏ 
A‏ 
Co MEM Uem‏ 
مر توښني AP‏ مسوا 
1 1 شر رج وت 
01-0 0 ي a e‏ 






















21 
funds appropriated in theo National Industriel Recovery Act 
of 1933 for ship construction. In 1934, Congress author- 
ized building the Navy back up to treaty strength; and when 
Japan withdrew from the naval limitations ayreements in 
1936, all legal barriers to naval construction were 
removed. In January 1930, the President proposed à $1 
billion naval appropriations bill to Congress. Tho bosbing 
by the Japanese of the American gunboat Panay in December 
1937 helped to ease the way for its passage. 

However, the spirit of isolationism and public 
&pathy toward the military was still strong throughout the 
country, even @g late es Soptembor 1939 when war broke out 
in Europe. It waa not until the fall of France in June 
3940 that the moo of the nation changed from مه‎ ۷ 
to alarm. The President then initiated a positive progr ae 
to convince the public that continued isolation from the 
rest of the world was a dangerous policy for the United 
States. 

On July 19, 1940, Congress enacted into law the 
Two-Ocean Navy Act, authorizing & 70 per cent increase in 
ghips and naval aircraft that would enable the fleet to 
carry on simultaneous campaigns in the Atlantic and 
Pacific. It was the largest naval building programs ever 
undertaken by any nation.” 

The parsimonious existence which the Bevy had led 


since the close of World War I had come to an end; ard the 


aeu Hum rece (ew of a عم غا١اداس جه سسب وعدم‎ 
ab -ueec9 3. aneleerAsi! مس دس ه۲‎ n aG 
سوم‎ uo eme دے مس‎ ereryteog Arye Aia 4 
2. 9 عونت‎ Tee .سس رصق بے‎ e ات سنا‎ 
Le سہہیہہ۔ ہبہ‎ o pida diss ا۶ اق ہہ ٹیو سو‎ 
met o} yul =y aama af Se اہو مہ‎ mer qd 
.——, ہے ې چو دګ‎ mh Au حدییوسثت‎ ٧ 
oe )اداه مد‎ Ws dela a am «٢ 
s.» eas xew sede SIS] cueHes am a m oe S 
سس«‎ sus a 21 ١ 314 
ہم رمعم وس ام وہہ‎ mes (ealasee* wr — sum of 
لات‎ mee cab qu odo Ud و ساب ہب‎ ap غه سو رزوجہت‎ 
baso سن ی ه سسمسه منم شن جو‎ aft د‎ Joun 
A ورو‎ 

سب با Geel‏ دد ہب 
سس تھا 
ونو سيوف و حیسم وي 
سوسس ويس نر دوہ womit‏ حب 
سم — 


4 
— — — - 




















> سن وید تد 
eds jm im m nt nn ad |‏ 





P 





22 
austere climate in which Navy public relations had been 


operating was due for @ concomitant change. 





Eight days prior to the passaye of the Two-Oceean 
Mavy Act, newspaper publisher Prank Knox succeeded Charles 
Edison as Secretary of the Navy.” Mr. Knox was a proxinent 
Republican who haé been his party's vice-presicential 
candidate in 1936. Hie appointment, and the concurrent 
naming of fellow Republican Henry lL. Stimson as Secretary 
of War, were political moves on the part of FRR, who wanted 
two members of the opposition party in his cabinet prior to 
the forthcoming Presidential elect ion. 

Mr. Roosevelt had additional motives for nominating 
Knox. He sew in the former Rough Rider end ardent admirer 
of Theodore Roosevelt & potential secretary who would 
support enthusiastically his non~iselationist foreign 
policy. The President also respected Knox's public 
speaking and public relations ability and planned to assign 
his new cabinet member to sound out public opinion on 
proposed measures with txlal-balloon spaeches. 

Mr. Knox, Dy virtue of personality and background, 
was well-suited for dealings with Congress, the public end 
the news media. To a certain extent, this public relations 
fole turned Out to be a primary one for him: since the 


President, with his lifeiong iove of all things naval, hac 


7 
ITE sb‏ نت تک سو وید یتاس للا سسوم 


سے ا 


22 عم و valo‏ یه فر سوب و má‏ اص — 
فصو ہہت — نعل 0409 سے “يا 3 = .. 
سم مم مهم مه چو دی." هه وم سيم ع ووس 
مویق eum‏ ےچ سردم یم ueni Atv‏ لن سجا امد 
منص » زھھ, وه ee‏ مومسم دد 
mii vo palam‏ صمویستدنی مت | یمس ےس VA ne^‏ 
Ag‏ وه set we ER as rans om? co asm (RASA.‏ 
وه es aya fedem nde d. l6 mila We? f ba conem‏ 
مس i xeman i elas iol i firrê Mo‏ 
وو وصموونه سوہ ٠‏ نموم اما Gt arma‏ اس 
LED iis i‏ ہمہ مچ 
quale;‏ محمد ۵۵۵ riding û ' wm Goga cule‏ 
دوس عختضر مسر وید ایر سالا baa‏ اا ده s»ises‏ 
سلسیمصیومی سقم لئے z rone‏ 
vao td" ee‏ و« 
—— — 
€ مامح ٥ب‏ میں ote‏ و تن me‏ 
quA ۳‏ .انا وسدحعفہ حه فس 
M gi co mim i —‏ مسب _ 













































22 
been in the habit of pergonaliy contacting the admirals on 
operational matters. Mr. Roosevelt continued this by" 
passing of the secretary throughout most Of the war, 
€ealing directly with Admiral King and Adwirel William D. 
teahy, who was appointed Chief of Staff to the President in 
July 1942." 

Whatever his Gisaspointment, if any, over the 
Girect Fresicential ewercise of Navy control, the new 
secretary showed no reluctance in assuming the public 
relations mandate. Ka inmediately began holding weekly 
press conferences in his office and, only twenty cays after 
taking the hele, he sent a reminder to لھ‎ ٠ bureaus and 
offices of the Navy Department to furnish pertinent data to 
the Publie Relations branch of ONI for dissemination te the 
news media." Three weeks jater, he issued a memorandum 
allocating duties end responsibilities of the Navy's 
civilian executives. "Public Relations" wes one of seven 
specifically agssignec to the secretary himself." 

Knox's parsonal stewardship over Navy public rala- 
tions during his first year in office was enunciated clearly 
in an address he made in the summer of 1941: 

I consider it to be one of the most important func” 
tions I have--to have the Navy adequately and accurately 
portrayed to the public. This Navy of ours belongs to 
the public. and what it is doing fer the defense of the 


public, with a very few reservations, should be made 
known to the public.1% 


ea 

لته dU‏ بب pQiláüesqeg To tide‏ سردم si‏ فدات >e‏ 
ات سا ہے سیت ہرد لښب ہیں -as‏ 
ve pita‏ ہے موچھوی se mlr Vo r apn‏ 
لوفنلنس فتمیسرن سم ممېیا نسم hat‏ اهدي ااانه 4. 
قب که سم وپس جیندر حا ۸۶ د ده ai geebdeacrt‏ 
مې سي 
mah a AN 50‏ بے ہیں e‏ رنہ 
mime (Adah sosit‏ ہو que‏ سا ہے سب 
om kele (ANDA‏ اس cd‏ — 
وم نت تفت ته مد میدن سچمہ نم نام cio‏ 
ipeo UNE‏ موسرو له Kee cba Att‏ حسم nola syd pmen‏ 
وگلا نهم ولت نه صا د 2— — 
هدم q^ Slat paged yro mit te‏ می — 
هغرم سن ورب هه په un‏ دسمسلمونې ب به 
P aibe avaa‏ ۲ ناما ته mbot e beei‏ 
وا ep‏ انمه مسد مع سوا ادمه AC‏ سے مس ہ 
و اھ سا — > يس to go‏ ہہت 
ومد «دل حصهلوجمند v)‏ وه سسوم Hiei‏ 
ہے ناوجون وی Lm stan, qr« von‏ 

— MS NE 




























24 
The secretary took a positive step toward ensuring 

that the Navy's story would be made known to the public 
Shortly after he assumed office by directing & mobilisation 
of the public relations organization for contingensy 
operations. Before describing this mobilization, it is 
worthwhile to note that on August 22, 1940, James Forrestal, 
a highly successful investuent banker and also a newspaper” 


11 became the First Under Secretary 


nan early in his career, 
Of the Navy, a new post created as part of the emergency 


planning. 


For several months. news media and public interest 
in the Navy hai been increasing as a result of the mounting 
anternational tensiens ani conseguent concern over 
national defense. As early as 1939, an annual report of 
the Public Relations Branch stated that thea number of press 


inquiries had expanded considerably in the past year and 





that 900 news reisases were Ce compared to 559 the year 
before. The number of releases increased to 1.216 during 
Fiscal Year 1940, end in May of that year a request was 
made for a "statistical research unit” to be added to the 
Public Relations Branch to handle the ever~increasin; 
volume Of press queries. A month earlier, another internal 


memorandum cited the growing demand for Wavy photographs as 


the reason for needing additional photographers throughout 





"t 

A AW 20094 O |‏ سو( خر مس ۔مسوف punere‏ 
sada‏ ننه o'y‏ وود سکاب — Eg sis sv ama‏ 
cala lire‏ بے qu cattle Sears‏ لاون د مول )املس 
o e er‏ مت نمی atts‏ دا دویدھ با eh‏ 
VC) see ae Jadr «ww «^ Te‏ تا اسر وص مووه, 
weeps Delamere sifpls 8‏ موو ME) a‏ ۶ بوسو meg‏ 
d= ama‏ ذه am cannes asset abd‏ مد ۰ ۳۳/۳۰ )هډه ود ته 
XR n 16‏ & وت AQ a Dune (m^‏ صا a ws‏ 
عاذ سدس نو 
 —‏ ———- ھ 
e‏ انا مات س ن و تلد Samui‏ 
d‏ مهو ټی ام املس دس د ad) `e (penes‏ مم دة 
ته لوغر د ودوم Fo o^ lame e 4l de vi A^‏ 
دش ان "————L Rete‏ 
کوست ښ پوټ اشنا اه سے sew‏ ودف ہے 
دک اه مې ونس مه د لام a)‏ 0۵ ہے ہی 
r o e E ak‏ نت ند ).اه وام 
ون iUd E‏ سید نم د یم سه بمنا د do deupa‏ 
ü———— Mh‏ 
كه امسر بكر سسكا مكو وها ` 

سوہ ےھ ووائلیہ: مو کټ 
mdy baida kaipaan‏ دسح —————— 
ته دمهععه ٥ه‏ تهجانی مشناتلمحسا هني noname sump‏ 






















25 
the fleet. 

The Offices o£ Naval Intelligence gradually ned been 
expanding its small public relations gtaff in recognition 
of the increesed demanés being placed upon it. The four 
personnel who hàad manneá ONI's Information Section since 
1922 multiplied co eigüt in the miócle of 1939, and in July 


i940 tho number nad rigen to thirteen. i2 


More increases in 
personnel were on tie way. 

The summer of 1940, in fact. coulda be termed the 
"turning point" when Wavy public selations changed direge- 
tions from a peacetime to a wartime footing. The financial 
blight that had plajued the function for so many years had 
been eased by the passage of the First Supplemental Appro” 
priations act on June 26. On July 16. Commander Harry K. 
Thurber rejieved Commander Leland F. Lovette as officer-in- 
charge of the Public Relations Branch, with instructions to 
"build the office up for an emergency. wid 

War plans for military public relations had been 
drafted es far back as 1924. These early plans, with 
certain revisions, were approved by the Army-Navy Joint 
Board in 1939 and signed for the Havy by Secretary Edison. 
They l&rguisheó in the Lxecutive Branch end were never 
approved by the President, but portions were utilized by 
the Bavy, ** 

The plans called for the establishment of a Navy 


Office of Publice Relations to be headed by a rear admiral 


a 
000 n وی‎ 
— ام نے رشع وص‎ Levee — د وت‎ 
آ[إومیں نے‎ — VERS MM dh) c^ Alum làeum eek quibmwque 
وم كن اسم‎ amm cw pau nee) —— mis n 
athe) akim نم‎ O LKU Sees See ele Pia DE TM 
gw. دت‎ be وو رېه‎ ole wm: غو ات نم دی حغنیف بت‎ 
سے سرب نہ‎ ttle لو نت دسا دوهي دی‎ MM 
o-— e» ته‎ supr پهر دو عسد دز‎ 
whee اسي سواه نس‎ b GA. 36 — "IP 4) 
مسي سس یم الم مایت اد سن کے‎ ' A4 bo و ري‎ ( 
نم سس‎ 
ud ese wm em s aniio يم دوه مه با۴سښه اد‎ 
cem ته اه سو‎ th dumme, S^ ye Senna کعدہ‎ 
4 سف هم‎ ste انا‎ — — 
— — —— — قو نفس ده‎ 
رر پد وس نی یہ‎ 
ايج اس د موم‎ t 
سید‎ PULS NUR کس‎ ia m tm o n rario 
— *—— dim ا‎ "T ™ 
سس‎ 






























25 
with a deputy director and five operating sections. Naval 
reserve officers with experience in public relations or 
allied fields were to be recalled te active duty to head 


the various sections of the wartime offica. 





Commander Thurber began screening the recorda af 
reservists; and, although there was no legal requirement 
for them to do so at that time, certain individuals were 
asked to return to active service to augment tne Public 
Relations Branch., The first to accept wes & retired 
Regular Kavy officer. Lieutenant (tunior grade) Victor F, 
Blakeslez, who reportec in August 1940 to head the newly 
croated Scripts Section. A naval reservist, Lieutenant 
Comeancer William h. Galvin, former secretary of the Navy 
League, came in September as chief of the Anslysis Section; 
anc Lieutenent Commanter E. John Long, a reservist who had 


been on the executive staff of pi 





control of the Pictorial Section in December. 

In February 1941, Lieutenant Commander James ü. 
Stahiman, UGNR, editer and publisher of the Nashville 
(Tenn.) Rammar and former president of the Newspaper 
Publisherz Association, volunteered to return to active 
Quty ag director of the Naval Districts Section. At the 
same timo, Lieutenant Commander Norvelle W. Sharpe, à 
reservist who had been an independent radio conwsaltant, 


returned to run the Radic Section. A short time later, 


کم 
dhe cD enema‏ مانس ده وہتا واه دمه چو 
ممد shladi‏ وی بو ې seline s^ sane‏ »به وہ 


te adco 9 eb د‎ " 
amc—ap pes Leu ی‎ com ني کس‎ ha سی شه‎ e 
oe نتسزہنتسصس‎ ciervee sear Sale دا‎ ès کې لاس رس کې‎ 
in + w/e af Sent aly cee هه ننس‎ 

فیک شي ات aol‏ من lawe‏ سوت C"‏ 
ان نهر با تاد اسوساد umi e; OM.‏ — — 
شا اوه قاتا kewkî elven Lama A‏ 
MAL Lum?‏ د« Ya wh) Pd ume MOY aI‏ 
مو جس تک a‏ رت ورو ند AA‏ نوسیوس: منص 
Tan‏ وو سی جسوسحمب »د دی سے Set ew marie‏ 
مک اى وص سراب سیو هه وسر items‏ مجه 
tonnes‏ وذ — lee‏ له سور 

آ- ‏ ده هس اسر هدنهد Joun ia‏ 
RA‏ ا ee ee‏ ١ا‏ کم کس زا 


















27 
another reservist, Lieutenant Commander Wallace $. Wharton, 
® member of the (Portland) Qresen Jiguxmal editorial staff., 
again donned his uniform to serve lin the Press Section. ^ 

in early April, Prank Knox wrote te his managing 
editor at the Chicago Daily Mans, Herold O'Fisherty, that a 
Girect commission aa lieutenant commender ewaited his 
arrival into the public relations fold, and thet he would 
be on active duty no longer than six months „^° Mr. 
O'Flaherty accepted the commission anc began acting as a 
special assistant to the Director of Public Relations a few 
Weeks later. Anether friend of Mr. Knox, Frank £. Masen, 
former president of International Bews Service and at thet 
time vice-president of the National Broadcasting Company, 
wés asked by the secretary to sorva part-tine ag his 
&pecial assistant for public relations in a civiliíen 
capacity. Mr. Meson performed this function as a dollar-a~ 
year men throughout Knox’s tenure, divicing his time 
between Washington and his Mec offiee in New York. He also 
assisted the Office of Public Relations (OPR) in many 
endeavors, péerticulariy in the redio field. 

èlso in April 1941, in anticipation that there 
would be an influx of correspondents, broaücasters and 
photographers into the fleets in the event of war, initial 
Steps were taken to place experienced personne] with the 
forces afloat. Accordingly, arrangements were mace to 


recall reserve Lieutenant Commanders Waldo D. Drake, © 


1 
' mese mew meh تله معمدډچټ يې پوس لد‎ Geet meee 
minn سه‎ Of ue me») کنا تا‎ ioe 00 5 
د‎ en rima r'a jaa «em postid ووانې 9۶ كلم‎ 
siè aaisa ايت مس‎ we موی‎ prid 
— Ol 
M ea Loe en 
i pa pia Ap کے بے نےنزے‎ arg 
ب«‎ 
فسوي‎ a Wari pa a lo bad si سن و‎ 
vads — —⸗ i 
— — — — —2 
— می له یئ‎ | 
milien هو‎ mi eebiAlws silÜR. sot میهد‎ arse 
انوا خو © قف دو‎ —— “ 5 5 
wees air رسای ————- ع ناو‎ m 
cols سب انږی. سند‎ a) segue DUM ننم‎ Ue تا‎ 
لد سا‎ siet سن‎ 
ف‎ 
— — ny یوغه‎ 
کا در ی بح‎ 


0 سب‎ a= 


سی © Heres om wk Maat melt ead‏ ہد سم سوہ 
— — — — 


ووا سن کیا ہے * 































23 
Los Angeles Tings staffer, and Stuyvesant B. Wright. of 
Paramount News, to serva as publie relations officers for 


18 Drake 


tne Pacific and Atlantic Fleets respectively. 
reported to Honolulu in August 1941, end Wright to Norfolk, 
VB, & short time later after first spending several months 

in OPR as hend of a motion picture sub-section. 

Fleet photographic needs had been considered at the 
beginning of the mobilization in August 1940, when at 
Commander Thurber's urging the Chief of Naval Operations 
gent a letter authorizing the recruiting of photographic 
personnel from the motion picture industry for the naval 
reserve. There had been @ long-standing offer from the 
National Geographic Society and March of Tire, Inc.. to 
train such personnel for the Navy. 

The recruiting effort in Hollywood was quite 
successful. anc a sizable number of highly-skilled 
photographers were formed into special photography units on 
a standby status. The first three of these units were 
scheduled to report to the fleets in the spring of 1941, 
but instead were diverted to the Office of the Coordinator 
of information by John Ford, the Hollywood director and & 
naval, reserve lieutenant commander, It wag not until late 
fall of 1941, when the weli~known photegrapher, Carlton 
Mitchell, Jr., accepted à líeutenant's coswmission in the 
naval reserve and took charge of the Navy's combat photog” 
raphy program, that the first photographic units actually 





e 
We or ساسم‎ Lus rise xrxlf wefept^ wel 
سس‎ 
تہ یہی نه تہ‎ Pur PUT! cm ٹم‎ Jipa or baroga 
جوم دا موس‎ ihm کئیی‎ wik yaf wy jote d "د‎ 
سس‎ ۳ 
ü — م سند هه امسا‎ 0 
m were SATE Pagas تو ناو عم له‎ te ات‎ 
ےم رم ہیں دری د ٭٭ ووی وہ3 نصہ‎ ۱۰ ۱۵ Eha 
کس اخ عبنم نو یو بج ہے جس‎ Came 
Ae ہے‎ Peter mieu se" qual w «mh Dad ودج دو‎ 
وهن مه‎ Q- t sow همها واه قوس با‎ 
وواه‎ «me om lial mi reta tise wt C 
صضقن-ا بد‎ Te s منومرعه‎ د١‎ «abba 
دسٍِ#«‎ + 
r Sls o Co ae كجوز‎ eS Eê a € 








Lae te سا ده اس سات‎ mat e^ P*baet فف لا‎ 
جووما ذماجوہ‎ mir 1O iY m7? dy هوډ افوفحغم سوه لل وود‎ 
و‎ m» morris "eoe e op ose كويد‎ ge mlina? ba 
صسسس<س<س<سس<س<س<س<س<س«سس‎ 





29 


eppeared in the fleets. > 29 


The official mission of Navy public relations 
basically had remained the same for a miber of yeara~-~to 
provide the public through the use of the mass mecis ٩ 
information about the Navy compatible with security. In 
July 1940, the Public Relations Branch adopted as ita 
motto: "Service Consistent With Security.” At the sane 
time, it was decided that in view of the international 
situation and the nation's response to it, "attempts to 
'scll the Navy' to the country were irrelevant and should 
be firmly anê scrupulously avoided. “° 

Behind this decision evidently lay the realization 
that it was no longer necessary to promote the Navy in the 
eyes of Congress ami the public in order to gat more 
ships. planes end men. Xt also reflected, perhapa. an 
maürenass th&t in a wartime setting the publie would brook 
no “prees~agentry gimmicks" in military information 
programs. 

The added personnel and expanded functions of the 
Public Relations Branch necessitated a larger physical 
plant as well. Accordingly, in Auguet 1940, the office was 
moved from the three cramped rooms it had oceupied in a 
remote second-floor corner of the Navy Department Building 


en Constitution Avenue to a spacious seven rooms on the 





سمسلے موم ara‏ 


ہے Tarim aaa aE‏ 
e -‏ 0 تاه وا eslam tao pre‏ 
هد ۱۱۵ ۵۸ alt Dodoo‏ بش Le te m ted‏ بإ عدو ديت 
Sieg ate while‏ مسنږيی دغه مس عا له pers‏ تسای |l»‏ 
تےمسستزقہ حسمد ٭ہ سی جموود نت وهه iiwan‏ چه 
نان سس 
قودبنه ههوت O e‏ .` اعد قد mora‏ 
má]‏ اد هه يست مد cd‏ -مہ af! ip‏ از 
ماجوحلدھ m c asolwo w^ we‏ ہہ ار Ge ermine”‏ 
vieni ed‏ مجو لصوي M. maoa‏ 

ath qu) commemo minie whee Amidst —‏ وسجدزفموهه تدم 
EM T1 — oo LEE EE‏ 
7 10 سے یپ cmm ema GF — xà cjue mós‏ 
مسوم ومعم وه Re‏ د دمه a vam ibm pes‏ 
roams‏ سوه ده »^ نه اټ تاه ات کات nuna huwe rile‏ 
یم رسود -حوو ین و عموصایو- غو -—Á à qu^ié 4e‏ وس 

پت کس 
ي۔ Oe summum I Y‏ عو Mami‏ 30 وم 
ena e sildot‏ — ء yayta‏ پو هلها 
وم مه ساد سه ویر (anes nt‏ »به د مچ ټسټ nes‏ 
boga cens sd) me Deren‏ مس له نه ومومو غه و 
— —— کټ 


ma aD men erm evine ⏑ وو‎ 
























30 
first floor of tiv building near the main entrance. The 
new location was much more accessible to members of the 


news media. ai 





Secretary Knox had begun the organization ef a very 
liberal public information program, but security was soon 
to prove 5ه‎ powerful restraining foree. Reacting to the 
deteriorating world situation, the Navy already had 
initiate a series of security measurea in early 1933 that 
broke with long-standing policy. Cameras were forbidden 
aboar ships and shore stations without specific author- 
igation; the cloek of secrecy wae thrown over many facets 
of new ship construction; and, in an unprecedented peace 
time move, corsespondents were barred from fleet 
maneuvers. ۹ 

In the &pring of 1939, the number of ships 
Scheduled to visit New York for the World's Pair was 
suddenly reduced from 119 to 30 due to diversion cf a large 
pertion of the fleet to Pacific waters. In September of 
that year. all general visiting to units of the Bavy's 
Shore establishment was discontinued. In September 1940, 
further prohibitions were placed on release of information 
about new construction: only the names and general classi- 
fication of new ships were allowed to be published. 29 On 
December 20, 1940, the Chief of Raval Operations, Admiral 





— لوص مهدج کسی يوا سه عب سټعواوه رم ٤٢‏ درسم 
ته LAY ° rey‏ تاونس "s main emê‏ رس 
نواکمه ےم منم د e‏ سسساون کم مول لساس seis‏ 
هم واي سس وس ہد وسود- 
out mea‏ لیو ATEN pee rm ٤۰‏ نی — هسوا 
6 جح« 
Job OY! FERS aaa aan urea PTUS onis‏ 

sabe AP مه س‎ OPEL Se ee سے ۰غه‎ 

diay oo ele‏ سپ کچ رجہ حلب alae‏ عم سو 
مسهمرحصمد چېي ڈیر ام د هم ته فنوس وچو »> ل 
Tr ET ⸗‏ 
e MR ae‏ — ےم فو کم ہہت 
NUS, ۵٤:۹‏ —— ——— — 
— — ——— سس« 
sys r QAI PU‏ — ۔ 






















31 
Harold R. Stark, sent a letter to the naval service voicing 
concern over “the increasing amount of classified informa” 
tion which is being reported in the press, over the radio, 
and in news ا مطجیھ روہ وداج‎ 4 
Ag a resuit of the rising concern throughout the 
Navy over security vioietions and upon the recomanat ions 
@f Commander Thurber aml the Director of Naval invcolligence, 
Secretary Knox initiated a progrms of “voluntary censorship” 
fox members of the news media. On December 3i, 1940, he 
gent a confidential ietter to over 3,200 media agencies 
thnroughout the country, asxing their cooperation in tla 
"aevoióGance of publicity" after January 15, 1941, on the 
following subjects--unless announced or authorise by tho 
kavy Departments 
(1) Actual or intended movensnts of vessals or aircraft 
of the U.S. Navy, of units of naval enlisted 


personnel ox divisions of mobilized reserves, or 
troop movements of the U.S. Marine Corps; 





(2) (Mention of) "Secret" technical U.S,. naval weapons 
or Ceveiopmont thereof; 


(3) Mew U.G. Bavy ships or aircraft; 
(4) U.S. Navy construction projects ashore. 5 
هغ جوا مهه اد‎ this unique letter was either favorable 
or unfavorable, according to whose point of view is 
censidered. Commander Thurber claiwed that replies were 
almost 100 per cent favorable. The primary questions that 
&rose, secording to Nina, addressed the possibility of plans 


by other government agencies to issue similar “lists, “ 


4 

سه نمحم duum‏ © وېمند با پټ aides ma coe cvm‏ 
سه وی يف نمرت سمسامبي حخسې بد »اسنا دوس 
سرد له iy ti‏ ^75 

أنه د مول با غه ادقن سے ریہ رب 
Lc Yea sero ۵‏ نتا رس smiiid a‏ 
So‏ سك اسقط ما مس وس Ve‏ درم — 
مسي ست io adc s Pamdlla)‏ سه وباس "ademas‏ 
نپ مه واد wom‏ جا وبس در DUM‏ يې 
مد یایند ون جم ہے وه سل سم 

سب فلك سس ه٢١٨‏ ۴ هلو اد س 
ښشت ونم ای سس DUI‏ یور یم هي 
Sum ot —— PER‏ ی 


—— — — 


کو بب سه ووس ووو 


— —— سور سم 

tos abd iu aem نس‎ 

9 emat exam aufidian dull S — — 

— ——— 7 
eunte ba PS 




































32 
whether there would be a central Navy clearance office for 
items of questionable security, and what changes, if any, 
would be made ín the Navy list in the future.^^ 

George E. MoMillan, on the other hand, asserted 

that the letter was “widely criticized, especialiy on the 
grounds that the bans were too general, and could not he 
followed. **7 He observed that Knox was compelled to 
respond to ths criticises and quotes from a statement issued 
by the secretary on February 9, 1941: 

From & few sources has come an unfeunded charge 
that the Navy Department was making an effort at peace- 
time censorship. Nothing is further from my own mind 
Or from the purposes of the Navy Department. But those 
Of us charged with the proper conduct of the Navy, who 
are fully cognizaánt of the gravity of the current 
emergency and its potentialities, cannot but be greatly 
concerned about the making publie of certain vital 
information . . . Of value to (potential enemies) and 
definitely damaging to the progress and maintenance of 
our national defense. 

To further explain the new policy, Secretary Knox 

and Commander Thurber embarked on speaking campaigns. 
Also, the Washington National Press Club scheduled an 2ت"‎ 
the-recoxrd" forum on the problems of press censorsnip. ^? 

The War Department quickly jumped on the Navy's 

“voluatary censorship” bendwagon; end in early May. 
Rgitos & Publighexr quoted both branches of the service as 
reporting “an almost universal practice of submitting 


29 The 


questionable news for clearance before publication." 
article went on to say that while reporter& did not enjoy 


as frae access in both the Navy end War Departments as they 


ta 
سب رجہ تد ح۶۸ عند‎ INADA 7 o موس‎ Siae wapa 
LN SÉ ہو‎ JR UU d d 
"ا‎ mane uwv 9. -—t) (uet oux زې‎ das dui hfewe 
موه درس‎ cm Lo- مي رپ‎ Elbe .) ---" ll 
تاد پر بس‎ penmi qen =è oyei A دل‎ 
ہے سسس ست که می یا اس لت‎ ٠۰ وور یمیس‎ 
„Aig E pmu au یښپ دتم‎ YS 
mer ecd n VOD HA اا يس‎ 
— ———À € | a 


























ain يی‎ mow 
=a] jab A ۱ 
— 0 sji te 
, Fy FT 
(MER. 73 | | 
teehee ciwrven be shies 
بت وا ہیی‎ Biste اس دي‎ 


ESL 
In ہے سسحصحہ‎ 0 mpm ساس ان اھ‎ 





— ——— چرس نې‎ i 

at otek © lò prerii inewise® mapa wi mets‏ "ہے وج 

ur ee ee ee عم دا‎  Á AJ 
oe om ete poe ‘wee ee آ" اھ‎ 

mamia’‏ ووا یي" ابنستندهوو.. سه له دته یر 

—— 

asan te xirin erme road e سد‎ 

sa umeog saoe 

سی وه وی — 
e‏ —— 

















33 
had a few months before, the news product was greater with 
more news relenges igsued anû press conferences held. 

At least one journalist. however, may have been 
subtly “tweaking the Navy's nose’ on voluntary censorghip 
when he wrote in the manner of @ Marc Anthony speaking at 
Julius Caesar's funerals 

They (the Navy) have 4a pleasantly courteous public 
reletions section steffed with yentlexan ard ladies who 
are your idea of what a Navy officer ought to be. They 
&re always ready to give you what they think is good 
for you to have. . . . Censorship? There is no such 
thing. if you must call it anything, call it 
sympathetic and graceful direction. 30 

After Peorl Harbor, &aturdBy Evening Porat credited 
Mr. Knox's system of “voluntary cooperation” with helping 
to "train the Anerican newspaper editer to police himself 
« « 4. tO recognigo the difference between news that would 
give ‘aid and comfort to the enemy’ and news that 


woulón't, „31 


Upon passage of the Lend-Lease Bill in 89411 1941, 





mention of the presence or movements of British warships 
and merchant ships in U.S. waters was added to the Navy's 
“avoidance list.” 

The ban on publicity about the british men-cof-war, 
wnich were undergoing war-cóanmagje repairs in JAmerican noval 
shipyards. was destined to plague the voluntary censorahip 


program more than any other subject. The news media, 





te 
ale Lae cme nale — — , ې لس‎ wal ه‎ 
شش یرو‎ acca bas کے‎ pian ته‎ 
تہ سہن = سے نے‎ we ې يم‎ ٣ 
ممص نع پټ)تادض مې ی مه اي‎ — — m 11218 
کی له ته تب ما شه نت هلت د‎ af لس‎ 











Ajur redi rw: <a mr سے و سلتا‎ — T د‎ é^d 
سا مسسم بر مي کجیی؛ سد سے سس‎ his’ mip 


— — = 


JML srm a ijl ala امه‎ eee 
— I> فكع امس‎ 26 animas 
دس ببس«‎ 
1 یپس‎ 

— وله لسه دہ وسیتستتین eet) ete Ce jma‏ 
— — وو رمد سي ہمد یہ يبموز 
ee,‏ غوودیښم ده پاټ اس املس س لاعس مجه 
a —‏ ا ا — 









34 
aggressively interested in the firsthand battle stories the 
British had to tell, claimed that the presence of the 
vessels was common Knowledge in the ports of arrival. 

When the badly damaged English battleship Malaya 
8teamed into New York harbor in broad daylight. and her 
sailors wore gubsaquaently seen in the bars of Manhettan, 
the New York Rally Mews printed a phetograenh of the ship 
and carried a story on her arrival, A few other newspapers 
followed suit, but the majority refrained from publishing 
the infermation. Secretary Knox rebuked the papers that 
used the story. anc there wes "no recurrence of this kind 
of violation of the Navy's voluntary system. “22 

Numerous protests were filed with the Navy Dopart- 
ment over the continuing ban. however, especially from 
media in Kew York, Norfolk, San Francisco and Seattle, the 
primary port cities involved. In Seattle, a newspaper even 
eontended that a boat carrying newsmen was shot at by a 
Wavy guard when it encreached in restricted waters where a 
British ship lay at anchor, 7? 

The secretary, efter considerable consultation with 
British naval authorities. succumbed to the pressures from 
the press anc wocifiecé the policy in late September 1941. 
He promptiy announcec the names and location of a dozen of 
the British warships anû added that “access by the press to 
British vessels . . . will be granted on the initiative of 


34 


tho British Commanding Officer concerned.“ In October, 


ٰ4" 
ete‏ ادن ريد و۹" ععمہہ اسيم ب ميدن تجو «hy‏ 
ووهه همها بي sided‏ :لمنسہ “nc?‏ چو sii ko sonson‏ 
وه هت اس ات ده ات رسب torte! te‏ 

ity amd" "E ۱‏ فشا اسيج انس aiam m ri‏ سد 
ei cedes dux; ww Dani beara‏ سا نک ہے 
سو و ای وس لہ اس نا مد هوسو سی 
at o ats‏ ⸗⸗— مې دون le‏ ليه میں 
has‏ اس ہہ سج 
۰« سس« 
aff Sous‏ ومر مه پس om" che‏ رسکوورت سد سر ون ننس 
۱ وا T. ary eles 6 quae nds So iedsetabe‏ 

ومد ab‏ صب بست .ات سایس mti aiioa Gna‏ 
حلصاع ermesi © eerte) edt Paw‏ 9 اوه مان 
قصسصتس dS‏ ¢ موس احا وه سه ډوم عم یم د 

s aoe — ہدعو‎ MÀ aos Ah Ow aby ہے هو‎ 
تفده صسسصسصسس‎ 

"۰ ووی سی ries‏ نمی ارت توت مس مے 
ت افا که ریہ ہے یم موس ٣‏ 
ا —— — 
em omme a y‏ 
کا ته ووس مم وہ فعددتدورهم مو 






2 














































35 
he ۵63۴290 the policy further by stating the Navy would 


issue news releases on the presence of individual British 
35 


ships seven cays after they arrived in pert. 





On June 4, 1941, one week after Presiódant Roosevelt 
declared an unlimiteó national emergency, the Havy took 
still another action toward restricting publicity. 
Secretary Knox announced that press relaeses concerning 
contracts between the Navy Department and individual con- 
tractors would be discontinued. Gince October of the 
previous year, it had been a normal procedure for joint 
Army-Navy releases to be made on any national de fense 
contract amounting to $1 miliion or more. Also in June 
1941, monthly summaries to the press of vessels under 
construction and werchant ships delivered for use as 
auxiliaries were dropped fer security reasons. Ô 

While the emphasis had been on the curtailment of 
information in the first few months of 1941, the naval 
leadership was making certain positive public relations 
moves. On March 17, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a 
letter to the naval service stressing that public relations 
was à function of command and cautioning against a too 
rigid interpretation of the phrase, “compatible with 
military security." Two days later, Admiral Stark again 
addressed the subject. this time in a letter to naval 








" 
ببس »سس«‎ αα 
"5 rump eb ee a ا‎ ease cane 


- 


© دنت ف ٤٤‏ سك , ۰1 »لم Jeo‏ 





هن P‏ —— پس رر مسا 
— — 








gee‏ يح شی — و5 حس 
و سر ٤ه‏ ما لیم »یس یښ وه بر 
ببس« 
e‏ سی ئی ١۱١‏ کا ےہ یھ هغ تم اس 
اع سس 
مسسب سس 
mal va dis‏ سس 


- © 1 o E 


سید ص ——MÀ‏ —————" 


e ^-— یي دس‎ 
pte — — 
| ۳ - - — — 


dam 


اوي خو سب کی jm ient FON‏ 














— 





36 
district commandants. He enjoined the reylonal commanders 
te upgrade their information programs by considering the 
placement of public relations officers in each state, large 


publishing center, or cOne Where there was an important 


naval activity. A 29-page “Guide to kevy bublic kelLations" 
37 


was enclose as a tooi. 





On May l, 1341, Secretary Snox transferred the Navy 
Department's public celations function from the Office of 
Naval Intelligence te the Office of the Secretary, where it 
would be under hia direct control. In so doing. he 
followed the footsteps of the War Department in setting up 
an independent and centralized Office of Public 
Relations. ^? 

Rear Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, former Commander in 
Chief of the U.S. Fleet as a four-star admiral and more 
recently Commandant ef the Twelfth Naval District at San 


Francisco, was pointed "Director of Public Relations," in 





effect relieving Commander Thurber. The admiral reported 
for duty in Washington in the midéle of May and promptly 
issued @ statement saying. “We shall be ag liberal with 
information for the press and public es the law and 
situation allow. „39 

Although he had no formal experience in public 


relations, Admiral Hepburn was a judicious choice as the 





" 
cenos daem i Dictaa a arsena عر«یربېه‎ 
قد‎ — ayo oao sign danye qe 
— —— Asca thii Xe ولسو«‎ 
mig a ew N? — — dde [den 
' مسن تاا ۹د زاس سنت وب يعوو جم رن اد شق مد‎ 
— —2 


لل — 











i] que |o 2‏ هع adams ON (etra‏ اپ اسيم 
غو مه sei ev muna rL ny a‏ ہے بس tM‏ يو 
iOS‏ پس نم out odo fp Fa maim ott‏ دہ 
سه پ نک sid‏ دام „jouen‏ ےو بث s qam‏ 
یس اص انیت ېد Wu mát ci Hemd comm sor‏ 
په Sudan ON!‏ نود ہی امس ulw to aA‏ 
um‏ 
Imam uo 05‏ ی A)‏ 
ر ك اندر نه م وت ALB‏ 
Imes‏ ود Gû? ٤۳‏ ڈیہ سس re yobisest‏ ټم 
وصئتم, cage e‏ لم hA 1h‏ ذه 
ومهم نویس duree‏ 7 سم ېووا 
ant O —‏ 
LR RR Ll lai ۷‏ 
en wi n subs to wr ERO‏ 
ient e ji t i)‏ ېس سا 
ge‏ — 































LEN 








37 
Navy's inforsation chief. As the senior officer on the 
Navy list. he was widely respected by his fellow admirals, 
an important prerequisite for the job. As fleet commander 
in 1936. he hed initiated a broader and more Liberal press 
poliay.*? 

The oxganizetion of GPR initially corresponded 
closely to that of the Public Relations Branch in OZ. 
There were seven sections in the new office: preas, radio, 
pictorial, analysis., scripts, administrative and naval 
Gistricts. However, there wes naw a staff of fifty-five 
compared to the thirteen in July 1940 when mobilization of 
the function began.  Anothex thirty-eight were on the 
— 

Admiral Hepburn had three executive assistants: 
Hal O'Fisherty; Frank Mason; and Lieutenant M. W, Gordon, 
JF, a Reguler Navy officer who served as tha admiral's 
aide and also headed the Administrative Section. In addi~ 
tion to conducting the business management of QER, radon 
handled accreditation to the fleeta of news media 
representatives &nd worked with the Marine Corps in forma- 
ating plans for its combat correspondents. 

Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Derry, USN, who hac 
been in charge of the Press Section in the Pubiic Relations 
Branch since May 1940, continued in that capacity in the 
new office. His staff had grown from three officers end 


one civilian assistant in July 1949 to nine officers and 





1١ 
صننوده.‎ weol(se ^ud ve ere” Cine ome ws ated) Cum 
bama ma u ود ده الم شه ته پس‎ 
Mt مرن‎ 
— تس‎ Q miim نت هم‎ — 
> od deere cila aiban اکسسان به ذس مز نس‎ 
— — سس‎ 
TY MN d dameng 
"UTER x M UN ⸗ ق(و+ندں۔‎ 
Ve céddmiilLkdow nome Ped) مسوم له د افغونسو نس ہزم‎ 


چ “s so rm E paka uime‏ 
DURUM 7‏ ويساك olus. s do led‏ هونن وودودون ,| 
هد 09040۱۲۱۵ — — مس سی هده 3. ©. — 
8 ه سوښوفت شم دون کو مسا سو نس شنج اء 

اسا عم نتا ابت انوه اله به مي 

لمعه ملت مر م کے ذذ ع — 

REND‏ 23232 5 نے ےے ےج 
ere‏ ےم 

S‏ نه ست amm eda‏ ہد 












38 
two civilians in May 1941. Seven weeks later, there were 
thirteen officers, seven civiliana and six enlisted men in 
the section.  Hany of those were former active newspapermen. 

The Press Section prepared, cleared and distributec 
hews releases, anawered prass queries, and arrange press 
conferences. It was divided into three components: 

& "city-room" staff of officer-reporters who covered the 
various naval offices and bureaus in Washington on a 
regular "beat-syston" basis; a watch section of officers 
who m&nnec telephones around-the-clock to ansver inquiries; 
and a reference division which haê been set up in February 
1941 under Miss Melene Philibert to compile background 
data. 

The 24-hour watch section was activated on May 3, 
1941. It had been a 16-hour watch since November of the 
previous yeer. One of its functions was to prepare a 
nightly news &uxmary from the United Press wire in the 
office for transmission to all Kavy ships and outlying 
stations. 

The Redio Section, still headed by Norvelle Sharpe. 
arranged for Navy participation in network programs, wrote 
scripts for radio addressas by naval personnel and for 
radio cecruiting material, answered broadcast queries, anc 
conducted liaison with commercial broadcasters. One of the 
four assistants to Lieutenant Commendex Sharpe wes a 


civilian. d. Harrisen Hartiey, a former NBC special events 


تم لل سی دبا بو بل عاك سی اس مس و 
فلس ee a‏ اف ست وله malbo‏ ته ہہ 
ul —‏ —— 
— —— — 
TT‏ ۔ — — 
E ° ene‏ سم کرم elect Suet Qe‏ 

"عل او ths‏ ۸ ںوہر سیت تاساسا سه 
T. — od‏ ——— 
Velbuh‏ همی عمش غټ سرب دا ءاش 
dE‏ نصا aa ea‏ حم !€ mus‏ السار 
نا وات ده حم سه سم ج و مسر سب 
لاه 


























Au dore ul‏ ان wm > belie os‏ د 
eei NE D AM‏ رم مخ مه قمصس انم 
GT ome bet ME .- maiteak‏ وسک ی 
ا سس ساسا evel‏ ده یہ ہی hie‏ نم یی 
nl‏ سس 
pm 1‏ 
os Wend lle died M M S‏ وود وبو.. 
— — — 
e som E‏ " 
bo‏ فاا مدطصا رفاست irap‏ سو 
| مسر مک مرن Y» aw‏ —- 
n‏ - یې ساد 
| ۵ ست ihs Bi‏ 



































33 
expert. 

The Pictorial Section had been operatim; since 
December 1940 under John Long. It distributed still photo” 
graphs, motion pictures and display posters, and cooperated 
with newsreel] companies and motien picture producers. By 
Hay 1941, Lieutenant Commander Long nad a staff of five. 
Also in Hay, an art program., the foundations of which wers 
laid earlier in the year by Commander Thurber, was initiated 
in the section. An eminent etcher and water-color artist, 
Vernon Howe Bailey, was given ےج‎ contract to paint activities 
Of the Havy's shore establishment. By dune, other civilian 
artista were added; end in September 1941, artist Griffith 
Baily Coale, presiGeant of the National Society of Mural 
Painters, accepted Bà reserve commission as a lieutenant 
commander to direct 8 group of Navy combat artists in 
recording fleet activities on canvas, 

hg the demand for Navy photographs and motion 
pictures mounted in the spring of 1941, the photographic 
facilities available to OPR proved to ba inadequate. 
Seerstary Knox subsequently convened a special board to 
study the Navy's photographic needs. 

Bill Galvin continued as chief of the Analysis 
Section, which he started in September 1940. He now had 
four officer assistente. The section compiled a daily 
summary of what appeared in the news media and elsewhere 





ntl 





ee‏ سواه مسا m — o s‏ اسم 
| 1 مه لضفا ٢‏ اخم متا يروو 
aufert‏ دلا ormi]‏ هذا انام ma n‏ ص &s 2e‏ 
از ناکشا فا سويد ہریو۔ہ پوس بی 
سب اتی ارب مسد ا عص s dd‏ س De‏ زيب 
od end‏ یا سر هم مبم د Yo bdid‏ سی جد 
فة ادات û‏ دی مب Qt‏ تسس ېښن پښو اد اس 
که کک مالس غه سوب مت ند متتسو فويس abies‏ 
وات عب لین مس ےب ده مرو ود مناد اد 
6 مل سو وا تت رس كور attilio vats an e‏ 
کان cedet d) de (ene wwe‏ سیق وره ورو اه 
سر —————— 
84ج, سوا د lI 3 ke iano Oe‏ ې جوسو 
o siih G cintas‏ سي دا اب سر نیو کہ 
09فظ نیز mal?‏ 21۸۷ی سے دوہ ۔ 

شه ېي کي عب وی انیب ەنتیف سے سب 
ولش سسمسه د Ve piip ait?‏ ونار اہ cisewsewbee‏ 
| مته نا ته -—po——J | -— — FY‏ 
مسب عوفجمسمتنښې وسه سي و 
⸗ — — — 
خی ٭ متا ⸗—· 
ad did modal‏ .رہ سو سو مسا 




































40 
about the Navy and on other pertinent topics. It also 
produced special "feedback" raporte on spacific subjects, 
such as "Typical Reactions to Russo~German War” and 
"Editorial Reactions to Landing in Iceland." The first 
issues of the daily analytical summaries were called “Havy 
News Bulletins." On May 27, 1942. the name was changed to 
“Daily Digest,” 

The digest was provided to eenior Navy officials and 
to all Wavy public relations officers. Everything that was 
considered indicative of public cpinion~-even Secretary 
Knox's f&án wail--was read, analyzed anû reported. In 
Lieutenant Commander Galvin's words: "Our job is to follow 
public opinion trends ase they have reference to the Navy's 
policies, programs, expansion. We try to keep our finger 
on the public pulse, "^? 

A 1945 report on the Analysis Section stated that 
its staff regularly screened thirty-one newapapers and 


43 When the 


twenty magazines in preparing the Daily Digest. 
Office of War Information was esteblished in June 1942, 
ecitorials clipped from sbout 400 newspapers by that agency 
became an additional source of information. The War 
Department's Bureau of Public Relations monitered radic 
programs and newsreels for both the Army and Navy. Public 
Opinion polls also were screened. 


OPR's Scripts Section wrote speeches for Navy 
officials, cooperated with authors and publishers, and 





oe 





هد غه وی سا ی mols AC NES Semi saine‏ 
امه ېدای —‘ nd‏ وسوی 
ee deae‏ )او هه OD‏ ره Lem "^s?‏ ۱ 
لت دا وني ہہ عمسٹنس نه حوزسمت۔- جو دوہ 
swaeit‏ مو ال iisi‏ ۸خ ده سا اجه بت سنا یت 
em o du E‏ عم de MEE‏ مس مې Y‏ 
AL‏ 
ه۳ :دو هوب سممص af‏ میټ "WT‏ 
چو مل سسې پو نند و« فصو mane10‏ ست 22 
üouabkamue‏ دمشلهوبمم ۰ پموژند E‏ — — 
سم تا زا سا ان تا مسا ۱ 
— ټاووسمم دسمهد عاءت الو MI sama‏ یو نو به دہ 
ورو د سه سلا سه دل ا 
—— — 
۵۸ ۲۵۵ — ¬ 
سم رسس wos og gi o aes rt‏ 
a‏ وو رس سی ہے مج ده * 
ودل دیس cans granu‏ 
مسوم سا مصسسسب وم بي به دو aiv) qwe bae‏ 
— — 


رجه — 


—0 






































43 
prepared special pamphiets. It also served as the clearing 
house for all written material other than press releases. 
Victor Blakeslee remained in charge of this section, 
assisted in May 1941 by three reserve officers and one 
civilian. 

The Haval Districts Section had been organized in 
late February by Jimmy Stahlmen to coordinate the public 
relations efforts of the fifteen naval districts in the 
continental United States, Puerto Rice, Canal Zone and 
Hewaii. It also acted as the liaison branch between the 
Washington office and the fleet public relations officers, 
and cooperated with welfare, patriotic, civic, fraternal, 
educational, entertainment and other civic organizations. 
Wherever possible, however, these civic liaison contacts 
were decentralized to the districts. 

The Gistrict public relations offices were, in 
total, functioning below peacetime operating levels when 
Lieutenant Commander Stahimen was dispatched on a fact~ 
finding tour in early 1941. As & result of his trip, 


several reserve officers in the field were ordered to 


active Guty in the districts, and a gradual buildup of the 
Gi 


regional offices was begun. 





On May 9, 1941, shortiy after the function of 


public relations was removed from the Office of Naval 








i. 

sase X) — — — —‏ سس« 
——N —‏ ——— 
paki qaa pi barotoi‏ یا n‏ موعت موحي ا c-D seme‏ 
هه بے 

sinun Dae aft ۰‏ ےھر — — ىك 
aang‏ سب qf‏ اسېي ی ی نه ii,‏ 
a. aminami — * =s t aiie ۵‏ = 
G osit ohen cann coe MAP‏ سی مد 
ow» c máál o Goo pel dede‏ دس „uwii miao silar‏ 


وکاوو به لصو رز . قوف ودنم موا taas‏ و هو وص وه ——— 
ome‏ سشونونس اې ۷ه اښ ceased‏ 

ↄ· ⸗‏ ہر ودع ا حوس مںپ وم و atte‏ 
“me ‘+ < gl e am — —“‏ 


«pies ain m rmn a aA viper piuma za cue pannie 
وت من مس‎ ith wt nir anti eene Pro 





42 
intelligence, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the 
district commandants to transfer their public relations 
offices aise from intelligence to @ separate status 
directly unmier the comaandants themselves. ^*^ By this 
action and the establishment of public relations offices in 
the fleets a few weeks later, the framework for the wartime 
Navy public relations organization was virtually complete. 

But the districts were slew to implesent their 
public relations responsibilities. Consequently, on June 7, 
Secretary Knox sent & messaye to the commandants to “please 
proceed immediately to complete plans for staffing of 
Gistrict public relations offices with necessary officer 
personnel and clerical help." On August 22. he forwarded 
te the field and fleet commands en organization plan fer 
setting up publie relations offices afloat and ashore, a 
list of functions for these offices, and a summary of 
"ready clearance topics. 446 

Bagically, each district and fleet office was 
Organized into three sections--press, r&iio eni photography. 
in naval districts whore more than one large metropolitan 
area had to be served, establishment of field offices was 
encouraged. Already, on June 36, the Third Naval District 
in New York had Grawn up plans for subsidiary public 
relations sections in Albany, Buffalo, New London, and 


Newark, It was envisioned that forty officers. seven 


F 

لیس به عم نسنت ام ہر i‏ 
هط سا نه miis‏ عاسند amimia cbay‏ 
تود لک کې تودااوسی ټ د -a a‏ 

«ule ye ۵5 ni اسے۔‎ m. ٠ 
sj سم که به سدس عو وو نہ سرہوزدس ہج سب‎ 
زى ھی ررس‎ wW) ed لک تل مج وھ‎ ٢ که دسا‎ 
سم سا عصسو لت‎ mienim سس سه هلود لس‎ 
ده دق اعم تسم عیب بن ات سا‎ ۱ 
+ ون لس‎ o) سک زین تصش سوہ‎ asili slidy 
سی‎ ai bamo انست ټې ه سسسې وو نن‎ ٠۹ ت٦‎ 
مسا لسا مم مسونعت بنم ووم سمساتایږ عا‎ 
ملڼا سمتوسب امن‎ meio ڈوک اد دنت اص‎ 
meen ني‎ Ui س0 د ا الجا ا نس مې‎ 
TL x Il. 
مه سی‎ a —— 
جا تینک ے اک لے اء ی ب‎ diit 
سمل مم انا نن تت‎ dis وکل‎ > 
—— عخطتف‎ 
bs emia ai a aiian کی‎ — 
سس منوزوروو‎ Du? وس‎ et mb ao یود لال‎ 
نم سم سو سا نکسم جو وسم کر م سرب‎ 

















































43 
enlisted men and aleven civilians would be needed to man 
the New York and zone offices, 7 The Zleventh Naval 
District in San Diego also wae guick to sat up regional 
offices in the nos Angeles and Phoenix areas. 

By September i, 1941, most of the naval digtricts 
had fully staffed public relatione offices functioning very 
much ag they would throughout the war. For the most pert, 
personnel manning the diatrict offices were care fully 
selected. The Third Baval Dietrict public rcalations offi- 
eer, for instance, wrote to Hal O'Flaherty: “I have 
personally hand-picked every officer on my staff and I have 
endeavored to secure only the meet intelligent men thet I 
could lay my hands on, ®e well ag men of several years 
48 ہیی‎ 
burgeoning staff ef OPR in Washington alse was henéd-picked 


experience in their respective professions. 


much as possibile, in keeping with the desire of Secretary‏ هه 
Knox to place the mest talented anû experianced people‏ 
available in public relations. *®‏ 

in late July 19461. a wonference of district public 
relations officers was held in Washingten. D.C. The 
Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Hepburn, top-flight execu” 
tives from the news media, public relations representatives 
from the Army and Marine Corps, ar New York Mayor Fiorello 
LaGuardia, among others, addressed the ensenilage. 9 At 
the meeting, it was estimtted that the wire services wore 
eartying about 40 per cent of tho news releases anil other 






—À iia TÉ Gite Gon Gem CE 
. که دای ما هس یت‎ zm 
جا ۴ا ےتا ہس‎ m Cmn عو‎ ae لع ہے لست‎ 

men‏ در فل ماس ہے سے ہے 
یشن مه ما مه بر شو ايد نت سبيت 
— ا و رک تاب dim‏ ٹپ ینہ عو کس 
m dii GM Gr‏ رقت سا سکرس یل 

€^ ۱ 

شا اا a mainin e‏ ماس وس 

a A ie od Bel — 

=" Sa 
— E 
> 1 


—. iili 
(S 
E31 d اظ‎ 






















ده په 


press material issued by OPR. The naval districts were 


encouraged to disseminate the remaining 60 per cont to 
51 


newspapers and radio stations in their areas. 





On several occasions since the end of Worid War I, 
the Navy had faced what it considered to be à major threat 
to ite role in national defense--the recomendations for 
creation of a separate air force out of the پجحعۃ‎ enc Navy 
air arms. In the spring of 1941. the iseue again was vory 
much alive in the form of several bills pending bo fore 
verious congressional committess. 

Wavy efforts to counteract the pressures for an 
independent air service inescapably involved public xela“ 
tions and turmed Out to be ome Of the first major tasks 
assigned to Admiral Hepburn. وه‎ June 6, Secretary Knox 
wrote to Walter Lippesan and other journalists. personally 
inviting them to a June 12 luncheon in New York &t which 
the admiral would discuss the "arguments for and ayainat 
& unified Air Service." On July 7, the Analysis Section of 
OPR issued a special kavy News Bulletin enticied “A Crose- 
Section of Public Reaction te the Unification of Army Air 
Forces." And in August. Hepburn sent to the district 
Comandante two Navy position papers, "The Wavy and the 
Seperate Air fores” and “The Case Against the United Aix 
Force." In his accompanying letter, he stated that the 


- 







an saree ua o يي ات‎ Aai as 
مسمنې س پم وس رن‎ odd oes oF I 2 
Apani cist a aia N ia | 


— 

te 20 |‏ سایللم ms de‏ ہہ که دمر س ي 
وي موس یې ووس cms‏ — © سے ہے 
0 الاش سصس e emo d eh anm A)‏ 
۰ سے maa le c‏ سس مه ټم 
ie‏ د 6 att‏ وساي ا غدل ei a‏ — — 
وھ علغمم ےو ga——À adl (o es c om‏ —— 
وام وسوا aee camo. node‏ 

سم دک وص — —— € D‏ نت مت 
9m we) cmm ala — —‏ نوت اس هله جارس 
cem 9n o5 ct XD V ma‏ دم Jada) ams‏ سے asm‏ 
قله — — — — 
E,‏ ا مي im A‏ 
هدم ټی nts m al‏ ار Oe me eme‏ اہ بد s‏ 
— ⸗— — ات نس (av Ww va^ rc meum‏ 


.د0 مه ھا ا mnm mu‏ وس چا 
siLa m pa MeS‏ سيوس وسو 
e‏ — — 
oe oe ooa qa beh. C‏ و رہ LA‏ 
quet 1‏ — 
ہے rms m" i‏ یں 

—— — — 






































material may be used “in eny manner which you deen best 
e o o لے‎ Connection with public relations activities. 

The Eighth Naval District at New Orleans took the 
admiral literally and offered one of the papers to Southern 
editors with the suggestion that it would make good 
editorial material. One of the editors, affronted by the 
suggestion, declared: "1 am amazed that a thing so 
resembling the handout editorials of tha German press 
dictators shouid cowe from an American institution. “>> 
liepburn, embarrassed by the incident, simply offered the 
Opinion that the Mew Orleans press officer had used “bac 
jucgeme nt. “ 

Nevertheless, the public relations effort to sub- 
merge ths separate air force idea continued., In October, 
Admizal Hepburn wrote to the Commandant of the Third Naval 
District: 

. . « bOth Life ami Time are helping us with favorable 
publicity on the question of unified air services. Tine 
has been given extraordinary opportunities for 
gathering Gata on this subject ín the Pacific and some- 
ng is in hand with Life along the same line. The 
also hes come into the fold and & 
DE for that s&j;azine is now afiosat on an aircraft 


carrier where ho will have exceptional opportunity to 
gather material not available to others.” 





For some time the Army and Navy jointly had been 


planning their censership responsibilities in the event of 


war, “> The Navy, as the "first line of defense,“ would be 


. 
comm cé yas iat ren‏ أبن وي pna‏ روه i mst a cue‏ 
ek 6‏ 
— ٤٣ف oe‏ سس دی نندو os ae) arily) r m‏ 
معام امل بم naria‏ وو Xe‏ می وسم ہے فمن 
وان ton us Sow jh RÎ iE adi Aita‏ 
پیج ہہ رت دہ ج لب سم ھپ یه 
cede eee mg" V7 utilized 9‏ وہ سس we‏ 
یمم کور نوہ سس وناكو يميم نا داد — seme,‏ 
ہوم مسق ہے جس رر نونمم امو اورا 
وس ee ee‏ 








45 
responsibie for cable and radio communications censorship. 
while the Army would take charge of censoring the mails. 

In order to prepare fox its roles. the Navy had 
secretly initiated training for a select group of New York 
newspapermen who were to be commissioned as naval censors 
when the tims came. All queries concerning the "hush-hush" 
$Chool, conducted at Third Naval Bistrict Headquarters, 
were left unanswered. The Chicago Tribune quoted tha 
Gistrict public relations officer, Lieutenant Commander 
John T. Tuthill, Jr., USHR, who owned a string 02 م‎ 
weekly newspapers on Long Island, as saying: "I don't know 
there is such & scheo1. 6 The Tribuna concluded hy 
editorialiging. “This disinclination for publicity . . . 
might be based on the navy's fenr of being accused of 
jumping the gun on & censorship appropriations request 
pending before Congress. “ 

The leaks in the presa axi from congressional 
SOurces about the Navy's plane for censorship of overseas 
communications pressured Secretary Knox to issue a special) 
Statement. In it, he emphasised that no censorship of 
Gomestic news was involved, other than the voluntary form 
currently in effect. Ma once again thanked the news madia 
for their cooperation in the voluntary censorship program 
and concluded with an "interestíng" bit of rationale: 

(I believe) . . . that the press and other news services 


wiii welcome a strict censorship of outgoing communicaà- 
tions, not only in the realization that such censorship 





i 


LT *‏ په خر سه مدان س س ا ساد 
hike a — VARA‏ 
mm ee dm EO 2‏ اند کش دی يې 
یمس قا تښ کے تست سی تد سے 
Gitte we on Be‏ نت si‏ میس و 
شش لا اک مس تل مهم ee‏ 
ظ سام ہہ شه سی ای وه پی 
32 لصا ee‏ ورسم ښوه بر 
گل ۷۷ uA LLLA‏ وس سامه سن jams‏ 
سح وسرت کے qiw æ hi‏ ۰ رمع ہت 
T a l redii‏ اتی ا بر سسم ب 
ak AAs i‏ ضه پس مسټ . . . 
سور غا اټ e‏ بي نوا نس نم مالس نټ يا 
سا aa ee‏ 


miei at wom اوت یت نم نف‎ ٢ 























47 


is in the beat interests of national security but in 
the knowledge that with the leakage of vital informe- 
tion effectively bettled up within the United States, a 
greater freedom for the dissemination of legitimate 
news will 96۵ 57 


Two more subjects were added to the voluntary 
avoidance list ky OPR in October and Novesmberz--the number 


of planes in the Navy and Marine Corps and information 
8 


concerning the arming of merchant ships. 





On August 23, 1941, it was announced that Admiral 
Hepburn would be placed on the retired list on Novesber 1 
but would continue on active duty as Director of Public 
Relations. In Novenber, he was joined in the office by 
another retired rear simira] on active duty, Henry A. 
Wiley, who headed a new Industrial Morale Section. Admiral 
Wiley waa assisted by four reserva officers. 

The new section was an outgrowth of recommendations 
made in the spring of 1941 by Lieutenant Commander Lesile P, 
Jacobs, an officer in the Analysis Section, that addresses 
be made by notable Navy personnel at privato industrial 
plants holding Navy contracts and that efficiency awards 
for excellence of production be presented by the Eavy. The 
first awards extended under this new progra ware the fore” 
runners of the World War II مرج نوی‎ "DL" Awards. Is 
October, Secretary Knox assigned to the Director of Public 
Relations the responsibility for coordinating the Kavy’s 
activities in building industrial morale by serving as a 


ما 
کس ام برای وس اچ اہ 
اس — gei‏ 
n —‏ سو لسوت اسل چيا آنا ahi‏ مغننستن 
idw‏ ایز ہے وم ا می سا امسر پل مس 
aas. ust wir wi wma] UN‏ سامت مشه نه ساسا لي 
نھ — تاس ayi‏ > 




















ہے . 0 nd Mane‏ فاب 
m m, t‏ مس يو ويه سمم )هه L anns e‏ 
کم ee rwr‏ م مدوم le were oe‏ می 
miami os‏ ہم مس له سم سد کہ رو دوس س 
e ueni suat celine c Rande men aid vane‏ 
سور n dna sm‏ سب snas LAM‏ سر Lan itus‏ 
هلي سم co alas‏ وص cools) «aes‏ 

کو ie ee qm atm m gm‏ مسممسا سم 
وم يم م sto mm, vt Ay a‏ 
ید هم مت د س pu‏ سریپ مس ومس 
wn, sm‏ ص۷۳۳ 
ب ج اسه يما ويد نے بے 
m m d ,‏ 
نم A m cow AB amm‏ 
vibe Ma c‏ 

































in olo 











cine Î |‏ ہپ وود سے 


4 
clearing acent and &dvisor for the speBking eng&jements and 
various competitive awards. He aise directed Admiral 
Hepburn to a@et a9 liaison officer between the Navy Dopert- 
ment and other government ayencies on civilian moraie 
matters. 

By Hovember there wae @ &gtaff of ninety-one 
employed by the Office of Public Relations: five Regular 
Navy officers; thirty-six reserve officers; ami fifty 
civilians, mostly in clerical positions. The office now 
occupied eleven rooms in the Navy Department building. 

The press officer, Bob Berry, moved up to the 
position of Assistant Director of OFR in Octobex when he 
was promoted to commander, and hia former igh was taken 
over by Wallace Wharton. A separate Motion Picture Section 
was createc on August 2, removing thís responsibility froe 
the Pictorial Section. The head of this new section was 
Ensign Alan Brown, USNR. Hal O'Flaherty was releagad to 
inactive duty to return to the Chicago kally Ness on 
October 22, as he had bean promised by his old bores, Frank 
Knox, p 


Also in Octonx 





r, Lieutenant Commander Robert ©. 
Vining, USNR, who had been the Fifth Naval District public 
reletions officer in Horfolk sínce late April, transferred 
to London as the first information officer for the 
Commander, U.S. Haval Forces, Europe. He was replaced in 


Borfolk by Lieutenant Commander Wilson Starbuck, USM, Y 








é? 

—— — وم یسس ہے 
۲ © نف oie‏ نیس 

wo P M‏ ا ای داد تسم ول vena‏ ووس 
ee‏ ټس تسا ماس م LIN‏ نون 











اې سی مو بجع د -۷ ۷۷ نه می 
کاٹ نت alti‏ جه اانه مسا ⸗— — 
senio cma‏ مس من موب مسب ہے A‏ 
حقئ سس ۱ ېي اس n‏ 
a GÀ eme) eh hebquasp‏ وسم میس ee d au cox‏ 
— جئو emi) ie‏ سم qos As‏ ے a‏ 
ولك a‏ سنا قاس ورمن a- ape» cà e s‏ ^ 
am‏ وبا نن ee eee‏ عړن نن ہہ سو ua‏ 
mh QAI Wa qvo‏ د oie mis cmho- co‏ 
m‏ سوه ار OF (ii oct—e m 4x7. cb s‏ 
meh ee Anat. adi‏ مه تیل سے وسوی مي 
معسوفرہ aem mih‏ سس« 
تمه شي ېم نه غه وير درس سر رس ۔ 
اسو غه مرو مت مم سم ےہ سر سم جس 


— — (mà umm a) sdb - 
riy mei ar اا‎ wm c .0886ء مب مه‎ 


—— — 


— — | 







































49 
&lugpcint.on the Lye of Pearl Harbor 
As Pearl Harbor bay approached, the Navy's 

mobilization fer public relations had been completed. In 
terms of experienced persennel, it was # formidable organ-~ 
igation. There were almost 100 persons in the Washington 
office, 127 officers alone in the fifteen navel district 
offices anc their véerious branchas, and 5 public relations 


officers attached to the fleets. °! 


Perhaps the proportion“ 
&liy small subar of personnel with the cperating forces, 
however, was indicative of the central question that faced 
the function on the eve of Pear] Harbor: What information 
“compatible with security” coulé be released in wartime? 

A firm believer in public relations, Secretary Knox 
in@eeé had set up an organization calculated to fully 
Ghronicle the WNavy's story in combat. Yet. Mr. Knox also 
was torn on the horns of the security dilemma. At the 
conference o£ puhlic relations officers in the suwuwwer of 
1941, he had gone out of his way to stress that he would 
use the full measure of his influence es secretary to 
change the attitudes of some Havy officers who believed 
they would stay out of trouble if they refused to talk to 


the news megia. 62 


Yet, he religiously pursued his policy 
Of voluntary censorship of information he considered needed 
to be kept secret. 

The inconsistency in Mr. Knox's philosophy was 


perhaps mote apparent than real. Nevertheless, there was 





5 





selec, م‎ 0000 

SES ae Komas مپس‎ ueduambD د قمتھ‎ — 

B tl ese ew a Re oe مماممسو‎ bn cem 
on aa دږ دی‎ re Sl قاتا نات سرب یدام‎ 
mie shid d ho بسټنه وونسنټي.‎ f^ KM دوو‎ 
-minra Más d 
e o r) عسسں ٭سب ٭‎ aie eji sm. 
me سرصم دص دی‎ sarang ملےعبہہ نه‎ uui د‎ * 
رہب مو رو‎ am ame! m camis ease Ze aw Qu cm ا‎ — 
می .رس‎ S — —— تح‎ 
EE lm iino pnr 
me ب‎ co «eee m Ul. LL 
ته‎ t mem ےو‎ ccc bei d dao mmm Aik ly دو‎ 
Daci eve عوجیسسیی‎ ras maa 10 سو اناس متس سم‎ 
we tind ہی‎ iim quis fà tame To وې ې‎ ame 0 














— — 


— —— ——— EO CS Te 


50 
no evidence on the eve of Pearl Harbor that his enthusias- 
tic promotion of the value of public relations had 
ponetrated the “security syndrome” of the admirals in 
charge of the fleets that would soon be making the news. 
it would seem reasonable to assunse that the secretary's 
enbivalence over security versguam information at least 
partially influenced the attitude of the admirais. 

Whatever the reason, the secretüry's liberal public 
relations program did not have the support ef many of the 
Havy's high-ranking officers as the nation prepared for 
war. In their minds, the increasing threat of U.B. 
involvement in the European War during the past year 
required that the Navy adopt intensive security measures. 
Aná as our relations with Japan rapidly reached the breaking 
point, secrecy snashrouded the operations of the fleet in 
the Pacific. After Fear) Harbor, this secrecy intensified 
throughout the fleets, resulting in extensive criticism of 
the KMavy’s public relations program during the first year 
ef hostilities. 


یم 

و ووسسقھ نظ !ات عم وسائت سم سس ہد 
tn ‘otis GUE caf LG‏ هن سموسمول نو 
RE ٠‏ می ر جد 
A‏ — — — 
— — — —— 
چا "مث سسست r‏ سس وو aeaa at‏ 

sily bhai o uD RF mm a î” 007 
ہیں‎ Yo ran b pa am cma cm CLD چات‎ DA 
ee er N 
why fep سی دو‎ cae یب مہم‎ al? ذا‎ EA 
wow — —— — اکتا ډیا تد‎ 
موس عم سب‎ LAAT ووو‎ AA AAAS وہ سو‎ A 
وې ولسم وپ‎ be hl افک نې ادس ند‎ 
٭سےہ سس«‎ eae: aR ê 
اد وسدے - ی و‎ ERO ۳ عله‎ 20 —— 
مې‎ NA 
-. ٭--‎ —X ٠ 
- -— o اس‎ 




























NOTES TO CBAPTER II 


io lene Philibert, telephone interview, Falis 
Church, Ve., June 13, 1962. 


^ James Le , ates in the Growth of Federal 
Publicity," | Dinion Cues fe x | 31 2858 (1939). The 
categories were: types of public relations progrens; types 
of releases to newspapers: types of releases to radio 
stations: and the use of film atrips, exnibits end posters. 





Lt. Cmür. Leland F. Lovette, USN. to Frank‏ وگ 
Thayer, May 23, 1938, U.S. Navy Department, Office of‏ 
information. “Historical Recerds of the Navy Office of‏ 
Information, 1919-1251." Job Order 6i-A-2740, Item 10.‏ 
Box 154, Waghington Hationel Records Center, Suitlanc, Md.‏ 
Hereafter cited ag "Philibert Collection. "‏ 


Spor a detailed look at Heavy publie relations in 
the two decades preceding World War II, see Lt. Omir. 
PF. Donald Seovel, USN, “Helm‘s A'lee,” unpublished 
Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1968, pp. 71-131. 
The activities of the Navy League, including its efforts on 
behalf of the Navy in World War II, are documented in 
(Dotr oit, 1962). 





*pAdm. Julius À. Furez, USN (Ret.), i 

n world we (washington, 1959),‏ سسس وس هف ګن 
cited ng vases. minis !‏ س وټ pranin.‏ 42-57 

The political techniques usod by FDR in gaining enactment 

of the January 1930 naval appropriations bill are 

éíscussed in Simon PA. "ond n Relations of Kaval 

Expansion," Pun Fly, 3:1213-17 (1939). 












gr ank Knox was @ veteran newspaperman. After 
graduation from college and brief Army service in the 
Spanish-Aserican War, he worked as a reporter for the 
Grang Rapids (Mich.) Harald. Be» purchased the Sault 5t. 
Marie (Mích.) Journal in 1901; and. after serving as 
ganeral manager of the Hearst newspapers and pub Lisher of 
the Hearst Boston papers, he bought a controlling interest 
in the Chicago in 1931 (mimeographed biography 
of Frank Knox, Philibert Collection. Box 155). 


Tena circumstances surrounding the appointment of 
Frank Knox as Secretary of tho Navy end his use by FOR in 
peimarily a political ané public relations role are treated 





Jld -— 1 


^ سے — 
اہ E‏ 








in Furer, Agz imation. 10-46 pagal. An axomple of a 
tríal-balloon pul by Knox was ene he made on Aprii 24, 
1941, espousin; the desirability of providing U.&. ۷ل‎ 
convey service for British supply ships. Interestingly, an 
analysis of public mail responding to the - پر‎ conducted 
by the Havy's Office of Public Relations, showed an cver 
2-1 ratio Gpposing the convoys (memo., Cmádr. Harry R. 
Thurber, USN, to Secretary of the Navy, May 2. 1941, 
Philibert Collection, Box 155}. 

Bueno., Secretaxy of the Navy to All Bureaus and 
Offices, Navy Department, July 31. 1940. Philibert Collec~ 
tion, Box 154. 


purer. igministration. 61. 


ank Knox, remarks mece before a conference of‏ ہے 
naval district public relations officers, Weghington, D.C.,‏ 
July 31, 1941, quoteó in D Hn Dougles, “Public‏ 
Relations, United States N‏ 
"Hereafter cited as Douglas,‏ .)1941( 6721432 « 
"Public Relations.”‏ 


å 
ا نا سب‎ worked for newspapers for three years 
following graduation £rou high school in 21908. Later. 
مامت‎ a n at Princeton, he was on the staff of the 
۱ 9 anian (Forer, Adoinistratigen. 95). 


— internal memoranda af the Public Relations 
Branch of OHI, contained in file “Public Relations Yolicy, 
1930-1949.“ Philibert Collection, Bow 154. 





ewar. Harry R. Thurber, USN, “Navy Public 
Relations, July 1940-May 1941," undated memorandum report 
te the Director of Naval History, quoted in part in Scovel, 
"Helm'a À'Lee." 166-184. Hereafter cited as Thurber, 
"Navy Public Relations. * 


14 emo. , George Marvin to Director of Naval 
History, undated, Mhilibert Collection, Box 156. 


l5scoveil, "Helm's A'Lee," 125-27. 


Frank Knox to Hareld O'Flaherty, April 7.‏ ورڈ 
Frank Knox Papers, Manuscript Section, Library of‏ ,1941 
Congress, Washington, D.C., BOR 4.‏ 


i. Mertz, personal ínterview, Washington,‏ رید 
D.C., April 16, 19۶8۰  Hereafter citeód as "Mertz Interview."‏ 
Miss Mertz, administrative and information assistant to the‏ 





53 


Director of Naval History until her retirement in January 
1971, served as a civiliísn information assistant in the 
Navy Office of Public Relations during World War II. 


ig 


19 ne foregoing information on the beginnings of 
the Havy'g wartime combet photogrephy progran was obtained 
from three sources: Ltr., Chief of Naval Operations te 
Chief of Bureau of Navigation. August 28, 1940 (Serial 
19315), and memo... Ens. Allan Brown, UENR, to Lt. Cmóáór, 
karol O'Flaherty, USER, September 25, 1941, OOR~5 (139), 
Philibert Collection, Sowes 154 and 155 respectively; and 
Mertz Interview. 


Scovei, “Helm's A'Lee," 130. 


“Navy Public Relations,” 168.‏ و و تھے 


هد دو 217 


۱ کب‎ Haven (Conn.) Journ: ۱ 5 
1938. For a detaile losk at the — — security 
restrictions at this tims, see Becurity Letters 1-6, 1938, 
from Chief of Naval Operations to All Ships and Stations. 
contained in file “Public Relations Policy, 1930-1940," 
Philibert Collection, zox 154. 





23 arious letters, memoranda and naval messajes, 
Philibert Collection, Box 154. 


Aree, Chief of Naval Operations to All Ships and 
Stations, Decewber 20, 1949 (Serial 1240416). jhid. 


2 Frank Knox to multiple addressees. 
December 31, 1940 (Serial 0293916), quoted in Thurber, 
“Navy Public Relations,* 179-180. Thurber also discusses 
the rationale behind tne dispatch ef this letter: The Joint 
Army-Navy Board hac agreed in 1937 that any future wartime 
press and radio censorship shouid be voluntary and self- 
imposed, at least in the beginning; it was assumed that the 
United States would become involved in World War II on the 
side of the British; in Worló War I, such a list of 
avoidable subjects was not issved until seven weeks after 
the war had begun; and, finally. it was reasoned that “an 
educational pecled in voluntary censorship would be 
mutually beneficial to the agencies concerned and the 





Navy.” 

"Navy Public Relations,” 130.‏ 7 و ہے 

P George D. NcHillan, — Publicity in the 
Impact of War," Pub Qu n. p. 51387 (1941). 





Haseafter cited as McMillan. "Government Publicity.” 





: 


i 
۱ 
1 





o e E‏ ق 





ایس ) vos‏ هله هننم ۱ 


CK! 





$4 


S nurber, Bia. e 
ater E. Schneider, یبا سي وبيس‎ T 
ments in Voluntary Censorship Plan.” Edi | 

May 3, 1941. p. 5. 





30 rnold Kruekaoaen, extract from Jlass Digest 
(February 1941), Philibert Collection, Bex 155. 


“Robert Humphreys, "How Your Mews is Censered, “ 
872 i Post, September 26, 1942, p. 17. 





32 


MeMillen. “Government Publicity,” 363. 


3 و3‎ attic 


340, peek Under the Navy Lid.” Mewawnek. 
September 23, 1941, p. 53. 


35 tte, Director of Publíc Relations to All Heavy 
Publio Relations Officers, October 22, 1941, U.S. Navy 
Department, Office of Public Relations, General Files 
(EN-117), Record Group 80, War Recorós branch, Naval 
Records Section, Nationai Archives, Washington, D.C. 
Hereafter cited as "Record Group 30." 
36navy Department press release, June 4, 1941, mná 
MENO., RAH. Arthur J. Hepburn, USH, to Office of Public 
Relations, June 3, 1941, soth contained in file “Junuary~ 
dune, 1941," Philibert Collection, Box 155. 


37 trs. , Chief of Naval Operations to All Ships 
anû Stations, Merch 17, 1941 (Serial 247216), an te Naval 
District Commandants, March 19, 1941 (Serial 3980616), 


Ran. September 12, 1941. 





39 Secretary of the Kavy to All Bureaus and 
Offices, Navy Department, April 28, 1941 (Serisl 959416), 
Recoró Group 80. The Army's Bureau of Public Relations was 
established on Pebruary 1l, 1941, under the supervision anc 
gontrol of the Secretary of the Army {James R. Mock and 
Cedric Venen. “Publie Relations of the U.S. Army,” Public 
dos uaxly. 5:277 (1941). Hereafter cited as Mock 
and 0——w “Remy Public Reletions."). 


395ouglas, "Public Relations," 1434. 









40 بعس‎ Also, tertz interview. 
4Alscovel. "Hein's A'lee," 129. 


له سے 





a i ۱ 


p TATE e 


-Mai qum 





asc m 


55 


۰ Cmdr. William M. Galvin, USM, remarks wade 
before & conference of naval district public relations 
officers in Washington, D.C.. duly 20°21. i941, recorded in 
simeographed minutes of conference, p. 125, Philibert 
Collection, Row 155. Wereafter cited as “1941 PRO Gonfer- 
ence," 

43 ی‎ 5, ۷ — Office of Public Bas Lat ions. 
Baval Districts Section. Public Be! ma Rullatin, No. 4, 
February 1, 1943, pe l, ihid.. Box 156. This bulletin was 
& monthly newsletter issued by OPR during tho war for 
publie relations officers of the Navy, Marine Corps ang 
Coast Guard. 

44 various sources were consulted in detailing the 
erganigetion ef the Office of Public Relations in Hay 1941: 
Thurber, “Navy Public Relations," 166-184; Douglas, “Public 
Relations,” 1434-37; “N News for Your Newspaper, ” 
Amaricmn Exesasg (July 1941). p. 3: and personnel directories 
of OPR dated May 3, 1941, and June 15, 1941, Philibert 


See Chief of Haval Opsratiíons t$0 Coomandants. 
Heval Districts, Mey 9, 1941 (Serial 4190509), U.S. Navy 
Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Oporations, Naval 
History Division, Operational Archives Branch, Clagsi fied 
Files of the Office of the Chief of Keval Operations anû 
Files of the General Board, Heries 441. It is interesting 
to note that à subsequent letter from the Director ef Naval 
Zatelligence (June 24, 1941, Gerial 1545014. also in the 
above series file) transferred tha responsibility for a 
1 list of naval reserve officers on inactive duty to the 
Off of Public Relations. Ga the list were Lieutenant 
Commanders Axthur Gedfirey and Walter Winchell and 
Lieutensnt (junior grade) Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. 
46 naval message, Decret&rcy of the Navy to 
Commendants, Naval Districts, June 7, 1941 (150906200) , 
Philibert Collection, Box 155; anê ltr., Secretary of the 
kavy M multiple addressees, August 22, 1941 (A3-1), Record 
Group 80. 














4? Organization Chart for Public Relations Office, 
Third Xeval District," June 320, 1941, Philibert Collection, 
Bex 155. 


48 .عع‎ Lt. Cmér. John T. Tuthill, Jre, UGR, to 
Lt. Cadr., Narci O'Flaherty, USK, October 8, 1941. Record 
Group 80. 





— (4 








56 


4 9 جر وی‎ Interview. 


S roug las, "Public Relations,” 1435., The War 
Department initiated these wartime public relations cenfer- 
ences with a meeting of Army public relations officers in 
Washington, March 11-14, 1941 (Mock and Larsen, "Army 
Public Relations," 279). 


5lopistribution of Navy Department Press Releases 
by Raval District Publio Relations Officers," mimeographed 
handout distributed et conference of naval district public 
relations officors, July 298-31, 1941, Washington, D.C., 
Philibert Collection, Box 155. 


5 ! 

SEE. Director of Public Relations to 
Commandants, Naval Districts, August 14, 1941, O0n-6(39), 
containe& in file “Separate Air Force," ihid.,. Box 157. 
Copies of the congressional bilis referred to above 
(H.R.s 4532, 4962, 49987 and 5101 and &.1635, 77th Congress, 
ist Session), along with the June 12, 1941, letter from 
Prank Knox to Walter Lippmann, the special Navy News 
Bulletin end the two Navy position papers are also 
contained in this fiie. 


334A Paek Under the Kavy Lid," 53. 


9A tr. , RAdm. Arthur J. Hepburn, USN, to RAs. 
‘é@olpnus Andrews, VSR, undated, contained in file 
“Separate Air Force.” Philibert Collection, Bex 157. 


She — and War Departments had been working 
with the Post Office and Justice Departments since shortly 
after World War I on wartime censorship plans. On dune 4. 
1941, President ioosevelt approved a plan submitted by the 
Joint Army-Navy Board and appointed the Postmaster General 
to heed a comnittea to finalize details of the plan the 
following November (U.S5. Bureau of the Budget, 
peram Washington, 1946. pp. 206-07). 


58 وود هن‎ ARuna. September 5, 1941. 


" "Navy's Plans for Overseas Comaunicationa Control 
Frogre&siimj," Navy Department news release, October 15, 
1941, Philibert Collection, Box 155. 


582,۱8 memoranda of the Office of Public 
Relations, October 24 and Movember 17, 1941. inig. 
Fane above data on personnel anc organizational 
changes in OPR were obtained from various letters and 





57 


menorenda, inid., and from Thurber. “Savy Public Relations,” 
183. 


585,8. Bavy Department, Office of tho Chief of 
Haval Operations, Naval Higtory Division, "United States 
Naval Administration in World War II," unpubiished narra- 
tive history of the Fifth NEsvel District, 45-46. 


6lopirectory of Public Relations Officers, District 
and Fleet Units,” November 26, 1941, Philibert Collection, 
Box 155. 


C2prank Knox, 1941 PRO Conference, Be Se 





CHAPTER III 
THE VIRST YEAR OF HOSTILITIES 


On December 7, 1941, 360 Japanese carrier-nased 
aírcraft, operating from a neval striking force at sèa, 
heavily attacked ships of the U.S. Facific Fleet and 
military installations at Paarl Harbor and other locations 
on Oahu, Territory of Hawali. Four battieships, one mine” 
Layer and one target ship were sunk; four battleships. 
threes cruisers, three destroyers, ome seaplane tender ax! 
one repair ship were damaged. The Navy Yard and Naval Base 
at Pearl Harbor; W&val Air Station, Pord Island; Naval 
Patrol Plane Station, Kaneohe; Marine Cerps Airfield, twa; 
and Army airfields at Hickam, Wheeler ané Bellows all were 
damaged. One hundred eighty-ccight naval ang Army aircraft 
were destroyed. Killed or mlesing wese 2,004 Havy wen, 222 
Army personnel and 109 Marines. The Japanese lost five 
midget subm&rines, twanty~eight aircraft and fewer then 100 
men, * 

This is what happened at Pearl Harbor, but the 
P-mericon people were not given the complete story 


officially until s& ysar later. 


58 





i ah joyas sape ana a a iang 
مب نس سو دو سا مد نم ولس ہد‎ 

— ü — —— —— — 
code mx هت مرم میس‎ Limma — —— 
سس‎ 
پس‎ mee pum) (em wm — dome mien dis cia mM 
از ارد مدا انه وای فا تسار می‎ 
me ami in ill وت غوسن ریه ی نیس‎ 
CIT posl —-— 
et) it at yews aem وسسدلښی بس‎ 3 































— 


D ame 















دا 


$i‏ او eet te‏ ےہ ہی سےم ہم یں 
qum ann dib anig.cm std‏ 


نه 





59 





Within hours after the attack, the Nsvy's plen for 
censorship of all outgoing ceble and radio comaunications 
was placed in effect. Also, when queried hy reporters, 
Army and Navy public relations officers simply repliec that 
they had no information aná had been inatructed “net to 


talk on any subject, "^ 


The Nàvy further refuseó to allow 
the press to reprint a broadcast by Nashington coxmentator 
Fulton Lewis, r.e, in which he had given considareble 
Getails of the attack obtained from congressional sources. د‎ 

Finally, on Decemoer 15, the Navy did announce that 
three destroyers, a minelayer and a target ship wers sunk, 
one battleship hed capsiged ami other vessels had been 
damaged. In the interim, however. eyewitnesses brought 
back firsthand accounts of much greater damage, and 
Amarican radio stations and newspapers freely reported tie 
exaggerated claims of the anemy picked up on Jepanese radia 
broadcasts. The disparity between the official announce- 
ments and the unofficial accounts led te wild rumors that 
persisted for many months. It also contributed materially 
to the dissatisfaction with war news policies hy beth the 
press and public that marked the first year of the 
eenflict.* 

Public disapproval was slow in developing, however. 
Anger, fear and patriotic fervor were manifest in the 
hearts and minds of most Americans immediately following 


** 

ف سے وم رھ 

e et eee comet GED‏ ل س a‏ وا ہے 
ات متسش ان ملس on Uu Mee cms cd‏ 
um‏ مد < en‏ مساساس دوس رووا —— — 
اس هغه کن —— ست لس پ رویہہ-م ما د 
سے ې ې mx ded‏ ` غه مسر ندبد وى ټم بد mui‏ 
شی وس >> zmr d y ld e am‏ 
غه ده جنس تر سا کے سےا س 












— | pou اټ‎ saiua roc m وسل دد نس‎ 





„s —— s à اي‎ alt d teu ے‎ uli mmi] 
مس مس‎ UU vaya à uae ے مسر رسہرو‎ cheques OE 
حل "ينال مال فا لياصا ب سی ہس اس سے‎ 
انى سم سم پټ‎ a 
w (espt ra — — قت دنهس‎ 

A baron (Leow کات کے س سسوم‎ A 
ال للا بت سشم مس ټم مستم مسل‎ ٨ 
wears Cee a> sme e> فا فة‎ | 
















- 





60 
Pearl Harbor. In & peil conducted by the Office of Pacts 
&nà Figures in eerly January 1942, 53 per cent of the 
public agreed that withholding details of our losses end 
damage at Pearl Harber was justifiable in order to avoid 
helping the enamy.” Twenty-nine per cent even went so far 
as to state that the people had no right at all te expect 
the story on losses any sooner than they got it. Only 7 
per cent felt that there was no axcuse whatsoever for 
delaying the initial news for a whole week, while 6 per 
cent said they could understand why the government wanted 
to hoid it back but thought it did more harm than good. 

A related question about future handling of news 
concerning military losses was quite revealing of the 
public’s ambivalent attitude over the news versus security 
.ه180‎ Almost 74 per cent of those polled believed that 


military losses should be announced as soon as confirmed, 





Interestingly enough, 13 per cont felt that bad news of 
this nature should be withheld antil some geod news could 
be released with it, while a@ sizable 10 per cent considered 
the best policy would be not to &nnounce news of our loases 


at all. 





The eariy public acceptance of the necessity to 


maintain security was due in some measure to President 


a 
ü—— a a aN ef 
وی موس هو وب‎ entem 
س۸ښمه مې ملاسا فلس عم دم رس ہیں‎ — 
رھدج سو سے ےت‎ 
> - nm —— — — — I — ° سے‎ a pinia 
ee وی ہد‎ £n me» — —— 
> chm sk es qué) AAA summas wr omni co quoe dii 
ee وو سس اد‎ 
سسای د ہی‎ ee نې‎ NN 
مس‎ -—À a rai Rien سد اس‎ aa 
ېی مر پس‎ camo Lom Ae has ek lle ده كدت له‎ 
سم‎ ۵ ot ae dme eA 
ہیف‎ Ae m dae m es co ⸗⸗ 
cd m — c em bent تنام تا‎ 
un^ Kette aec «cde Ke quan پس‎ PF mA — 
esame am nmm am Ames کرمید سر‎ semen en 








bit mem cm (A — — —‏ — مه نې وټ 
t~ ——— — —‏ 
1 قر te ٢‏ مو مس mn‏ 
umm d ue m se dimma pitoe Saai:‏ ——— 
۷ کت 











ima 
4 
۱ 





63 
Roosevelt's speech the day after Pearl Harbor in which he 
outlined initial cules for news shout the wer, First, the 
accounts must be true, he said, and secondly, thay must not 
giva "aid and comfort te the enemy.” Significantly, when 
asked who was to determine what information would fali in 
the latter category, the President replied that it would be 
up to the higher officers of the Army and ووه‎ Thus, at 
the very outset, the decision whether or not to release war 
news was lef: to military sources. 

The first area of secrecy. however, resulted from a 
direct order issued by the President himself. Wo casualty 
lists were to be published. it was reasoned, with 
considerable justification, that the eneny might induce 
from a completa list of nares ths ships end stations to 
which the dead and wounded were attached. Only the death 
of Rear Admiral Igaac C. Kidd was Bunounced immediately. 
The first official casualty lists were not released until 
three months later.’ 

Many Army and Navy officers were convinesd that the 
Japanose could have cocupisd Pearl Barbor if they hac 
followed up their airs attack with an invasion. Tha reagon 
the enemy didn't. accerding te these officers. was that he 
ği not know the full extent of the damages he had 


8 


inflicted, despite his propaganda clains. This assumption 


on the part of the American military was responsible in the 


iu 

ه11" سد Vat qu SUD‏ اسار ap onde s evel‏ 
اس که له د ب م خا صف دلب سه ی. 
vo tile tae Ge CS‏ ہے Jom‏ ڈا سا وانسے۔ سس 
لا یر اله مته oe‏ ناه سا از رز u‏ 
تا تین -ud a ell weed‏ 
٧ه‏ هاا وت هام Jen mal wi‏ يی > 
re 2‏ ناتك سس ینی' کہ سسے ہے 
سه سه دل — 

تک eee Na‏ مس مسب ہے 
لک تخت ف dA)‏ حوب نوس سه ہے عهم 
لس ed d rmm‏ سالا٧م.‏ د سس دہ 
aa‏ لا Gem oe‏ له رمس 
ndi aen d UNE‏ »اهم ور اص انس ot emul‏ 
نے کے وا تہت نہ اکا سس went su‏ 
لل سه مخفتا تر د سی سو مس 
۱ سا زا انا چوس iim baidi‏ 





























o- m | «doin dub) DS E 
مس صاع مر مس وسم سب مسا‎ 

فنا سم — — — 
اک ی ! " E"‏ 







62 
eaxly stages of the war for a very Strict interpretetion of 


what information would give aid ané comfoxvt to the enemy. 


fhe Navy aepecially clamped down the lic of secrecy, 
particularily in the fleets and at advance bases where naval 
censors commandscred every outlet of communications. In 
Washington, Secretary Knex rescinded his September relaxe- 
tion of the ban on publicity for Sritish and Alliec warships 
in 0.8. waters, asking cence ayain that there be no mention 
of the presence Or movemunts of these vessels. Later in 
December, he requested the news mecia to refrain from 
publishing reports and rumors of U.S. forces Sinking enemy 
submarines, unless they could be attributed directly to an 
official goverrment spokesman.” 

The secretary also took steps to engure internal 
security. On DLecember 17, he directed tho istrict 
commangants to acquaint 211 naval &nd civilian personnel 
under thair commands with their incgividual responsibility 


10 in the 


for observing naval aná nationali security. 
directive, he modified two of the voluntary censorship 
categories ha had asked tho press to guard against à year 
earlier. The publicity restriction on “new U.S. Navy ships 
or aircraft” was extended to “strength of military 
disposition,” and the restraint on "U.5. Navy construction 


projects ashore” was changed to "productive capacity for 


7" 
ple‏ — بے - con ° a‏ انا ات نا شین eu‏ 
ات اس -iy aum‏ ونو سم فغنست  co‏ په ome‏ 











۱ p^ ~ dall 
Se مد از تا‎ 

a a P"‏ ی ا سے کے لا م 
تم مه ری ھا دا سبع سے که سین 
ویج و ہشیر ی ہم سے 5 

سم سومحم نس :وای نن سس ہے ہہے۔ 
۰ لن تش em‏ ومح للقيو نز ۱۵ دی تہ و سای 
4 وښ مقانس کے سمل سم رن و مه ووي 
سه سپ ې سپغست ےی as ond Mam tom‏ 




























رس حم سی موی سے 
سلوی اس Aas‏ نہ هاس سسسوج cov‏ 
— — 

"اا ښوا د سه سا ا ست 44 
al ۸ i‏ فتوسياة الله موس 

o |‏ 
Hd dbi |‏ 
Dem dm‏ صن ree ee‏ عن یں 
رکالم غ!د دز بت تب سن 
ا هس سے 
پا — — کے مت 


کے کے - ۳ 














Ge 
certain items usec by the Navy." Stii1 caught on the horns 
of tho dilemma, however, Knox closed his instructions by 
cautioning the commandants not to let their security 
indoctrination procedures interfere with the dissemination 
ef unclassified news by the cistrict public relations 
offices. "The Navy must at all times keop the public 
informed on all matters not involving actual Naval or 
national security.” he admonished. 

The Navy‘s wain difficulties with thè press at this 
time centere round the censorship of cable, wireless and 
telephone messages ieéving the Horth /weerican continent. 
Foreign correspondents in particular complained bicteriy 
ebout the delays in clearing messajes, failure to notify 
writers of Geletions in their material and the almost 
insurmountable difficuities encounterede with foreign 
language dispatehesa. ^ group of british journalists 
@ppealea cirectly to Secretary Knox to alleviate the situa-~ 
tion. anc representatives of the Foreign Press Association 
conferred with other Heavy officials. څک‎ 

Meanwhile, the Acmy teok the initiative in 
éttempting to establish better press relations during this 
€eritical period. Gn December i19, officials of the War 
Department invited editors and publishers of ali daily 
newepapers to discuss the status of war correspondents and 


"other things touching upon relations between the Army ans 


ف 
nm‏ 
ا 
مها رہہ و ای 
p sica ~y‏ 
** — جم 
— 
z‏ — — 
حور مه و نے ares‏ — 
= تا — — 
2 = — پخ یي یی 
: = — — —— 1 سا 
= ظ یلم thar a‏ 
—— —- = 
oro az vu r9‏ 
— — — 
s‏ 2 *. — 
di un‏ — ——- 
۱ = نر دې A‏ 
— — 
۱ هم ونت ېی a an‏ 
| — — هب ریات 
* — 
ات — 
hin. Lad D^ E sine‏ 
"mar pe -‏ 

















































LI 
دو ہے‎ 


I WEDEDOIS. i3 


inquiries ín Chicago shortly after Paar) Harbor, while Savy 


The Army also freely @newerec reporters" 


public relations representatives thare gaid "no news will 


be xseleesed until the situation is clarified in 
13 


Washing ton," 


AR IM RD i. 
The situation was clarified somewhat on December 19 





whon the President established the Office of Censorship 
under Byron Price, Executive News Editor of the Associated 
Press. The White Rouse order provided for a Censorship 
Policy Board, whose mexbership included the two service 
eacretarcies, and a Gensorship Operation; Bosró to be made up 
of representatives of wach government agency involved in 
censorship. +4 

The Office of Censorship soon wes to take over from 
the Kavy the troublesome task of controlling وا وود‎ 
incoming c@ble and radio communications. As fox domestic 
Genscorship, Mr. Price. @ firm advocate of freetion cf tha 
press, hac extracted a commitment from President Roosevelt 
that policing of the press ami cadio should be unilert eken 
by the news maria themselves. Thus, on the hom front. 
press consorship continued to follow the "voluntary coopera- 
tion" program instituted by Secretary Knox è year earlier. 
with the newspaper editere having the benefit of twelve 
months experience at deciding what news was printable and 


what was net.” 


ل 
o, eee‏ یس یمو سل سا وس و 
مهم ده شرب نستان پس et‏ سم بجعت rm‏ 
aeons comet Lim ibm.‏ — یس سے 
ee Lk baisa aih‏ ساح يا pa ca mns ma‏ 
اند سي ا 
— يس پو د 
کي نت ey‏ دیا مق به did‏ به 
ما seamen‏ 
amb — —‏ او C up aem‏ ما c———ÀÀ‏ 
oll at‏ کھے سم مهن papt s oð‏ 
د à AME‏ ہین سہم زم 3 په سي ہم 
jeje jedem wm Ai Gd‏ له 









































ee ell id wets tee‏ ہہ کے اف ae‏ دس 
ن وی مج و سس م ا 
سین تک ہی "uU.‏ سس ا سے فسروں 
€ + اس سسټري دو هس ۱ یہ 
a deena:‏ ہس ویو و Homo‏ 
غين ۵ا وه bee cag‏ ہس نے —» — — 
سه سفاہ تصرف کی سا مہ ود 
رمضم dresi‏ 4 — — 
7 سم دو ^ 
ws D‏ | 















in Ls 












وه 
Mr. Price, however, Gid not rely on the newamen's‏ 
experience ox Knox's guidelines for voluntary censorship.‏ 
in January 1942, after consultation with the Army and Navy‏ 
ang ether government agencies as weil &s prominent ecitors‏ 


and broadcasters, he igsued a 








the code spelled out certain clageas of 
information which the news media were requested rot to 
divulge unless made available to them by appropriate 
authority. Of special pertinence to the Mavy were the 
following restricted categories: 
(1) The wovementa., identities and cargoes of navel and 
merchant ships, including those of our allies and 
enemies; and the sinking or damaging of these ships 
from war causes. 
(2) Details of new ships under construction, including 
advance informetíon about Launchings and commission- 
ings; and the physical setup or technical details 
of shipyards. lò 
It should be emphasized that the censorship code 
applied to the press and not the Navy. If under the code 
the press was asked not to publieh certain information, 
that same information eould be released by the Navy if ít 
SO degired. By the same token, 8 story cleared by the Navy 
could be published even Lf it contained information which 
wes restricted by the voĉe. 

Mr. Frice attached a proviso to his code in which 
he promised that news on all of the prohibited subjscts 
Would ultimately be released by the government. “But in 


war.“ he said, *eime lire ae ia an import ant factor, ena the 


مه 
r 7‏ فس سه سر ای O9‏ به سم 
ان ان خش انيس س m‏ مم می سن 
ees velt. ONT fee TB‏ ارس Qe moms n» cad‏ 
هغه ee‏ سم مد ه ممسم وس 
NE‏ اسیو ف تەس ا¡ جه عاص پو س 
کی jam.‏ ۰ 
ae des ges Siooe "mé C Gao muisccnia)‏ یې 
A 9— od o) ss Am) tm cium amd opr‏ 
"—————M— O aiina‏ 


A کا‎ 


.وسو د٥‏ پوت سم 
a‏ 


vin = SSS SS ر‎ 


mass d dos dV‏ رس gta, ee‏ س 
ای نس سن بپ مس wa Wake ee‏ 
لو دت سس 
Aa‏ مه ته سرسم» یي Jb Wa vmm ase‏ 
ات ملب اناد د سسبن وس ين سه reb‏ 
n‏ - 4 د ا تاشن چرم بیت 
m -‏ وې ۲٢‏ 
M‏ وى تاه سان رہ امن ہت کے asm‏ 
lh‏ ت م ت وجار فت مء 
— ج 
سیو عن مس 


















































۱ 
ma 


- 





0 
5 





66 
Government unquestionably is in the beat position to decide 


as The Navy's decisions on the 


when disclosure is timsly." 
timing of ita releases, as we shall see, were to draw much 
criticis during the first yeer of the wer. 

The Office of Censorship had no responsibility for 
issuing information. This wes a Gepaxture from the proce= 
Gure followed in World War I, when the functions of cenmor- 
ship aw information were combined under the Cresl Committee 
on Public informetion. The separation of the functions in 
World War if resulted from President Keosevelt's acceptance 
Of the censorship plan drawn up by the Joint Army-Navy Board 
in 1937 and presented eariy in 1941." 

There wre a number of naval officers directly 
attached to tbe Office of Censorship throughout the war for 
the purpose of security review. Relations between tha 
Bavy'a Office of Public Relations and the “censorship 
poepie” were very good, according to Captain Harold B. fay, 
USNR (Retired). 36 The news mecia for the most part dealt 
directiy with the Navy if they had any questions about the 
Security status of Navy topics. At other times, newsmen 
would first contect the Offico of Censorship, ani that 
Office would then celi the Navy to check out the item. For 
these calls, Cagtain Say claimed, his effice had an informal 
code worked out with "censorship" to circumvent the reloc- 


tance of Navy eparational officers to release material. 


۳ æ e 
ole ند دس يس ماس یه‎ P سسسه ر ال‎ 
وې‎ ime come یی‎ ees ده انس تک‎ 
کس إن ميت وت‎ ud Lite Ww oes افکټ یه )نه‎ 
= نه مو د‎ KA a wie Sie 
ot (gest —— o uM ۱ لله‎ 
—— ad a) ud À awe AUN — 
— — گا وی دا وپ ون را شب بي‎ 
ہے‎ 
سے دہ ی‎ wel Se lhe eee سوسس سه‎ 0۷ 
ان حم‎ P b فقو بر عو و ومهره -. ات مونسم.‎ 
i, es quel د غا تا وام ات مرم یي‎ 
Ci pwe a elode adhait Rad ria a) 

(suoni tavi) Dre on ttem o od S 
d cue amd ee ون ته فا ینت ا ص اسن‎ 
e more momin mS A — — 
ا ما سم اميم مين‎ 6 
ات سس سے یسید جمسویننے دس ت۳۳‎ 
Mies — i am aber dem um سم"‎ 4 
کی سرن جس ری‎ m^ vua 1 yat ma پا‎ 
smp smi Am, o qm qu سب‎ 
— — — — awe — Sele | 
ہو ومر د بے رہ ہہب‎ cda Lime ante daga 
— mam And rn وہ‎ | 







































é 
LA J 













67 
If OPA wanted the subject in question released, Say would 
Simply ask tbe censorship caller, “Are you asking me or 
telling ume?" Once the Office of Censorship cleared an 
item, the Navy would sey nothing about it. 





When the United States entered the war, there were 
six civilian agencies of the federali government involved in 
propagania and information activities. The moat recent of 
these to be formed was the Office of Facts ami Figures 
(OFF), established in October 1941 under poet Archibald 
Maàcieish to coordinate the wotk of the other information 
organizations. 21 

the policy-making body for OFF was its Committee on 
War Information, cozyosec of representatives fron various 
government agencies, including the Army and Navy. The Kavy 
representative, appointed by Secretary Knox, was Adlai 
Stevenson, who later served as Governor of Illinois ami was 
twice & PresiGential candidate. 

To offset the impact of Poarl Serbor and the 
resuiting cloax of secrecy surroundim; naval operations, 
Ms. Stevenson proposed a “project in public education” to 


22 "he thrust 


restore the public's confidence in the Navy. 
of this propaganda effort was to be directed at the Navy's 
many ganctions, cesponsibilitise and limitations in s 


global war. Assisting Mr. Stevenson on the project wan 


d eS‏ خسن بو 
Ne vignin‏ دہ e n‏ ا gs ag‏ = © 

لس e “tom‏ سب نتاس داد — — — 
— — — — یت سار کس لد 


— T 
سرت ہے‎ Daa uate eee 7 
ei lent ہیف‎ On ams چلو «مرنيې ند عا‎ 
1 سا‎ aM مر ریت‎ ld a | 
uoc DLE 

9 مه مپېيفي» A — CH)‏ 
رت 
و سنج — 
سرت P‏ مړ سوب په 
— اخس ندز رهس res diy‏ 
س fete‏ ای o enm‏ مسج »سه ine‏ 
۴ عم یس موسر ده یسر ور جا لہ سد سے 
SS res.‏ 
o n pee e AM‏ 
Se —‏ 
# ې سم 


و باي دم 






0 
























66 

Christian Herter, OFF*s liaison officer in the Savy Bepart- 
ment an! later Secretary of State under President 
Eisenhower. 

The first step in the effort was to be a campaign 
to esphaaize the “colossal character of war operations in 
the Pacific" py atressing the magnitude of geography, time 
differentials and other considerations concerning the worid's 


s" The task wes l&beleÓO "Project Proposal 


largest ocean. 
No. 2" of OFF, aud Aósiral Hepburn essigned Wallace &. 
Wharton, the head of his press section, to act و" #ډن ود‎ 
Liaison officer for the praject. 

Evidentiy this rather intriguing attempt at domestic 
propaganda never saw fruition, fer the author was unéble to 
find additional references to it Leyonc the two memoranda 
cited. It did serve aa an exemple, however, of the type 
Gf liaison conducted between the Office of Public Relations 
and the Other government information &jencies in the early 
stages of the war. 

Lieutenant Commander Wharton also was assigned to 
represent àójmira) Hepburn at daily meetings held after 
Pear] Harbor at the headquarters of Colonel William Donovan, 
the President's Coordinator of Information (CGI). In late 
January 1942, Bill Galvin, the Analysis Section chief, 
replacoó Wharton as liaison officer with Do 





novan's group. 
Since the COI had been assigned the task of handling 
foreign propaganda, orne of the chief functions of the NE&vy 








be 

na altda mehkih ۱۸۵ «aa,‏ ہف ون عہموں- 
one) V‏ 
ےہک —- بب سرت لم Tue a om o Ab a‏ 
له — «ua‏ 'سوفووتن مسج مه =< om‏ 
 -—— cà Jp bum MAP lape ge “eine! ale‏ —— 
رمعم مق وه ناس مم لون کے چ کین 
الاسم عدون "ل ين مه e‏ دم sm andes‏ 
کې Seen? reps inci ba Ai ٤١‏ سریس وہ 
oom‏ > سس« 
venias rentals‏ هود اف جوویہمہ 
to 7‏ سس سس« 
om) legi hd eer a‏ ہس ہجوت ماسب کی os alien‏ 
كلم غا بي ووس اى را دیس لس سم ee‏ 
ففوھا۔ ren Gio ae‏ م X — m‏ — 
hd de‏ — سسیښم وسم off‏ انس cilmes de‏ عرس بره 
ch om diem iA a nih AS‏ ووس 
— تام سي وچ-پ- دجو eee a ad‏ < 
— ڈراو چو ری جو دو 
I rtt‏ سسسب جه Ln‏ انیس MA‏ 
—— := 
r — P‏ لس نس تو يموم پس 

عو ai nup‏ 
3 " یی غاب وو 

































— — -v 













59 
contact officer was to provide Navy news and information 
for dissemination abroad by ghorzt-wéve radio. 

Similar to the Office of Censorship, the COI also 
had = number of Navy officers atteched directly to his 
stars. سوا‎ of these, as we have already seen, was 
Lieutenant Commander John Ford, the Hollywood motion picture 
director, who headed the Visual Presentation Section ani 
hed sixteen naval reserve officers under his direction in 
that GOI unit. Colonel Donovan's principal assistant also 


n&val reserve officer.**‏ 8 وتم 


Knox. Iana Stape to inform Punlíc 

Shortly after the attack on Fear} Harbor, Secretary 
Knox flew to Hawaii for e firsthand easessment of the 
situation. He returned convinced that secrecy on fleet 
Operations in the Pacific would be paramount for some timo 
to come anc that it would be necessary to withhold other 
forms of information about the Navy's war effort as well. 
Akt thw same time, he was determined to provide ag much nawa 
fer the public as pessibie within these security 
parameters. 

One of the first actions he took was to bring 
Dempster MacMurphy, business manager of the Chicago LDRÀly 
Haa. to Washington to survey Nevy public relations needs, 
assets anc l1ie»ilitiíies,.  MacMurphy Gic not remain long; he 


Quickly ren into opposition from many of the Regular Navy 


e 
هن س ت چا سو ١م مل سن‎ 
مها یې هب ہمستہ مون‎ 
لک صا و يی وم له ټمسم.. ے وی وم‎ 
«<< عا يت وا سم‎ 
سب ہی‎ aisle مه وټ مو سان‎ "135 











اوس وټ هسو ند تسس مب 
سے ظ٭یلہ خڅوې ھ وس camem‏ سم 
Jedem © oo — — —‏ + 
نض 4 wa = a a ae ma‏ 
همل نر زې we a (here hisel‏ سس دا 









ات مس لم oie c^ quse ma m Adam ad‏ ملس 

diee wh مر ودوم‎ gi نمور کد د‎ wt. 
=m a —— ہد دم‎ mme ہ۹ قو وضو‎ 
هرل واا سی وس هې‎ | 4 


| د پو لوم حمقنے ی wish M sum mma‏ 

















ive nane cum Ms a — y‏ بت 





70 
officsrs in the bureaus and offices anc nevar really got 
his study off the ground. ^" 

The basie formar for the release of kavy war news, 
the communique, took shape within a few weeks after Pearl 
KHarbor, however, ^" A Communique Officer, Lieutenant Con 
manger R. D. Bill, Jr., USER (Retired), was agsigneó to the 
Press Section of GPR to prepare at least one official 
communique daily. For this purpose, he wes provided with 
battle information and combat narrativos Ly the Publicity 
Security Officer on the staff of the Cowmanéer in Chief, 
U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), ard also received daily summaries 
from the Office of Naval intelligence. After crafting the 
communique, Hill sent coples to the Office of Cansaorehip 
ami the COI prior to its release by the Navy press relations 
officer, 7 

The key man in the naval communique system was the 
COMIMCH Publicity Security Officer. It was his responsi- 
bility. subject to higher &Buthority on the fleet commander's 
Staff ani to appeals from the Director of Public Relations. 
to decide the centent and timing of the communiques. Ne 
also vapresentec the security policies and views of COMINCH 
in Gealings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Coordinator 
of Inter~Awmerican Affairs, and later the Office of War 
Information. In addition, he prepared a weekly summary of 
Navy activities for use by the Secretary of the Navy at hia 


press conferences. This important post was filled by three 


wt 

تاسمه لطامت Se‏ 
هغه مس ده نے — 

ee a — — —‏ 
o A 2 lae n u, aD‏ وريد اروف 
مھ — — بی سے 
LU uh uat‏ فال ےھ ہس ہے مسب — 
اوی «n CP im amice‏ مه Gigs. Gm ctl o‏ 
lide met iat‏ م نصا Sod (o, oe QA eq‏ 
وود هداس مو ہین see‏ د هس SO MAS ^ fedem‏ 
صا ایم evi] TuS mh. ncmome‏ نج وس یہو 
سو سو سو "m‏ 
۳۵ 07 سم سی نت بے eaidil‏ دا مي 
رك وس ص كم سمت ب عله عمو وسح ہے 
































2 25 aS SEATS 
ہی‎ adi هر تم‎ wm نم‎ einen | 7 ید‎ 
s'en فا ر ج نفد بیس‎ 
سیا سے‎ ۱١ وسات سم بب ویج‎ 4 
Pe مسا متسد س ېب‎ 
Cat u en a mr eb à 
— — ۳ 
me up papó ما نب مب‎ .> — 1 
m gma gaen d Ss i halda قر‎ m ۱ 


AP stia T: هد‎ LLL 







— 





s 





73 
officers duxing the wac: Ceptain Theodore T, Patterson, 
USK, of the COMIBCH Plene Division, who had newopaper 
experisnee he fore entering the Naval AcaGeny--frcos 
December 1941 to June 1943; Captain John ©. Phillipe, متا‎ 
who became the first official Publicity Security Officer in 
the newly created Combat Intelligence Division of the fleet 
staff in Juma 1943; sand Captain مت‎ F. Walsh, USE. from 
merch 1945 to the end of the war. ® 

To supervise the issuance of comcuniquee anc other 
Navy war news releases by the Office of Public Relations, 
Gecretary Knox enticed Lieutenant Commander Paul C. Smith, 
VENR, editor end general manager of the San Francisco 
Ghrenicie, te return te active duty as head of the Press 
Section. He arrived ten days after Pearl Harber to relieve 
Lieutenant Commander Wharton, who hed aireacy begun 
functioning as liaison officer with OFF and the COI. Ina 
memorancgum to the chiefs ef Kavy bureaus anc offices. the 
eecretary announcec the arrival of Smith in glowing terms: 
(ue) "is one of tha most widely known and greatly respected 
editors of the country and he hes come to serve at a very 
great pergonal sacrifice." 

In the same memorandum. Knox asked each bureau and 
office chief to set Gown the security rules he wished to be 
observed for news coming out of his department. He aided: 

With these precautionary measures taken, I want 


each Bureau Chief to arrange so that the Public 
Relations Department will be provided freely with all 


1 
oink emai‏ - — 
— سد موہ وت سخ ہا رر مج کف 
otf amend aoe‏ ند ټوا هدن سپ دوج سب رہ 
دص وسل منم تہ tem mu la male mei,‏ 
m lll diii]‏ کس 
یچ و س ود در a‏ سار 
دس qa tt‏ فقففغاستت ا — tie oo‏ 
۹ ججحد سوہ E e‏ فا نان ۰ اف - نے اح 
مدي لسن وج فد Ly,‏ — 
ow dbo EN‏ ومسوی i rms‏ لم -—— 
سوليات ته ددس e‏ ممن بي مر س th) RS‏ بت 
و می هپې موي ۷ سو of‏ دہ ] روہ 
هنت مسب a‏ مه مک ment‏ 
سور یاپ حدیو مر کو وم a ame var‏ = 
ون سے د اشا ماماد ٠۰‏ وس ہے ہے مجا وانیو att‏ 
nd! anion yes‏ ہے ورزسزی سرہسو 
H‏ — — 

— 


مه 
eiae‏ ہم ہے 
, سے — — 
سے ہے — € و تا ی سم Lia‏ 


Eu iin 













































73 
information available that has nowa value. Eow much of 
this informetion is toe be released will be peseed upon 
by Admiral Hepburn. . o . In thio way I think we can 
set up a news handling system which will funetien 
enoethly and will achieve the purpose I have in mind. 
That purpees is to give te the newspapers and other 
sources of public information the maximus news of Navy 
activities that can be made public with due regard fer 
Wavy Security and the protection of essentially secret 
metter, 

The response to this memorandum was in most rospects 
negativo. The restrictions proposed by the naval military 
lesders, if instituted, would have been sufficient to 
tender the entire Navy public reletions program ineffective. 
For exemple, the Chiet of Havai Operations, Admiral Harold 
R. Stark. Submitted a list o£ thirty-eight subjects about 
which he believed no information whatsoever should be 
furnished to the press. According to AOcmirsl Hepburn, tnis 
List covered “the entire field of news which is pertinent 
fer inelusien in official cosmmigques if the public is to 
be Kept reasontbiy informed upon the progress of the war. „30 


۶:401: 1ه‎ Hepburn went on to say that the Havy's 





eariy war commeniques hed been criticized for “meegqornese, 
woodenness and evagiveness," and that steps would have to 
be taken to improve the system for receiving infermation. 
io recommended that there be given to an of ficer-messengjer 
of OPK current information from all bureaus ami offices on 
the status of the wer, The very s@me day, Secretary KACK 
forwarded the admiral's letter te all bureaus and offices 
with the terse statement: “The comments and recommendations 





۲ —⸗ 
juam Ue اسیو رم‎ Doimi f ۱ 

mud bed ٢|‏ — روه و پا رسیم ہم 

— جک عون راس ai eem een el mj er i,‏ 
مت تھے ہف ٠‏ لدب uinen brans ami‏ 
"APP‏ انساازی د رم م۷ nulo‏ سم تن تسسار 

— welcawamdud Uc bersb[mé یف‎ 

piding 00. wv ar!‏ ام ملف depu‏ لس 
بپ غ سب سب سم سسد نه m———‏ 

— à dje a li aa LUANG a ده لسلست‎ 

"٣ وښ وم ےھ وسواښت ترجہ پس‎ cmd 
som a a m ضفصندیٰ سیسن سم پ د‎ 


سل یم سنوی لد ماس ما ما وخم سو مي 
Pee o‏ وب The ime nevra: iis‏ = 
" لد = يم وم در 1۲۳۳۳ حم 
و و (o à EE‏ بصعت ين صني 

































73 
in Reference (a) are approved. Chiefs of Bureaus and 


Offices will take stepa to inaure effective cooperation 


with the Office of Public Relations, '! 


Frank Xnox's frustretion with the "security 
aynárome" of the military leadership seemed to reach its 
menith in the early stages of the war, amd he included the 
Aray in his bitterness. In February 1942, he wrote to 2 
friends 


With respect to the public relations policy. my 
difficulty @a @ life~long newspaper reporter ia to get 
the mes of the two arsec services to recognize that 
this is not a private war to be carried out surrepti~ 
siously, bat that, after all, the country belongs to 
the public and the public is entitled to know eli thet 
we cen tell them without giving away secrets to the 
enemy. Sut in simple terms. tha task is to sell thes 
ides that the people are to be told all that can be 
told them... inetead of es littie as possibla--the 
less the better. 

The latter, unfortunately. is the peacetime 
attitude of the Army and Navy. In a system where 
promotion is cependent upon recorda, the instinct of 
ths Arey or avy Officer when confronted with a 

porter ord B request for news is that if he says 
nothing he can't be hurt, but if he says something. it 
Wy be used to hia dissdvantajge. Therefore, they have 
poraved & policy of silenca consistentiy. 42 





The secretary himself, however, was at the canter 
of a controversy that developed in January and Pebruary 
19542 over the time of release of naval comaunitques. Since 
the wer began, the Washington corresponoents for morning 
hewspaápers h&i accused the Navy of timing ita releases to 
benefit the evening papers, one of which was Knox's Chicago 
UDALL. Renk. 

The issue came to a head on February 12, when 


ie 
ای د ۲ سد سنا‎ E ad. 
nio remi or pla diia 227 وسي‎ 
ik. تاساقف ووسر‎ Ds اه اعاب‎ Salm 

همه ومو تت بلس )2 Moma‏ 
irk û I ab FS e‏ سيا مو ووس ہہ 
m NM‏ »سه ۷ باه نتا.. عدم كم لما ن 
۸ نہ قب وب — لله em‏ م). y a mam set‏ 



















-~p d d ١ 
۱ mi-e | " 


له ih wit A nah Sf‏ لیس بب 
am oer A m‏ وو — 
سر سه — 

--— ری ا‎ a 


Page | 






74 
rumors apreaód that the Navy planned to release at noon the 
next day information about the Gilbert and Merghall islanc 
raiés on January 3l. A group of morning new&pBpermsen. led 
by Fred Pasley. ection; chief of the New York LhALly News 
Washington bureau, organized a telephone harassment campaign 
in an attempt to get the Navy to hold up tha release until 
the following evening ao that the morning papers could 
print it firat. Pasley haé additional word that the only 
two eyewitness correspondents embarkeé on the raids were 
reporters from the Chicago Sally Hews anû the Chicago LLluca. 
Me caustically told the Navy Preas Section: “it's not going 
to look well if the release is go timed that an exclusive 
eyewitness account by a Knox man Bppearg in a Knox paper 
and in papera served by à Knox syndicate, "?? 

The persistence of the morning newsp&parmen paid 
Off. It was decided to issue the initial communique about 
the raids on the evening of February 12, giving bare 
details for morning pepers, and to follow up with a move 
complete release at 9:30 the next morning for the afternoon 
journals. A memorandum for the press tho mext Cay struck 
back at the battling journalists by saying. “The Navy 
Department considered thig manner of release a fair distri~ 
bution of the news to all concerned.  Obviousiy, not 
everyone can be pleased in such a manner. Consequentiy,. 
there's the explanation, and that's that. 434 

Secretary Kuos had gotten wind of the controversy a 


۳ 






4 

حم od mmis — — CAMA kg‏ یم ور صمو ران 
oe © oe YE ae ۷‏ ا رش سوپ جس رہ 
he om sr!‏ 
ag? ge "o^ 44 "a oupe (m c fua» sa wu)‏ ہہ بمعف IA ma‏ 
aime pege parre ch) cc Q9 piares jimmina ati‏ 
«i‏ مسسمزنم (2e nm OI aii was emm mi? Ajo)‏ 
يو یسه 4۵ ۸3 ei ddiaa Odi‏ عه ې چم "alum X»‏ 
— — — — — — 
هوه ان gC r‏ 4 دہ پس u.‏ 

۰۰ل A‏ د عا لب يس ب — 
— سمیعہ دہ رس به اد سد عب 
انك ففف وم — — ادنس ندج 
وون ee ee‏ 
mt kt LIAE d‏ هع میں ہی 
— مسمس ص we o cmm cem oo‏ ہے 
قفا دہ am amo pte qo etia met qutkocmó ade‏ ويم 
ea vq‏ 









75 
week earlier. On February 5, he wrote to Admiral Kephurn: 

Although I am certain that this precautionary 

suggestion ig not necessary ae far as either you or 
your senior officers are concerned, nevertheless I wish 
you would take the necessary stops in the Offica of 
Public Relations so that under no circumstances will 
the representatives of the Chicago Baily Reus receive 
any more favorable treatment from Public Relations 
officers of the Navy Department than isa recuived by the 
correspondents or writers cf any similar newspaper 
under similar conditions. 32 

The secretary exhibited a personal concern for mëny 
fecets of public relations during the early part of 1942. 
He sent B letter to èll ships and stations encouraging 
commanding officers to be on the alert for publicity 
photography opportunities, citing several occasions on 
which there were no photographers on hend to recorà newge- 
worthy events. He also was extremely interested in a fund- 
raising drive for the Navy Relief Society. The campaign 
was chaired nationally by Clearance Dillon of Dillon, Read & 
Compeny, Mew York, but involved considerabile liaison work 
by the naval district pubiic relations officers, Waites 
Winchell, an inactive-cuty neveal reserve lieutenant com- 
maner, was New York chairmen. 

Another program which required public relations 
cooperation by tho Navy during 1942 was the effort on behelf 
of War Savings Bonds. Admiral Hepburn assigned ono of nis 
officers, Licutenant Commander Eugene Zachman, USHR, to 
conduct public relations activities for the Coordinater fer 
Wax Savings Borns, Rear Admiral Cherles Conrad, UBH 


(retired) . 36 












0 
نی وج‎ e ee e ۶ ومجم‎ — — 





لاي ول ووه ونیو به dist‏ پس wo‏ . 
که مه ه وموم P‏ ————— 
s es pauro piisav‏ یي چم اسر تې سن لا چم 
همون ېس دون b^ m — Qm ario‏ 
rel) ee‏ مب ò mum] ur‏ اه يی d‏ — 
QA‏ مق اع سو سوا امسو اد ءءء ett‏ 
اکتا دا غه د مې سور رسرب سی 

سه ساما اسان م cedi‏ رنھ م a -— ALII‏ 
پټ ده همو =i. wii ime “hee‏ رس 
om. tn mee ee‏ نم مر مس 
 - o‏ ات کاس 

⸗— — — —— 
iae‏ سس خدج عاك لہ eee‏ 
مندھا مہوت ee‏ ——- ہے .9 »یس 
ووو سم یی سب a nor cdm‏ 
r —‏ ده 
سح ہے ہے 


























76 
New Sublic Relations Faces ond Penotions 

When the war started, applications for comulssionsz 
as publie relations officers literally swamped beth 
Washington and the naval districts. At the same time, the 
number of public relations officers wes frozen, as were 
other specialties in the Navy. But within a few weeks. 
many of the younger officers serving in public relations 
assignments were detached for gea duty end other combet 
jobs. The rapid turnover in personnel. especially in the 
Gistriet offices, was complicated by the increased informa- 
tion workload brought on by the war. To compensate for 
these conditions, Secretary Knox initiated a policy of 
accepting for duty in public relations those officer candi- 
dates who hac minor physical defects sufficient to dis- 
qualify them for sea duty. 

The over-all guality of Havy public relations 
personnel thus began to decline somewhat from what it had 
been before the war, when officers were hand-picked for 
their special talents and capabilities. Evidence of the 
change was apparent in a menmoramiua written by Frank Mason 
in the fall of 1942 in which he aired & Rew York Times 
complaint about “young, inexperienced and irresponsible" 


37 The basis for 


naval reserva public relations officers. 
the newspaper's criticism was the fact that one of its 
stories had been reviewed by a former Timeg office boy who 


had suce\eeded in getting a Navy commission. 





n 
sein E CN mae Se DT 
md meine ies mme ⸗ 
sù eh wo ont 7 7 و‎ 
cee و وریہ سم سا مسر‎ 
۳۲ صوعملنښاڼی ٦م بے سب ہے‎ vade 
بسن کت ات‎ m! ô— om? Un wm 
a. aan u me yi epe CTE 
ei gà د نا ⸗ —— مہ وہ‎ 
ce epe ج‎ a má — —— —⸗ 
s^  - oa CC cunt i n om digo Amaia and 
اکسوہ اه خن تسس عم سا ہف جم ۔‎ 
ر‎ a Ra E 






















77 

The compleints over imaBture public relations 
officers, coupled with the difficulty in kesping certain of 
the young men in shore billets, caused the Office of Public 
Relations to consicer limiting future assignments in the 
function to officers over the age of forty. Fortunately. 
this plan was nippec in the bud, partialiy by Paul Smith 
who wrete directly to Secretary Knox outlining &trenucus 
SGbjections to the policy. ^? 

Experience was an instrumental fnctor in the deci- 
Sion early in 1942 to bring Lela P?. Lovette, now a 
captain, back inte GFR to relieve Commander Bob Berry لت‎ 
the Assistant Director. Berry remained es an executive 
assistant to Admiral Hepburn. A former head of tho Public 
Relations Branch in ORI who had the respect an! confidence 
of the Washington Press Corps, Cuptain Lovette--as 8 
Óestroyer squadron CoxmanGer--had two of his ships sunk in 
the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Accoréing to Egliar.& 
ERuhli&h&r, be brought b&ck with him "that spirit of out- 
raged indignation that enimated anyone who witnessed the 
treacherous attack .. . ani he infused this feeling in the 
entire public relations staff, "?? 

Lavette found the public and the news media “in a 
high state of doldrums ag a result of Pearl Harbor, &nc 


- He immediately 


Gemandiny details of alil encounters." 
promised that he would ensure the factual accuracy of 


future comnuniques and newe releases, £0 that they would 






n 

ates MS MPRA Neve هر پس يس‎ 
le pirme saprai وق صحف ۔صسورمہ غو‎ 
اس‎ sels شا ہرسوے هغه‎ em — هغم‎ 
a!) a) stare -- دسج‎ 
eiaa y 09 o A) Eee Cherian at eee 
et wt at One oe لات كاه‎ bere ore cate ae 
۱۴ bine aii ai amani 
افص سا‎ 4a cad Lee — — — — e 
&o-aa «anew! 1+ deed pai of AAA n vie e 
سس مت مدای ہی‎ e moo a NEY aL e «AP 
-firem à am lee! (Wet چکگ‎ 
aiiai sb do kim E a a D a D 
- ود‎ RL ان ساسا - پای سم و پر‎ ee لأ‎ 
— ⸗ میشننوخفق‎ 
CA mà aedi ہی سے نس‎ sd Am e. s MOM ⸗ 
M- aren esimin aiba saatat 
* a^ wia peas واه ست عا‎ at) omm 


78 
"stand up in the light of history." 

Other personne] changes in OFKR eariv in 1942 saw 
Kr. .دت‎ Harrison Hartley t&ko over tbe Radio Section from 
Lieutenant Commander WBorvelle Sharpe end Lieutenant Com” 
mander William A. Bernrieder, USNR, relieve Lieutenant 
Commamier Janes Stahimen as heed of the Naval Districts 
Section, &tahiman reported to Hew Orleans aa Eighth aval 
District public relations officer. 

Meanwhile, the increased Gemanós of the news media 
following the outbreak of war dictated certain changes in 
the functions and activities of sone of the sactions in 
OPR, Hartley estimeéted that demands for services by the 
radio industry alone trebles after Paarl Harbor, *i 

Since the four majer radie networks, .ےھ‎ locsted in 
New York City, were devoting more anc mora broadcast time 
to the war effort, including naval ectivities. it became 
apparent that a branch office in Mew York to concentrate on 
the probleme peculiar toe network radie would have consider- 
able value. The Army had slready set up such a branch 
Girectly under ita bureau of Public Relations. The Navy 
followed suit on May 25, 1942, establishing in Mew York the 
Branch Radio Section, Offices of Public Relations. The new 
office was under the Girection of Lieutenant Morgan 5, A. 
Reichner., USHR, former radio officer fer the Third Naval 
District public relations office who had his own advertising 


firm in Kew York City before returning to active duty 





E I 













eroatea te w ane "9 qe "se^ 

عا بت ee‏ ووسپیسن LÁ LLL‏ ہے انز ودس 
yo teese te pT Ree — — ——‏ 
odin‏ دا اپ د — — ہہ —- tt pee‏ 
veh‏ کټ am amer‏ یھ پو رسک coma c4 bee‏ 
Dacus coo oA aetas Mo cm — dr — "AAT‏ 
doors ab deus 4 1‏ )سم 

i." Ser M n — be Abad wo جیب‎ cau 209 
غه‎ ——— ——— mı uae wire + 
هسر سي‎ cc» — iA AF 





aocemed o! a ee ma mem Dare cer aor 
= Avom mm c o نم"‎ — — — — ⸗ 


e pier oh‏ ضحم لس اې وه بپ سه د س 





— — — —— d» sale SOD — 





۱ مس یی — ہے - 





te weet ست ان دا‎ "un 
AR 
ورس‎ 


79 
in i941. 

In the spring of 1942, the Navy had three regular 
half-hour preyrcams për weox On network radio. “The First 
Line“ was featured by CBS. while the Siue lotwork carried 
“Mest Your Navy" anc Kutual aired "Anchors Aweigh.” 

Bartley wisely vaecoumended to Captain Lovette that addi- 
tional programs not ke added “for fear of our material 
boeoming too spreac چون‎ 4 

The corgadcaestinmg incustry, in addition to alring 
regular service-oriunteó progrens, provided invaluable 
assistance to thes military in recruiting and other campaigns. 
Early in the waz, foc instance, there woe a shortage of 
binoculars in the rapidly expanding fleets. The Navy 
Gecided to ask the public for their binoculars on a loan 
basis for the duration and turned to radio to make the 
appeal., The broadcasters responded with such effectiveness 
that "within a wenth a staacy supply of hineculers was 
weaching the Naval Gheervatecy. ے‎ 3 

Requests for assistance from magazine publishers 
@iso multiplied rapidly curing thie period. In March 1942, 
a new Magazine Section wes formed in the Washington office, 
Seplacing the olà Scripts Section. Victor Blakeslee, the 
leng-time head of Scripta and now à lieutenant comeander, 
Was placed in charge of the new section. And as was done 


with vaéio, ده‎ Branch Magazine Section was set up in Hew 


^ 
— (Cua 
boy os سا رو اقس سے‎ ٢ سل‎ ۱ 
aor ar 2l P 
tur das ERA 
‘iw ee Vee dee شا‎ "y" 
Vase ie ای مس‎ 
سے مو در‎ VO Ge ae? ante at انس‎ pa 








I 











5 
i‏ ی کک : نہد سے mmu‏ مون غو ود . 
او اھ تن کت سفتہ p anid s os rd‏ 
کآ ‏ لااففکتان بت انان منت تسم ېی سم 
| شتا eod at) MÀ M‏ تم Hull‏ بال لسن ب و ضہ 
db‏ اسا aD Gi uz) C‏ —- رت 
چو تة animati‏ سم دد یرس 
٤۵ (adis MEN 1 em s MF" WA‏ دسس وو دی 
o arman a N‏ 
wd eel ٧‏ ویوس an‏ موو nd‏ 
eg Cee‏ ې صت اد 
⸗ م جس و ریا سوت ص 
سے e ao e‏ 
— — — 
xwe.‏ 
EE III‏ 


=e AA. n 

























89 

York, with Lieutenent James Van ^len, USXAR, as director. 

The upgrading of service to magazines was particu” 
larly timely et this stage because navé&l personnel were 
beginning to return from compat sonas with action stories 
of great interest to magazine editers. Within six months 
of its establishment, the Magazine Section of OFA was 
handling 250 manuscripts per month, both foc magazines end 
books, Its biggest story of tho year was an interview with 
Lieutenant Comander John D. AZulkley, USN, the FTI-Bost 
Skipper who dicacted the evacuetion of General MecArthur 
from the Philippines. Axrangemente were mie for Bulkley. 
Guring à visit to Washington, te work with a writer from 
the section in developing the story. Keagera Dice at 
printed it in full; end later the book Thay Ware Expendable 
was published about the adventures of Bulkley and other 
211 personnel. *^ 

In enother orgenizetional change, @ sub-section of 
the Pictorial Soction was locatec in the Larz Anderson 
Mansion on Massachusetts Avenue to supervise the Mavy’s 
combet eft program, war posters, and special Gisplaeys ani 
exhibits. Lieutenant (junior grade) Robert L. Parsons. 
VEER, wae designated officer-in~-charge of this activity. 
The new sub-section stemmed from a recommendation en 
December 29, 1941, by the Committee on War Information that 
the Office of Facts and Figures coordinate the preparation 


anê distribution of all government war posters. 








ve 
اه لیف نننټییل انس مې عنم سی په ننس یس‎ 
na uN a qeiimepe m) aire Va د ې ينی‎ 
— — — مخ :۱ ۵ اشاو اښ‎ 
si wos فى‎ 9 Cu» summ JW جب‎ coe M 
مو رس‎ sa Lhit soii cr 70 
انح نمس سس سس«‎ : 
سسس سي‎ su] سسماپی ی مس مو‎ PUT تاداس‎ 
abe mbrat em sue dE, md) F3 Tree ep oF — 
ینن نالا نس می‎ o e لاو ېرم سی‎ 
— dde تیوه‎ 
۳ نس سر سس«‎ To. 
c-— تے سپ چیه 1 موشن‎ — 
ad i un O rrr tA nare 
نز اس جت ها شد وی سب نټ‎ um VU لکم‎ 
= sae 

















81 

The combat art progra&s, meanwnlle, was now in full 
eving after its initiation in the fall of 1941. Lieutenant 
Commander Griffith Balley Conle Already had painted scenes 
depicting à convoy enroute te Iceland and the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor. Four young artiste, Lieutenants 
(junior grade) Dwight C. Shepler and William F. Draper of 
Boston and Albert X. Murray of New York, end Easiga 
Miteheli Jamieson of Washington were commissioned early in 
1942 and sent to sea to record dramatic incidents in combat 
areas. it is interesting to note that these artists were 
wali received in the fleets partially because thay could 
omit confidential details in a painting that a photograph 
might reveal. Another prominent artist, John Taylor Arms, 
known for his etchingjgs of architectural subjects, was 
engaged umiar Navy contract teo etch various types of combat 
vessels. both under conatruction and in a complete? state. 

An edditional function undertaken by Bavy pablic 
relations shortly after our entry into the war was tho 
providing of publicity for special recruiting drives. Less 
than à week after rear] Harbor, Admiral Hepburn wrote the 
district comsmandants that their immediate publicity emphe- 
sig should be on the Navy's need for wen. In April 1942, 
he Cispatched two letters stressing the requirement for 
publicity on the Clags V~l and Class V-5 recruiting 
programs for non-cavietion end aviation officers respectively. 


By April 1942. there were fifty-seven officers, ten 


p 
نس اوور‎ en نس‎ hee lee Á دد‎ -— 
ن ود جار رسوی-س‎ eit "à dame au t quem 
ومس بت به سن‎ UO win dip UR 
went) eur wes Wr"  suuPmad (ed d MB 
te ame) oe مسا دہ‎ make ېچ‎ apad fulmag volasti 
سس م٨ سېا ټل سا سب‎ E mA e وسو‎ 
یول لم‎ eker reer امام‎  سنسو‎ | 
-i À bee Ap tus «9 و مه مها‎ 
Wri abr به وس‎ oe t او غنټټاي‎ ٢۴ ndm 
بن له ف ےو امار مو سه س تان‎ 
اس همون‎ 
ee سم موس‎ aarp SA ir 
وص‎ cre ieee ites te behets tus viti ۵ 
mdo ھا مت سے چ ما‎ ee لديو سوه‎ 
سیت جب‎ » ot toe تا تاه مد دته‎ 
+: ۳ چپ سم وس‎ rks ANS anD ua 
“ls ewe و س یوس اښ یی‎ ano ra 


لت ور لوت mar‏ ات اس 
RC‏ ساسم و یي نش سی نے 


oo. a 4 — P 1 
A mmo ws aim w 
ووس مر بب مب موو‎ "d 

ve | 2‏ ونا دوامسته معوومۍ۶٤‏ هسال . 
+ د سسس ا۸ېښټېی سے سے 


٣‏ ہم 
































82 
enlisted men ami seventy-three civilians in the Office cf 
Public Aelationsc-exciusive of the branch personnel in New 
York-- for a gran total ef 140, an increase of forty-nine 
sinco Pearl Harbor. Of the fifty-seven officers, only nine 
were Regular Navy, showing the reliance by the Navy on 


uniforme civilians performing public relations duties. وہ‎ 





In each wer, certain sen emerge as strong and 
natural leaders of a particular aspect of their nation's 
war effort. in naval operational matters in Werid Wac II, 
euch a man was Admiral Ernest J. King. 

King was personally selected by PresiGent Koosevelt 
to relieve Admiral Husband Kimmel as Cemmancer in Chief of 


the 0.8. Flest ® 


following the disaster at Pearl Harbor, 
and furthermore wag made directly responsible to the 
President himself. Three months lLater--en March 12, 1942-- 
he also was designated to replace Admiral Gtark as Chief of 
Naval Operations. This unprecedanted move of combining in 
one man the Navy's two too militery comands gave King & 
greater cancentretion of power then hac ever been vestec in 
any provious American naval officer. it also hao signíif- 
icant implications for tho Navy's wartime public relations 
program, since all policies for the release of infermation 
had to have at least King’s tacit approval if not his 
wholebesrted support. In the firat stages of the war, that 





۱ i 


às vw iio‏ سف وسوس امسر :دزاس ند سس اجکی دا 
21 :0-7 -تپتتھ ِ َپ9پ,‪79 
له + سا مده وا زوا wat te adorani a‏ سے 
ايد 19094 سو ادو یی ابحم ود eee‏ 
له مهو نه سم rORR así - chbad£ta a6 yel‏ هد 
0ت سس بح سس سه سس مس " 
im mem ® iiu LLL LLLZ/Z/L .‏ 
omlbal ⸗‏ سہمہ 90 tine i‏ 
وم می د (acme‏ ووانیو ete‏ له هسوي OI E‏ 
a‏ م جم سند مامد س \ ۔ 
— — — مدر و لسا دو ااڼبسداه کا س بدل. 
si a Ser ore pe‏ کر مسد ار iil‏ 3- 
فو بده. ورم" همیس tt‏ — — — 
Ame‏ سټت جوا qim ab cms‏ سومس مس 
Eh fe hane‏ مسي پس سی سی سم )مهم رس 
puo Spin, pi‏ شسغارونسستا اي ماس متدجو مه په ساد 
001 س وا — 
دم سه تم مې او مس e wed mg dinme pehli wa‏ 
(ma m come n med mem vede ٢‏ ہہ ہے پوس ام 
ب nndis din amid mium‏ ,نے سد ٢‏ 
بج AAS SEE ttn aD m m, air‏ 
























fea صح۔‎ uy 


43 
approval wae very Giflflieultl to came by. 

The n&tucal aversion te publicity sharec by seafar- 
ing men seemed to be personified in Adwiral Bing. Added to 
this wae hia absolute prececupation with security following 
Pear] Harhor. We eapecially wanted ta avoid the appearance 
o£ any information which might reveal te the Japanese that 
their codes had beer broker or let the Germans know &bout 


43 


our anti-submarine techniques. He was nost sincere in 


his conviction that lives could be saved and battles von by 





withholding or delaying the release of many details a 
Our wartime operations. “If I can save one life by 
restricting public relations, I will, 9 he vamarked at one 
point early in the war. It was @ sentiment not easily 
argued agj&inst, anû one shareÓ by many others. 

inevitably, King's negétive approach to public 
relations we6 dostineóG to clash with Frank Knox's more 
liberal views on the subject. It was one of the few 
instances of basic disagreement between the two men during 


56 


tho war. The secretary had concurred with the President 


in tha choice of King as the top neval military leader and 





had great reapect fer the admiral’s unusual abilities and 
long experience, despite the fact that he was often by~ 
pessed by him on operational and many administrative 
2532 2-7 17 8. 

King and Knox never really reconciied their diffsr- 


ences Over releasgo of information policies. Theoretically. 





سا 







۳ 
0 رر سو تسول 

-nes yi sm qiiid. ei eb india a 
لسلس سه‎ one له وتا ہب ام سي‎ of bee med 
ysa (| ټحسيام غه‎ es m ee ee که"‎ 
me ند ےھ سس‎ iain Cele غه ت مسل‎ A 
u omia عو — — ته و مه‎ 
u am pajing w eye m uye mmi رېد‎ 4 
mr rine p مه‎ maet مخ شسجدو؛ ہے نس‎ géidomaqy 
راب ټم‎ e a Ar مه مهم مسمیبپ‎ 
mar چم‎ em و‎ dide | ae سال‎ Gare barnes 
mau cm وه مسوا له نم سی دږ حم مسا‎ 
— — د‎ a here .تت‎ 
c» alme cem ولسو ہا‎ vd ملس کوو و وس‎ 
c oo. m خو‎ «DAL ہف دی‎ moar موی‎ 
دج‎ 
هو وښ سس‎ 


è‏ وم نبد — — د 
d‏ ماده pom un)‏ سو یب جر وع - 






























رز سب د کگز سا 


Bd 
of course, the Secretary of the Navy had final say on what 
was to be released amd what withneid. In actual practice, 
however, King's views usually prevailed, particularly 
during the first two years of the war. For instance, 
through 1943 he was able to maintain a policy of permitting 
virtually no stories cf an operational nature te be cleared 
in the theaters of combat. Each one had to be referred 
pack to Washington. where his Geputies censored them in 
conjunction with the Office of Public Relations. Hore 
often than not during this perioc, the admiral's deputies 
voted on the side of caution and refused material that the 
secretary's representatives and later they themselves would 
heve passed, ?! 

Reas hüniral Julius A. Furer, USN (Retired), 
recorder of the Wavy's wartine administrative history, 
definitely states that Admiral King's desires on the release 


52 Furer 


ef information were accommodated in the long run. 
cites ea evidence for his conclusion the fact that the 
Birector of Public Relations altimately wae ordered to 
report both to the Secretary of the Navy ang the Chief cf 
Naval Opersetions. At least one parochial vote for Secretary 
Knox as the winner in the dispute, Twever, Wes registored 
in a postwar letter toa Mrs. Knox discussing the public 
relations dis&;reements between the two men. “King was 
aiways &Overse to publicity. Me wàás built that way. Frank. 


with his newspaper background, naturally hed different 





5 


۱ 
. 

IT DAN 5 1 m LJ ۱ 
, ها وب نسم‎ f Damirja sane غه نہ دنه کس عت‎ MEM 
دا و اسان‎ Ham سک بے‎ 
Pesas —⸗ — O Je mam a mel ai aS 
د ونيم‎ Ag cie P adeb os تی مد کم سم فل‎ 
mer vs e mr lii ۵ Se مه عافد‎ rise tay 
— ب٦ ہو‎ s ABL LAE 
— — دب‎ 
نتم .4 له ۱۵ات با — — مہ‎ 
کا‎ e ل‎ i m Meli وو‎ 
— — — — — كس ره‎ mb umm VO pip wit av peg 
ham rovi amai pr O DOM AT) rhet! 
ب سه‎ 
Porcino) S ہیر‎ A سے مہ تا من‎ 
, کې مې اد مسوا ٭ہ:میووب کنعحمیأ‎ — — 
i t E 
ver) -. «ټه.‎ mi جب‎ en inti یې‎ 
وه کی ہد سد مس ام موي‎ 
aae در اع ودی وې ې‎ 001 
(Pese eem cao m jn em ومس شم وس وېي‎ 

— n ge" erm — سم له غه‎ 

۵( بن هئ شت cde cbr ninth‏ 
مو سن هه — 










































views which, of course, prevailed. ">? 


An example of King's distrust of Xnox ag B news- 
paper publisher occurred at a top level and top secret 
briefing on Gusdalcenal early in the wax. The secretary 
missed a point end asked the admiral to go into more detail. 
King looked at him and eaid, “Of course, you realize this 
is completely off-the-record, Mr. Bocretary:"^* 

Barly in 1942, Admiral Hepburn nad a meeting with 
King at which the fleet commanéer agreed that it would be 
all right to “loosen up a littie” on releaaing pelicy. A 
few days later, the Chicago {ribune tock a reguler nava] 
comunique about defensas on Midway and acded to it some 
information obtained from secret messages seen months 
earlier by an employee who was a farmer naval officer. The 
resulting story should have reen submitted fox clearance by 
the newspaper, but instead was pageed by an assistant news 
editor who thought it was simply à rewrite of the official 
comuunigue. Upon reading the article. Admirai King 
immediately called Acmiral Sepbuxn anc reared, “I Gidn’t 
mean to loosen up that much: *75 

Frank Knox aise took exception to what he considered 
carelessness on the part of the Tribunas in publishing 
secret information. In late 1942, he wrote to Will Hays 
gompleílning thatt 

bertie MoCormick's praise of the Navy falls on 


rather deaf esra. On two separate occasions, he hes 
not iet any concern for the Navy and security of the 





£ Serene — ö 

سے ts n. o‏ ات مات ند حي عو وا موس 
DG‏ سس سس wm‏ — · س ر 
العام — ر ingyen <P ame‏ 
aa me -— male, a nele‏ نه ېی نسے موس i?‏ 
هش یټ )سل پدوو و omit P‏ موم ۱ دا 

i^i mim a Ge! med Deme w کی لم له‎ 














-' 
mih dedo M ani‏ دل مس وید ami‏ یہ مسلد c.‏ 
ج a‏ رسہ جن © e‏ الما قا فى 

دو دوو نمروہ۔ دا -wemid‏ مسسھ كيد د يمون سنن 





رس« سس 
Shims‏ په سوب a otan ata ap o a i‏ 
ns see cmm anm dme pe piin‏ سه p omte‏ 
rm ge — — m‏ سا —-—- 
د 44 sb meme o vA am‏ وير (mama. 5 n‏ 
— — دم ہدس جس 
(^d d^ — nits DCO‏ 
٠‏ ود رو سسټسسيسسټ 
و num eli m‏ — — — 
CHAP mh 4‏ ب سو یو غږ یا غو 


— 
> — ES ۲ — 














- 





5-٥ : 

5 ماع تا — 
© 
سا یر 


D ۱‏ 
هم E‏ = ۹ 5ب کک کک ب p - üt‏ : ۱ 


ES c mum pem - ۴ 
- ——— ا‎ pu ww a mac" = رو‎ 



















E 


Ge 


men whe man our ahips prevent him from publishing 
information of the highest value te the enemy. 76 


When the cerxsier Lexinctan wee sunk in the Battle 
of the Coral Sea on Kay 8, 1942, pews of her less was with- 
held fex thirty-five days, even ten cays after her 
survivors ani thousends of others who saw her go Gown 
arrived in Sam Diego om June 2. The rationale for this 


26 121 was based on the top secret fact that a powerful 





Japanese fleet was prowling the sic-Pecific evidently bound 
for à major strike ageinet Micway. Since the Lexington bsc 
been sunk by one of our own destroyers after sustaining 
Critical Gamage, Admiral King assweed that the enemy cid 
not know of her joss. At least, he wanted the Japaneen to 
think thet the carrier wouid be availabie to defend the 
U.S. outpost. Whether or not the enemy fell for the trick, 
it is true thet they turned tail ané ran in the ensuing 
Battle of Hidway. King wae convinced that their ignorance 
of the loss of the Lexington led them to overestimate the 
Size of the Awarican force, and thus he felt justifie in 
keeping quiet about the earlier sinking. Mevertheless, the 
lateness in the announcement caused a tremendous furor to 
be raised by the press anc many Conmpressmen. y? 

Also in the spring of 1942, King wag urgently cen~ 
Cerned about the attack on Allied merchant shipping mounted 
by German submarines near our Atlentic Coast. As a result. 


he issued a astringent directive prohibiting all publicity 






es eS 1‏ سردي دسي 
 - -  ص ١‏ ا 1 سرت 
اڈ وو — مسجم وى كن فى سی d n‏ ېي )ا سوہ o ete‏ 
۰ سس 

c-— a» a Te a rs on cami 
aki oue mA a ee oe اليم‎ e < Cene 
is fimewe ١ پے؛ ہمو‎ maras E شود سه — به‎ 
com leo kin دو‎ ule ال ده‎ ome ancl) ogee’ 
۔جھ ہے سس دن‎ booa — — ee 
+ te mee د تسه دد لوہ بھی ند یی س‎ 
ہمز سے نو نه وون بې‎ v sibe siran ا‎ 
mulsa ei cd iis qem-e یا‎ Gum qe س_‎ — mmm وي‎ 
exce ci مسا ده ډور‎ bia Aurea کم نه ووي اس سي‎ 
— وم تجوت یی سه ےیسصیکف جع‎ 
si mater a a A RAA قو سم دو ہہ‎ 
^i ہپ ا‎ e ټی‎ mene — Pe wal 


"IUE di i sd 


ae cw ee 
۲٩ asuma coge qm مها‎ 


a imo pee no one et 
جوف وس سس«‎ « 
رپس په‎ M 

دس هغه ره 





























` 7 — — 30 37 2 


37 
about our own suiehAripneo operations. This directive was so 
Literally interpreted thet the security review officer in 
OPR could not even gat fihia stories about submarines 
cleared. 4 

Within the Limits of his security policies. how- 
ever, the aémiral tried to be helpful to the news media, 
éecordis; to his Biographer, Waiter Whitehill. Although he 
id not hold any formal press conferences during the war, 
he frequently met on an informal basis curing 1942-1944 
with a group of Washington correspondents at a friend's 
bouse in Alexandria., Va., giving then background briefings 
on current nov&l operations, Thig relationship resulted in 
tho folicowing "citation" being presented by these 
eorreseponcentsa to “Fleet Admiral Exnest d. King” aftar tho 





For conspicuous bravery and intrepidity anes 
beyond the call of duty in performance of which ie 
daring iy ignored hie own natural instimets, and alione 
end singiehamtečiy, at a moment when adverse wincs of 
publicity were threatening te sink the whole fisot, 
exposed himself to a frontal assault by the picked 
shock troops of the journalistic enemy led by some of 
the sost reprohensible anû bloodthirsty Washington 
correspbonüents, and from thkt monent on, never retiring 
to cover from their incospant salvces of crossfire. 
stormed the enemy in ite wn defanees and in thea 
decisive and littie-known Battle of Virginia conquerec 
and captivated them completely.? 





ne of the earliest aml probably largest headaches 
for the HNavy'a Office of Public Reletions and the U.f. 
Office of Censorship during the wear began in early 1342 








۳ 
سمنے مسي ان‎ cr da مت نت ات فا‎ ۱ 
uml 
—— m— hans سم‎ =f 2e دته نه راهامه‎ À(— 
able ddp" mur x^ اک‎ at me eer Paint GAS vum 
ناا نجھ ب‎ etnia انقب ليست‎ Gam D? رم‎ D 





a3 

over procedures for releasing information about merchant 
ship ainkings by German submarines off our Atlantic Coast. 

Ga January 15, 1942, the pages of newspapers ware 
filled with reports about the close-in Gerran Sumer ine 
activity, with the lead story being the sinking of the 
Gala east of Mew York. The press, it would seem. was 
not violating the censorship codo, issued only a few days 
earlier, because that code permitted publication of sewa 
amnounces by “appropriate authority.” The problem was that 
Byron Price had failed to identify in hie code just who 
would be considere? proper &uthority. When the merchant 
Ships began going down and survivors drifting back ashore, 
every amali-town police chief and young Coast Guard 
lieutenant along the coast audderiy became “appropriate 
Buthorities" for tha rele&sge of such news, which in turn 
was verified by tha district public relations office in New 
York without prior cheek with Washington. °° 

The Office of Kaval Intelligence immediately fired 
eff sa "broadside" at Admiral Baphuxn, demanding thet 
"proper steps be taken to withheld from publication news of 
enemy Operations in United States coastal arets. «Sl مع‎ 
fesponse, the Director of Public Relations sent a diepatch 
on January 16 to the commandants of coastal naval districts, 
esteolishing the policy thet 411 annountements concerning 
merchant ship sinkings and enemy submarine operations in 
thelr waters would heneeforth be male first by the Reavy 


“u 
— — — — سے‎ 
cnn م مه‎ ed Ui are a A 
سس ری‎ a — سو من سم بس‎ CED 
1 Ve سح ہم یس‎ reee MEC Gp Ee aioli 
سم‎ a u دز بات بت وښ در‎ ce 
oe کر صت بسا رلک بو‎ mo 
san) ae amo "^ - سسدمو‎ sed eol" a 
سس ہے وپ‎ cur وښ نسح نہ‎ 
س مھت سی مر ام کے وس سسوم‎ D 
mimp —— — — N 
ہہ‎ «b sede . ee duse dí xmAAleY سن ووه وم یس‎ 
سه ببس سس‎ 
— سه هتوج ودی سه په‎ 
V aisi) Gere D d» PME 
ECL اع‎ 
«o ——ÀL um ٠” 
a 
LLL LUN Li. 


























83 


oe Hagty consultation with the 


Department in Washington, 
Office of Censorship had secured a tentative agreement that 
all such releases would be channeled through the Press 
Section of OPR, with tho Navy now designated as the soile 


"appropriate authority" for news of this nature. OPR 





quickly followed up its messaye to the coastal commandents 
with detailed instructions on how to handle euch delicate 
matters as survivor interviews and eyewitnezs &ccounts (sec 
note 17). 

On January 17, the Office ef Public Relations 
apologised to the press for the misunderstanding surrounding 
the Coimbre incident, in the form of a "not for publication" 
explanatory memerendum iasued by Paul Smith. The new heac 
Of the Press Section, while stating that the Navy bepert~ 
went in Washington was without authentic information about 
the sinking, nevertheless did not excuse the Navy's 
responsibility fer the resulting confusion--in which some 
newspapers carrie the story while ethers killed it in the 
absence of official confirmations, Lieutenant Commander 
Smith's tactful approach to the situation enabled his to 
solicit presa cooperation in withholding such stories in 
the future until they could be cleared by hie office, “aven 
though the incident may be within the view of shore 
observers, ail even if the information has been given by 
iocal officials, Haval or otherwise, *9? 


The controversy also elicited en apology from Byron 








t 
ex: ile minsin a " مسپم‎ mem 
ابص‎ 
eai ii warm Pales ې‎ law emnes dS هدڅ‎ 
سو یدع ری جاب‎ cm سس‎ 
atc سس‎ uen" 
تعرس‎ a w ص یسھا ېي ١و ےا‎ TLD 
سا نمرت وس ےد تی‎ o om omer Seder npn 
a یہ جوج — — — — — ہی‎ S» remm 
شاک‎ sm 
—T 2.23 — E IN LJ E 
—— — — —— wt چوفصلم مہ‎ 
uA الله فسات 5 نم هد‎ 
— وکس — — ہے‎ 
-regi rea دیس بر‎ parn و په دغه فسات سال‎ 
+” بەر سے جھ غو‎ ia anino لی واو‎ 
#0 
sig ai n pakas — =A beissen a 













































نو 

Price, who in @ statement toe managing editors aminitted that 

“the confusion recently over submarina activities hag bean 
due to à serios of errors On the part of ali concerned, 


including the Office of Censor ship. "9? 


Príco assured the 
editors that the necessity to clear stories with Washington 
applied specifically to the subject of enemy &ction against 
merchant ships and sinkings ef enemy submarines. Naval 
authorities ín outiying possessions could #etill clear anti 
distribute news without checking with Washington, and the 
naval district public relations officers ret&ined the 
authority to release naval information of other types 
within their areas. 

The security rationale behind the withheldin; of 
news about merchant ship sinkings waa valid only if ene 
agreed with the Navy's premise that the primary enemy | 
intelligence reports on the Subject came from the skippers 
of German submérinas wao fired tho torpedoses. Reports from 
these sources quite naturally were open to question. Even 
iE the enemy commanding officer was absolutely sure thet 
the ship he attacked did indeed go to the bottom, which 
Gould not always be the cage, ho was reluctant to break 
radio silence to inform his superiors because of the peril 
in which this would place his own vessel. If he chose to 
wait until he returned te port, the information could be 
Gelayec fer waeks. In addition. he might not make it back 
to port at ail, in which case the information about a 


se 

ceed 1 4b MM 0‏ ہے فسني تخاس مارم sats‏ 
اا متها تسسا مه مها دت zu w edaba‏ 
LLLA.‏ مر یی سی هذ 112 سس سس 
یلاش نټ وق په صن پور ۶۹ سس ھے wen‏ نت 
ملت وم نت وسن یہ اہ —— — — — 
وین وټان کت عد مسد Va‏ سي we saire‏ 
ننس طناك ست ونوم مه دس حفس س 
— روسمس eee‏ م پر a- se‏ 
a Eb‏ دوم ees‏ جوم um abu‏ بي 
وود فلج فط وس Weems‏ اس a ware‏ 
اف دې نه اسم نس مس بد ہے ve‏ بہے 
شی تسیب mi‏ 
”فة git‏ ————- 
که كفا فشنت <a u ym uis oa ominis wa‏ 
د سم ١‏ — که پس سے 
او اتك ai‏ دي eet)‏ بب سہسسہ wi wee‏ 
لش ee ee‏ 
ات ری نت سب ومنت ہے سی ناا sees‏ اسه 
ui vla uii‏ ساس نا نس چم و arp‏ سسیس, علیہ 
Midi‏ سرب ې نب سیر ی ہس وو mao‏ 
(٦‏ دم ووس غاب موم 
قا تسس خفن مدا 1 1 BI ZEN‏ 
1 ۱ ناس کر رمک مس د 
—— سے سم 

— 7 n 

























91 
particular sinking would never reach enemy headquarters. 

The main flaw in the Wavy’s logic was that quits 
probably German Intelligence pieced together considerasi« 
information about these sinkings from their agents B&hore, 
who did not need to read the newspapers or listen to the 
vadio to get their information. There were plentifal oye” 
witness accounts om! survivor stories floating around. The 
wids girculation given te these accounts and stories mace 
it very Giffieult for the press to accept the ban anc 
delays on publicity about ship sinkings. At least one 
editorial writer, in denouncing the policy. net oniy 
insisted thet Hitler knew how many ships the U-boasats hol 
sunk, but further claimed that the American public should 
be given the information too in order to jar it cut of its 
complacency. °° 

The Havy hed another reason in addition te security 
for delaying the sinking announcements, however. The 
Maritime Commission had requested that ne release be mace 
Snout the incidents “until the commission has had an oppor- 
tunity to notify the ship’s owners anû operators, who in 
turn will inform the insurS8nce undexwriters anû next oZ 
xin, "97 

Still another twist to the merchant ship pxobiews 
arose in early March. Despite the restrictions, some 
newepapers persisted in printing uncieareé stories obtained 
from survivors of the sinkings. including lurid details 





je 
© سیا فا مق تسم بابس‎ painia هقالع‎ 
mi vin Ca مدت" ف سوا ہن‎ EC 
تست‎ mu diss لها ام کته انس‎ 
مو عتس تن نا‎ were سر سای سا تی‎ ۱ 
— نب و رت سی ہر‎ — r 4 
"2, هنن‎ ۱ | 
ښه‎ ani nii pues اڈ ناه ته م‎ VC 
"AT .. نش‎ eb undi VUA do «DU 
TUTUP c7 31?* 3 

eio acm vd rui! eSB aus be‏ ریہ نہ ھا 
Lamas Um vam vui Am) RR‏ نشا بھ ہف دیس پس ران دا 
E —‏ ړل یا کا دیا 0د un VÀ‏ 























Kad (rua P‏ مب تنس ند ناسنا 14> سی لاي 
ف ينس ې «لسدب وپټ0ښمره um‏ 

مون cm co aam a Ma: moet ied‏ 
حم الہ لہس سےا ےس او ا سوا 
کک کہ تھا کے فلو فقسب ف سه وا لآ 
U oam am emua — 2— d Iie‏ 


۳ == g g" 







a. 


ف له 













١ T ae‏ — | | سه 


وو 
which began to erode the morale of the entire Merchant‏ 
Marine. This prompted Admiral Mepeurn to write to the‏ 
district commendants:‏ 

It hes lately developed thet the type of publicity 
xesulting has oreated a serious situation with respect 
to the morale of merchant crews. Cases have occurred 
Where serious Gifficulty and delay heave been experianced 
in securing crews. The principal source of trouble is 
the emphasis by the press upon the "horror" aspects of 
easuaities as gathered frem survivorzs. Conversely, 
(there has been) the comparative dearth of news items 
showiny heroic actions or good morale, %8 

The only solution open te the admiral on the 
$urvivor interview problem waa te attempt to bring these 
interviews under Heavy control] as much as 22851518 ٠ 
Aecoródingly, he issued instructions in his letter that the 
Gistrict public relations officers interview tho survivors 
firat and then preside over their initial contacts with the 
press. 

Admiral Hepburn toox 8 major step in late March to 
neutrealize sowe of the press ódisgsatisfaction ever the now 
controversial merchant ship issue. In a menorendum to ail 
district public relations officers, ho inplored them to 
search for ways to make the press understand the reasons 


&nd "retsonableness" of the current policy. S? 


His plea was 
significant in that it represented the first evidence since 
the war began of a growing realisation that quite possibly 
the press and the public had not been presented with suffi- 
cient information to give them a basis for gracefully 


&ecebting censorship. 


په 


OL‏ ورسم ونیس 








lem «fj‏ شنت نی ہ ime‏ ې .ې 
AAA 2‏ لېه ü‏ 











93 

in early dum, the releasing procedure for ship 
Sinkings, which at last had been operating ameothly. 
received à jolt from an unexpected souroe--cCongress. On 
the night of June 3, Washington Senator Homer T. Bone 
issued an announcement about a ship sinking from his office. 
He felt qualified to de se, because the survivers hea 
ianded in his home state and the Mavy hed provided kim with 
information about the incident. Further, the watch officers 
in the Office of Consership passed the story because he 
quite proparly judged members of Congrass to be “appropri 
eto authorities." No crisis developed over this loophole 
in the policy, but the Navy was forced te release its own 
story on the sinking within a couple of hours after the 
Senator's release." 

The Mavy also recoiveó criticism from the press 
eoncerning its operational measures te combat the U-Boat 
menace. Over 300 merchant ships emi tankers in the Carib- 
bean. Gulf of Mexice art along the U.5. Atlantic Coast had 
heen sunk between niü-Jenubry &nóí late Zune of 1942, in 
the wake of these losses, cclusniets Axthuc Krock and 
Walter Lippmann urged the sea service ito compensate for the 
shortage of destroyers by using small boats to locete unc 
fight the German submarines. The Wavy countered with the 
claim chat such small craft were not esceworthy enough and 
810 not have the listening Caviees. speed and armament ta 
desl with the modern submarine. The onslaught of the 


th 
— — قهووول سے ہے‎ 0o 
ee cvm oed ⸗ 
a سورس سنوی‎ — —⸗ — 
ear o ume rea — — — * 
cayo هلسم ٦رہ به‎ — — — 
— — — —— — 
نس دا اد نټ مول ما سب بحا — سر‎ 
انیت وی يا اسان جنس ه. مښت وښ‎ 
— — ام بے سس مس ممیہ سم‎ 
1 ک‎ 0t A c A — — N نرہ‎ 
———— —— P. Tem د-‎ 
دس وس‎ —— — rp anms a E pa 
— — 
a — — چو خی‎ 
E M یسب پ٭ چے۔‎ Tees amen 
مسوم‎ mo oss o» omm "M ca "m 
mi o — ها دو ن٥ سا ملاس په ےہ‎ sab 
5 s m سسسب مو بس‎ DON 

















94 
columnists continued, however: and om June 27, the Navy 
announced that it was relaxing its restrictions ta allow 
1,900 small boats and crews to qualify fer anti-submerine 
patrol. “in so doing," Putune declared, “it may heve been 
rolling with tho columnista’ punches, hoping to stop 
criticism.” t 

The merchant ahip isaue continued to causa certain 
problems throughout 1942. Early in May, the taking of 
photographe for publicity purposes of comaged ships which 
managed to retarn to port had been prohibiteóc. This 
directive was so literally interpreted that it had to be 
canceled in late June because no photographs at all ef 
these ships were being taken. Since the Navy needed such 
photographa for intelligence purposes, the order was modi- 
fied to allow commwerclal photographers, who were often the 
Only ones at the scene, to take pictures~~provided they 
Were submitted for clearance. On Juno l, the press was 
requested not to identify the ports where survivors ibarndeó 
except in very general terme such as “an East Coast port.” 
This irritating restriction was finally rescinded in late 
December when the instances of sinkíngs close to our shores 
were considerably reduced. ^ 

The reason for this reduction, however, the 
increasing success of our anti~submexsina warfare measures, 


continued te he cloaked in secrecy. On June 3, 1942, the 


Secretary of the Navy sent a message to all naval commande 





ib 
yi rb موم سو بد باس چا‎ Lamas ماس‎ 
تا تر رہہ رت ىت و نب‎ 
جا اس تن‎ oi Gilad Kd تن کنات انم‎ 
هر سب اس سمت- د می رس س‎ a 
گا لان ات نات سوہ کے م ت س‎ 
کس"‎ 
سورس‎ amd) Or asd ee" «mal qui ساننسی‎ wl — 
۱ ی‎ pela; بت‎ Sw" مات سس اعود ۳ نه‎ 
ښک امن نه من‎ GNA OT 
suy sadne شب‎ è Fi A ی نذا اہ‎ 
تست سا رر سه بې ی‎ U بت لت‎ 
eee انا له انشا اس‎ 
ett کن جک نتاس افد اف س قب س‎ a 
یمسر ومس گے سے سے خی‎ di | 
et teen وسہت مه س‎ alae Lee Sulla oo شا‎ 
مم‎ soir diba فان‎ a کل عا .اه نش‎ 
لت تس اف .از ات از اف اس س‎ 
هه لاه ت ج فت عتتا سف‎ Xu 
n! ài 


د لیت وښښت )6 ونه سم 


- 3 ak | 4 | à 


UON eee ee ee‏ بب 
> کاو مس * عي ae boon ie?‏ 



















































95 
stating, "Wo information concerning activities of U.&. 
Submarines will be released for publication prier to 
initial release by $ecHav. "^ ) Admiral Hepburn attempted to 
relax this strimjent polícy by sukmitting & detailed plan 
to Secretary Knex in July which would have permitted 
considerable background information to be given out on anti- 


" Whet happened to this plan is 


submarine capabilities. 
not known. It is known, however, that at least as far as 
Our own submarine actions are concerned, the "silent 
service" label applied early in 1942 remained appropriates 
throughout the war. 

fhe Wavy dic make public in late summer the first 
casualty list of Morchent Marine personnel killed or 
missing; هم‎ @ result of enemy BSctien. And, it is interesting 
to note that shortly after the Germans launched their 
attack on coastal shipping, the prewar restrictions against 
publishing photographs Of merchant ships armed or being 
armed was purpose fully lifted. ^ 


Firat Casualty List and initial 
Policy Leclarations 


Complete lists of dead ané wounded were a trouble- 
soma security and public relations problem from the very 
start of the war. Right after Pearl HMerber., the Army and 
Havy had agreed on a procedure for releasing casualty liste 
while at the same time protecting security and providing for 
next of kin te be notified before the public announcement. 





u 
teate musola sirupa ګګ هبت‎ api qon 
دی‎ praya mimkin xa وسو 1130 بپ منسې‎ 
اسوه وړ‎ rama ad o um El amab m cmhnj my نی‎ 
ö — وه سل‎ 
wring eu Akre i Ch em E 
- نه غه داوس مد سس من‎ — — — — 
رف هدم‎ Oi) ot وچویہجتے‎ cad ۵7 سک دی موسر )م ړو‎ 
لون سه نس مه‎ ot p m aan N awmi 
ونوس پس ینب‎ me um mae o 
جسن در ات وسم سودت‎ Panny ماد اض‎ 
ہی ہی‎ men اس‎ ob Bedding nnm bb س‎ 






















— 
=- milis lumes Mani samd صن عم ما‎ 
سی مي 1م اة توراه‎ quens ta diran n yë grimis 


gab omo e~e وس‎ mmnm i لهس ووس وڅه‎ 








anit سه موس مو‎ inue 





96 
However, Gn December 12, Presicent Roosevelt erdered that 
no general release of casunBlties by names be mate, merely 
total numbers and categorics. in late January 1942, the 
Office of Facts end Figures asked the War and Navy Depart- 
ments to join with it in asking a recommendatior to the 
President to aliow publication of such lists by names, 5 

Mearwhile, the avy hac heen holding up announce- 
mente Cf naval losses until lists of survivors could be 
thoroughly checked and the next of Kin of all casualties 
notified. Dus to the Navy policy of permitting frequent 
Bnifts of personnel between chips anc stations in the 
fleets ani outlying arees sni other fectors peculioer to sea 
warfaxe, there were often long delays in obtaining accurate 
information on casualties. Thus, in the middle of March 
1942, news roleages concerning the loess of nine naval 
vessels were pending because the next of kin had not vet 
been notified, 

AGairal Hepburn became concerned over what he 
termed “an increasing tendency on the part of the press and 
public to suspect that the Navy waa withhelding uafevorable 
news regarding ship losses because of the grim picture it 


56 هوا‎ based this concern on an analysis of 


presents.“ 
editerial comnent and personal conversations with leading 
journalists and racio commentators, ön example of the 

editecial coment which Gisturbed the amiral appeared in 


the Hew York Times on March 12: "Unnecessary suspicions, 


T 

یاءکء جر ees! sc Nue amen „ palm‏ 
U—— 3 T‏ اس وسو س 
پت ان نت ىہ نم مم رم ېي 
دي دبا او وسد می سس مس مم سم پا 
à clum aim‏ نه وز د ——Ó‏ 9 2—- 
ې amd Leg wap‏ جو( v oral! ce‏ ووس ۲۴ 
yeh lene Orme Am gm ac nu — ss‏ یي — 
سد سس« 

mnn‏ ود be sx omm‏ رو سا dir‏ سس دم 
THY ate oo od.‏ سم ں؛ — — 
ft ide‏ دا مد سس ولوا meia Tum‏ مس لہ 
pelis ime ademit‏ وښ سا Dd cma‏ — 
وني amc cma mw cmd‏ موم 22 eevee ALA‏ 
aiian O i‏ سد nh‏ میں سید مو ون 
b pir‏ ده و ima pia‏ 
وون — ene nii rne‏ نان مع سا ې 
"anim me‏ 
سو مسست سی ہے ہ 


خد قسوەصنے ee‏ س ماب ہے به اس phe,‏ می 
مه ببس بیو داد ڈوم ہم جرجنرکینا نڈے ےسے سے 
سي — — e——‏ دا 

——— لط‎ GR. 























mE 
m 
I 





97 
unwarranted delay. en confusion over what information the 
Navy Depertwent actually dows release is not calculated te 


79 The day 


stiffen American morale in a jeng heré war." 
after this editorial appearec, Admiral Mephurn recomne med 
to Secretary Knox that neval iosses he announced &s soon &8 
Confirmed, provided thet no security considerations were 
involved (seo note 77). Every effort would be mado to 
inform the next of kin prier to the public announcement, 
but this would no longer be an absolute prerequisite for 
the news releass. 

A few days lèter, the Committees on War Information 
Gf GFF issued a press release stating that the government 
pledge@ to give the American people the bad war news an 
well as the good, so long as it would met give aid end 


e It wes the fírst cowprelonsiva 


eomfort to the enemy. 
goverment satatenent of golicy on war information anc 
repreaented the first official ačmisaicn that there was 
presa an publie dissatiafection with thea manner in which 
wer news wes being hamiled. 

The rolease included a long-awaited decision 
regerding the publication of casualty lists. Lista of 
garvicenmen killed in action would ke meade public en the 
condition that the news media wouló not issue nstionwios 
Kumar les of casualties, They wore to confine themselves 
to pablishing only the nëmes from their own arees. 

Qn May 2, the Navy released its first cescalty list 


a 
ان‎ w يی وس نه سم‎ coh ورا‎ MA 
ےس“ ہی سم‎ md md n AR m 
ا‎  —— ac دغه مت وره ھہے میں‎ val 
— — — — — — — مه‎ 
صما‎ — — a am Ang aR 
<a ے‎ pe? -10 wu | rie 
د موی ج مسد پسماې سے‎ ee 
وج رات‎ m 
— — — — ا‎ 
eee ht رس‎ 
ووو نره لم —— — — — — ید اس‎ 
am وسا رھ نمس سم ا ساد ج برو دنه‎ ۲ 
a وام‎ c o Pom m 
um came aa lime em bibe ١١ نتا‎ em hao, 
ü— — — زا‎ 
دزن رور ماھ جب مسب من‎ fon پل‎ 
مہم سح‎ sm m WM 


——M los مہ‎ mo * uma ae 2 .. 
e» edoid oem laum m 
نه‎ «- hee ہنم مس و عنم‎ — RE 

oc — 0‏ بب مس سا 
amos. -- A‏ وسر ۳ ا | — 










































© 


| 





98 
of the war, covering the period from December 7, 1941, to 
April 15, 1942. The list consiste of the nemes of Guad, 
wounded and missing, as à result of anemy action, of the 
Wavy, Coast Guard amd Marine Corps. In coosonance with the 
earlier decision, it carried with it the stipulations that 
newspapers Andi local radio stations must use only names 
whose next of kin rosie in tüieir respective circulation 
and broadesst vicinities, ami that sagagines end radio pet- 


works should restrict themselves to name of national 





significanes or interest. The promiso was see that addi- 
tional lists would be compiled Bg ruüpiídiy bs possible upon 
receipt of information and the notificotion of next of 

kin, "1 

By this time, however, & firm procedure hel been 
worked out to hold up the lists only thírty-six hourg aftar 
telegrams were gent to thu next of kin. The lists weru 
coupiled by a gub~sectios in the frees Section of OPR 
headed by a Civilian, Mc. Robert Templeton. 

A second major announcement in the Office of Facts 
anc Figures March press release about war information 
policy was that future “joint bulletins,” giving a general 
reviow of the mílitaery sítunation in various theaters of 
operation, woulc be issued from time to time by the Chief 
of Staff of the Army and the Commanmjor in Chíef, U.S. Fiset. 

The policy deciaretion also spelled out in detail 
for the first time the reasons for withholding certain 


- 

ټس — —— 
QR‏ ۳ سو ٢٢‏ پل eem be ec‏ 
اتا سا وور کے مدع سیر ہے ہے ہس دی 
— کت ست ee ond‏ سس کے ex «ie sime‏ 
ملا فغاس- د سب دنو ټووی در بیت meh ay‏ سے 
سچیټ» سا سا مس موم ہے awe‏ سرن mo‏ 
tm «dao a) es d BÓ aM UMEN‏ روسمس 
نو re a‏ و سن جس ۸٥‏ 
ونډی ——Á—À Vals aV Bibel‏ — — وذ !— 
وله S0 amen)‏ يمون o t d si‏ جوف مس 
3s Mee (EI Den)‏ مااع a‏ سس نه مون پس 
هساپ am cubes i‏ دي Su Pe cd e/o‏ 
و 3 
9 . ۰یع نت وو ere‏ وہ وتوہ وسم ت . 
سم پک شه ونه ee‏ سام اسيم A‏ 
mé or rv cm ^ a and a mul‏ ٣٭د‏ یس سب 
ve tk Le mem ei‏ 
——— —— — ۶ — 
AAS‏ 0ئ 6وس دا ١ ١‏ — پم بپ 
hon O —‏ 

ot me Sn |‏ در wh‏ سر 
يي nm‏ 





































5 





0 سے 


وو 
types of news. The rationale given for restricting‏ 
goecizic naval news showed much evidence that Admiral King's‏ 
yvigid ideas on what should ami should not be released were‏ 
very much in ascendancy at the beginning of the war. For‏ 
instance, any news of the sinking of American combat ships‏ 
هع Bay VeLee‏ هوه وون 
khe s&osSEy. Damage sustained by U.S. Navy Ships would be‏ 


was ruled out u 





reported when ít occurs ín sight of the enemy, bot the 
extent of the damnage normally would net be announced until 
reptire had been made. 

Three reasons were advanced for the policy of with” 
holding any newa of enemy submarine sinkings. The first 
two had consicerable validity: these actions were diffleuit 
to verify; and the enemy would probably send another 
eubmarine to replace ons that he knew for sure was lost. 
Tho thire reason was not so etsy to rationsiize. it was 
Claimed that withholding news of enemy submarine sinkings 
would have an "adverse psychological effect” on the enemy. 
Presumably, it was felt that in the spsence of any nows, 
anxiety would build up in the enemy camp when a submarine 
failed to return to its hose port as scheculed. 

The press relanse underscored one indisputable 
factor behind saw of tho delays ln naval news. So often. 
it was ebselutely essential for @ ship or task force to 
maintain radio silence in order set to tip off the enemy az 


to its location. Consequently, reports of sea engagements 









— — لات اص esi‏ ہف mimis‏ 
La Ae imag artis don iale pam tete‏ سے 
44 اس ب بصت علودلا عا نش — 
سا د سورب به فا انا تسا amm cs le‏ .- 
کت Wu‏ یې ها لل لل شت ^um edu»‏ 
e CR‏ ارون اښ ټين 
— سپ ġa y muan‏ ندعم یلیم =æ ibms‏ 
سم عا شب د مسحت نه نوم په یس حم تس لنت 
mb oe‏ 
e eam tne‏ 

Md re‏ شنت ۰ اا 
د TTL in mee m--— 1 mm‏ 
gle um ir soati «ii imeem l‏ 
34 نت siis Uie, Mes vos us Tan‏ ہے 

— ue em m wen) ج عا ل‎ lO m 
سا‎ «a تت‎ ài aul Ge سس سو کر‎ 

۱ نه کر ےآ حي مضه epulis‏ 
| سا — — 
"EA‏ نو س a‏ ا کے مک ا د ص 

AL |‏ کیک کے سے ٢‏ سخ ے 
د — 
— — — 
. ہللا میطنے ہے۔ = wate‏ 
اه س ma‏ سہ ہم 
نن سو 
۸ — 

















سس 



































100 
were frequently not filed until & vessel reached port. 

The press and public had ne quarrel with the basic 
philosophy of not giving out information that would aid the 
foc. As we shall see, however, they were shortly to digs” 
agree with some of the Navy's judgments as to what informa- 
tion fell in that category. But first. let us look at 
another step being taken at this time to further the 
information flow, the refining of procedures for handling 


war correspondents. 





There had been a system in effect for seme time in 
the Aédwinistrative Section of OPK for accrediting 
corresporientsa to the flaets and for special emparkations. 
in the emergency period prior to the war, many medie 
obteined Navy acereditation for corresponients on a "wait 
and see” basis. When the war begen, these accredited 
reporters flceked to Hawaii anc other points, eager tc 
embark with the fleets. 

Due to the critica] operational situation and the 
emphasis on security. there wera few emberkations ia the 
Pacific in the first months following Pearl Harbor, now 
ever. Correspondents were required to fit their material 
into the framework of official communiques from the battle 
areas, end often were able to fill in details on those 


conmuniques only days and sometimes even weeke after 


۱ اث 
0 وص کس رسس ہۃدر ‏ چنا سدار د ree haters listos‏ 
sap wit 10‏ سا وساد )سا مهم نک ad Ais‏ — 
دداسشمښې ۰د مم واخلې سم نہ thts‏ بی hi bum blew‏ 
ER E‏ سس« 
وتوہ ستے Au) ad‏ سي نس as eh mm Pez .a—aRR‏ 
ات ambe quas‏ لاس ue a uma udo cm‏ يت 
غمسسدمونوہ کہ د LSU‏ ممص ناکم 
Samir yma np‏ 
— — — 5 
"INE‏ 
atti hows wat mD ke ete orid‏ 
n‏ اھ — — — — — —— 
————ÓT— €‏ 
fm‏ س سما ovd ita d‏ ېي m‏ ویره مه ۾ ")^ 
وم لله پات نهت کسوس لس tiie‏ 
کہ دد دہ Linen‏ مم سي سی نه 
کھت تتھ یې کټ 
mm‏ نی em e Lee ia‏ —- 
> مەدان ea‏ ې د -i ai animi‏ 
ct‏ اب سم ساررسس وما اسو يد 
- موسدمہ ہہ جا niuis‏ ونوا 
o * as‏ . —— 
لس هله ده شنا ك فسعدف ب 


o ——— see <> 

















































ers -r 


162 
particular operations took place. By order of the Pacific 
Fieet coamander, Admiral Chester W. Wimite, the comauniques 
aiways hed to precede press copy, which first had to be sub~ 
mitted to the fleet public relations officer fox checking 
by the fleet censor. 4 Press copy of an operational 
nature, even after this censorship at the source, had to be 
sent back to tne Office of Fublic Relations for cioerance. 

There was at least one early complaint filed by a 
correspondent over the initial procedures fox handling 
press copy in the Pacific. In late February 1942, Admiral 
Nimitz referre two articles written by John O'Donnell of 
the New York Daily Naws., which had been disapproved by the 
Censor, back to Admiral Bepburn with the remark that the 
reporter “proposes to discuss their disposition with the 
Secretary of the Navy. os 

it was obvious to both the Navy and the Arey that 
procedures for handling war correspondents needed to be 
updated, As a consequence, in April 1942, a common policy 
for accreditation and other details connected with these 
correspondents was worked out between the two services; and 
a Joint Army aná Navy War Correspondents Credentials Board 
was established to censider each request for accreditation. 
In announcing the policy te naval commands, Secretary Knox 
Girected maximum cooperation with accredited war 


correspondents consistent with security. He emphesized 








itf 
وا غور اسر وی‎ cubus qu pad 
v-——Á— wit irina ۴ ۱ اغهه.‎ 










ي ooo faye 7W meme Paafy add‏ دا هد مچ ععاییتت 
d‏ ااا ju quaeve ul‏ ما مه سه به ې 
فا هپ ee ee‏ 
a ai bakri a a o eel VA coe eee -—‏ 
ننس تن وی نس عنس مس ری سو نس 

joni’ Eb) mancum cms ad ویاځ ړو.‎ qm سم نټ رې‎ 
ve emt ath. aml نش وسر یھی ها یمو‎ 
ee ee ee د ئا له‎ 
رن رون ون‎ "KO die ہہ خسن هد کت‎ mai وسم‎ 
ہے‎ e eh e a E e, eiiie 
cn, eo a ie ed 

gee a ANA fF mi aa |‏ ما مه سے روب 
اسه إل ai Cil‏ ہس پو مووسیام at haben‏ له 
یسر p a aA‏ لن riim pom è URI er‏ 
غه n‏ ما مب نیا انا موز راس 
— — — وم وی مه موز هب 
هاس کې سا وه لا اسو کین م 
“— — — دوومررني وس 


ق — — — 












102 
that "this cooperation is to be interpreted aa including 
authorization for embarking these accredited corresponcents 
on beard vessels or other craft of the United States, "74 

Lach correspondent wae required to sign three 
waivers prior to receiving his accreditation. He had to 
waive alli claims against the government for losses, Caxayges 
or injuries incurred while attached to a military unit; he 
hac to subject himself to abide by the provisions of U.&. 
Mavy Reguletions and other pertinent instructions in the 
area of his attechment; and he had to agree to submit his 
material for censorship. 

Censorship rules for war correspondents were agreed 
to jointly by the State, War and Navy Departments ané the 
Office of Censorship in May 1942. The basic regulations 
vequired that all press dispatches filed from Outside the 
continental United Statea had to be cleared through the 
cognizant U.S. militery or naval cowmander at the point of 
filing. Lf a dispatch was received without evidence cf 
such clearance, however, it could be passed by the Office 
of Censership in the United States, 

In September 1942, the Navy further required war 
correspondents embarking with the fleets to have a license 
Signed by the fleet public relations officer or the fleet 
censor. This wae in addition to regular accreditation 
credentials issued by the Army-Navy correspondents board. 
Also, radio broadcasts by commentators embarked with the 


Séi 
ېلو همو یم نل نه له ندسومویست وم نويسايس‎ 9 
M. acad ونم مد نس ورایس‎ Bene wo موردیم‎ Bead و‎ 
c» سم‎ ow له ودغعمه به ۳۵۱۷ پله خس و ورنوچ‎ 
ماد او‎ è oj befinna ajite —— —— 
مج جا‎ emisia sis pA همد ته ووښي تتود ہو عورف‎ 
تلم عو — مسا ته چېا سس‎ 6 
— — 
چېا اس‎ simi جس‎ bes لالض مور‎ d wd pianot er 
س‎ MASE ge tam) quit Abar وسمسمدرفتو +« عي‎ tu منم‎ 
مس انیس خلاو ع جد وعد‎ ila وموم مې‎ 
دنسم پرسون تب‎ ad ei bed ا‎ 
کے کس د چیا‎ À E 
ھ ر رهم سه بب سنښس ې‎ | 
X — Mt ا تم م‎ 
مک یا وز جر ومسو‎ o 
e enm, gama لمعد يې هم‎ e ج‎ ۱ 
ووس یہ‎ | ۱ 


— —— لیے — 







































-ه سک 


1023 
forces afloat had to have the approval of the Director cf 
Public Relations. ln November, both the Army and kavy 
began requiring the submission of governmental Fersonnel 
Security Queationnaixres from corcespendents desiring 
accreditation for the purpone of conducting background 
investigations on them. 95 

The system for handling war correspondents was 

working smoothly by the fall of 1942, &nd a large number of 
press and radio reporters operateó out of Hawaii under the 
control of the Pacific Fleet commander. However, it was 
still difficult for correspondents to embark in a Navy ship 
under combat conditions, deapits Gecretary Knox's eacourage~ 
ment to coamanders to allow them to Go so. A reviewer of 
the book, Queen of the Fliat-Tong., lamented in December 

1942: 

One of the minor disappointments Of the year has 
been the dearth of good stories in the Pacific. Here 
in an ocean lapping at the feet of half the people of 
the world is being fought tha greatest naval war cf 
history. That war has encompaseed for us the disaster 
of Pearl Harbor, the hopelessness of Cavite, the 
desperate heroism of Macassar Straits and the Java Sea, 


the elation of Midway--here were stories that had 
everything but reporters, ő 





There were complaints from photographers, too, that 
not enough attention was being given to the picture 
agencies, which poolec their coverage by means of a "Still 
Picture Pool." The Associated Press, Acne, International 
Hews Photos and Life initiated the pool under rules set 
forth by the Army ang Navy. There were more then thirty 


th 
ہم بس دابموود وه‎ Levees abf be eo few HAAN ae 
yet tos اسک سنہ نسحد سه سو‎ 


j soe Laney ده‎ ieis ir ٣کالو‎ waged 


— — jQelaseime ص۲۲‎ 

7^ ase sm اون نم‎ 

miyo AY 7‏ مدد موو سی 
سا تن سپ وس So eden Gre od Ane S042 fo diet‏ 
وم acacia Eha e‏ مود مہ وو سودا! "bs ume‏ 
le‏ ۲۶ فا اند رد سس وی تیج 
۵ئ aac il IEMA‏ بب diis gami s al srodka‏ 
۹« <سسسس ۲۳« 
مها یت فان wt oai ai d‏ حه È =e‏ ولس ۱۵ 
۵ كمه سم نط تح الال كير si Dos‏ — 
















.+ سس سج لضي ماد ۱۵ 
اک e‏ قد اوموق اس مس ووس 
wh‏ ا نعل اسا سه پو ژ سرد Set sade‏ 

Çê‏ دچ دوو ضډه ووي. وسوی وني ښوه ls‏ جورجوں 








104 


ooi photographers, out as late ag Octoner 1942 only 
87 





four Weze accredited with the Pacific Fleet. 


Estahlishvent of the Gtfice of War Inforaation 

Kot long after Pearl Harbor, President Rooseve it 
stated thet he was opposed to the “establishment of ons 
large Gepsrtment of information which would issue, as in 
the last war, ali information put out Ly tho government. ,8 
Re seemed to prefer that each office and department of the 
government speak through its own infermation service. 

As we have seen, however, the governsent was often 
criticised during the first few months of the conflict fox 
its handling of wer informetion. In perticular, newe of 
military and naval operations were considered by many to he 


“belated, confusing, or inadequate, "8? 


the charge was 
hurled also that the goverment was “sugar-coating™ the 
news by withholding or minimizing information about our 
more serious loses, including thoss at Poarl Harbor. The 
Committees on War Information of OFF wrestled with the 
problemn of developing a comson information policy, but 
press and public dissatisfaction continued to grew. 
Finally. on June 13, 1942, the President consol- 
ídated the information functions of several agencies, 
including the Office of Facts and Figures, into one Office 
of War Information (OWI)." me new office, headed by the 


well-known broadcaster Elmer Davis, operated directly under 


poe ہہ :سی ری‎ Ga s a ew _ومسرموس-چقت ہیف‎ Dog NS 





رسود ہیر پر سم یسیں و ني ولمس جا ہس 
ayang‏ سس ود هون مراحم سجن ارس یم th‏ 
— صمحنیہ سز حم وپ um‏ — 
٢-٧‏ یمد سم مس e ay‏ سم ۲۰ بک 
se sti devus wep mary‏ — 
; هوو "die cue inom) alt need mp amd‏ 
ndash hela‏ بک داد د موو «Wi ty‏ حم m‏ 
مس vow be‏ ووس € Lum‏ سے ہا 
سو سيا سرت عم وح شما عن بيك «i «i‏ 
ee ee‏ فاه سد 
سم سمه سه مه u‏ " موو "gend FD‏ 
me A mmn ELE‏ 


2 2" > 



















106 
the President as part of the Office cf tmaryency Kanage~ 


mont. 





The Director of War Information was mačo raspon“ 
gible for coordinating the information activities of ai} 
federal Gepartments and agencies. However, eech departaant 
and agency retained contreli of information proycane 
relating to its cwn acthoriszsÓ activities, subject to the 
policies formulated or approved by OWI. GSignificentily, the 
determination as to whether specific military information 
would be of aid to the enemy was left in the hands of the 
War anc Navy Departments, where it wes placed by the 
President right after Pearl Harbor, There was & stipula- 
tion, however, that the Direetor of War information would 
be consulted by the Army and Navy on releasing matters. 

Shortiy after he took office, Elmer Davis proposed 
to the two services that he be provided a daily report of 
all military operations, after which it would be determined 
by mutual conference what news should bo released and what 
should not. The services agreed to this precedure as it 
applied to military communiques to be iseued by their own 
information agencies. However, they were extcamely re lue- 
tant to give GWI any infomation which they did not wish 
wede publie, because they considered Davis to be the 
primary official advocate of full disclosure and hence a 
“major government security problem. sa 


The meetings of O¥T's Committee on War In format ion 





ms 


دیک اسن ر رحد دو اص km e) TO‏ یی —— 


اس .هغ — ä‏ رسي 
فققت wi‏ سموانسمنۍ چیا نریصوس نے یوین دہ هل 
شد سس نیرو وس ated‏ 
امس مساب سی م — 

نه cm d‏ سس« 
aia crias ingit — — —‏ 
A‏ — — لھ کت مهد وى 
qum af Gy he ce‏ سس حم نه AM! pe mem dem‏ 
— — انب ١ه‏ پنسا ۾ ww‏ 
ee‏ رم ادا ص ہے DIEM M il‏ 
سو ٠‏ 1 ""— ———— 













w 
iS qaem pareti ae cane عم‎ et له مسوواست کي وب‎ 





افسال موس هف anto inat‏ سل ۱۸ سيسجا 
یو سوام رس مرم mà‏ پو سمعسا ء دنل چوس ور 
algo» (à ames "me cmi‏ ان وم سا 










A 


166 

Policy--set up on the sa»e lines as the old OFF Committee 
on War Information--were not productive, according to 
Davis, because the Secreteries of Gtate, War and Navy 
appointed their respective information chiefs to be their 
representatives on the cOumnittee. "(These were) gentlemen 
who, whatever their competence in operations, had little to 
say about the information policies even of their own 
Gepartments. . . 293 

Although Elmer Davis’ first dispute was with the 
Army over the capture and trial of Nasi saboteurs who 


landed from & submarine on the Hast Coast, 3^ 


hia major 
problems during the remainder of 1942 were with the Kavy. 
as we shall see in the next section. 

While OWI did not have the authority that Elmer 
Davis desired in the matter of press releases, it diê 
maintain strict control over all government participation 
in commercial radio. Every pregram proposed by any office 
or agency had to be channeled in writing through OWI, end 
gach script had to be reviewed and cleared by its radio 
bureexn. That bureau also served ag the central point of 
contact for government relationships with the broadcasting 
industry. 

Daily contacts were maintained from the very begin” 
ning between the various sections of the Navy Office of 
Public Relations and their counterparts in OWI. Bill 


Galvin, now a commander, served ag Admiral liepburn's 


کے کے کے اة Wedd‏ ناسه و شه نه دو cuidam‏ 








r‏ اور sird iii‏ اما ناه موو وات سے 
و له مته ما واه وا سر سی 
کا یمد ع ات کم ےد م کے 
ونی llth‏ ولك سس سي وذ مو سے alte‏ امه — 
له ا د فس کہ ہے 
rs aN‏ ۱ | 

لفنای عا ونا یا «er cs!‏ سوب واه وې 
ikak aia‏ كز ده rh‏ وز وت مسق له الط 
تما ات فو هم موز اکسم يبد مسن 
di‏ خی تہ ۴ وعصعووفه "LENT‏ 
مد ret‏ بد Ad «O‏ داھوس نا خد عطزہزمم wm JO syair‏ 
که سک تک ol ob‏ سم سا اوس و نس سی 













107 
Liaison officer with OWI, as he had cone earlier with the 
Coordinator @f Information and OFF. Seven officers from 
the Office of Naval] intelligence. including one admiral, 


were assigned te OWI for security purposes. ° 


Good ها‎ Firat a... Then. the. Bad 

As mentioned in the last section, suspicion grew on 
the part of the press and public early in the war that the 
government was “gugar~ceating” the news for morale purposes. 
While the full extent of our losses at Pearl Herbor was not 
known, there was a whispered belief that they were much 
greater than announced. In the eyes of many, the Japanese 
wast have Known what damage they did at Pearl Barber; 
therefore, it naturally followed that the only reason the 
complete story was being withheld was to prevent the public 
from Knowing the true seriousness of our military situation. 
When the Navy made an @nneuncement on April 18, 1942, that 
certain of the ships damaged at Pearl Harbor had been 
repaired and were back in service, Bob Casey of the Chicago 
Iribuna cynically laid à story on the conscr's desk in 
Hawaii stating, “The Navy announced today that Sevan of the 
two ships sunk at Pearl Harbor have been put back in 
connission:""! 

The Navy, probsbly inasdvertently, contributed 
greatly to the "sugaxr-coating" theory, when it released 


early reports that more than sixty Japanese ships had been 







v3 

pd —‏ الا سا شک salruma‏ اوه بت 

wit و ستتنضم‎ 0 
wilds wee pallies نا اصه صا امت لوسك‎ 
— — — J— 
قات عوز‎ ed تتسد اندجت‎ A 
mc vere disigas naka 1al لسا نله جات‎ ۵ | 
ath wate cum air sà yma dhian boa Sorog = Pe zany MD 
me am- amumen ہہ‎ e emia دد دس‎ a o ت‎ dd" 
— — —— S و‎ a mE 
یہ 0سصصوب‎ gum Û ace در و‎ -Daa caig mA 
امم یہس‎ oa lA Net سه سی‎ Î eı 
نه دال سے ہے‎ forts هلسم‎ icant Hi Qe watt 
sijde dg marong ol my می‎ quedé mme queda atao 
aipat هم دی اما وم سکممسم ود دک وناب‎ 
amd — سوہ 2م هم سي مه‎ 
nd Was وف هر یی ساب وسرو ه وت وتو‎ 
ona تست حد بب‎ God اوه تست اه موف‎ ۱۵ ۵ 
یات وله د مو س زب وسم دہ‎ ۸ 
ô— مہ‎ ST لوطا شت‎ 
oped eget n ont 

















ری دو جو مس 
41 3ه pepate "prisong unga",‏ کې 
غه ەل" mem; Mia a e‏ 





108 
gunk by Allied fleets in the Battle of Makassar Strait on 
January 24, 1942. The true figure was four, but this final 
tally was not arrived at until all battle reports were 
authenticated. The incident was a prime example of the 
difficulty in substantisting losses at sea, especially in 
the Pacific during the early stages of the war, when many 
battles were fought at night or at distances in which 
contesting ships were out of sight of each other. The 
experience also le! to more caution on the part of naval 
commanders in the future ín reporting enemy losses and 
hence to delays in receiving and announcing the losses back 
hora , 96 

in early March, a representative of the Office of 
Facts and Figures accused the Navy of giving out all of the 
qood news and little of the bee in its communiques. ” 

Cited in particular was the communique reporting the Battle 
of Baceony Strait on February 19. which left the Japanese 
fleet withdrawing to the north apparently frustrated in its 
attempt to invade the island of Bali. The actual invasion 
followed closely. however, without subsequent statements 
from the Mavy. 

Some of the confusion in reporting results of naval 
battles in the Pacific during these first few months was 
due to a lack of coordinated releasing policy with our 
Allies. At this stage of the campaign, American, British. 
Dutch and Australian combined fleets (the ABDA forces) were 


مان نت تاشم" manisi Yè drodi dh‏ اکا ده 
سم عم the!‏ كه ق تابه سا قب ف قف isalt‏ 
اه تسا مدع هرد کو چت سے 
- ااي Mt te okie Meg © ame‏ 
l5‏ نے دمن اه هد Apt‏ 11 لت 
د احدفتنه مان نكم vUa‏ د 3o‏ له با 0 me‏ 
bajorai‏ سم pia at ano,‏ ٭×د مد :دم amije GA‏ 
روص 00:70 some mida‏ چیو to‏ «دوی Apo je‏ مټم. uI‏ 
وله هزم لد ته Lemna yy Fue. wit mm‏ 
وک لھ قلس ابم ره usa basau) omen (HA Amgen‏ 
saa ome TWO prisur ⸗‏ 
uL‏ 
-.. . ھ ومن و OTRO a OE‏ 0ه Je altto æ: I‏ 
سم دمه at be Lia me putag bo pan ads bene eon Agni‏ 
ده وو سا دنورلں «د کس سوا نو ابم "golem‏ 
“لكوك [rela o‏ موس رن ét smi cm pium‏ بئان 
و کوحمدم دس له — 
feni.‏ زویڈردیم ہے Dé +۵4۷۱ Ci Aang Mii wh‏ 214 
۵ ۵ دوہ لف alan jo Macai‏ جک دص عدا تاه نهم 
يوب یب سر 
تت سم La arian ASSO mi ha oor wf? bó‏ حو هآ 
سے جم جح شس ہہ ees‏ 
ee‏ راو پاپ Atqui‏ 





















169 
desperately attempting to harass the Japanese march into 
the Netherlands East Indies. After the Battie of Coral Bea 
in early May, news of the engagement was released in both 
Washington and Melbourne. The Australian communique 
reported that U.5. Army bombers played a major role in the 
victory, a fact unmentioned in the U.S. Navy announcement. 
intelligence reports received later indicate that no Army 
bombe fell on any Japanese ships. 0 

The major Navy ínformation problem developing out 
of the Battle of Coral $ena--the sinking of the L&Xinatau 
and subsequent withholding of that feet fer thirty-five 
days--has already been discussed. 

The Battle of Midway, dune 4-6. 1942, was hailed as 
a major victory fer U.S. forces, which it was. Four 
Japanese aircraft carriers and one cruiser were sunk; and 
Admiral Yamamoto's force retreated westward early in the 
battle, abandoning plans to invade Hidway. Wewareela in 
late June and early duly glorified the victory with 
"excellent aerial shots showing enemy ships maneuvering 
frantically to escape American ships and planes, ani 
finally going up in flames. "1"! 

An important factor in the Japanese defeat at 
Midway was the breaking of their naval code by American 
eryptologists shortly before the Battle of the Corel Sea, 
enabling the U.&. Navy to obtain advance information on the 
102 


order Of battle for the enemy fleet. Returning from the 


eo. 

| س اس سر حم دت peer‏ سردم ډډون 
asa jeyo De sisson awr uw aie: rum mae‏ 
sumi quo s Ye vum SEL‏ —— 
کک ہے م کے سے sion voter a Pris‏ بپ بپ 
۶ ہے se‏ سی سر رصع EN e a‏ . لہ ممسسیہو سس 
seek! erha erca "pti‏ نهذ الوفيوت pai a wed?‏ 
۱ 0 مر quà‏ — 

ټس quee eaten‏ نه ود ف scion‏ تین feo‏ 
mapmima! ———— e‏ 
— — نور 
44 سے Sue ab‏ 
tiled oy EMG p ment sree ۱۵ dused aft‏ سم 
soins a‏ —— — مال د .ae‏ بي 
Ó‏ —————-——— 
اسا سم e rer mire‏ ہے 
ہے — ۱ اخس ته مہ ملم مم مم ره اند 
سف سح کین وکت e e‏ سادا 
اكد کس cen at os ees‏ 
77 سس كوه اذه سم — 














— 


















110 
Pacific after Midway. & correspondent wrote 4 detailed 
account of the Jepanese order of battle which was published 
in the Chicago Tribune, Washington an New 
York Raily Hisus. The information was attributed to 
"reliable sources in naval intelligence.” ‘The Navy inmedi~ 
ately reacted by recommending to the U.S. Attorney General 
that an investigation be conducted to Gatermine whether the 
Espionage Act of 1917, as amended in 1940, had been 
violated. A grand jury, convened in Chicago in August 
1942, ruled against any indictment of the gedbuae or any 
other newspaper “because of the great public interest 
involved concerning the story that the Navy had advence 
knowledge of the strength of the Japanese fleet. °193 

The good news of Midway was cheering to the 
American people, but it was offset shortly after the battle 
by the announcement that the lexington had been sunk 
earlier ín the Battle of the Coral Sea. However, the Navy 
was not to reveal until 100 days later--on September 16-- 
that still another carrier, the Yorktown, had been sank in 
the Battle of Midway itself. 

The rationale behind the long celay in announcing 
the sinking of the Yerktown wes that it hed only been 
damaged in the actual battle and was set sunk until three 
Gays later when it was torpedoed by a leone Japanese sub” 
marine. Again, the Navy's security experts assumed that 


the enemy Gió not know of the loss, especially since they 








ont 
—— ۔ 0ہ لوہ مجسوني. ء‎ 
هاس سس ته او ووس‎ 
wes onm لہ چو دپ دصیف هیاس جسح مت رر‎ 
سس سد ی‎ sar misrin کآ انل استصد ېښ‎ 
ناو رحسوح-‎ mF د الد سس«‎ 
شا غوومسپ عومووی‎ aki ûi ihren ya amane ES 
MES See im دی‎ a E فل مه دس‎ i 
تسمه‎ and د مج س عم س سید کے رحن‎ 
ü— — — erg ۷ مهن‎ 
سس«‎ qwe Senaege Daik کا‎ 
وسوی س:‎ a vor cnm 
"یياوو وښو‎ | 
يمن لوصوب مو اين عد‎ A SO rem DoNp دا یږ‎ ۷ 
وت سم‎ saspe دو ویو او ند نتس وون‎ 
aore nee Sar sanasina زو ټل‎ sau يب‎ 
cow air — ومس‎ (eres ae ن۷‎ aired غه دص‎ 0 

hl het تن بس سسوم ده شن رح‎ (ew WU 

aj mem we Dai mm P وه 11 وموم مس ریم‎ 
۷۳۰ 1 quake fo 6 — 

tee of wish pnd aif bakar atm چو‎ ٢ 
ered tine ےہ کی‎ wer s MENGE sd Wo guide mts 
de» cea mand f f vos Dew d ! سد‎ 
O اس ای نی کت فووسہ ہد"‎ 

































ta 
tss 
اڅ‎ 


had covery reason to believe thet the submarine which 
accomplished the sinking wer destroyed itself a short time 
later. Further, initiel plenus were being made at the time 
for the first U.S. offensive against the Japanese Ln the 
Solomon Islands. A major pert of the strategy, cf course, 
waa to deceive the enemy as te our strengths and weaknesses. 
£ there was any doubt in his mind that the Yorktown hac 
been gunk. why resolve that doubt by an official confirma- 
tion, the reasoning went. 

The abeve rationale might have been accepted by the 
press and the public if the Japanese thenselves had not 
announced shortly after the Battle of Midway the sinking of 
& U.B. aircraft carrier. One newspaper editerial put it 
this way: 

(The) &nnouncement that , . . tha carrier YXQxXxtowa 
had been gunk .. . hangs up a new record ín delayed 
communigues. The official excuse for this tardy 
announcement would have us believe that it was not 
until this week that the Navy Department wes sure that 
the Japs knew the Yorktown had gone down. Yet on 
June Sth this newspaper carried a diapateh reporting 
that the Jepenese radio had definitely announced the 
sinking of a large U.S. aircraft earrier the day 
before, Just who wes the Navy trying to kid--the Jeps 
Or the American people? 

. . a There is the uncomfortable suspicion that the 
American people, instead of being told the truth as 
soon as the truth can be told. are being fed Lits of 
geod news anc bits cf bad news according to a scien 
tific dietary program worked cut by morale experts who 
look upon us as 2 mixture of boobs and fraidy-cats.104 

The opinion that military information was being 
tampered with for morale purposes was compounded by the 


fact that oniy twenty-four hours before the announcement 





هم at‏ ی rimi‏ ووس دام att as ummequu‏ 
هله تم سے د سم موي وو — ماس عسوو m——À de‏ 
غا — سي مهه gisk tas.‏ وه موو نوس 
MM‏ سم سم چیه خوش aa‏ سر سر اسم ګر tai petim‏ 
اوه منم cee suds onze Yr‏ ٢ي‏ دی Lainie‏ مود رس 
iere 4‏ عم وه اسم ۸ وط sas ins ête renge‏ 








112 
about the XorkLown's loss, Rear Admiral W. H. P. 13177 
Pacific Fleet destroyer commander, held a press conference 
in Washington at which he claimed the U.S. fleet in the 
Pacific was now superior to that of the Japanese because of 
the severe enemy losses. Commenting on tha timing of 
Blandy's gtatement, the above editorial asked: “Could he 
have been sweetening in advance the sour communique that 
was coming?” 

Columnist Arthur Krock took the position that the 
public would better understand the Navy's security reasons 
for withholding news of our losses if they had been given 
the true picture of the severity of the disaster at Peari 


Harbor. 5 


In expressing this view, he struck closely to 
the heart of public dissatisfaction with war news 
policies. The American people were by this time very 
personally and emotionally involved with the war. even if 
their individual roles on the home front were in many cases 
limited. They collectively seemed to resent any evidence 
of & lack of confidence in their ability to “take it” on 
the part of the government. In the words of one editor, 
"Even when we're losing, we don't see any sense in covering 
up the scoreboard, "196 

By no meang was all press comment about the 
žorktown communique unfavorable. however. In fact, 
according to a report of newspaper editorial reaction to 


the announcement conducted by the Analysis Section of OPR, 


£11 
مامت‎ ١ 8 .9 Zexhebé ume می‎ eee مه‎ 
)ہت‎ snes a hini natem) دمه یہو جو وہہ‎ 
وي‎ ti ùm WU adi baia ad ہے »3 ساب‎ ci, 
iò masten] ایس‎ ete toe meet کت‎ ane toque war »وه‎ La 
سلس ی‎ siy wo 00  , qu يله موسي‎ 
-i aub bee jA e a ه0‎ ۰ 2 
sacs axpinpemes Kaca ak) semere ai aies dood ۶٧۷٧ 
mu sev wabthucg ots Hogs ولاس ممصت‎ ee. ہے‎ 
apere riiyan D' {YAS 3 ⸗ yadta Maor alig 
wonky ewe Lad qui? tà ammanl wee ba avem prihirddsiw aS 
هم یب‎ tea مسب خر سر‎ af? 3o وو کی وتسم‎ 
ei viario ته هوحم‎ omiy eirt بي 0 ته ۶وت2 ضو‎ 
mee ne Hl eS aD MIR to پسه‎ eti, 
weer cole elas yd crew boe aA a3 لم‎ 
ij aes eras a مه مسسدب سومسمه مانه‎ ۹ 
couse ete oh ear me tal am vo ae 
— ght dabek — —“ 


























li3 


$0 per cent of the editorials screened were favorebie to 


107 


the NBvy coupaáred to 42 per cent ageinet. an excellent 


example of an opinion in cowplete agreement with the Navy's 
position appeared in the Long Beach (Calif.) Prese~ 


ARAS RS 


Delayed confirmation of the sinking of the aircraft 
carrier Yorktown . . . provides an exceliont illustra- 
tion of the importance of censorship and tho holding ug 
of news which would be of value to the enemy. It is 
true, the Japanese loudly proclaimed the loss of the 
Yorktown immediately following the Midway encounter, 
but subsequent events proved that they mexaly were 
guessing. They knew that the carrier was in that 
region, And to report its loss not oniy would provide 
sonething to brag about at home, but there wes, they 
believed, the eralll likelihee’d that sach en &nnounce- 
went would bring forth an admiesion ox denial from the 
United States Kavy. Ag the result of wise censorship, 
however, the world was kept in ignorance of the ۱ 
Yorktown’s fate, and the Japenese in the west Pacific 
were kept in a state of suspension. Wet being certain 
ef the whereebouts of the cerrier, they were obliged to 
map their strategy on AT assumption thset it wes 
available for action. 


Although complaints over the delay in the 
announcement were quite vocal, the Navy was to reactive an 
even greater public relations “biack eye” over its handling 
of the account of the Battle of Bavo Island on the night of 
Magast 98-9, 1942. The Japancas scored B major victory in 
this battle when seven of thelr cruisers and one deatroyer 
approached an Allied fleet in the middle of the night 
موت‎ 14 0 117 unGetested. Three American cruisere-~the 
Astoria. Quimey and Miacannese--and ene Australian croiser, 
the Gaokerse, waxse sunk. Ome other U.S. cruiser anc two 
Awexrican destroyere were damaged. 





a dipe < aia e e مو ووا غ۴ییوه ډو وې‎ 





سورد سي — — — eA mis‏ 
هس AAA ye‏ ف٥و‏ سوہ هون عب وپ 
"۲ ۳« 
۰ اسېېېیدر a‏ سسس_ 
۱ یرہ ید دسر سے مع سب ری سس 









124 

The Australians promptly announced the loss of the 
Canberxa: but the day after the battie, Admiral King merely 
admitted that one American cruiser had been sunk and two 
others damaged along with two destroyers and a transport. 
At this point, he was not withholding anything. since this 
represented the total extent of the information he had. A 
few hours after his initial announcement, however, the 
admiral was informed that the two damaged cruisers had gone 
down also. He then made a decision not to release this 
fact, because he reasoned the Japanese would have returned 
to attack the American transports debarking Marine 
rainforcenents on Guadalcanal if they had known the two 


eruisers were not there to protect them. ww 


When no further 
statement was forthcoming from the Navy, the public was 
left with the impression that tha battle was actually an 
American victory, since King's original announcement statec 
that the Japanese force ۵۵ ۲14487 1. 

This time, aceording to Bewaweek, Elmer Davis had a 
"showdown" with the Navy, eventually forcing it to release 
on October 12 the news and names of the three cruisers sunk 
at Bavo Islang, i? He described this confrontation in a 
confidential letter to his wife, in which he offered an 
interesting insijht into the personality of Admiral King: 

. + . We have a major row on with the navy; I had a 
long argument this afternoon with Admiral King which 


got very acrimonious yet somehow remained friendly. He 
runs the navy so thoroughly that they are ail afraid of 





َ‫ 8 
تپ ee,‏ یدام boana‏ کے Mi be Ghat‏ 
یې پر بی دي نم به لسن . لود تاي ودل 
acize — —‏ ماس new’ bat‏ سا عا ې 
غاب حسم رس مهه و سوت سو و rueqansas‏ 
i‏ ۸ه پوتی som wee ed‏ بات انشا مب ولس side vonie‏ 
امج ۵ بت هه ممم و عنم دو وسم انم چا اوق ۹ 
al ena ebes VE‏ — اه دوو بی 
ü — — — — — ——‏ 
ates wets of maja uad‏ د هې رورجم «mele: dé ses‏ ہیں 
اه- — — — — — ü‏ 
غا aimi - ceases‏ 
وسم سو ⸗— — ces‏ 
ae vilaniws pem one md? dadé moleeewpà mds diim mud‏ 
تو ان نیہ —Ó——— A oen‏ 
فقه — ̃ ů‏ — 
ہے mis OAT‏ صسودام وہ — — 




















yoresi i *‏ نہ sola aj hiv eis‏ = وس سم 


— — an mtem 


115 
him, and maybe it was something of a relief to him to 
find someone who wesn't. This is a very serious 
matter, however, and will have to be resumed next week 
and taken right to the top if they do not come 

Twenty~ four hours after the announcement on the 
Savo Islan sinkings, the Navy countered with geod news in 
a communique about the Battle of Cape Esperance. Davie 
claimed that he ió not know about the Cape Esperance 
victory when he pressured the earlier release. Neverthe- 
less, due to the close proximity of the two announcements, 
both OWI and the Bavy were charged with delaying bad 
releases until they could be offset by more palatable 
News. 112 
Davis also had been kept in the dark about the 

sinking of the carrier Wagp and the damaging of the battie~ 
ship Nacth Cacoling on September 15 near Guadalcanal; and 
the disabling of the carrier Saratogm in earlier action. 
According to the OWI director, he did not hear about these 
events “until returning travelers brought hack the 
ROWS. 4113 He added: 

Wo had always agreed with the Navy that no details 

about ships damaged should be given out; but it was 

« . > essential that wo . . . know what had happened, 

sO as to form a judgement on what should be published; 

if this concealment had continued OWI would have had 

to go under different direction. 
Davis again "talked" to the Navy about the situation, after 
whieh information on the losses wes updated. 


On October 26, 1942, the carrier Bernat was sunk 









۱ ا وس لے 
ta elm a foods {pisma O‏ جمے تست وجو 
— هلو ۰۰۰ _ِ«ِ«(س7س_ 
wepusre ecce quum ais dos N 4756‏ مودق لوو نحو aad‏ 
و)همه ىداا وسم دود 4- eto‏ ند سنوی ښلاهسه‌يم 
تصش oon bed ante‏ ود ده یویم اعم aad $oQudB‏ 
ats La panid‏ صندنۍ wo iae gpa‏ حمسسعما دو یی ےوریرں- 
امس وه س غه کلوبمې mad ses RU md‏ تن و 











o 
0 







سا یہ قب مہ لہ سو عب 


رح مھ 5 نے ہے 


— که کسه — — 
4 —— 





| — 


116 
after the Battle of the Santa Crus Islamis., Two cays 
later. the Navy announced that she was only damaged. That 
aame night, speaking in New York. Davis told an audience 
that all losses of major Navy vessels reported as of noon 
that day had been released. Me later axplained that at the 
time of hia statement he did not know sbout the sinking, 
but instead had been told that the carrier was in tow 6 
might be saves. 414 

The episode occurred only a few days before the 
November 4th congressional elections; and Davis pressed 
Admiral King to release news of the Horeact’s sinking to 
avoid the accusation that the administration was holding it 
up for political reasons. When King refused, Davis went to 
sea President Roosevelt personally on the matter. The 
President agread that thea logs of a carrier should be 
announced but that the ship's nam should not he released. 
The Heavy did announce the sinking on October 31, prompting 
Bevis to coment that now “ONT was over the hump with the 
Navy, so far as major issues were concerned .. . Hever 
again wag news withheld from us, nor wags there much Gig” 
agreement about its release, i15 

After the elections in November, Devis discussed 
the various delays of news about naval actions in a 
national radio broadcast. While he asserted that military 
Security was the only factor in these delays. he claimed 


that news of some of the ship losses was withheld longer 








ale 





۱ ذاه نك صن مهو Jas?‏ 
وسوس د رسای ئل ہس تس یی 
ده دل فسس کر سر سو سور وت دا دہ سہ 
ددم هم مد -مر ررسمم .نه اد وسم mı‏ 14 وب 
Pe ai‏ له سم ar‏ وله سه زۍ چم ال «اولمس. 
be yai ni m a ge) gd aiar om Ai hes det‏ 
i a n‏ ۱۵۲ 
pee ee om‏ تا ws cek AA e e‏ 
Nauka Ak bet mimin imire A eA‏ 
"WT REP E EE masim al mad‏ 
صهمووڅه سب سس نې ایسد سے سے رہ 
دو سس ید mi‏ وم ټم دوه جمہ ہم 
wj? m cna oo. alieni Miet Indias m‏ 
ola‏ روعت پیر دب مس مد سونس وسو بپ 
سس ېی همر سر موه سو مدا مر هم سس 
په مې د ممسمم شم کی م کی اد ووس زو 
ل cdm md om na‏ —- 



























117 
than necessary. fignificantly. he added that criticism of 
the news policies regarding the naval wer in the Pacific 
reached a crescendo just before the congyvesslonel 
elections, 

His assertion was backed up by the results of 
monthly surveys on public satisfection with war information 
conducted by the Princeton University Office of Public 
Opinion Research. In December 1941, 69 per cónt of the 
American people thought the yovernment waa supplying suffi” 


cient information about the war. 11$ 


This approval figure 
declined atoadily as the war progressed, however, until it 
reached a low of 49 per cent in Gcteber 1942. Following 
Davís' succag&ful fight with the avy over the Hermet 
announcement and the publicity giver to the Worth African 
landings, the figures jumped dremetically to 76 per cent in 
Movenber an! levelec off Bt 69 per cant again in December. 
the same as it hac been a year earlier. 

Yet, there wes stii? considerabile gnashing cf teeth 
in the Navy over the wisdom ef tively announcements of ship 
losses. An article in &aeaoGNRE. Navy league magazine, in 
discussing the congressional and other evitician over news 
policies and the Navy's entire strategy in the Pacific, 
@pined thet thie “clamer . . . youded anc werried”" the Navy 
into prematurely announcing the sinking of the Boxoek wher 
it was “certain that no Jap eye actually witnesse¢ her end, 


and the announcement might easily have coat the blood or 





و 
t baie w i —‏ 
— سا ی تہ 
eee‏ — — 
9 ۶ له 
٣.٠ d‏ ہو 
me ۱‏ 
,رو ns‏ 
SEII AOI IE md .‏ 
Ny tà tt ae ~ vamo‏ ورمع عو محا 
— — — ۱ 
da —‏ 
٠‏ د "mw "wp us 7 “= AE‏ 
A maman mi se |‏ -——- 
امب می at‏ ویم 
پوس » د سدم e gE‏ اع 
ed / tus‏ مم 
M‏ مو i‏ رن 
— — 
temas‏ سب 
mL‏ گا 
و سیر تم 


mmm o " نو‎ re ap 
or * بس‎ 5 
—_— ۸م‎ ۳ 


























— 
~ اہر ایخ لس یبا 
وي * 
lw coro‏ 
موے 





life of many & JU.5, sailor. „LAT 


Captain Lavette Succeeds 5dmiral HARDER 

In August 1942, Admiral Hepburn, the first director 
of the Office of Public Relations in ita new status under 
the Secretary of the Wavy, was named to be chairman of the 
Navy's General Board. Picked as hia succossor was Captain 
Leland P. Lovette., The choice represented a Gecision on 
the part of Secretary Knox in fevor of experience over 
rank. Captain Lovette, it will be remembered, served first 
Bs press chief and then director of the eld Public Rela- 
tions Branch in OKI. iie returned to public relations 
Guties from command at sea in February 1942, serving &s 
Aesistant Director to Admiral Hepburn. 

Ceptain Lovette immediately addreased himself to 
the overriding issue facing Navy public relations st the 
time. He told the presse “Your Government is trying to 
give you the facts--when they do not in any manner give aic 
and confort to the enemy . . . The geod news and the bad 
will be told. “^® ge stiil had some "rough-sledding” ahead 
before this issue wes resolved. 

Shortly after he became director, Lovette, at the 
suggestion of Secretary Knox, began the first of three 
tours around the nation for the spocifi- purpose of elicit- 
img opinions from the news redia on how to improve the 


Navy's public relations program. His first trip took him 












abar نه س مومسم‎ al amimia مھ تقد هسه نو اتا‎ 
مس بر ہہس سد دو ہم‎ wê «maê ûî O (IPY a 
nier ev mpos "لخ -» اه‎ Jat bame "(N 
= makê o bamer مسا ېاي دص عدف‎ 
seve ually bto AN Ki com هغ پا هه همهم هه‎ 
وم‎ — — c Shes ده‎ a 
- iE bio Wir Yo OEE mA wee Seba» saw d 
وءسحدد تہ وس تد اس وا‎ we fup «d Cem دی‎ 
os eters (COED مره‎ ô— — دک‎ 
سنا( سارک‎ of oi wapa 

طخ را مد فا رو موسوم id Vleet!‏ 
alive aa‏ نرہ امن سوب sia‏ ہو يمح ود رد 
وو reç‏ كنع وسور اسم Aa wp emos pe ad cem vb wes‏ 
A we‏ مالس سن ہے اس مه مس مم رس سو 
سا کت بډ )۶ و tine‏ وت مس وسرو ستداي- وس 
سوج ۲ 

tls Yee —‏ ے ao‏ — امو Te‏ وب 
* — نسټوس عموں Raped‏ 1— 
سه وسم -zisije Ae spr aitigh i a meas a‏ 
دو ولاس کم وای a e‏ ور wet‏ نو C ek‏ —( 
aE dasr diye ec n ye seli KAA ¥ ae‏ 































113 
throughout the Middle West, where he held many conferences 
with press and radio representatives and answered questions 
on news policy aad the war in general. On subsequent tours 
im the early fall, he traveled to the West Coast anc along 


the East coast. *?? 


Qther Fax AGAR. soc Organizational changes 

With Captain Lovette moving up to the post ef 
director, Commander Bob Berry, who had been acting as an 
assistant to Adasiral Hepburn sinco Lovette's arrival, 
became the Assistant Director of OPK. Mis title waa 
changed to “Deputy Director" in October., Lieutenant Gom- 
mander W. G. (Slim) Beecher, Jr., USN, who also had a tour 
in the old Public Relations Branch from 1938 to 1940 and 
then several sea commands. returned to OPR in early July 
and assumed Berry's former position of Assistant to the 
Director. Captain Lovette also appointed Lieutenant Com” 
mander A. Db. Hill, the communique officer, to be his 
special assistant for liaison with Admiral King's two 
staffs. Hill still prepared the naval communiques, but 
now worked independently from the Press Section. 

another significent personnel change occurred in 
August when Paul Smith, the erstwhile editor and general 
manager of the San Francisco Chronicle. suddenly resigned 
from the Navy and hie position as head of the Press Section, 
to take a similar job with OWI. The unpredictable Smith 


ere 
ووهه مسجد‎ yar tliat af حم‎ r4 albinu ats seodguouts 
eno Inve يه‎ dee i ume غۍ‎ boe EAE ve ۵ 
ددوسيسة دا با دوم کات مسا ےس‎ mi istà vise غه‎ ad 
Ri! aus «a^a atò 
= ج * | چو‎ 


NL 





E a do vite ڈو‎ ad dod جوصسحثٹہ:‎ o 
Pe ee ea ee اد ات‎ 
ww wLiER alii mad ا ی ھک ی ڈت‎ 

ما بے سن 20 dl‏ كدي لفن انتصق كسم 

مسب iE Sanaa Diii A‏ جس به مك فنا ى Suet‏ 

ta ا ا تس سالک اغا روم‎ edi 

yiwe mi mp af erus — — —‏ لع 

و دنس —— 

و nm‏ نم دن oals‏ —- 

کے تبغر موی oi oi’‏ مت 

بل لشېو لس لل 

M‏ ا وی جات اع سر نج 




























120 
quit OWI three months later to enlist in the Marine Corps 
ag a private. Selected to replace him as head of "9 
Press Section was “ieutenent W. Marvin MeCerthy., USNR, who 
had served es a preas Officer in the ection since the 
start of the war. 


in Ne 





vember., Lieutenant Commander William L. 
Huggins, Jr., USM, xselieved Lieutenant Commander Bernriecer 
as head of the Naval Districte Section. In December. 
Lieutenant Max Miller, USNR, author of I Gaver the Wates- 
XAR} anû other novels, reported fer duty in the Magazine 
Section. The writer had bean training recruits in 
Sheepshead Bay. New York, when he was "discovered" by the 
Magazine Section, “which took immediate steps to put his 
talents to work for public relations. "27° 

The year 1942 saw the creation of three new 
sections ani the loss of an old one in the Office of Public 
Relations. One of the new sections wes formed out of the 
Pictorial Section, which now concentrated only on stíll 
photoacraphy end art. in the fail, a separate Combat 
Photography Section was set up to supplement the wozk of 
Wavy photographere and civilian war correspondents. Itc had 
been recognized for some time that photographic coverage of 
the Navy's war role left much to be Gesirad. Accordingly, 
the combat photography progran begun 2 yeas earlier wes 
expanded to include ten field units consisting of one 


photographic officer, two enlisted motion picture 





ort 
—— aA piip os reani mI E E. 
s umo bo وت اس سب نمو‎ 
سس ہے‎ o almum «¥ — — ۴م‎ 
| ac echa وود‎ eda لاسو بلع‎ 6 re eram nd 
.- ود اب‎ ۶ 
هسسوم هم مې )سه ی‎ wed 1 
ee ee cem .. ۶ په8ووشسه‎ 


سل e‏ ق 
گلا ھا مج مین یا ف عد ل رن 2 زر 
مھ دب هواک سه لح كرت کے ر 
هه مځ ا سے کے بے سی کے 
واب — دی مد اى ار یں 
3 الا مسر ې سه اموس د٧‏ 

و ۸ه ته ما مسل ما نټ 
سا ای chides te calle md» à em ALS ne We sand‏ 























121 
Photographers and one still photographer. The teams were 
trained in Hew York by March of Time, Imm., with Louis 
be Rochemont, the producer of the newsreel, serving as 
advisor. They were then assigned te the fleets, naval 
forces and other naval activities. Lieutenant Carlton 
Mitchell, ïr., USNR, formerly with the Carl Byior public 
relations firm in Maw York, who had supervised combat 
photography in the Pictorial Section for the last year, was 
chosen to head the new section. 

The decision to upgrade the Navy's photographic 
coverage Of the war coincided with the promulgation of 
General Order 179, which replaced General Order 96 on 
August 26, 1942, as the governing document for the photo- 
graphing of naval subjects. The revision was much more 
flexible. It canceled the “carte blanch” authority which 
naval officers had in the past to halt picture-taking on 
navel installations at any moment they believed security 
was being violated. They now could interfere only if they 
had dofinite reason to believe that such photography would 
pesas out of naval control or jurisdiction before it could 
be reviewed. The new directive made clear thet ell Kavy 
photographs taken by commercial photographers, including 
war correspondents, had to be forwarded to OPR for security 
review. Further, photographs showing damage or loss of 
U.S. Navy combat ships or classified fleet operations hac 
to be routed via the office of the Commander in Chief, 


sg 
سید‎ atten acum ۷ه لپ وسم ود وټ‎ aE A 
mi wirpa «Abas mur 1o ته اسم‎ toon et 
كرون‎ aruoll اس نمواوسټه ہے سب‎ uu لص‎ 2041418 
عتسیهور ورود‎ .sobdiviece Lowen Wade شي غه‎ 
HIG US Fu ao ihe ۵ ا مھ بت ہد یھ‎ 
مې‎ exi neque Bx we uuu) لافس كنس لله سب‎ 
ټی‎ army aradi oh saiia لك داسممیر‎ nd سبوا‎ 
"——É—— dial — 
— — — 8ء ج‎ 










ee ere 
حلہ‎ qxbpom mee "e-aDe «rumo «d bala 0 «Euan 
وکس ۳ وت سدنس جہ‎ DUUM, 
ivan eni quads شب مر سی موس‎ a وق‎ 
vets سی )د‎ ad xami i ٭ہ‎ ۷ beatles gac! ob 
١. ۷ ae یی وس‎ ae o2 لامها ممعي‎ Ba 
سو سو عا دنس م لس ذه ون‎ Coase Devas 30 wee Mq" 
جس‎ Lis mds mia ahaa تورہوورزہہ‎ vas uit دوه سس‎ ad 
——PÓ— Pos md 
ده هښ دې مسوم بپ‎ oomunn "d "مث جم‎ 
Jo wend مس مہ‎ qub saye rag 
»سس«‎ 
— ata De smiVbs تل‎ ۷ 








122 
U.S. Fleet. 

In early August, a new section--$pecisi Pventa-- 
hac been added to meet a nae for community relations 
Services. One of its first assignwents was to establish 
liaison with the Navy League in making plans for the forth” 
Coming Navy Dey celebrations. The section also obtained 
Navy speakers for civilien audiences and handled tours, 
exhibits and other promotional projects, including ones on 
behalf of the Navy Relief Society. Its first director was 
Lieutenant Commander Frank J. Courtney, VSWR. 

In the fall, another new section-~RKeview-~was 
created. This section was establisheé to mora effectively 
accomplish security review of Bll types of copy ané 
manuscripts referring; to the Navy, thoreby centralizing in 
one section the clearance of material formerly handled by 
the various sections to which it pertained. Review also 
took over the task of clearing speeches by naval personne] 
to insure conformence with policy anó the protection of 
naval security matters, and maintained liaison with the 
Office of Censorship and OWI on classified matters. 
Lieutenant Comaander Victor Blakeslee transferred from his 
position as head of the Magazine Section te take over 
Review; and Lieutenant Commander Walter Kariyg, USK, 
reported to OPR to replace Blakeslee in Magazine. During 
the first three weeks of its existence, over 500 manuscripts. 


press stories, magazine articles, radio scripts, 





ret 


+ = 





ptt سک رہے۔- ہیں ری‎ uar 9 Sn Vu a ۳ 
سيد قاد مسر 6+ اسم‎ Wo Pwam Bf Debe qued BUE 
دو اووس رلوم‎ Wwe ram se Ferit wi? 5b ww an ote 
UT ITM 3 0 للكت سدم وك هدم وی‎ 
ای پا‎ 
e ware giharê etek پټمسهسموا‎ usse تل‎ IR 
موم‎ safarid ہد‎ «42 ۱۰ veas قا‎ e فاسص‎ 
اسآ«‎ 

lod u WS a a تس تصة نفد‎ ۴ mm 
bue بعد مو دو‎ TIS ro wive Ha aa 

سس ni ge likin pried e.‏ 
wis noiresa wia‏ عقف صم asas to‏ اه ہق ھا ew‏ 
wis‏ د AY o2 ae‏ د ru Kanara‏ ویج 
di ave 0‏ هوو دو HEA‏ تست چا سای مس 
تا افو ده نموم بداد هئ to maireta ar ias‏ 
سم امس ۱۱ بداد ريم 

emus empti ناه سب قم‎ 7 
els seu. aecrotemee! 348 
s a6 qum aupra ek O 

A‏ ع اا سی ار حو چ 





























i —‏ — — لوا 





123 
advertising copy and speeches were channeled through the 
Review Section. 

The section lost to OPK during the year was the one 
headed by Rear Admiral Henry A. Wiley that began in the 
fall of 1941 as “Industrial Morale” and latex assumed the 
title of “Board for Production Awards.“ In duly 1942, 
Secretary Knox established a new Incentive Division 
directly under hís control to supervise the coordination of 
Wavy liaison with the civilian defense industry. He 
appointed Rear Admiral Clack H. Woodward, USN (Retired), es 
chief of the division, while Admiral Wiley became Chairman 
of the Board of Awards. 

The Incentive Division was tasked with improving 
the Navy's labor relations, whaich were not very good et the 
Start of the war. It was organized into three sections. 
The first, called Creative Material Production, dealt in 
the areas of production and labor incentive. It released 
data on war materials directly to war industry companies, 
letting them and their employees know how their particuler 
products performed in combat situations. The second 
section, Operations, was involved in plant visits and 
rallies, tours of wer plants by naval heroes, civic 
meetings and other special activities. لا‎ third section, 
Press, handled liaison with the labor press and forwarded 
material to industrial house organs. 1 


The creation of the Incentive Division removed a 


mi 
با ات ومس سه سب‎ END 
هلالم شیو د شم‎ 
بصع تدعو وص سويت زد داب‎ 
لالت‎ bem هور مسا نمی‎ taisivat“ ui سه وو‎ 
tat ورسم سسویشهه."' ع تل‎ wer م١ وغ ده‎ 
قوس چو ونو منمه یه دشۍ وخښس وی ریم‎ 
ja smidündicvmc. و مس ہرم ہے‎ Lowes ماقف واه حابم‎ 
سس«‎ 
سسسصبہی -" رہ متا مد‎ VR umo faxum «sas unio 
ووي‎ Gonos UF Vê 
van) aw Aano au aint Anî تت په‎ ٣۳ 
C rS NE 
rr a 1801 1 2 J]i A AL 
سرد ووه لمي كم هسوسو‎ e ووه وی وه‎ 
smie pried so di I SAAR aa tar وی‎ ae فا‎ 
Aur ہیس کد ومول‎ ER اش جوف ےہ تعدب‎ 
— — — —— iy rk 
له ون بویا نت‎ Seslxwm مس‎ — ee⸗⸗ 
———— —— AS 
ہر رد‎ bss a — — 


























124 
function from the Office of Public Relations in Washington, 
but the naval diatrict public relations officers retained 
their responsibilities in the area of industrial morale. 
For instance, they handled ali liaison with Army public 
relations officers surrounding joint Army-Savy Production 
Awarc ceremonies and in m@ny cases issued press releases 
and other material connected with these presentations. in 
the fall of 1942. Brigadier General Robert IL. Denig. USMC, . 
Director of the Marine Corps Division of Public Relations, 
representec the Navy Department in an extensive tour of 
companies whose production records were named outstanding. 

Zt will be recalled that in August 1940 tho Public 
Relations Branch of ONI moved to larger and more accessible 
quarters on the first floor near the main entrance to the 
Navy Depertment Building. The rapid expansion in numbers 
of personnel in OPR following the commencement of hostil- 
ities necessitated still another move two years later. 

This time, with the exception of the Arts sub-section which 
rem2zined in the Lars Anderson Mansion, the office began 
occupying the "zero wing" at the extreme eastern end of the 
Navy building. Easy accassibility was retained, since 
there was a separates entrance at this end of the building. 
The move actually was not completed until March of 1943. 

Gn April 30, 1942, a major Navy organizational 
change took place when Secretary Knox established a 


separate Air Operational Training Commend reperting directly 








ته 
te solto wit O mira‏ ازيم نم اجه نل لاممسلمومس, 
فاد جوا انندم ده چغ ووغه bo‏ دماپب کا لها صد 
Enos Ami ae‏ چس صسدنو aa,‏ دس امل wl‏ 
0ئ ہس ہماسا سه له aang Mee asap om‏ د يسوم 
d‏ ود دشر هپوی وسم منسرر دن صدين. بھو۔ 
قیوودرجو وو نیہ set‏ کم وفنعام هد mein eituvt‏ 
A lee‏ وین ود اس لم es maca am‏ سو 
E‏ ۸ ووو دسا دنه غو eme‏ رصله eds‏ سرب 
mole‏ حسم ٭ج «Idlers mm Aem i4) oa orroa DE‏ 
06 به د طلی چیم eds es menie sime sd lees‏ 
ور uf p*cwnlle) A0 pd e‏ سس -pii te‏ 
شاه Pron ome Liles Oebhidenc en‏ يس EH ape‏ 
مغدم ddi gel)‏ داب ميدن دد Fulde doispee cwm ma^ C‏ 
adoi si mia ad ban AAR‏ سسونصي. gas velilo c^‏ 
چووڈووانوہ "aede cuam at?‏ بد oir‏ مرس سوب ats to hac‏ 
هه mihim‏ میم سای سم موسو ومين sowie‏ 
هم یسه د می دون ورور وض se‏ مسب بعد NMA e Ze‏ 
نر وه سییر سم fom‏ مپېوولوما مسا محمي ډور SOME)‏ 
کو ٤ک‏ « laugipecigeem vex pisa‏ 
vam! ۹‏ یھ یمم 
7 سس وم‌سدنم qirowrib‏ 































125 
te ths Nevy Department in Washington. The step was part of 
the policy shift in the Wavy in 1942 to concentrate on 
building aircraft cazriezs instead of more battleships and 
to generally upgrade the tole of naval air power. À rear 
admiral, headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, was 
assigned as Chief of Air Operational Training, with subsid- 
lary commands scattered throughout the country. 

The new setup xequired changes in the Navy’s public 
relations organization és woll. "Flight" public relations 
offiesrs agsigwad to the various sir commands now func~ 
tioned directiy under their station commanders and the 
Office of Public Relations in Waahingten instead of under 
the naval district public relations officers as they head in 
the past. The Naval Districts Section of OPK supervised 
their activities in close coordination with the Bureau of 
Aeronautics; and an Avistion Assistent to the Director of 
Public Relations, Lieutenant Robert A. Winston, USN, was 
assigned د هع‎ special liaison officer. The change in 
effect placed naval air public relations in a special 
etatus which it has maintained to the present day, with 
officers assignec to conduct air public relations ectiv- 
ities normally being naval aviators zather than public 
information specialists.,  À detaileóG "Guide for Flight 
Public Relations" was issued on August 1, 1942, setting 
forth directivos covering re-Flight and naval aviation 
publicity. 





ج2 
ud‏ حم سس alah‏ وصور ٭ ote gare‏ رود ود 
اهغه وعنې عوزه خو « مر al prèn‏ وو کب me édsibwoneob‏ 
الاش تهج سنهمم 11 iho GuLa‏ هد مدوم am ejlfgéljàd‏ 
امه رماع وو کو ان Miey‏ هد مهومن Á „ambe dia‏ - 
«Aa‏ لش سه GF ô‏ اع سب االه. اصدندص ate‏ 
توس Xe ebd) we‏ عږه جیب ومرعومہ ۲ ۷ ~biedwe‏ 
amam sti sae Osaran lemme: ÇAR‏ 
fF E‏ سه »مي moO‏ وسچاه اد عب لاوم ses‏ 
01 ت۱۱۰ ١س×‏ لف سذ سس “CN‏ وشن روا اسان 
ٹوس mi (CPD‏ قسف nF‏ مسد يون ls‏ 
کلف وط hijd‏ ورس خ: اسورھدوووہ نووخعف مر سلی 
as‏ ها çl) ûs aes wm Lhe bat, Saab‏ میں cl‏ 
dete‏ دده قم ونس mimi‏ سالاږ ig datat ad‏ 
anina‏ سرد غ ولوب سروس ıi muyooriz wi? us‏ 
الله هو ساصف غه تی م. اص ټښښ ہی 
ماس مه و taama‏ اس اس al opi ai‏ 
وه 06414 có» leva‏ ناناشن یدقن و ايوزو 
ووس یاه ud PedMafalàs amd jt‏ ف ود مد ET „yab‏ 
a aA saarista‏ اتد db awewdadlss sibAeq sis‏ 
sitil‏ سيت chine eds seul excsbivs ismas pabed‏ 
ټوم نه مدع ځانوهم TUE NU isis‏ 
— — — 


jevas bos SATO GO Savassi arad‏ انریم 
سور — بو ست m‏ 











126 

Another change in Navy public relations occurred on 
September 23, 1942, whan the Bureau of Navigation (latex 
redesignated the Bureau of Haval Personnel) established its 
own Public Relations Division. The move had baen recon- 
mendec in August by 8 survey team from the firm of Booz, 
Fry, Allen & Hamilton, which had been retained to help 
streamline the bureau's administration of the Navy's man~ 
power resources. The study group pointed out thet the 
bureau had a “profound effect” on public relations in the 
sea service. “Next to the degree of success in combat 
eperations, . . . the policies amd methods employed in 
handling the personnel of the Navy are the most important 
single factor in determining what the public thinks of the 
wavy. **?4 

When the war began, the Bureau of Navigation was 
flooded with inquiries from the public, press, members of 
Congress and other government agencias. It was ili~ 
prepared to handle this volume of questions and soon cained 
a reputation for being "rather indifferent" to such 
requests for information., In early 1942, when the Office 
of Public Relations instituted ite “beat system" of 
covering Navy bureaus and offices in Washington, many of 
these queries were answered by officers from its Presse 
Section.  Jdiowever, these young OPR officers came to be 
considered "nuisances" by many senior officers in the 


Buceau of Navigation, who resented their aggressiveness in 


PRL 
سس و‎ amimi: iba q ہہ‎ Da ات‎ ۳٧ 
متت م1 م رپس ارو‎ aM dde A زاین عل‎ 
a aiia Uim a O od E 
mot te evil ate ا‎ e pri © Ge تہ اوہ‎ tee 
اشرت س بک ما وسم ټوووسمما و جو‎ 0٧ 
س .> ی‎ ea Do i a 6ا‎ 
E ap sass نت‎ co جنس‎ Reus eng" 4 M uud 
"———— ما "وی ها‎ 0 
نه‎ wpe ins bs aita a, سس ان‎ 
mp a دس و وى‎ i Fo كت مق سینت‎ 




















ان نت" که قافن نا اه xau» cb‏ ود s>‏ 
کس Ixi.‏ 








"1" اوی ue we a‏ اسا سم دا “ingest‏ سه 
"mmm‏ انیت I Or ar‏ سے انیت و 
aa‏ د اس بب juri‏ یسدنه و سے و 

beu‏ تة فس ت س ا سین مھ دس بولسا 
pd ae alee A‏ می doré «9 “testi‏ 

Î —‏ م۵ ډو ووي وف وكات 
هلغار فاصی ماي ( کم ووس مه 
vi andis UP AE QE TOME‏ موو وې د 
TUIS V)‏ بات treme‏ و cares esd wade cutee‏ 
eet eee ee‏ سو وق du» vas cant‏ 























1.27 
seeking out details of personnel policies. 

Upon creation of the bureau's Public Relations 
Division. resentment over the intrusion into personne] 
matters by public relations officers gradually disappeered; 
amd the Bureau of Personnel became more responsive to the 
public needs. A naval reserve lieutenant commander who had 
been a lawyer in civilian life was appointed to head the 
new division. Me was assisted by four other officers and 
two enlisted men along with stenographers. 

in addition to answering queries and furnishing 
news about the bureau and Navy personnel information to 
OPR, the division assumed responsibility for the naming of 
Ships and designation of their sponsors; the preparation of 
the Bureau of Naval Personnel Bulletin (l&ster renamed $11 
Ganda) and a daily bulletin for the information of officers 
within the bureau called "The BuPers Daily Register"; the 
operation of a congressional information service; and the 
supervision of a Documentary Photography Section, whose 
function was “to obtein and assemble for the permanent 
records of the Bureau documentary portrait photographs of 
Naval personnel especially active in the war, "14? 

The U.8. Coast Guard took steps to upgrade its 
public relations program in the summer of 1942.also, with a 
directive on the subject being disseminated to the service 


by the Coast Guard Commandant. A year earlier, Captain 


ttr 
0 فتاه سا ومدحصطفتظ‎ sus validam 
ككل لان تاساود نيس‎ svava «bf to nale a تت‎ 
هلةةالقشمه هوسو مو اس کو ناه غوهه چوسوویسم‎ 
(Deme qq nib دم‎ O————— ^ 
س*<سسسسسسسسس‎ e$ UNA 
عا‎ als ee He eine د مون‎ heer کاله‎ 
fs tw of feonicqge WG abar nsiibvio mi sopat w wiid 
ine ا رکرو ناریو م وه ده‎ miale. d wei 
پہػسو = —— الور بيك د‎ 
a mid besoni wiy Bi Veisa ais eose 
sa Gy a ach idg a e o hb as 
الات سب وبوه وس ناه ےبد و‎ a 
Lip Dewees sed) abfellas leeubw2vA (velt Be ae 
iso So ۵ وتي اس‎ WOU wiselive (lies ء‎ one — 
السو سر + بر‎ qiie موی سپښه ومسان‎ veered aed شم‎ 
os bu ach تل ودن سس‎ 
an ہہےعوموکسن- جب تس‎ Yeno s ٥ x 
—— — ت ا ہت‎ | 
"e" OE 
ء‎ did لعن مس‎ Jo seems ade x) tum nêl لھ‎ 
سس‎ et 
aiaro mtrs mey A eines — 






















٦ ۱ T | 






128 

Ellis ABeed-Hill, as Public Relations Officer of the Coast 
Guard stationed at headquarters in Washington, was the only 
officer in the entire service performing the function full- 
time. Me hed one civilian assistant., Dy late Geptember 
1942, two junior officers were adGeÓd to his staff, but one 
operated out of Hew York. There were plans to assign three 
Others to Hew York, two each to Boston end Chicago end cone 
to each of the other continental Coast Guard Districts. 
Since the Coast Guard hed been transferred to U.S. Navy 
control in November 1941, all of its public relations 
activities came under the jurisdiction of the respective 
naval district public relations officers. Any Coast Guard 
release or statement had to be cleared through them or the 
Office of Public Relations in Washington. *2* 

arine Corps public relations also was under the 
cognizance of OPR and the naval districts, in soecordance 
with a directive issued by the Secretary of the Navy on 
July 24, 1942. However, the Marines--with @ small bet 
aggressive public relations organization--operated more 
independently of the Savy than did the Coast Guard. in 
late summer of 1942. there were five Marine public rela- 
tions officers attached to Headquarters of the Marine Corps 
in Washington under General Denig. Most of them were young 
second lieutenants who ware being trained for field 
assignments, Aa they moved on, they were replaced on the 


headquarters staff by new second lieutenants who likewise 


aw 
هنن مس لصو وتاب مد ت ج‎ uw A— i2 
vine ts سه‎ snes صسفموتء نه‎ ۵٥ binalak GUS 
ندیه 9۱ تبه 21113 ماس انس اى سرت هر‎ 
-— مالسا وھ اتا‎ ل٥‎ um wd a لا‎ 
oe wi Malu thd oF قا سه مہ .شی ہے فا‎ 
یمسر یتے بے‎ Oke Sue لس جابيد دمر ".و وو ا یکاہ‎ 
اب نا ان سرب سید رہ لا س‎ Jun سا نہ هه‎ 
amis? سو نای سے اسسا‎ inte edi td ,تم‎ 
pe JN دک مه کی سه نما نسا یس سے سا‎ 
سي‎ silia dE Vg LAN ساس سی‎ ou 
و در یجد دس بھی نش هننم لم دا نه ونووس اې‎ 
سین ےب اا سم‎ sindo siik گنساہ‎ 6 
وتسا لے کے ا‎ wider Mas ١ ناتك‎ ۹ 
594 , org ima Ó eedialud skpue* we anui 
a» tole ae Ge ]سا دا‎ > aw" 
ذنم شل ج د می‎ Chee ati tae کت ا مه‎ 
دس«‎ 6 
a= Jie ٥ — — — -e oreg الو یو فر‎ 


ARRA‏ ره نے 






























129 
served an apprenticeship in public relations. 

The Maxine Corps Division of Public Relations was 
organized differently from the Navy OPR. There were no 
separate sections; each of the five officers performed 
general duties. There also were five regional public 
relations offices-~in Philadelphia, New York, Atlanta, 
Chicago and Sen Francisco. These were manned by one public 
relations officer with a single assistant, usually a second 
lieutenant. In addition, the Corps assigned non- 
commissioned officers as “Fublic Relations Sargeants” to 
local recruiting stations throughout the country. 

By the summer of 1942, the famed Marine Combat 
Correspondent program was fully operative, too. The 
program was begun after the fall of Wake Iglanó and the 
Philippines, éng&gements in which the Corps was “placed in 
a very embarrassing position of having practically no 
information to feed to the press of any kind. e125 wis 
experience led to the recruitment of newspapermen and news 
photographers who had & “minimum of two years“ experience 
for assignment to Marine detachments outside the continental 
United States as enliated Combat Correspondents. These 
journalists were sent through regular training at Barris 
island. brought back to the Division of Public Relations 
for a brief indoctrination, ané then dispatched in pairs as 
Seporter-photographer teams to the combat units. The first 
stories and pictures generated by these Marine fighting 


ex: 






ma)‏ ميه به 


«s‏ يسمه بسن ذه ماله مةل 
to eoteivid exon mium ed‏ ابلح ق اددام پت 
سین خسن مد مت هی کا esaf‏ سے وه 
ylievey — ——‏ * مجورین 
ek Ladi” "2909۳‏ عولو داصمصه تسه پ| هوم " وج 
دو سے ات css‏ سیت minns ali‏ 
00 . 8 دغه وس Jakob — d] LA) Lo‏ 
د facem rum‏ سی دی ورل وسمداهم. کي ۷۶۴ 
sO asra oymi siw 0‏ 141ل 15 فلت wie tnd hestet‏ 
ae + e‏ ل مصني ans Ago ١‏ )انفضا لى 
pase‏ مسد ساحن my privar te auisieng‏ اجه اي un‏ 
a‏ هته دس cd‏ فا وسم ےم que‏ د aue CiU.‏ 
ندال له متسد مد سوت تاد kes‏ سے 
Er‏ وم wer bo mole” à bag fv‏ يرودو" موی 











5 




















130 

correspondents came out of Guadalcanal. 

karine Corps headquarters was somewhat concerned in 
the fall of 1942 over what it considered to ba a Lack of 
cooperation on the part of naval district public relations 
officers in the clearance of Marine press material. In the 
words cf Major George T. Van der Hoef, an assistant to 
General Denig in the Division of Publie Relations, there 
were certain incidences in which Marine stories “were 
turned cover to the Navy Department Public Relations man in 
the field and have perhaps not received as sympathetic 


consideration as possible, "i76 


The bone of contention was 
that assortions by Marine officers that specific material 
did not violate censorship rules were not being gíven 
proper credence. 

On July 30. 1942. the President signed into law a 
bill creating 4 Women's Reserve in the Navy. The WAVES, as 
they came to be Known, from their very beginning affected 
the Bavy's public relations program in one way or another. 
OPR was daluged with requests for photographs of uniforms 
to be worn by the istaff Navy members almost before the 
ink on the President's signature wag dry. Initial release 
of these photographs wes made in Washington with consider- 
able ceremony. In October, the Bureau of Naval Personnel 
requested assistance from OPR in bringing up to strength 
the lagging recruiting quotas for the Nomen's Reserve 


officer training program. And in November, the first WAVE 


04 
"هماند عه سد teo‏ بت !سور 
ERU l‏ ———— ند ل 
"د و ټل وو ar‏ نان 1ه مه نظا We‏ ہے € ا > 
allege‏ اف ور مو و فر مون شه دای ودی 
وکن دا تو caus To omma‏ وم GAYE‏ ہہ 
و عم مې و موا مراد سر سا ہرس ب 
"ای fee‏ نه E E‏ ¥ وید سا wek,‏ 
ات تاه امه هنت ند مه woe setters er‏ 
n‏ ند اع هغمه چ مر لے فد 
لا س فت پل nd borima smr‏ — 
نماد مه کت عا سل th. SI moan ıe i n Ml.‏ 
ml raba oad‏ إن اس انه وس tiap cad!‏ سس ری؛ 
0,1 اة ين dalh‏ ےہ om ty yal raz‏ 
—— 
یبر ونج" قا امن معن مدني Guts‏ فت نے > 
اد انشا ء سم وسم ىا کی موي یې سي ي 
ar ae Gi Que‏ مس رد قم وم یوی م 
وا وې wie‏ ”سب وروپہے نه تا تاو is‏ 
ae d‏ وما لت arati‏ 
ci dU Nd‏ کس qut Valais‏ مس ویم وود و 
۱ اوعس مم ۱۴ تونن 
ساپ mame‏ 
د مه UN‏ سن یه pastu Ine‏ 
w‏ الي | ام و — 
۱ مهم Co‏ 






























131 
public relations officers began reporting to various naval 
commands. Ensign Hona Baldwin, USNR, former member of the 
Washington bureau of the New York Times. joined the Press 
Section of OPR on November 6 to handle press matters 
related to the Women's Reserve. 

After the initial expansion following Pearl Harber, 
the number of personnel ín the Office of Public Relations 
leveled off at a fairly constant figure. On July l, there 
was a total of 145, again exclusive of branch office per- 
sonnel] in New York. This figure áropped to 135 in October, 
reflecting the loss of the Industrial Morale Section. Of 
these, fifty-six were officers (five Regular and fifty-one 
reserve), sixty-two were civilians and seventeen were 
enlisted men. By the middle of November 1942, there were 
215 naval officers serving in public relations in tho naval 
districts, air commands, and fleet and overseas forces. 
Again, as a year age, the vast majority of these were in 
the continental United States. There still were only two 
officers attached to the fleets in the Pacific, and the 
Atlantic Fleet waa now without a public relations officer 


at a11, 127 





Weekly Press Seminarg--regularly scheduled “off” 
the-record" discussion periods for members of the Navy 


Department press corps--were begun in the summer of 1942 


ia 
Locan weir 33 gelmeqec geped mei ۱ 
عماس ودود‎ nwalok dubii s-5Y een ale 9۰د دج وذ‎ 
sias aee c» shad o û onc ao (Wo US ۵ 
.*"Posah a sumOM gw» ow» SERRE” 
.wowrwA (xev ید ہنےں‎ costumes هسو شه غکورهوا‎ 0 0 
صم نوو اميه‎ vilat io ونیم‎ ce ده مس نم پو نس ني‎ 
مر د. جسن‎ sÓ که ٭دد ھن بیوصت‎ 
“am مووعبعہ سر روہ > ریہ‎ siega ihl be LAMI e are 
. ویوس‎ ah (Lk هوید به‎ ay sist -o يور ده کی‎ 
ب‎ Miron سم يہ سنہ‎ «tr دا‎ mol وعل دی دی‎ 
سس«‎ 001 
— — ٤٢ وټم‎ Yo يی متندم‎ yi toe Sekine 
غد عم بسا‎ mimin ساب‎ a miren ramite Jee OE 
ai ose cenda We yhixotas دم‎ pot seve همل عه و‎ 
ou سم صن سم ورم‎ — — 
ent به مب همه ده مه وس وي سر‎ PUR PY 




















132 
by OPR. These meetings proved to be extremely popular with 
the media representatives, since they provided beckyground 
information cf a confidential nature which gould not be 
released but nevertheless gave them a sense of understanding 
of the Navy's wartime problems. Kules for the seminar were 
rigid: no notes were to be taken; 411 information was te be 
treated as confidential and not te be relayed to & second 
pérson; and there was to be no centinuaticn of the discus 
sion following each meeting. In other words, any question 
Could be asked put not onae answer was to be printec or 
repeated. Naval speakers were scheduleóc to talk ou 
specific aspects of the wor and reval operations irn general, 
The sessions also ware used to further explain anë clarify 
security and other information policies, !?? 

Anothex public relations tool instituted in 1942 


was an internal one. Beginning on November l1, the Naval 





Districts Section published a monthly 
Bulletin “te aid Public Relations Officers of the Navy, 
Marine Corps and Coast Guard in carrying out their duties 
in coordination with each other, and in conformity with the 
general policy of the Office ef Public Relations, Navy 
Department. «12% 

During 1942. media anc public interest in anyone 
ox anything directly connected with combat was at 5 peak. 


Navy man returning from battle areas, for inatance, ware 


mach in emend for radio and press interviews. The field 








ني 
alime et NP gd‏ چد وو نمو m"‏ عرس ودوو مد daiw‏ 
mg‏ 10 & مو هخم بي Anida &suIna‏ موتا rom‏ - 
ي Pe nae & sud pues aa alaya iA‏ سسوم مو نوي 
ot,‏ الد ۶ sume "andae adr RÀ select 9 rw‏ 
hig‏ 8 0 او یم 11A‏ له ووو زور سو دو ى 
ووو ریو دی رٹم دیع سه ود تن لب اف فیس ات harora è‏ 
و OM sa ec xw «edi m‏ حمدحنەیمگد اھر 30 ته اویه 
Rien‏ ميا در مه wma uet soa‏ جم عب ووس بد 
٣۷۸ا‏ غه ټپ ېمر سور ورز دیا به دع وہ 
ودراد Javea tne sae ott 29 afovges‏ میا ام همروف . 
YF‏ هې مولمي دوو سم eee‏ که ادرا AA‏ 
lane‏ 9 وریہ ام اسم پونمدیږ :1۰ 
وین Ns‏ 
* سب سم ارقا ی عکمسم d‏ سر هو 
ب رب وکاوما ء دی وین یی ههه 
r^,‏ مہ الله نادمه mia 3e axamd)r‏ وې . 
ab sas sane? Bae‏ دہ وہر ورک هار سی 


—— — کے‎ OE 

































- 


ee I‏ اوه نہ نوریب 


۱ له فا ماوع امیر سن » ىر 
la oi d‏ <<« 


ھ@ © سے 














public relations officers were kept quite busy with 
arrangements for such participation by naval personnel, 
since sli interviews for both officers anó enlisted men had 
to be channeled through the nearest public relations 
office. In addition, if à radio eppearance-~as most of 
them dic~~concermecd @ man’s experience at sea, military 
actions, or Navy, Harine Corps or Coast Guaró operations 
Since the war sterted, & written script had to be reviewed 
for security and policy ia advance of proadcast 0 

Numerous requests for exhibition of war materials, 
both ours and the eneswy'a, sent beck from the combat zones 
also were received by the summer of 1942. To fill these 
requests. Admiral Nepburn asked the Navy bureaus to make 
available to GPR such itema as Japanese two-man submarines, 
life rafts used by naval aviators, and enemy war ہو مرج رج‎ 

In iate September, another naval district public 
xelations officers conference was held in Washington--this 
time, however, for only the first through ninth naval 
districts. The western Gistrict& were not includeó sue to 
the wartime travel restrictions. Representatives from each 
section of OPR, the Office of Censorship, the Army bureau 
@f Public Relations. Marine Corps and Coast Guard Public 


Relations Divisions, and OWI addressed the group. 7 





One subject to which partial publicity was given by 





dele qms babe ka oye smite ia EAA 
eee te ةسوس ااذه ور‎ 
ناه واسمسسا نسوسټږی ما مسوم ویو یہ نون‎ 

———— HÀ ویننن‎ ee le 
yayi Ass A اھ نینم ‌ مس ء سء سعوروسېم‎ 
amim mar سس حسم‎ a Abbia 
beuet ې‎ p Da Abar ostes اقا‎ cand bf Wists 
۱٩٢ 5ا نس سشیم‎ Hormis ni taiii Sas tibunas 8 
.ajake«mwe usw 24 جخوہ مہو ےہ‎ ales es aq ى٠‎ ٣ 
samus sien ate الست من‎ a a کک حتاف‎ Gn om ed 
went) LUD OF لاله امعد —— مع ملا وهو‎ 
م با قسج ده > مەه‎ ea تا‎ 
١٢ aot عم سي یسه‎ vedere مس‎ wd ems dikoe a 
جسوہ جروی ہہ وسرحعہ‎ — ⸗ ——— — — 
megan a عون ووهه وس٨سښم حسم سی‎ 
ہی لہ ہہ نت‎ curet AMET 
موی وااوخداص هوسو مہ وص صن وم‎ 
نيسې نوم‎ apri Ta Pane Ca 100 9 1. 701 
لہ لچ یہ مد‎ —— e وون د سر بع وني‎ 

و سپ ټس o —-— d m‏ ہی مہ "a‏ 


is minem irm $ : 


















































134 
the Navy curing 1942 despite the fact that it might heave 
been of some value te th: enemy was the launching of new 
Ships. Whether ox not to reiease information on new cen” 
struction was discussed immealately after Pearl Harbor along 
with the other security measures, Secretary nox admitted 
at that tize that the enemy would nenefit from such 
publicity; but his view, which prevailed, wag thet it would 
be mere valuable for morale purposes to have the American 
public know that we were striking back from the war 
production standpoint. 

Security precautions on many aspects of the new 
conetruction program remeinec quite rigid, however. A 
directive by the Secretary of the Navy issued on March 30, 
1942, retained the prewar ban on visiting by the general 
public to ships either in the builCing or conversion 
process. Further, all information and photographs 
regarding now construction or conversion of Sibwar ines, 
Óestroyers, cruisers, aireraft carriers and battleships 
was to be classified as confidential and not released 
unless specificaliy authorized by the Secretary of the 
Kavy. 133 in a clarification of this directive issued to 
public reletions officers à month later, the policy was not 
Guite so restrictive. AIl publicity about ship 
Sempiasioninga vas prohibited and that concerning conver- 
sions had to Le referred to Washington.  Launchings, how- 


ever, could be publicized Guring a period of six cays prior 


دنک سب چو وو بو سم نومت کدی کہ سر سم 
ol ris‏ بس نت اسان ects ossei Hens? koth‏ 
:اناقل cdi Wwe‏ ند mlm‏ و صحرسص Su am‏ دږ مس 
سه en ee ee ee‏ 
coe ow feds tut iD‏ ودس duo‏ وو ant‏ بسن 

و همي hl‏ سم پیہ؛ 

me w+ Vc a سي‎ «e eine Vil 

کققد هموک وجصمموجد وممعدست wet) ipi sip‏ => 
واک 2ب اپ دن مسي وس غه اه cf tree oo Ó-—-— qewu‏ 
pi pridie sa Sa arei ۷ Caisse LOA!‏ یہ facamep‏ 
نه ته سپ ماحم al‏ لٹ ددني موه abisme‏ 
7ج we-———‏ 

O‏ سی وسن سرام Se‏ سا ادا لا وا وی 














aa ta paren ud g aiina piisit Tm 
os arosa airan abis wo waaa o a "i 


— — — —— 








i35 
to the actual day of launching, provided such publicity wes 
strictly limited to the ceremonial aspects of the occasion 
and only general information about the ship was released, *?^ 

The security issue about ship leunchings came to 
the fore again in early April, however, when Canedian naval 
intelligence sources made available to the Commandant 
Thirteenth Raval District in Seattle = list of U.S. naval 
vessels recently launched, which had been compiled from 
American press reports. The district commandant relayed 
this list to Admiral Hepburn with the somewhst caustic 
comment: “Inasmuch as Canada allows no publicity concerning 
ite launchings. it is a natter of some interest to observe 
the &mount of detail . . . ít is still possibile to obtain 
from the public press regarding naval leunchings in the 
United States, "17? 

Admiral Hepburn’s reply to this letter was signif- 
icant ín that it represents one of the few cases found by 
the author of definite evidence thet public relations 
considerations were a major factor in determining Wavy 
release of information policies early in the war. The 
AGmiral steted that when the directive on publicity for new 
ship construction was in the process of being prepared, it 
had been proposed to flatly prohibit launching publicity of 
any nature. The Office of Public Relations argued against 


this restriction on the following basis: 








tar 

em gilaki £xe4 PebkiyoTg prdénanl هې ۳ د تمنصید ےم‎ langen pis n 
ME ورو لنم سمل بلس دا بو‎ 
‘<4 ہیں ومس‎ oime mis لوک"نستنۍ عسټم‎ iesones چو مل‎ 
— — پا‎ ١ 
inte ERD مس‎ coed dingi yade Al ciapa ووی‎ 
ٹسسس‎ att OF ءاساامډل‎ shea ومساحوة‎ 4 
سوہ‎ Áo مد‎ well لل هرمو الم‎ 10 sewa هه‎ i. :! 
es — — — — 
absesin Samos رن‎ ike ασ مد‎ saii aida 
e violae zm mecíl کم "اصعسمهه مه سي‎ 
EI س1ج‎ ٤ لد غه ه تن وو سس‎ auiéemel età 
1àsede of nlälssng 14256 لو‎ ۸ . - Linred ho sebuma at) 
at ai وم نا مه یا وب ہعسوینے‎ 
— 

تا مههه سوال يه صا ite pew am‏ 
mi anmai‏ سه در موسسوه نس ند m mai abasas wal‏ 
که ومهم es bo‏ تد piling tome‏ ہ ۳ تسه 
وص سال سب د ول سا 


— سپ سه سواہ لع سي سب — wa‏ 
pd‏ مه وم دم مسوم د مسب کے ہے 


>a o - 


A بدوچمسن‎ grit سم نه ئم پوجمممت د0‎ n 


مس یمد په دمحا مه پفسشتننم پ شالحام fe‏ 


سج Mn ous‏ — 
- فص - — 
— رم 


= e[s a ool — 2 dies Gaius OE 






























































136 
Having in mind the state of public morale and naval 
public relations, thie Office advised against such a 
step at this time, pointing out that all launchings fox 
a considerabie period would involve only ships publicly 
authorized by Congress, the laying of wnese keels had 
been publicized, and the rates of construction rather 
بز مجع سب‎ announced before the sudden outbreak of 
war. 

In the sene letter, it was mentioned that OPR did 
avise certain apecific restrictions on launching publicity 
along with the complete ban on commissioning publicity 
previously cited. It also was stated that further 
restrictions on launching publicity could be expected when 
ships not publicly authorised by Congress were built, 
eventually leading to a future total ban on publicity for 
launchings a5 well as cowmissionings. 

In late summer of 1942, plans were made by various 
government agencies and representatives of labor and 
management throughout the country to give war industry 
workers special recognition for their contributions to the 
war effort on the forthcoming Labor Day, September 7. The 
occasion was tailor-made for ship leunchings end other 
ceremonies connected with the Navy's shipbuilding program. 
Aecordingly. Secratary Knox authorised end encouraged as 
many launching anc keel~laying observances as could 
possibly be scheduled for the Labor Day celebrations. The 
ben on public visiting was even to be lifted so thet 
families of shipyard workers could be invited to sttenó the 


events. 137 





0 





d‏ سوا یزیر سم سرع جن 
شه ېمر مرن سو وکل > تاا ونما 
—ee 8‏ ——— 
ا ونا کک امه اس کید دی موو 
7 یضر مو مېسی نه sd Aisea‏ یمد سی 
ee ee.‏ ومس یوب ور 
7 وني P cr‏ ووی am i, ian‏ يج ززم ب موو 
سم زیي ود سنا به ممسنوودسنید۔ 
وو 2391 دد ھار ودوم qe cham wee‏ موز 
parente‏ مضيس سنا سيد م ü‏ 
e‏ کا می a‏ ودی ما زیاس 
· ابت 
EE‏ 0۷۶ چم پېر وولوږدي نشم دول ویب d ٢‏ 
Louce‏ مخغوی i mod memi qidh wh‏ شسم. 
— 7 سه یام agin inan e^t và‏ 
۷ کش — 
W‏ — — 
ماما 3+0 موي پو نکمم غو روب 
مهم وواد beessa a» benbemd ٤‏ دس 































: g 
a _ 


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a 


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سن‎ 
7 
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137 

Naval district public relations officers ware 
directed to extend full cooperation to the business and 
labor representatives in making arrangements for the Labor 
Day ceremonies and to assist the news media in gaining full 
coverage of them compatible with security. A general preas 
release announcing the mass launchings and keel layings was 
íasued by OPR on August 30. Ho complete list cf names of 
ships was given out, but the districts could publish ship 
Names involved in their own ceremonies. 

in lato September, &n extensive public relations 
campaign was conducted by the Navy surrounding the 
launching in Boston of the new Lexington, which replaced 
the carrier of tho same name that was lost in the Battle of 
the Coral Sea. The campaign was tied in with a massive 
recruiting drive for aviation cadets snó enlisted air 
personnel. The theme, "Be a 1942 Minute Man~-Join the 
Lexington Volunteers," wes emphasized.  Congratuletory 
messages were selicited from the mayors of twenty~eight 
communities named Lexington, along with gubernatorial 
proclamations and similar endorsements from community 
leaders. Naval speakers were echedulec, window display 
contests arranged, anó radio interviews with personnei from 
the former lexington set up. +78 The effort represented the 
first truly coordinated and creative public relations 


initiative by the Navy since the start of the war. 


vel 

غه عاوهام وساله anit ANA Sas‏ سے 
Si aldamenyes L1 lento —‏ و یسرم hme‏ 
— — —— 
دې سمښت با ده عمتا ی غه LUS patiray W) kiber‏ 
De able"‏ دنم وود دد miaa Jajo A pime Atle‏ 

موم sham sds‏ اميا امير سا لب ان زر ای 
ست س م م کو ۴ء dE‏ کاس ات je oom Ss sel)‏ 
TOE LLL] —‏ ہے؛ adi‏ خططلونالدنه blows‏ 1 انا عفن 
مس اہ اہ وسل مہ سوک 
۱ ے qué eel‏ . 4 دا پنټژل. ۲ ای 
هه ee‏ ونه 
— 
ene A be alge ae‏ له لا موی سورب ده 
ais‏ هت لمن as bald mew iepen a?‏ را وان 
ادلی نو ات مدت ما ا سو یرن 
Lacon‏ صا سے حر ے بښصل همت lomo‏ بنك 
elle |‏ ° عت عوالى انه . quasa tà te mpoob‏ 
ull Claas‏ سن یو ې همی همو 
as ARS‏ اکت حا س پس 
وس هس امي ا ااا سی وس مييق 
emit ele — — a‏ 
امل ord lames veg‏ 
nds kS di — wis‏ كلد 
— — 
weeds aint‏ عا مرم عو gine wis‏ 


























135 





The first yeer of hostilities for the United States 
wee primariiy a neval wer, Except for the delaying action 
in the Fhilippines ami the croun corbat ln ths Solomon 
islanüs late in the summer of 1342, most of the fighting 
either tcok place on the high sera or originated from thera 
ae did the Peolittli«e Tokyo raids, 

Crippled by the sneak attack on Poari Harber, the 
Wavy eperated on a shoestring capability in the firat 
months of tiw wer and concentrated œn keaping the enemy in 
the dark on any information which wight conceivabiy help 
him. It wae ineviteble thet this emphagie on security wes 
to run at cross purposes with the gublic’s eagerness to 
know and the press’ @gygxesaivencss to tell what was 
happening. Az 8 result, the ses servíoco abserbed the brunt 
ef public and presse criticisa of war news policies during 
the first year of the conflict, primarily fer its delays in 
announcing ship losses. 

Sy year’s end, however. there were faint stirrings 
GE a more positive public relations stance by the Navy. 
Riser Davis-~-the Devil’s odvocate, so to Speak--forced 
speedier revelations ef ship losses and camage;: and the 
status of aviatora in the naval hierarchy was upgraded hy 
the policy seision in June to build aircraft carriers 
rather than battleships. Whether by nature or by long 
experience at fighting; for a proper niche in the Kàvy, the 





^t 
d am ان ای زې‎ —à— 
یعس‎ Cám «A mà ملا ده غوااااغنلی‎ AR apo n 
ولس مووفسټ‎ op ad eee Aw Amen s pie VEO 
لاړه هنیټ‎ wet be sont ینتک‎ Wc wae a ee Ganges 
cma m coa made ca cmo پوس س رتا بے‎ o mil 
"UT وبس سیا ہے‎ hib a9 
نس‎ te tee am amir Chess c» m Caen + 
ووي سس‎ 
u m سے کا مو سہ ےکوی‎ ac» ame کت مو ال‎ 
لس تیه خر سم موو مان‎ — m. نو‎ 0 
tar piumme =e simte m لس سم دا تن‎ 
= emit a al dg اک‎ aaue enpe ES ته‎ art وی‎ 
— — س سا ری رن‎ ‘sta s مسا‎ 
دمه نید‎ — —— — ⸗ 
runt entailing ed Á-— مه‎ 
si pba exi Gem quo emn. Ohta 4) € "amt 
C وسو‎ 
sym دي اس‎ m ul — — —— —“⸗ 
oes ma O — ہے‎ mk = v 
سه وسوی ووو ورو‎ — — 
(à fetum sm فغنووون دع اع مکی ويم ملحي‎ 8 9 
ruume yamin mimt asad ai aS <2 
بسح‎ qv جم‎ y tubas aiaa 
up سب ہے بل هم‎ qui کا‎ IR — 
































4 
© 





E 








139 
airman seemed to ba sore public relations conscious than 
their surface and submarine colleagues. This was also true 
of their counterparts in the Army. 

But the evolutionary process is 52 slow one. The 
Navy public relations ship still hed “shoal waters" to 
navigate. However, the war began to take a new turn with 
the invasion of North Africa on November 8, 1942. With the 
ensuing land battles taking away much of the news spotlight 
from sea engagements, the Ravy waa able to focus on 
improving its public relations program minus certain of the 
Severe pressures it encountered during the first twelve 


months of the war. 








- -- 
wssw d a daa da‏ تلالد ۷ )اما seas‏ 
افده ساكس ته وسم مکو wore saxa wow alar‏ 
GP Wu" ۳‏ ياښ هم »یښ کے رپ ہے ما ^ 
اه سه الاما مب bes bade‏ مد پمپ a‏ 
واه سی و مو وس ده وفع د نم مته dije‏ 
وو تسای سټو انم — 
مسق ee‏ اداه piled‏ مو سه عا چو wen‏ مور لويد 
Toras pd Ču‏ که اب بت ا as‏ ووو ينا 

فا می ١ا‏ من محر رف مکو موو 
اون wit ko‏ سس 


- ) o — — 













140 


NOTES TO CHAPTER III 


- Navy — — Office of ا س‎ 
Liaison Branch. 2 | 5 aig 2f Xo 





war IL, 1۸۷50۵ P-3024 جو‎ June $, 1967). i. 
2 


MA 1. Rosenman: ed. ا‎ 
103819, كي‎ in Lamar s. Mackay « "Donestie — o£ 

the Office of War Information in World War II," unpublished 
Ph.D, dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966, p. 1857. 

Hereafter cited as Mackay, “OWI.” 


Iashington timea-ferais. December li, 194l. 
4 





Mackay, “OWI,” 187-88. 


59.8. Office of Facts ard Figures. “Report on Poll 
Taken to Determine Public Demand for Additional Information 
About Pearl Harbor,” January 16, 1942, contained in 0.8, 
Wavy Departaent, Office of Information, "Zistoricel iecoris 
Of the Kavy Office of Information, 1919-1951," Job Order 
61-A-2740., Item 10, Box 156, Washington National Records 
Center, Suitland, Mê. Hereafter cited es “Philibert 
Collection.” 


Cn osenman, £y ء‎ Cite in Mackay, "QWI," 185. 


7 


Humphreys, “Now Your News ís Censored,”‏ ناس 
axler”‏ .غ114 Eds Ie ED oak. September 26, 1942, p.‏ 
after cited as “ews is Censored, “‏ 


ibid. 


"navy Depar tesni press ۳9 1 Decemoer 18 and 
27, 1941, Philikert Collection, Bow 155. 


Secretary of the Navy to Nawal District‏ یبد 
Cowmuandants, Decesbor 17, 1941 (Serial 411217). U.S. Havy‏ 
Department, Office of Public Relations, General File‏ 
War Records Branch. Naval‏ ,نټ (E¥-117), Record Group‏ 
Records Section, Mational Archives, Washington, D.C.‏ 
sreafters cites ag “Record Group 6d.”‏ 


\inesningten Evening Stas, Decemosr 11, 1941. 


12-censorship, 1919-1941," & chronological leg on 
censorship, Philibert Cellection, Box 155. 














تحص — di vinë‏ ادف 
SN ABS‏ 


j AW 









کت سنا غاسا له JU "O^ asini‏ 


ا بب دج اسل ٣.‏ — 
E al | /‏ 0 


ae Ty —- —‏ 
T‏ تت ا وت وت و ہے 
لاب پا اد ——— 


rv 















P 
M ni 


= — 








141 
2 ههو نوي‎ Sun, Decesber 10, 1941. 


“ne stablishing the Office of Censorship and 
Prescribing its Functions and Duties,“ Executive Order 
8995, December 19, 1941, contained in file “Directives, 
Cetober-December., 1941," Philibert Celiection, Box 153. 
LS wows is Censored,” 17ff. 
— Office of Censorship, Coce of Wertime 
à | — — — January 15, 





1942), 2. 0ك‎ oe 

17 
Merchant Ships,” undated directive issued by thé Ravy 
Office of Public Relations to All District Commandants 


(Less Nine), contained in file "January-March, 1942," 
Philibert Collection, Box 156. 





"Instructions Governing Release of Information on 





19 وی‎ Bureau of the Budget, The United sr: 


War, (Washington, 1946), 2060-08, See also, Mackay, "OWI, " 
50-51, and "News ig Consorod," 113. 


case. Herold DB. Say, USNR (Ret.). personal 
interview, Washington, D.C., June 13, 1568. Hereafter 
cited as "Say Interview." As a lieutenant, Captain Say wes 
a security review officer in the Press Section of OPR and 
من‎ headed a separate Security Review Section in that 
office. 


21 موم نی‎ 1 Darsock ané Joseph P. Dern, "Davis and 

Goliath: The OWI and Its Gigantic Assignment.” Barnes's 
ine, 196: 227-28 (February 1943). The primary 

information ayencies to be coordinated by OPF were the 
Office of Government Reports, Division of Information of 
the Office of Emergency Management, Office of the 
Coerdinater of Information, Office of the Coordinator of 
Inter-American Affairs and tke Office of Civilian Defense. 


?2wemo. „ Aàdlai E. Stevenson to "Colonel Knox," 
January B, 1942 (Serial 420108), Record Group 30. Box 423. 

^ 
23 uomo. , Lt. Godr. Wallace 5, Wharton, USNR, to 
Cur. Robert W. Berry, USN, Dacember 31, 1941, Philibert 
Collection, Bex 155. 
eno. , Lt. Cmdr., Wallace 6. Wharton, USNR, to 
Director of Public Relations, January 3, 1942, ibic., 
Box 156. 


sat 








كا تین si‏ موو ' ۷۹۳ 







E — —‏ مر سو مد دنس 


were 3 — * 
بد رن‎ ina e 





"EWL Do > "لمر‎ 












ات فة اس > مهس 
وت وم * 


—— zt 
اب سے‎ at e e 















A EM fuf eL 
um ME SUE reet E S IS کا‎ 


SOUS AO وی هر‎ oa D mb ګل‎ a. l 













of 


142 
25 i. Mertz, personal interview, Washington, 
D.C., April 16, 1968. Hereafter cited as “Mertz 
Interview," 


rne first Navy Communique of the war actually was 
issued on December 10, 1941 (Helene Philibert, "History of 
Wavy Public Relationa," 4, Phiílibert Collection, Box 157 
see n. 7, Chapter I/). 


- undated “Comaunique Follow-up Sheet, contained 
in file “January-March, 1942.” bi., Bex 156. 


295.8. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, Naval History Division, “United States 
Havel Administration in World War II," unpublished 
narrative history of Headquarters, Commander in Chief, V.S. 
Fleet, Vol. 1. Book 2, pp. 158-59. This series of naval 
command histories, contained inthe Navy Department 
Library. Washington, D.G., is hereafter cited as 
"“Administxative Histories,” followed by the pertinent 
command title. 


29 میور‎ Secretary of the Navy to All Chiefs of 
Bureaus and Offices, December 17, 1941, U.S. Navy Depart” 
ment, Office of the Chief of Hava] Operations, Naval 
History Division, Operational Archives Branch, Classified 
Files of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and 
Piles of the General Bearcé, Series 441. 
30 Girecter of Public Relations to Secretary 
of the Navy. January 10, 1942 (Serial 420108), Record Group 
80, Box 422. 

3laemo., Frank Knox to All Chiefs of Bureaus and 
Offices, January 10, 1942, ibid. 


32 Frank Knox to Theodore ۰ 7 
February 14, 1942, Frank Knox Papers, Manuseript Section, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited ag 
“Knox Papers." 


33.Press vs, the Navy," Mowsweek, February 23, 
1942, p. 56. 

avy Department semorancun for the press, 
February 13. 1942, contained in file “January-March. 1942," 
Philibert Collection, Box 156. 


1: 
3 1 Frank Knox to RAdm. Arthur J. Hepburn, 
USN, February 5, 1942, ibid. 


دی 


لد IA‏ , لیک ]7۳م 
باص عم hortas”‏ 









هت ما تن 


"o 140 ede Ra 8مي‎ 










= دوس 


۱ کمیں مسب مي [i^‏ كله وه 
| ام لمخم “Sage AA,‏ 
هه ند (mod iss rice duel Sa‏ 
— — 2*2 

th وع وخوحصہ‎ OED dro 









و دنر میا 
jázmin‏ فحیوش هواه ووا 


* — 
مق o.‏ تھ 





den. p ainan m me کک‎ 
— n 








143 


3ya ious Office of Public Relations ani Secretary 
Of the Navy letters and memoranda, ibid. 


USN. Geptember 5, 1942, ikid. 


“Colonel‏ دع ,8821 Lt. Cmdr. Faul C. Smith,‏ اب 
Frank Knox," September 26, 1942, jbid. Smith's objections‏ 
centered around his considered naed for Navy public‏ 
relations officers to identify psychologically with young‏ 
officers and men who were fighting the war.‏ 
eorge H. Manning. “Lovette Saya Navy Press‏ 39 
Releagas Must Be Factual.” Ecitar 5 Publisher, August 1l,‏ 
Pe | P‏ ,1942 


J. Harrison Hartiey to Director, Office of‏ » نپ 
Public Relations, OUR~3 (299), March 6, 1942, Philibert‏ 
Collection, Box 156.‏ 
Sremo., J. Harrison Hartley to Capt. leland F.‏ 
Lovette, USN, OOR-3 (506), April 6, 1942, ibid.‏ 


435.8. Xavy Department, Office of Public Relations, 
article prepared for publication in Bacio Annual. 19432, 


um Cmdr., Vietor FP. Blesekeslee, USNHN (Rat.). 
"Magezines anó Navy Public Relstions," remarks mado be fore 
@ conference of naval district public relations officers 
(First through Ninth Naval Districts), Washington, D.C., 
September 29, 1942, recorded in mimeographed minutes of 
conference, p. 129, ihid. Hereafter cited as “1942 ۵ 
Conference," 


4555 addition to the references cited in notes 
36-44 above, various other letters, memoranda, news 
celeases, information sheets anG persenne] directories 
contained in ihig., Boxes 155 ang 156, were consulted in 
compiling the above data on personnel changes ang new 
functions in OPR ín sarly 1943. 


“Sone naval abbreviation for Commander in Chief, 
U.S. Fleet, at the time of Admiral King's appointment to 
the post was “CINCUS." Het liking the phonetic connotation 
of this short title, King immediately changec the sbbrevia- 
tion to “COMINCK“ (“The Mavy and the Navy." Eortune. 
26:176, hugust 1942). 







et d3 iwà e‏ "لال لهس 
سا ے-۔ bal 990! 5 et A‏ 








to solite هه ال خیس‎ 
»-—11 CMM . 


— ټوب‎ Y — 










5 — — ea | enm 


rak ^A en —‏ سوه د صندی 


LJ. 
رت ۱ له‎ es 


^ ow 





144 


incent Davis,‏ یں 
N.C., 1967), ۰.‏ 


(Chapel Hill, 





43 ٢ Julius A. Furer, USH (Ret.), Bdmisnistration 
of the Navy Department in World Mar II (Washington, 1959), 


77. 

interview.‏ رٹ یں 

*ÜPurer, Op. Git. 

Slendr. Harold Bradley Say, USNR, “Censorship and 
Security.” U.S, Nitval inetitute Preceadingn, 797136 (1953). 





purer, fg. cit. 


93 یں‎ Raleigh Warner to Hrs. Frank Knox, 
March 29, 1949, Knox Papers. Box i. 


“42,4m. Robert W. Berry, USN (Ret.). telephone 
interview, March 17, 1970. 


555 ay Interview. 


9ÓLtr.. Frank Knox to Will H. Hays, November 24, 
1942, Knox Papers, BOX l. 


“ews is Censored.” 17. Bee atso, Byron Price, 
“Censorship and Common Sense,” an address before the annual 
meeting of the Bouthern Newspaper Publishers Association, 
Hot Springs, Ark., September 28, 1942 (a mimeographed copy 
is contained in Philibert Collection, Box 156); and Roger 
Kafka, "Publication Hot Recommended," $a2power, 3:13 
(September 1943). 


Interview.‏ پب 


J. King and Waiter Muir Whitehill, Fleet‏ و وج و59 


Admiral ging: A Naval Record, lst ed. (New York, 1952), 
652. 


60 


61, emo. , Jd. .لا‎ Thomas, Jr., Office o£ Naval Intel” 


ligence (Op-16-F-7), to Director of Public Relations, 
Jdenu&ary 15, 1942, 8۵۰ Navy Department, Office of Informa” 
tion. Administrative Fíles, Job Order 63-A-2506, Item 1, 
Box 76, Washington Kational Records Center. Suitland, Hl. 
Hereafter cited as “OI Administrative Files.” 


“News is Censored,” 114. 








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ws 21 7‏ لكل 


-w e N 
ا مب‎ O er «FA RRS ^ 


mind p 


j" 
ham ayo n UD و‎ mÀ o 
= . — —“ 


ve 
—L p m کب‎ wa — — 
—— ae © asa a han 

















145 


2 aval message, Director of Public Relations to 
All District Commandants (Less Nine), January 16, 1942, 
Philibert Collection, Box 156. 


63 t. Cmr. Paul C, Smith, USNR, “Navy Department 
Memorandiun to the Press,” January 17, 1942, contained in 
file "January-March, 1942," Fhilibert Collection, Box 156. 


- Price was quoted in a special “Navy Depart- 
ment Note to Managing Editors," February 4. 1942. ibid. 

Price, “Censorship and Cosmon Sense" (see‏ ووو 
ne 57).‏ 
Oya Eka, “Publication HOt Recommended,” 15.‏ 

67 .سو‎ Secretary of the Havy to Cormandants Ali 
Continental Naval Districts, QOR-6(1733), February 23, 
1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156. 


6483 مجع‎ Director of Public Rel&tions to Comandantes 
Ali Haval Districts, Less Bixtoen, GOR-6(1873), March 16, 
194 25 Ahid. 


63 emo. » Director of Public Relations to All 
District Public Relations Officers, OOR-2(2738), March 30, 
1942, A. 


TO unows is Censored.” 114. 


7lomhe Navy and tho Navy," Poxtums. 26169-70 
(Aug ugt 194 2) ۰ 


72 ووه موی‎ latters from Director of Public Relations 
te Commandante of the Naval Districts, Hay 2 to December 31, 
1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156. 


TS raval massaga, Secretary of the Navy to All Ships 
and Stations (ALNAV 114. 042054), June 3, 1942, ibid. 


T4 eno. , Director, Office of Public Relations to 
Secretary ef the Savy, OOR~A(2176), July 17. 1942. ibid. 
District Public Relations Officers, OOR-6(1853), March 7, 
1942, ibid. 


Tuama., Cmér. Wallace $. Wharton, USER, to Adlai E. 
Stevenson, January 29, 1942. ibid. 
















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em 


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US Miu m" TUM To 





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146 
Tere. Directors of Public Relations to 
Secretary of the Navy, CORA (362), March 13, 1942, 


ia.‏ د78 
ew York Tipes, March 12, 1942.‏ 79 


Office of Facts and Figures press release‏ یب 
(0f£-9), March 183, 1942. Philibert Collection, Box 156.‏ 


Sl.uavy Releases Casualty Lists," Navy Departmen 
press release, May 2, 1942, contained in file “Casualties,” 


92 dministrative Histories. Commander in Chief, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, 396-408, paagin. 


S3icr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to 
Secretary of the Navy (Director, Office of Public 
Relations), February 25. 1942 (Serial 0695), OF Administra- 
tive Files, Geb Order 76-A~-2Z140, Item 2, Box i. 

Secretary of the Navy to multiplie‏ ری 
addressees, April 2898, 1942. Philibert Collection, Box 156.‏ 


85 yar ious letters and memoranda, ini. 


“Albert Har ling o & review of Stanley Johnston's 
5 ۳ FE B. P. Dutton & Co., 


1942). douxnaliam Quarterly, 19:395 (1942). 


Cmdr. W. G. Beecher, Jr., USN, to Lt. Cmdr.‏ سج 
Waldo Drake, USNR, GOR~} (8500), Octobsr 31. 1942,‏ 
Philibert Collection. Box 156. See also, F. A. Keech.‏ 
the War by the Still Picture Pool,"‏ - سد تہ ہنس سر 
i | d.e 292312 (1943).‏ ۶ 








38 


New York Times. January 12, 1942. 


59v imer Davis, “Plow of War Information,” Army and 
Hayy dournal. epecial edition entitled "United States at 
War: December 7. 1942 - December 7, 1943" (December 1943), 
222. 


“congo 1idat ing Certain War Information Functions 
into an Offices of War Information,” Executive Order 9132, 
June 13, 1942. A copy is contained in fille “Msy~August 
1942,* Philibert Collection, Box 156. 


*low Regulation No. l, July 19, 1942. dbsd. 
















اف ۱ 
نب من ده ام -—Lamj«b‏ | 
a‏ مو ويوس( دسان Te amas‏ کس 
— 
٠‏ "یو سب ابت له ده — 
ااا ا | فک وس وه 





vel” L‏ کت ]اء مص موس - لوه > | ف 
ook‏ سی uda‏ 









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2154048 اسا ۴مي ۱,1 ست امسن وز سے اد لاس . 


a جم‎ Sheet جى‎ Jailed of 
۱ er is ate eda 










147 
92 nsrles A. H. Thomson, Quexseas Information 
Sercvice of the United States Government. (Washington, 1543). 
21, quoted in Mackay, "OWI," 1983. 


35» quer Davis, "Report to the Fresidcent," nee 
— — on Government Operations, Eearizy * DAS 

nfexmation Pla nd Policies. Part 2, 58th vH ist 
Session (1963), 231, quoted in ibig.. 178. Hereafter cited 
as Davis, “Report.” 


94 






Mackay, "OWI," 189—151. 


95 ع بون‎ Regulation No. 2, September 9, 1942, 
Philibert Collection, Box 156. 


—E George Marvin to Director of Kaval 
History, undated, ihid.. Box 157. 


976 ay Interview. 


98 rafka, “Publication Not Recommended,“ 13. 


99 somo.» Cadr. Willian M. Gaivin, USER, te Direetor 
of Public Relations, March 11. 1942. Philibert Collection, 
Box 156. The OFF officiel was Allan Barth, who registered 
the complaint at one of the Gaily meetings of the Radio- 
Press Section of the Coordinator of Information. 


100... fka s وله‎ cdit. 


101, i cerpt from U.S. Offíco of Facts and Figures 


xeport, "Heóia of Public Opinion," July 3. 1942, contained 
in undated and unsigned “Memorandum for the Director of 
Public Relations,” Philibert Collection, Box 156. 


1025.8. wavy Department, Office of the Chief of 
Naval rations, Ficld Presa Cengorehin (OPNAVINST 
5530. SA), eine 1967, ve 19. 


193p rank Thayer, 8 1 5 
(Chicago, 1944), 69, quoted in Mackay. uM 196. 


194 he Truth, 100 Days Late,” an editorial in the 
Tulse Tribuna, September 198, 1942, quoted in memo., 
Lt. Hugh R. Autrey. USNR, to Director of Public Relations, 
Octobex 1, 1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156. Hereafter 
cited as “Awtrey Memorandum." The subject of this lengthy 
memorancduu was an an&@lysis of newspaper comment about the 
Xorxtown communique. 









defer سر‎ -— 


هب رم زوم JOR‏ كي سا € ای 





^ 

ontara‏ کے 
ہے۔' 

هی سک mt mm‏ سب مد یا ہس 














148 
lOar York Rimes. September 17. 1942, quoted in 
Awtrey Memorandum, 


106 


Omaha "orla Herald, September 17, 1942, Ahi. 


PMwtrey Memorandum. 


108. censorship Justified," Long Beach (Calif.) 
Erana TALAL RD. Sentenber 17, 19423. ihid. 
108 





107 


Kafka, "Publication Not 13. 


110 np ovis anc the Navy.” Mewsaweak, November 9, 
1942, Pe 30. 


Elmer Savie te Mrs. Elmer Davis,‏ سب 
Ese 9. m quoted in nogas |a; x‏ 





and Kew C 1961). 201-02. 


Lizveckay, "OWI," 192. 


Lisp wis, "Report," 226, quoted in ADA. o 122. 
114 4p wis and the Savy, “ OP. cit., 29. 
115 


Devis, "Report," 227, quoted ir Meéeckay, "OWI," 
193-94. 
Lis 


Jarome S. Bruner, “OWI and the Agwairican Public," 
minion Quarterly, 7:126 (1943). 





Li kafka, “Publication Hot Recomended,” 15. 


118 ochingten اوطقس‎ Stas, Auguet 12, 1942. 


113955 3. Ravy Depavtanat, Office of nais Relations. 
Naval Districts Section, شاف‎ Ee | 3 عم ای ال( و3‎ Ho. 1: 
Hovenber 1, 1942. p. 2۰ Philibert Collection, Bow 156, 
Mereafter cited as BE Bn 








٣ ہیں‎ Ho. 2. December 1, 1942, p. 3. 
ihis- 


inh. Cmdr. Samuel J. Ginger, VEN, "Havy's 
industrial Incentive Progr am and Its Relationa to Public 
pen Officers," 1942 PRO Conference, 94-96 (see 
Be 44). 


132 wai story Gf the Office of the Special Assistant 
and Director of Public Information, Bureau of Bevel 
Personnel, " Administrative Historias, Bureau of Naval 







S9 cx مس‎ دسي٨٨۴٨۴نس‎ — ona سب‎ 


a‏ ا ونه تافص 
*— 








107 + 
~ سم J‏ 
— یو ,* 25 تا لو الطک , JU‏ 
تا مې JE QJ de^‏ 
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whee eat af) Rae Jv T 
0۹ mn 





149 
Personnel, 155. 
l23ymid.. 159. 


124 capt. Zilis Reed-Hill, USCG, "The Navy and Coast 
Guard Public Relations," 1942 PRO Conference, 9-14. 


i2544j. George T. Van der Hoef, USMC, "Marine Corps 
Public Relations," ikii., 138. 
26 141-42. All of the information provided 
in this section was taken from Major Van der Eoef'’s remarks 
at the 1942 PRO Conference, pp. 136-142. 


127 a foregoing detaà on public relations personnel 
and organizational changes in the swamer and fall ef 1942-~ 
with the exception of the circumstances surrounding the 
establishment of the Public Relations Division of the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel and the information about Coast 
Guard and Marine Corps public relations--wesg compiled from 
various letters. memoranda, personnel directories, and PR 

. Wos. 1 and 2, Moverber i ane Lecerber 1, 1942, 
contained in Philibert Collection. Boxes 156 and 157. 
128. comprehensive file on the OPR Press Seminars, 
including biographical deta on each Navy speaker, is 
contained in Philibert Collection, Box 156. 


129 à Bus ۲۳ تن‎ . HO. l, bovewber 1, 1942, Pe le 
ibid. 


130 tr. , Secretary of the Navy (Director, Office 
of Public Relations) to multiple addressees, OOR-3 (7511), 
Getober 31, 1942. ibid. 
131, ome. ; Director, Offices of Public Relations, ta 
Chiefs of All Bureaus, GOR-A (2207). duly 27, 1942, ibid. 


132 


135, Security Letter 1-42," Secretary of the Navy to 
All Ships and Stations,” March 30. 1942 (Serial 39216). 
Philibert Collection. Box 156. 


134; tr., Director of the Office of Public Relations 
to Commandante of All Raval Districts. Less Sixteen (Public 
Relations Officers), GOR-G (2411), April 25, 1342, ihid. 


135 عع‎ Commandant, Thirteenth Kaval Bistrict to 
Public Relations Officer, Wavy Department, April 6. 1942 
(Serial 102006), ibid. 


1942 PRO Conference. 





1 


2. Director, Office of Public Relations. to 
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, OOR-C (623), 
April 25, 1942. hid. 


A Secretary of the Navy to multiple‏ د 
adéreasees, August 12, 21942, ihi&.‏ 


138, rious letters from Director, Office of Public 
Relations to All Haval District Public Relations Officers. 
August 28 to September 16. 1942. ibid. 








wae ۷ 
«KK | 
«4 ااه ا زد‎ ۱ uh bi pt Linai ٤ 


CHAPTER IV 
TROM DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE 


By December 7, 1942, the first anniversary of 
U.S. entry into the war, the military situation for the 
Allies hàó begun to change from a defensive to an offensive 
posture. American troops were advancing on Tunis, follow- 
ing the successful landings in North Africa in early 
Movenmber. Soviet armies had launched 4 powerful counter~ 
offensive after halting the Germans at Stalingrad., And in 
the Pacific, where the offensive phase actually commenced 
in August with the landing of U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal, 
Gesperate Japanese attempte to reinforce their garrisons on 
the island were being repeatedly repulsed. l 

On Pearl] Barbor Day, 1942, the Savy announced for 
the first time the complete losses sustained in the attack 
on Hawaii a year earlier. The anniversary statement 
admitted that eight battleships had bean “knocked out," 
five of which were either sunk or Camagec “seo severely that 


2 Five 


they would serve no useful purpose for some time." 
other ships were listed as damaged in adáition to those 

reported as gunk or cameged a year earlier. Total casualty 
figures and plane losses also were ravealec. 


i51 


cCu)mamftio 1 (eq AA چیو‎ ۱ ٠ 


"يی — 

تب فسوي تمده تمه سا بت ھن ےن تا ان 
فلق سا مب نه وکس of mierda © cont‏ ی 
غو سس<سس<. 
هکس ههد هایرینی ما )دبا € —m‏ 
eee ee milel Am. die vague ul‏ امو . 
of a/ mes * se—si atezequeb‏ وجنعوم i» errea (iets‏ 
Goalies ase‏ سته l ajegan qimeng prias‏ 

د sery å ijon‏ تا سموممسم واوسم‫ 
سل minke‏ وا مھ tím cem eed Bes‏ 
قابس ولاس مد ص ome sa arpa‏ اپ rare‏ 
سم BLoow‏ مو سا مد پسہسیف اد يست دن >> ورب 
wap» c» — oa bertit osav agiis 3000‏ 
O ae «^‏ ات ۰ Leser o miim ey‏ موم 


2 EL 


wi "Tea 















152 





The Analysis Section of thea Office of Public 
Relations carefully screened newspaper editorials anc recio 
commentaries for reaction to the Pearl] Harber anniversary 
announcement. An initial flurry of cxitical press and radio 
comment about censorship and tho flow of war information 
was observed, but after two weaks the issue subsided, 
Reflecting the fect that public and press attention hac 
been diverted somewhat fren naval actions in the war, the 
analysis report stated: “Criticism of the Navy continues to 
decrease on about the same scale that dissatisfaction 
BONES Over certain aspects of the North African news 
Situation. .3 

Despite an improvemant in the flow of war news 
following the Borth African landings, the news media 
continued to criticime wilitery control of the release of 


information. 


Concerned about the persistent presse disz- 
satisfaction, OVI conducted a series of netionwide surveys 
to measure public attitudes toward the handling of war 
news. These opinion polls showed that the public, in 
contrast with the news sedia, was generally satisfied with 
military disclosures. In a February 1943 survey, 71 per 
cent of those queried gave the Army a "very well" resting on 
its news release policies, while 63 per cent thought the 
Heavy &lso was Going well in thig regard. However, there 


weg à certain carry-over of adverse public opinion 





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sin æ uua ور‎ tn pitra aed AEE 
(ert Le lee سا‎ a oy jm اسهد نسم ہہ‎ 
ات‎ +. eee ett ne T+ qed iaisisd si — 7 
— — 
—————'———À 
gre ] 
EM ده هغه‎ let رس میا‎ lee tered wall 
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هم‎ In 
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سب یا‎ ٢ ee eee et 
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— — دوو‎ 
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— — — | 
— — — وممف‎ 
























153 
surrounding the Mavy’s earlier delays in announcing ship 
losses. Thirty-eight par cent of the public believed the 
Mavy waa remiss in not making wore prompt announcements, 
whereas only ll per cent accused the Army of taróiness in 
ite xveleases, On the other hand, the Arm wae blamed for 
not giving enough details about lanc battles.” 

Captain Lovette, in a Pearl Harber anniversary 


article written for 2 Mi. attempted to 





explain the Navy's dileama over the timing of ship-loss 
re lenses: 


The lapse of time Zin announcing ship losseg/ is 
not, AS some would heve you think, based on a desire on 
Our part to withhold news from the public. On the 
contrary wo realize as well as anyone how vital 
complete coverage regarding the scope of battles won 
and lost is to the morale of these on the home front. 
But it must be vemesiered that when the enemy attacks 
our ships in the heat of battle the iseue is often 
unknown to him. He cannot always tell whether his 
bombs or torpecoes have struck heme, or just how badly 
damaged our units may be. If we were to issue com 
muniqueg regarding the immediato fate of our ships it 
would indeed constitute aid end comfort to the enemy.? 





in the article, the Navy's chief infermetion officer 
also summed up the tole of Xavy public relations es ho sow 
it after one year of wartime experience. Me divided the 
joo into four specific fonctions: 

(1) To inform the publíc of the progress of the war 
at sea through official communiques. 

(2) 30 assist the news media in covering naval 


activities and using Bavy material. 


tai 
وسواو ببس ...یل سین‎ 
ar torim ibd > h پود مسد‎ 





فك نتت بف را ةا | 





154 
(3) To sct as "appropriate authority" in assisting 
the media to release newaá and photographs on subjects 
restricted undex the censorship code. 
(4) To answer inguiries from the general publie on 


naval personnel and activities. 


Lid of Security Lifts SLighrlu 

On December 29, 1942, restrictions on the use of 
complete casualty lists by tho news media ware removed, 
Shortly thereafter, the Office of Public Relations began 
sencing full casualty lists daily to the naval district 
public relations officers and authorised their release in 
engwex to queries.’ 

On January 11. 1343, the previeus rigid reatrictions 
on the release of information about U.S. submarine activ 
ities were modified to allow news items on the underseas 
Craft to be issued wy individual submarine commands. 
However, in the Mavy~wide directive suthoriming this 
modification, Acting Secretary of the Navy Porrestal warned 
commanders to exercise caution “to insure that no informa- 
tien is released which might endangers the success of future 
operetions. ,8 

The relaxation of security bout submarine opera- 
tions came in the weke of a sharp revival of public interest 
in the German submexine campaign in the Atlantic. George 
Fielding Eliot, desiring to change this interest to concern, 











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سے‎ n! as "hj" te cA مس‎ comit Ammo | 





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—À سی‎  — فان وه دنہ سہ‎ -— 
mane —— —— — € 
-—— | مغ مسہےنے ورجہ ۱ء‎ ab "mena ھ‎ 
— —" | yet vite ۱ 
: 0 — 
= ۱ 
mw are 


— © 
9 





















wrote to Secretary Knox in Warch 1343; 
X wish it wore possible te release more material on the 
U-Boat war, specifically human interest atories of 3 
dramatic and appealing nature. . . . In other words, 
what I am anxious for ia that there should be behind 
tho Navy .. . the full pressures of جردت‎ aroused and 
vigilant public opinion. I know thet what I am 
suggesting is in many ways a departure from precedent~~ 
the Navy; hes always been here ss in Britain the 
“silent service” ... but... there is neecé for 
public pressure to keep the U~Beat war at the top of 
the priority list. 

Knox replied to Eliot that the Navy hac at læst 
adopted & more Liberal policy on releasing information 
bout the U-Boat war. He added: "I certainly intend to 
keep this situation very much in the peblie wind both to 
prepare them for the very probable losses and to secure 
their support in taking remedial measures, "^7 

In addition tO partially lifting the lid of 
security on U.S. submarine operations, the Navy for the 
first time Dagan permitting normal publicity about the 
anti-submarine role of the new escort carriers. > 
Previously, these ships had been in a strictly classified 
Status. 

Admiral King was worried that the relaxation of 
Security restrictions on anti-submarine warfare wight go 
too far. in June 1943, hes sent a letter to all shipo anā 
stations cirecting that strict secrecy be maintained as to 
tactics, methods am) new weapons being used against the 


12 


U-Bosts. Ne particularly warned against any disclosure 


concerning the use Of radar, a gubject closely safequarded 





semi x dm سر وی ۹ جو ده اعم به سم‎ i 
— — 
- al r d v ته‎ .- e" ati ټی‎ 
ا ا ا م جم ب ی رسن ديت ون ان‎ G 
وکین ——— سد ند -ھ-‎ 
eee ee EUN 

z ûr or pond اه نت لل چو اسال‎ al 
مه سپ سس ہم‎ aor 
شا‎ as uate u wS E a م۱۵‎ al 
ہے‎ eri موس ېږ ه ومس‎ a yi e ONY 
— 
we anin a aar ف التي معن‎ ME 
دب ره مصسور مرا‎ 
17 1721 X AL. 
(——— — 

— — — 


— — 































156 
threugheut the war. Jin a significant departure frem his 
pravious admonitions to the fleet on security matters, 
however, King reminded commanding officers that many facets 
ef anti-submarine warfare were unclaesified and invited 
them to submit news releases on these subjects. 

It ie interesting to note that ducing æ period when 
certain restrictions on publicity were being semeved by the 
Ne. Navy, specific requests to ensure secrecy were 
xeceived from the British and French navies. In December 
1942, the British Admiralty sent د‎ sessage to Admiral King 
complaining thet a U.S. Navy photograph violated Dritiah 


is The mess also 


security about @ new type of corvette. 
objected to a photograph of a British ship published by 
Henry Kaiser's Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation and 
reiterate British censorship rules on new merchant ship 
construction., in February 1943, tha French k&val Mission 
in Washington asked that no mention be made of the move- 
ments of French HAVA] vessels Currently in American harbors 


GY Waters. - 





By the end of May 1943, Captain Lovette, speaking 
On @ network radio program, commented that “because of a 
@peod-up of communications and iwproved techniques in 
getting comuuniques cleared, the Navy ia now releasing news 
fester than at the kegianing of the war. “t5 He cautioned, 


)هه 
ret —— ———‏ جرب ui‏ 
ews «m c ۱‏ م مول سس 
— — — 
ھ ۱ a‏ س omer‏ ربجا نود Wee Ce‏ فور لاهسا 
يي amaos uair m piia‏ 

دا 4— ند 
n. agunt UN‏ سا شا ملس ہے ut vc‏ 
3ه — GSES mi ame‏ نه — — 
⸗— دم م مالس مه همه مت کے کے 
áo di 8‏ ————— ونم 
ml aay‏ © ان مې پوھے می cm tes‏ وروم نے 
Ro Re‏ —— 
demum — —‏ یہ مہ بیجم دی وھ سب ہے 
— — — —— — 

سس e e n‏ د سه سز 
— —— — — — 
gman em — — 2 ae‏ سو att‏ 


ساس 


چو ہے ۵ — —— سو 

































157 
however, that delays in releasing news of volue to the 
enemy would st times bw necessary in the future es thay 
have been in the past, One such delay occurred pricr to 
his statement. The occupation of the Aleutian island of 
AMCALtKS by American troops, which took place in January 
1943, was not officially announced until May 7. almost four 
months after the event. *6 

Despite the Galay in the Amchitka announcement, 
Elmer Davis also reported in the spring of 1943 thet mili” 
tary news, especially naval news, was being roleased more 


17 ^ne OWI 


promptly ané in greatac detail than be fore. 
irector at this time was meeting frequently with Army and 
N&vy representatives to discuss the content and form of 
military news roleeses. Moreover, a system had been set up 
whereby OWZ cleared in advance the communiques to be issued 
by the services in Washington. This gave Davis and 4 
staff an opportunity to rebut if they felt more informaticn 
could be given without impairing security. Davia credited 
the services with keeping his ayency mere fully informed 
about military operations than they hed in the past. One 
reason for the better exchange of information was the 
establishment in May 1943 of a security advisory boers 
within OWI. This board was wade up of Army aml Navy 
officers unier the chairmanship of Rear Admiral Richard P. 
MsCullough, USH (Retired) „Û 













- ot D. s. em viale اکا دلا ار د‎ 


— — امسر اې 


em en ak‏ کہا ےلین یور ےی 














tke asi VM) im هف سوس لے نف ودام‎ 
om tant on ص‎ ca لاس نټ نټ‎ 
TE ۲۳ ښليې ما نت كد‎ 4080301 
— یه اہ کے سے سای‎ 
(rore سب‎ deerme Û aê a | 
يا‎ tae ېټ‎ qe à Treo — $m 
ب یس‎ et oinnes x arvis at vett UN V 
uu جاه هده‎ nw wm :یں مهم‎ «d سام‎ 
— —— — 
— ود‎ mm — —— 
eae viet ame سات تایه ناه‎ 
- m uod. up. velt oit ctis کا‎ 


هر مه مو ون کے کا غه ېاو mé ed‏ 
ص ا — — 
— — — — 


۲ bs n | سا لہ‎ ۱ E 
4 . . 




















سس و 


a»‏ 6 — ي سټ پټ 





The OWI director told a group of Havy public 
relations officers ín iate April 1943: 

We have always hac the utmost friendly reiations snd 
the best possible cooperation with the Office of Public 
Relations. And when we disagree, as we do only 
OccesionRlly, 88 to whether a certa@in item ig a matter 
of security or net, we Go not question that the Naval 
authorities have tha lest word. . . . Dinoe I have com 
Over to this side of the fence, I realize a great mëny 
things that i was not awara of as 8S reporter, The 
question of security . . . has a good many angles. many 
Of which an outsider might net gee at al) but which 
actually exist, and may not be revealed until perheps 
three months later. 19 

Ag Wa shall sae, Davis’ magnenineus attitude toward 
the problems of Bevy security was to change later in the 
year as the press and OWI launched & new attack on military 
information policies. 

Speaking sl the same conference as Eimer Davis, 
Secretary Knox 8150 Xeynoted the improvesént in Hé&vy public 
relations. “There has come عحموحطه‎ &@ considerable faig/ 
greater degree of enlightenment among high officers of the 
Wavy about the proper place and... impertance of 
information te the public."^ Knox noted that thers was 
currently in progress s reorganization of kavy intelligence, 
which "will reault in a better understanding of exactly what 
king of informetion is desired anà what kind of information 
mast be kept secret.” He @ided thet tha Envy in Washington 
did not recaive nearly as many coaplaints about news hana” 
ling as it did carlier in the war. “Today the mews is 


dished out as fest as it comes in. We don't hold up 


niise و سس‎ + aeccw ^ KIN? anin iw oF 








ce HR AARAPA -‏ سم tea. oan‏ یپوویں۔ 
— وې ې سس eee ^ c‏ 
—— ریس بو an p eraile mor =a Cuma‏ 

p eaa — = ce 

تمان د ت سودي ن bone Ome‏ ایسا ہیں ہے 
ap e a a o anum eb iOS‏ 
شم با ید د سم ی یکی با سان مس 
—⸗ — امیت سم ga ae pedo‏ دنسم 
cá dame m C mm AE‏ سو بی سوہ 
" ھم س سي بي سه و — 
لا Je Be‏ سر سب عن Lr‏ 

pe Camo cam = =) eee ae سد سے‎ 














159 
anything for à press cenference. The communiques are read 
es rapioiy as possible and handed eut,” 

In hig speech, however, the secretary leveled a 
charge of irresponsibility in protecting security at his 
former newspaper colleagues: 


Captain Levatte and hie staff ere dealing with a 
lot of prima dennas, who unfortunately . o . think the 
story is more important than security. If have been 
frankly disappeinted in the lack of imagination and 
undexatanding on the part of @ good meny newspaper nen. 
« « » They seem to think that it's suart anc clever te 
get something into the newspapers thet they themselves 
Know ought, for the sake of security, not to he 
printed. 


in & letter to a newspaper friend shout three 
months earlier, Knox criticised tho editorial jwiqment c£ 
Washington's two morning newspapers: 


1 am in the middle of an amusiny controversy here right 
now. The Japs have been Saking soue extravagant and 
fanatical claims of Gamage Gone Our ships, 6ه‎ 
when à goamunique was published of a vary inde finite 
character explaining that the brushes sow occurring may 
be the preliminary tẹ a heavy engagement later, beth 
morning papers here . . . assumed that this meant an 
engegement was actually in progress anc added that on 
the outcome of this battle now in progress restaeó che 
control of the South Pacific. I had a press conference 
the next dey and correetad the misinterpretation of 
both newapapers and now they ara zeslossly trying to 
prove thet the Secretary of the Kavy anid the Press 
Relations department of the Ravy have è difference of 
Opindon~-kiné of a silly performance which shows 
beautifully the irresponsible سمه سور‎ of the eüitor- 
inl management of both pespers.? 


An analysis of media ítens during the four weeks 
ending June 14, 1943, showsd that the volume of coment on 
the Navy's informetion policy waa declining, "although suci 
comment is still preponderantly adverso, 577 Of thirty~ five 


دا Doce en‏ = سر مسر اعم ے 
سل بپ ادا "IN‏ 





160 
items, twenty-two wero uncouplimentary, five favorable and 


Sight “balanced,” reported the Analysis Section of OPR. 


هصق ماه ما Public‏ اه ها a Bore‏ 

ia eonjanotion with the gradual celanation of 
Security restrictions and the sgeedup in releasing proce 
dures, steps were being taken by the Kavy to actively 
interest the press ané public in specific naval activities. 
As discussed in Chapter lll, this more “creative” approach 
to public relations began in September 1942 with the 
extensive publicity eIfort surrounding the launching of the 

in December 1942, the Director o2 Publio Relstíens 
forwarded to the Coumandanrts of the First, Eighth anê Ninth 
Kaval Districts a detailea plèn for publicising tbe transit 
Of à new aubmarineg, the USS Pete, aicng inland weterways 
from Manitowoc, Kisconsin, to New Oriens, ^^ The trip was 
eonsicGered an excellent opportunity to dramatize for the 
people residing in Mid-America, who seldom saw a Navy ahip, 
the xole played by submarines in the war. Media repre- 


sent&tives were encouraged to ny the akg fron $t. 





Louis to New Orleans, anê unrestricted photographs by the 
press and public were allowed at any point during the 
transit. 

Also in December 1942, arrangements wera made by 
Captain Lovette to embark a selected group of media repre 
sentatives in the new pattiesniy Alzbase to observe gunnery 


- 
٠:‏ ام سم هود نه الب سمل مت 
i‏ ا“ کت کا سے ا کس 


— —— ھی 

سے CE‏ هم« ص lute, a At‏ ماس داس ید 
qlee‏ مې ور m aisan d ph ai a‏ 
ew‏ وبين سم id‏ سم ده سو ہے ماسب 

Lim Wiis ai 9A es‏ عونا ولاه 
هم cepa al eee‏ جح سب ہیس سسوم — 
0 تة وَامدزقت wpa‏ له ane ce: weet‏ ہے 
سا می رود( ېرسم و داد :ہبہ 
iaa‏ 

سے sS dios ia Mi^ IN E‏ 
مسا بت و aroia‏ ما نل کر مسوم —- am‏ 
amd gr tac aov apii nin‏ ده ونو اتسونې m‏ وو 
هد ء دې ۱۱۲۳۳ ۰ مہ áo did‏ — — 
سه aww - mane ae see used Lai‏ 
وښو سوام موز له وسم ہے۔ 
د کرد سرسرس سه یم deme bows‏ ی 
۲ 8 — ته tike! em‏ — 


























۱ 
0 





c "^ au oec queque » ——‏ 
سس me‏ منم رېم مهد وهه ده -- 
ااا مر سب چوس یورام ہف 


ردد سا a‏ - 


pat apy etal, im 
— یا‎ 


| 





161 
exercises during the ship's “shakedown” cruise. ٩ Ag in 
the case of the Peto campaign, these plans hed the fuil 
support of the Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations. 
During the Alaknama field trials, coler photographe were 
taken for tne first tise by Eàvy photographers. 

by February 1243. the Navy's combet photogr apy 
units were in full operation in the fleste., There were 
five teams in the fielú at thís time~-oma each assigned to 
the Pacific Pleet, htiantic Fleet, P6uth Pácific Ferca. 
Southwest Pacific Force and the U.S. Kaval Forces, Europe. 
Sy June, tha purder of units hag grown to eleven. 

Ag a result of the combat photography unit system, 
the recapture ©f Attu Ialand in the Aleutians in lete May 
19432 became one of the most photographed American military 
Operations ín the war up to that time. Kavy Lieutenent 
Dewey Wrigley, USNR, à former Paramount Films motion 
pieture photographer, and his combat film team went with 
the convey to Attu anti accompanied the treepa ashore., They 
&pent four days and nights on the front line, photographing 
ail phases of the battle. 

To effect additional and more efficient distribu” 
tion of the increasing namber of stili photographs that 
were being forwarcéed to Washington Gaily by field commande, 
4 photejraghic reference Library was eatabliahec in Janusery 


1943 aa a auc -wectien of the Picterial Section in the 


tad 

vw "ues و‎ 

سه له مت وسات شت Te.‏ 
ماس a salar‏ نو همها ا فوا وء س 
ووس wet unm‏ سم بد ب وت بايد sg‏ 
CAE ee E‏ ہی rinasci ae ot yee‏ 
idm"‏ دد ام ن د مر کی کاس ہی بی 
هم Goer‏ له دس صب - سس u ooh‏ 
۹ ند ea‏ سا یہ د د aw a a‏ 
و( د پس an NaN eer cá bm‏ 
Mu ALME E‏ 
Yû am RAA 9‏ اک — ————" 
وهو رس ۰ ۰ سس« 
کم an + md oh a AM conie‏ 
dem me ah le — — © vyen meee‏ دارم 
OMM‏ قاس u- ew)‏ میټ و ٭ھ — — میم رزسے 
⸗ وت ها هسه سام 
ong DS‏ 
O ue 1/2 > i dem on) amma‏ 
sanis‏ مسب سس 
veraa — < — —‏ 
ia‏ سب ب سا 


E sis 















































162 
Office of Public Relations. Initially. mere then 17,006 
different photographs Of Navy subjects were placed in this 
library. All of these pictures were cleared for release, 


anc writers and editoras waere encouraged to "brosse" through 


the library and maxe their own selections. ^^ 


Aiso in January 1943, the Radio Section o£ OPR took 
Steps to isprove brosodcagt coverage of Navy activities. 
Fieid and fileet public relations officers were urged to be 
on the lookout for oroütive ideas for radio programe: 


Producers, weitere and sponsors wili welcome guidance 
in making radio progrars dealing with the Revy, Marine 
Corps and Coast Guard gffirmative in their effect upon 
the listener. By affixmetiva is meant the presentation 
of fectsg--in dramatic interviews or any other form 
suitable to the garticular prograw--on probleme ef the 
Bavy in this war. Every seript, whether for network, 
regional or local broadcast, is important enough to 
J sometning of the tremendous job the Navy is 
RE 





At least one result of tha increased effort in the 
area of broadcasting occurred in August 1943, when NBO 
turned over four hours of network time to the Navy for a 
Special broadcast entitled “Battle Stations." The first 
two hours covered tha Battle of the Atlantic, while the 
&scond half of tho program dealt with naval aviation. û” 

The medium of radio was the primary vehicle in the 
first years of the war for dispensing internal information 
to military personnel. In eariy 1943, the Overseas Divi- 
sion of GWI, in cecperation with the Navy anê Marine Corps 
public relations offices, was short~waving two progresas to 
men afloat emi] at advanved hages. The shows were made up 


وسیپ تت کس لح 





0 ا BAAN‏ رفسب اننا سے رم ےہ مو 
— يسم ہیس جوم مس سکیس عم ورا اہ al)‏ 
c El —— cP amd Je CHA‏ 

عفاوسنهه uA‏ نشی سب دوس د سب 









وی 


٢د‏ لوس سه وښ وق مو ری ی ره 





163 
OË service news and personal mess&joasa from next of xin, as 
well as musical and other entertaiment. The wavy program, 
“Calling the Navy.” was broadcast six days @ week three 
tises & day all over the world. Direct contact with the 
OWI Overseas Division was maintained ہیر‎ OPR'g radio branch 
in New York in connection with this program, 4? 

Arràngements were algo made with the OWI Radio 
Bureau in February 1943 for a network and local racio cam” 
peign to assist a recruitin; drive for the Women's Reserve 
of both the Navy and Coast Guard. Ths campaign begen with 
4811 apet announcements on network-effiliated and nen~ 
affiliated stations throughout the nation. It continued in 
the second week with appeals being broadcast on leading 
network programs, including the appearance of five admirais 
on five different shows. In the third week, a fifteen~ 
minute recorded program was aired on 800 stations, 
featuring Lieutenent Commander Mildred H. McAfee, USNR, 
irector of the WAVES and former president of Wellesley 
College. 

This radio publicity was the beginning of an exten 
sive effort in 1943 te recruit women for all the sea 
services. A decline in the enlistment of women reservists 
eccurred at a tise when they were critically needed to 
velemsa mon for coxbet duty. 

The public relations aspects of the carpaign 
eentered around the first anniversary cf the WAVES on 


مد په ta‏ 
دا مرم مه سمما سسوم دس شه مه aii‏ 
هري واه الوزن" اوه عا وجي ع سن أب 
غو هک ati be om mia hd mem om n Lia‏ 
Mê ©‏ وین و رو اوسامه پا افعال محر سد 
ځور و هس له — ولل وغل — — 
1 تت Gels oe pARMENESAME‏ می بہ ہے us‏ ھی “Gee‏ 
(INS vum ad. coe,‏ جو د Jewel iro dija‏ صن سے 
پخ مم سم ه ان سے و سصہء سسب 
ده OD od pui Mà que‏ ومد plement T‏ کم مس 
مسین rem hen dali HEP Pet! n mam Jem‏ 
مدقم سا كن وس وې nb tne oie‏ 
لغم سس 
— — سوورزے؛ نو ہب ہہ-+ہہ بو وف س 
سس« 
فا و وم وو نام زبه سے 
0 راس سښت سات« مس ہی 
m‏ — ——— 

































aus e De رس ووو‎ ose wa سه کي‎ 7 

dr adi‏ انم و موو اوو د مرا بے س 
d — 0‏ اناي ۸ 4 oa AZ‏ ب81 هس is STE‏ 
ELI,‏ 








164 
July 30. The Office of Public Relations and the Director 
of the Women's Reserva of the Navy cooperateé in a natien- 
wide publicity effort to observe this event. The Press 
Section of OPR issued an advance selease. containing 
statistical information and a summary of the first year's 
history of the WAVES. Feature stories, including photo- 
graphic feetures, were prepared for newspapers &nài teqa“ 
zines. Radio programa and interviews were conducted, with 
a second intensive national radio drive steged in the 
latter part of duly. Arrangements also wore made for 
nawaree] coverage of anniversary ceremonies, 7” 

The assistance rendered by the Office of Public 
Relations was praised by Lieutenant Commander HeAfee, who 
wrote to Captain Lovettesr 

1 suppoes that the Public Relations Office considers 
that its recent activity on behalf of the Women’s 
Reserve ís in its normal line of duty. May I assure 
you, however, that those of us who have watched the 
efforts to celebrate the first anniversary of the 
Women’s Reserve are lapreased by the remarkable 
achievement which resulted from efforts far in excess 
of whBt we would normeily expect in tho line of any” 
body's Guty. Every branch of your organisation was 


untiring in its effort to present the Women's Reserve 
to the public, 2° 





Throughout 1943, naval district ant branch public 
relations officers were asked to provide publicity assis- 
tance for various other recruiting programs, such as the 
drives for aviation cadets and the now V-12 effiesr traines 








i‏ سه 
اا شاک کہ e‏ مات iaaa Duda fe‏ ہم بر > سووے 
وش عنم نان — Pe‏ حم سم ہوس ہدج اه د سولس. 
وسم ai — —— san ib‏ — — 
ورم puos anan abi a hom) HUP lO‏ 
AL AO O‏ — — —— — 
admo —— —— ——‏ 

tlic te ور مم نيس‎ pi uneca aso په‎ — — 
—— — — —— اہ ع‎ — 
wel miedo òt MON 
























165 
glasses., In the latter case, each college at which a 
Class V-12 unit was locateč haudleð publicity about the 
unit as a wholé. However, Wavy public relations officers 
released stories about individual class members to wadla in 
the enrollee'g home arca. 

in August 1943, the Bureau of Aeronautics requested 
the Office of Public Relations to coordinate publicity for 
the Navy's pre~flight training program., Because of the 
strong athletic emphasis at tha pre-flight schools, OFR 
gecoumended that leading sports writers be invited to spend 
& week at the various schools during the opening of football 
season. The plan called for twenty writers to visit each 
school. - 

A month earlier, a selected group of newspaper 
writers from around the country were given a flying tour of 
naval air facilities. Commands vigited included the Naval 
Air Stetions at Sienview, Ill., Norman, Okla., and Corpus 
نا مع ہت‎ Tex., and the Haval Air Gunners School at Purcell, 
Okla. in early December 1943, a spacial tour was conducted 
of naval activities in Charleston, $.C., by the Sixth Waval 
District Public Relations Offioe for newspepermen from 
Georgia and South Carolina. The highlight of this tour wks 
a one-day cruise at sea aboard a new Gestroyer, in which 
the newsnwen were given gunfire and smoke-secreen~laying 
Gewonetrations ami wire “subjected” to dive bombing and 
atrafing attacks simulated by planes frox the Naval Air 


57 
ايا ل ال رو میا سو Muta‏ — بىت = 
اهم rig Looe Deere; mm Ria LA"‏ حدر لا 
٠‏ ساو مه و اسا noe‏ ۱ یادن دہ سیا دا 
ima arole bainion‏ شم GRADY‏ کیو دہ ہب id‏ 
— بدا ماه هرم ie‏ سہسمنلوں -ہےر- 
کر 3e‏ ازن فو نانم به سداس ور ریو A‏ 
مور وم د ووه عند وہ ددامنے ےو سوا LI wma‏ 
وص مس خر دہ مہ رہ ا نوہ >u stand‏ 
paia‏ نويع ره mi‏ فلك s e enteral‏ 
مي زیر سور مس همی بت دمو نا Tm‏ 
سس جب Kb "Alae mo,‏ و شلات ot‏ دہ مدد 


















Ca 

—"c Sere eww + E x 

١١ لس‎ PAR s c3. m cm mo cce em vta 
پب اسم نتا لو به کی‎ 

















— uL) cami meni dh 
yat t pupae qme ibò Shed <i رر ده‎ 
للا چسوزہا تت بمو ەوسسممے‎ 
Lm "us شاه نکی فف ےم دس‎ ۵ 
— — 
— — — a سر کید د‎ E 
c دا ۱ وما وښ د وام - نے‎ 
م داب ټس سر‎ mem ېم‎ 
لہ‎ diera aio cum Mecha c | 












Station, Beaufort, Ga." 


By 1943, public relations essistance in recruiting 
was much more coordinated than it had been earlier in the 
war. One previous problem was the lack of centralised 
control over reguests for recruüiting publicity. For 
instance, in the summer cf 1942, the Bureau of Yards and 
Doeks Asked the Radio Section of OPR to enliat the coopera~ 
tion of the broadcasting industry in a “erash” program to 
recruit 60,000 Seabees in ninety caya. The goal not only 
Was wet but excesded. However, due to the lack of 
training facilities for Seabeoa, many plwabers, electricians 
&ná others who hac given up their jobs or private businesses 
to @anlist “cooled thelr heels“ at home waiting for the Navy 
to process them. OFA shortly thereafter arranged to clear 
&11 such requests in the future with the Director of 
Recruiting. " 

A series OË "S&ttle Reports," kuthored by the head 





of the Magazine Section of OFR, Lieutenant Commander Walter 


Karig, began i» the fail of 1943, supplementing for the news 
media the official communiques and Navy presa releases. 2d 
The first full volume was published in 1944. Four addi- 
tional volumes were prepared ag the war progresseóc. 

tn 1943, as in the previous year, naval district 
and branch office public relations officers also were 


involved in publicizing the national war bond program. 


































ہ هوس "a‏ 
dida J -‏ كص ai nia‏ رورم 
گا غه مات مت دا iios cmd Bat‏ ب ی 
amik‏ شی وڼ !ست دا نورا نت 
ةا ری ہیں سه 
ت a‏ ت سسا ا ا ل سف مه سو لد 
€ س مم وسال سنو مه س At‏ نالور عه اساي 
———I. d‏ — 
mendis MORE‏ |« مسب مب ہہ یسر سہ سے 
Ses ee‏ اماس نت نه دده روس یا 
LATET i y‏ ——— 
کا we «reip bd War‏ ناسل امه عا دسي — 
UWÜO  s-- abeoryw 6€‏ ود 3د X» ci urinal‏ الس 
te wru dd diis shi edi al a‏ 
— 


و .مون یې ہیں امہے 
M iC rel ri ۱‏ تنه صم i! el‏ 
— — — 
CAPS c‏ تست بت او اسان M osaan‏ 
کار MU n Gaalan sar saifa‏ سے ce‏ 
اا کک a‏ يست 

say mir cj se GUAE wi‏ پوت سر نون 
y‏ — 42 اس ہی 



































i67 

Nuch of theis effort in this regard was directed toward an 
interna] audience~-nayval personne] and civilians working 
for the Navy. In 1942, the internal infosmaticnal 
Campaign to encourage War bord purchassca resulted in a $100 
million investment in bonds by Navy bepartment perzonnel. 
Purchases in 1943 amounted to $300 million, and the Secre- 
tary of the Wavy assigned a quota in 1944 wf $600 million. >” 

Not ali Of the Nevy's promotional activities on 
behalf of war bonds were internal, however. Early in 1943, 
there were several notable efforts to raise money for tha 
construction of naval vessels to be named after specific 
cities. The popularity anid success of these promotions led 
to an increasing number of requests by cities to have ships 
néxmed in their honor.  Consequentiy, tho Navy appealed to 
the Treasury Department to diecouraye this type of bend 
caspaign, since ship nawes ordinarily were approved far in 
advance ox resexved for other subject areas. The "Sponsor 
م‎ Fighting 5hip" program, however, in which local communi- 
ties received credit for defraying the cost of a ship 
through bond purchases by having B plaque displayed on the 
Ship's8 quartoróeck, continued, ^9 

Another fund-raising drive in which Navy public 
relations was askec to assist in early 1943 wes the iad 
Cross Var fund Campaign. President Roosevelt designeted 
March of that year as Red Cross Honth, in preparation for 


tho campaign, Norman Davis, director cf the American Red 


رم 
ا AS SRS‏ یت لہ 
وسفاسب سردا وسویلې؛ فلا جل تاد pime‏ 
مق we n‏ ته کامں اف فغود ,ودن — — 
اہ — ⸗ — — ipsos e 4i atl sua‏ 
— — — سمم یں می imme íe—— ene‏ 
và nendum‏ مه ٠ښت‏ و hum .amAl[is PORA‏ ټس -sem‏ 
ھ سي ابا > ہروس HN‏ تمه و وسوی موا M‏ 
فا دا وان سه Duim‏ سه لدغهي ab‏ 
سن دا چب سن د املنسبد سم نسح ده ore‏ 
al pete ei dal abc m e hm Pavo au‏ الت 
سوت so C‏ ته سم dup‏ ودن 
د od ies‏ منت روج 
qi edu MP uni miti 0‏ وسن ami‏ وسو 
مم نہ داسف ات | cle‏ مسا مسوم چوس وی 
i‏ سس o ma‏ مهام هتا وس مه سا 
رې ae sumas quie «mida‏ 
غا مب Se‏ 
omg idi ni a‏ اسر نے ينون مرف س-سد- 
وسال مہ مم هوکم سی مپي ۸٩‏ ه at‏ 
a irmi” -pain e msi o‏ اش 
وور ساسا" 
niat trn |‏ ممن سے سی 
4 مات زه مول تهنا ممه جه سي 
۱ رل SS‏ 
is ۵ ۱‏ 
هېت اښ ووي 






































168 

Cross, asked the Secretary of the Havy in January to 
provide photographs showing Red Cross activities in conneo- 
tion with the Navy at wer. 3 Pietures of 51666 1ج‎ 80568 being 
loaded aboard ships or first aid being applied to survivors 
of ship sinkinge were the type desired. Secretary Knox 
took a personal interest in the Rad Cross drive ami urged 
Wavy public relations officers to cooperate to the maximum 
extent with Red Cross officiels to "help promote public 
understeapndimn; of Bed Crosse work with the somed forces, "^8 

A unique publie relations progres, begun in 1942 
and continued in 1943, was the Modei Aircraft Project, 
eo-sponsered by the U.B5. Office of Education and the Nevy's 
Bureau of Pheronautiíca. For 1943, a quote of 300,000 solid 
model planes wae assignec to the nation’s school students 
fer the study of aircraft recognition by military personne) 
and civilian plane spotters. The models were built to 
scale, so that at a distance of thirty-five feet each plane 
model appeared the size of a rasi piane at a distance of 
half à mile. Models oT enemy planes anê those of Allied 
nations were built by boys and girls under schocl super- 
vision and then shipped to Navy receiving depots for 
distribution to naval schools, ships at sea, Army comsknóog 
anc other centers where 2ccur&te models were needec to 
teach aircraft recognition. About 35 per cent of the 
models were used by the Navy iteeif in training 


&vi&tors and gunners. Wavy certificates of rank, rangle 
















ھت 
i BAM ,‏ مهم Ve‏ ما ai‏ تسس ws‏ 
۱ کے لودج چم شم کې لب سم 


-. 007 دع بت لا نم‎ a 
Hing on gw" جم عو سط مس نا‎ 
Wa omi e e e a اقا ات‎ 0 

el سم نہ‎ pa وہ عفد‎ ii edam A 


كسحا نہ من., dt ws‏ سس لت مه  -———‏ 


e ym ټیس ىټ‎ soeh E» تع‎ d AL 
جنه مد لاس للك ست‎ À TMi on مسر رق‎ 39 


سا · — — 
mr ~‏ 24 درس وم dd mn ١‏ بات ۳ X lji‏ — 
ei RUE‏ سب ې تكم تست ناسا si‏ 
alse‏ مه کد س ۽ — اسنا یو »— mia‏ 
Tm‏ —" 
A‏ سل مه سا مه نت 
AE‏ 
— — — 
دھلورسا نے حسپ بسزبرص مہب ہے 
LS S OS peser RE‏ 
x —‏ ومو مسل ot‏ سب سوا نم 
eee "‏ | هس یسال 


. LJ سن هلو وج‎ ® LI 
— — 


— — — E 1 














169 
from “Cadet Airoraftssan" to “Admiral Airereftamean”" were 
awarded to the students on the basis of the number of 


Boceptakie wmode la built. 3 





During the war, the United States Mevy waa the 


0 


nation's largest single employer of Labor. S Labor rels- 


tions not only wae of vast importance to the Havy's effort; 
ít also required extensive public relations activity, 
particularly on the part Of naval district and branch 
public relstions offices. 

in December 1942, Kear Admiral Clark Woodward, who 
headed the Navy's Incentive Division, wrote to Captain 
Lovette expressing his appreciation for the assistance 
provided by public relations personnei: 


Since its creation in July of this year, the 
Incentive Division has had occasion to lean heavily on 
the various Public Relations offices throughout the 
country for aseietance in Army-Navy "5" awards, 
Staging rallies, visits of combat personnel to ínéus- 
trial plants anû other similar activities. 

The splendid ogeperation which has been afforded 
this Division by /these offícen/ . . . has enabled uz 
to extend greatiy our response tO the need for 
incentive work in industry supplying the Navy with war 
materiels. 





Admiral Woodward stressed that the need for incen- 
tive work in the nation's war industry was increasing. 
“Hew methods must continually be Gevised to meet the 
changing psychology of management anë labor, and on even 


larger number of Nevy contractors is requesting assistance 


oe! 
to م‎ wy Ye sleet «tl «e waa کت‎ oF 
W piid هله سه له‎ 





— 





eee n‏ د ابر ته 

r ودی کد اریہ سې کر‎ tu سج می‎ ٢ 
ہیں نیم يوستب‎ 2c Fein نه جوت فد ایا‎ c1 ntne 
۱۶ به وسېبماه شم‎ Lax کلک عمد مسدب سی غه‎ 
سس ریو‎ ose cdd moi cama —— snjó dd 


. 


8 غو eke Meee out Cel eee‏ سه 
اس قسج اء دنه اقسا سس د وسن 
minaga attona‏ دم amirim sid iah aiii‏ 

tiamo wa aio ttan y mn 


pet ap r$‏ سر رد 
a ie Sates "‏ ي0 و 


ره مت یىی وص 
ې یق ناسا c‏ 


— — Y ۷ — 
— — — — — — (p thm fh 

⸗—⸗ - ١ عہ‎ 
— — — — — 
— — ۱6۳08 ها‎ qe 











































179 
en both old and new type of Incentive problems." He 
renewed an carliaxr request to Captain Levette for a1} pos- 
gible public relations assistance to his division ín the 
future. 

in June 1943, Admiral Woodward specifically asked 
that branch public relations officers contact local catio 
Stations in their areas te arrange for the inclusion of 
incentive messages in public servios programing. It was 
particularly Gegired that these eessaves Le broadcast 
Guring the morning hours when workers were enroute to their 
plants. The announcements were definitely “herd sell,” as 
evidenced by the following example: 
| "Pick out ihe biggest ships and let 'em have it," 

That's what Captain Jack Moran told nls crew he fore 

going into battle with the Japs. Bis ship~~the UES 
BOISU--sent six Jep werships to the bottGn.  Euil more 
ships n yoyr Navy, and help send more Jap ships to 
the bottom; 

As discussed in the iast chapter, the Incentive 
Division provided many other services in addition to racic 
messages to help publico relations and incentive officers in 
theix liaison with industry,  Photo;rzaphs showin; Navy 
products in action, cómeuniques reporting on the per form 
ance of certain equipment under conbat conditions, material 


foc employes publications, exhibits of finishaó Navy 





products in settings appromimating their use in combat, 
posters, motion pictures, speakers and special recordings-~ 


All were made availabie. 







کہ ہہ 9+99۲ 211 
decal‏ کو مََعت جا ج مجر نمع 
: له عصد — به قور مدوم که اک D wiv Ie?‏ 
— 

sss له ود انم مہ قم ومو مي د‎ pmen a 
— — —— از‎ 
سس بی رہل‎ — —— — ⸗ 
ev dm irm و س س فا‎ 
Meme median وی لم‎ 
"dd Pr oam" ULT yo سد کی که‎ 
LL 

d‏ می gn‏ و 




























ونش مس بوس بب0بب۹)۹) مس ۷ه 
)هصغ مون مج سا ملف سنس نه 
— “— ——— 
ee ies LP à‏ وبح 
م یکس وس حمہ سسطارامے۔ Hicom‏ 
اق رد ا — 
مد صز و اا —ÀÀ—‏ 
سداد سدوا et‏ 








€ 








171 
in September 1943, at the urging of Under Secretary 
Forrestal, & plen was initiated whereby two newscasts per 
employee shift would be brosieast directly to public 
address systems at wer planta on leased lines from lecal 


radio stations. 5 


The newscasts wouid consist primarily of 
war news, especially about naval actions. Local items of 
Mavy interesat wouid be provided by the nearest kavy publie 
relations office, and incentive messages would be fneorpor- 
ated into the opening end cliese ef cach newscast., District 
public relations cfficers had the responsibility of 
exranging with local radio atations te originate the 
newscasts. Charges for telephone lines and fees for the 
stations ware treated as regular production costs. 

In July 1942, the separate awards previously 
presented by the services to individual plants for out- 
stending performance in wer production--the Navy "E," 

Army "A," and the Army-Navy Star--were combined into one 
joint Army-Navy Production Award. Six months later, Rear 
Admiral Benry A. Wiley. Chairman of the Navy Board for 
Production Awards, complained that the new award was being 


“4 He felt that 


presented too often and to too many plants. 
the number of firme receiving the awer should be reduced 
in order to "accentuste" ít& value. Accordingly, 1 

egencies recomsending the Army-Navy Production Award were 
requested to exercise more stringent supervision of their 


recommenástions in the fütore, so that the awards would ga 


iti 
— — — 
مسل رس هب مې‎ ap لت د شا کی‎ ٧ 
* qhaGemicw miare hisa eters a — *«* 
bt ead ji مس سس‎ 
ni i e ب ت‎ e e ست نس‎ 
——————— Men 
2رہ‎ ga erus ub VO «olw tum سه و پور‎ 
س مسر تا اد‎ f rana sema fms کل‎ 
mir misim sa mitos عو نمس ہج‎ 
p^ x^ n4 اس سا‎ Sage م بے‎ a 
لس‎ ae a 
— —— د سس‎ mil = 
وده ټیب‎ mna y بے ننس‎ alam eth ys یو وف‎ 
mw سیب‎ cm) c edam bes we af mhi 
RM ni 
,سراد فسا اس په وود سم بحم‎ BOAN 
س اه ت‎ — n — 









































— — ې 


— — — — à 
دم يم‎ —** — E" 
Man E EPPP = di " 
په‎ oae اوه هې تلم مه رسس‎ of A3 





172 
Only te “these contractors whose production performance has 
been outstanding end who are really deserving of the 
Wwwerd,." 

Physically. the eward consisted cf a special flag 
te be flown above the industrial plent and a vin to be worn 
by every employee of the plant as a symbol] of outstanding 
eontríbutions to the wer effort. Ag sentioned previously, 
the cognizant naval istrict public relations officer or 
his branch representative handled a]1 arrangements in con- 
nection with the presentation of awards. To demonstrate 
the joint character of the award, an Army officer, if 
available. presented the pins to individual employees at 
sa geremonies, while s Navy officer made tha 





presentations at the Army-sponsered events. 

Vader Secretary Forrestal, wae nad the over-all 
responsibility for the industrial incentive proqran, 
acrangec in Mey 1944 a tour for selected newspapermen and 
radio commentators to Navy establishments “where they could 


45 The 


see the resulte of the Nevy production progres." 
tour comiste of two tripe: a one-day visit to Fhiledelphis 
and Camden, Bew Jersey, on May 20, and ® three-day visit to 
Rew York City. Kearny, New Jersey, Dehigren, Virginia, and 
Patuxent, Maryland, on May 29-31. The purpose was to 
acquaint the newsmen wlth improvements nde during the past 
year in Navy ships, aireragt and ordnance. Many of the 


weapons systems shown could not he written about because of 


üt 
—— ووه وموس لت‎ LR سٹو‎ 


le eater ee Bie cm | | 
5 " 8 


Reda) mam coe liinis‏ ےد وحدد یز ریم 
cate tím mdi‏ »ساملا منیو مس د پا نير يك سدم 
پانو ہہ مہسعب ووو تسس 
رز به اف ےہ واصضہحی۔ ده pma mem‏ 
دس ونا o pie mmia ethan seh‏ 
n Aman. na ad‏ بب دا ئس ۸ه م. 
Able‏ رپ of sc ١١ ne‏ — — 
—⏑— لیو اد ۶ 
he Te m‏ رن اس لال سو اح پ 
سس سسستم۔ یر salo. r û‏ سم مد 
e Ch AAD‏ ټب — — 
Fam.‏ تفاي A‏ © سه — um‏ 
6 وہہ ؛ہ سو ہس سس سم وس ټیس 
⸗ — — —— — 
wimg dna a ir yi © adi cote 3 :‏ 
جات AW‏ سے queo‏ ہی a‏ 
NO Ln 8‏ — هويم سم 
dod mm ZEE‏ — — .— 
n mere *‏ دس فو we cma‏ 


sto de AB m A m 
4 (vw رم سل‎ 
































9 








173 
secret classification; however, Porreste2] wag anxious that 
the newsmen see thes, so that they would be “better able to 
write about future wer developments. * 


Runilc Re 
On March 1, 1943. the H.B. 








Manual was issued by the Office of Public Relations (see 
note 40). It was the first compilation of directives, 
instructions and guidance for sea services public relations 
personnel since the Office of Naval Intelligence pubilishec 





1939. 


The new manual contained the fecoral statutes, NEvy 
Regulations and Generml Orders, sections of the Burosu of 
acr andina anc 
excerpts from the Public Relations Bolletin which releted 


to the subject wf public relations on ® pexrmenent cr semi- 


Raval Persorme)] Menual, directives. letters, 





permanent basis. It aiso inciuded, where pertinent, 
letters of the Office of Civilian Defense, the codes 
published by the Office ef Censorship enê the reqeletions 
ef the Office of Wer Inferwation. It wes @ivided into 
Seven sections: adwinistxetion, nedia~-geuneral, media-- 
press, media--radio, wadia--pictures, special events and 
seeuritvy.  Purposefuilv issuec in looselenaf notenook forme 
8o that supplementei and correction&i paces could be cariily 
inserted, the manuel also had a simplified numbering system 
and an index whereby the user could quickly locate the 


"ug 
as می نےں‎ «di end و مت :سو‎ 
— — — 


83 وھ‎ p 
ع و انه مدا درنس‎ me اي ف لح‎ 7 
جو یرہ نا نش اه‎ On mE کي‎ pi bm 
اهم مسپارءسمم وز مسوا‎ di dà + 
euo ow) نانم ټوو مہم ہزیر‎ lam قا‎ 
© hae موه اهاسی‎ oe ee 0 
Us p.m - 
























8ل هه سه - .aemw er»? juvde a Mamas tame‏ ہب 
— ۴ دوو شی دا ماب نت دوس وا 
~ — — — — — 
| ف نا لو اس واننسوږ رسب 
عردم رما و دی یہ ٠‏ وك سچسریںن ہی — 
س د٤‏ سامه وسم و At‏ 
m miiba Vn eq n. MN và‏ .سک o‏ 
| لج ۵ و99 ما am gn amem‏ ده اس 
ہے رھ cm mettent. "nt‏ :ہیں زسم رم 
جم ¢ 5 c‏ — —— 
— ې يو پر سر چو سه 
"e^. qm :‏ " کر qi entum itt | oe‏ 








E Ed 
* 








174 
subject for which he wes looking. it was fully intended to 
be an up-to-date reference book aod a text for indoctrinat- 
ing persenne] new to the field, and it served that purpose 
throughout the romainder of the war. 





Paradoxically, at a time when Navy public relations 
was gradually coming out from under the “heavy hand of 
security" and beginning to pursue a more aggressive course 
in informing the public, steps were being taken to reduce 
the number of personnel engaged in the function. The 
seagons for this action were: (1) en urgent need for addi- 
tional personnel to man the rapidly expanding naval forces, 
and (2) concomitant criticism from various sources over the 
utilization of combet~eligible maies in non-combat 
assignments. 

A Navy that had been “starved for funds” in the 
past was now being permitted, even encouraged, by Conjrees 


46 1n May 1943, with leas 


to "spenü like a drunken sailor.” 
than thirty members on the floor, the House appropriated 
$30 billion for the Wavy in Fiscal Yeer 1944 in just twenty 
minutes. This prompted one representative to remark 
sarcastically that he thought there gkeuld be at least one 
member present for each billion Gollars voted, پک‎ 

in January 1943, Captain Lovette wrote to public 


relations officera in the centinental United States that a 


vti 


— — 7 سو a ee)‏ 
0 ۱ — سے حم سس ۔رسی۔ 


| سوہ االو ازا سا د ټيب tet‏ سروس 
bim‏ 


ee ee ee Ue 
عله نمه سوب وود واس‎ POSU {IM 
۴ وس مع ابه مت دې خووب حتف‎ e 
كس نها نت سم دس وسور وسم‎ RS 
ence as ek) gabs m» -— تہ وسصتن‎ i 
- oe یا افا‎ — cdi 
mo wi e ek ت‎ LÛ |e ime ae 
— فص — سس‎ 
سييست‎ sí oe uit enn "er ea 





































am od سور ف مو‎ ed Oe ee >٦ 
ang D a a e⸗n 7۰ 
یں یں مین بر ہت‎ a a تو و‎ 
eye ومن ده وسوی‎ ٢ 
je سی سب :وم‎ MADE ۰ہ نب‎ 
sa t cómo Vu" umm eem ek 

-e- c) T» ot ete u e uA ca 
dee mi مه ووس ټېب عون‎ va 
ووی رسد د‎ — — 


9, 1ج‎ mm d d 





175 
congressional investigation ef the Offices of Public 
Relations, ag wall as other offices tad bureaus of the Mavy 


Department, propably was forthcoming, ^? 


He added that the 
Secretary of the Haevy wanted to enaure in advance of any 
investigation that all! male personnel qualified fer duty 
afloat were being made available fer such duty. Accordingly. 
the field public relatiens officers were requested ts 
furnish as soon ès possible the names of their officer 

and enlisted personnel up to thirty-filveo years of age who 
were physically qualified for asa asaigqumenta. Despite 
Lovette's warning, tho congressional investigation of 
military publice relations Cid mot materialise; however, the 
Navy continued to assume that it might take piace. 

The Chief of Haval Personnel, in late April 1943, 
stressed the need for qualified officor personnel in the 
fleets by citing figures showing the tremendous increase in 
officers in the Navy since the war began. “The Navy had 
35,960 officers before Fearl Harbor., Today, wa have 147,000 
© «a . @ad by January i, 1944, we shall need en additional 


60,000 for a total officer strength of 207,000. 449 


in 
February 1943, it was ostimated that in the near future 
there also would exist 4 shortage of 100,900 enlisted men 
in the Navy. 3° 

The acute manpower shortage caused Admiral King to 
write to Secretary Xnox in March 1943 recommending thet 


further expansion of personnel in the fields of naval 


P"? 


ila Wo GRO s De epee OD 

dinis tum. paio sati Lo d mi‏ و و سس 
ووس پو زې Am m a amm‏ وی ج 
اب > موس uj‏ مسبت وذ حب 
gie‏ مد د ناسا ساجک او دی 
aon fn‏ سم سنس سے 0 ^ — — 
= یی — — Peta:‏ بی 


A‏ — — هه ون يهن 


d uter 3 E 
3 کر‎ 


ETT — ولس بپ موس‎ 
JE uat met ow — —— — 


























BEL RA mp omm oum سوب‎ — ۱ m 
— — — 
su A ato yo anope waite mont d یم‎ 
— — — s | 
we esiin Deit Do amat * هو‎ ٥ 





176 
intelligence, photography and gublia ralationa be stopped. 
The admiral observed, "I have come to tha conclusion that 
certain military activities are now edequately manned to 
meet all esssntial requirements. "| 

There seemed to be a certain amount of justifica- 
tion for Admiral King’s assessment, A postwar history of 
the Public Relations Office, Fourth Kavel District, 
Philadelphia, noted with considerable cander;: 

e.» « the wartime Strength estimated to have been 
necessary in July., 1941, hes never been required. This 
early set-up called for 29 officers, @ enlisted 
personnel and 15 civil sexvice clerical empleyecs~-2a 
tai of 52. The fact is that kae total compicment 
ory public relations officg/ has never exceeded 

Secretary Knox inmecdiately appreved Admiral King’s 
reconsendations and further directed a reduction in public 
relations personnel wherever poseible. in response, 
Captain Lovette infermed the naval district commendants, 
the chiefs of naval air functional training commenégs, and 
the commandants of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard that 
revised complements for their public relatiscnsa offices 
woulé be forthcoming. ^^ 

By September 1343, the entire public relations 
manning level for the Wavy had been redueead by 20 per cent. 
Priority was given to fulfilling requests for additional 
public relations officers for fleet commanders, but 
officers so ordared hac to be taken away from public 


relations offices in the United States. Even with this 


«t 

sre A‏ سه ریو راس وی سوه 
— ج سپ modo wmm a 4) oot‏ —— 
0اا or nen ln ee‏ 
PITE ween oiii -‏ 
لاف emi ee m‏ دعاسم ې 
8 الم موريس يض لاسب سم وې رز jaded‏ 
mo. save Ai Ad SENI‏ 
































| ia. a op — — arura y i 
— — | 
ow اننا 1 بكسن‎ 7 Chel | 
n سف‎ ۳ 
alae 


sk hanekê oe ویوا سي مسورن.‎ .٧ 
مس‎ an miai o OOOO سه مله مو ووس‎ 
— سښیبپچین‎ 

Comet ule levee be ١‏ اهنت سسسسر, ہہ 
تن بت سیف صروہ ٭ حوسہے راس بت 
اس سدق هد PET‏ — 
70 

۲ت یی سی ہیں نید ہے“ 

لت سس سنا سی edes‏ ےم په پب یر 
d‏ وہ > ee‏ 
sa a emm 9h] oe‏ 
ee‏ 
















177 
procedure, & request from the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, 
Europe, for four additional public relstions officers wes 
filled with only twe. °% 

The public relations personnel "squeeze" becane 
even more acute in Movember 1945, when the Secretary of tha 
Navy and the Chief of Havel Personnel in joint conferences 
Ordered the Director of Public Relations to "reduce to a 
minimum" the officar and enlisted personnel] atteched to the 
various public relations offices. Cowplying with this 
Girective, Captain Lovette recommended to district 
commendants that an inmediate survey be made of publie 
reletions personnel in their areas and that "only these 
officers Rud enlisted personnel who can be certified as 
being absolutoly necessary for Public Relations cuties he 


retained. S 


Despite th- emphagis on cutting personnel in the 
first half of 1943, the total strength of the Office of 
Public Relations increased from 135 im Oetober 1942 to 158 
وي‎ June 32, 19435, The additional personnel, however, ware 
civilians and WAVES, both officer and enlisted, There was 
& decrease of eight male officers and four male enlisted 
men in the office during this period. Throughout the 
remainder of 1943 and during the first four montha of 1944, 
the officer strength An GPR remained constant. fluctuating 
between sixty-two and sixty~four. 

There was a drastic reduction inp the number of 


[T 
— سه مد‎ Lem età 
ame aumuine aclini m. odhbé نها مین‎ 4 
اوعس سه‎ 
سس‎ ee ا‎ 
sis dm pasen adip ade AUT ammo manm cms am 
کو سز جات لل د وه سن .مد سر لواو ماش مو‎ 
ہي وله موی وې یه —-- سے‎ mee نض‎ dim 
41 se ہد ما سا ات سا سا‎ omm" 
یہ ووه‎ drer —— —⸗ 
ےو سم زويف موس له مضه ما روسیں‎ — 
توت تاه ند سیا س اسا قان سر مت‎ 
>» wim“ a me A Lee. AM MA, eA 
ا وسلهامه هنم و‎ e الور جسن مومسم‎ 
m. ف‎ «< 
مون نپ مول مدر اد دنس‎ ou 
be بعد موی‎ Ao Ammin aam cm فقاو ہہ ری‎ ees 
w em اى ورموس ہے‎ s — شم‎ 
— — —— 
aain un y naa ۱ — -r > 
— — — 
—— — وهي‎ 


EI J —Éià 






































9 


178 
officers in the field and fleat public relations offices 
during 1943, however. A January directory in that year 
listed the names of 274 officers attached to thirteen naval 
Gistrict, fifty-nine branch, thirty-eight sir command and 
two fieet public relations offices. By August 15, 1943, 
the number had decreased to 218 and to 165 by May 1, 

1944, °° The reduction was achieved primarily by the 
Closing ef twelve naval district branch offices in metro” 
politen centers. 

Compared to the War Department Bureau of Public 
Relations in mié-1943, the Navy's office in Washington did 
not seem to be over-staffed. An August 15th Army directory 
listed 129 officers in its Bureau of Public Relations, 


twice as many es in OPR--anj Ovor three tines 28 Many 
57 


Civilians, 306 to 76. 





7 یھ ا‎ 
The variety and magnitude of Office of Public 

Relations activities wora keynoted in sn annual report 
submitted by Captain Lovette to Secretary Knox, covering 
the fiscal year period from July 1, l942-June 30, 1943. ^? 
Some of the statiatical highlights were: 

(1) Issuance of 335 cowsuniques and 2.446 press 
releases. 

(2) Distribution of 178,520 still photographs. 

(3) Release of 40.500 feet of motion picture žile. 


i 5-5 
cem فو ېه — اوس غعنسم عد نه‎ 
کس — و دس سس‎ 
— a— ua em “⸗ ووو‎ ctn dh. فل وغه‎ 
oo 2 ee س‎ ambien موس‎ A غو ده‎ 
a مب‎ oUm ed um MA ee tee 
امام دي یس‎ — — — — 
ee m. smi Be Mrd opel sees e gaini 
د ېس ټون سملم سو سر رل‎ ln اجس ر‎ — 
mua anal AY AA ۳۵۹۵ o oes wie ويم ټری‎ ob دت‎ 
—— — — سی هت سپهها‎ x ol mem a 
. ند وڅ نو‎ peer xe cmm c OA. mme Mul enm 
وم مر موی‎ rend وو‎ Damm nn m qmm — 
ور مد جر‎ mee 






۱ 
9 tm 














172 

(4) Security review of 4,500 articles cubvitted by 
newspaper and magagine corresgondents; 2,012 raGio scripts; 
1,684 advertisements; 276 speeches; ami 102 books. 

(5) Supply of material and/or personnel for 1,571 radio 
progzems. 

(6) Preparation of 704 speeches for Navy officials and 
409 articles for magazine and other periodicals. 

(7) Answoring of 16,482 queries submitted by the news 
media an? general public. 

There were twelve sections in OPR in Jenuary 1943: 
administrative, press, racio, pictorial, motion píctures, 
naval districts, anelysis, magazine, Combat photography, 
special evants, review ang aviation. The last four had 
been added since June 1942 and xeprasented additional war- 
time services provided by the office. 

A new poat of Crecentiale Officer for war 
correspomdents was created in January 1943 under the Exece~ 
tive Assistant to the Director, Commander Beecher. 
Initially. Lieutenant D., C. Biythe, USNK, whe hed rejieved 
Lieutenant Cordon 29 head of the Administrative Section in 
the full of 1942. @seumed thís position, while Lieutenant 
P. G, Perker, URI, kecam the new Séministrative head. 
Blythe was relieved as Credentials Officer in April 1945 by 
Lieutenant Thomes Pinckney, USMK. 

During Fiscal Year 19423, 113 war correspondants 


Were Gccroedíted to the various fleete and see frontier 


















e 
اسان بسن‎ SAAT E. o سپ‎ 
سو‎ ⸗ 


simt Wr od ur —— 


4 

o aii kk u تاه‎ PTS t 
سارك قلت تونن دو با ې ناوسن.‎ QD 
———— eves Or SS lel 1 
réi زی انسسوس‎ OW db ہو جرنقو‎ refus m NE 
انندم نه فنع کسام رشا رمو‎ ELM meu 
Lua 


- ١ 


- ۸ ته اب هذ لمن معد ہے عم 

ہے 35 ۵ gene co‏ نا ګرم af) c-—‏ مسدب 
a— Ó.—À áe —‏ — 

spes ws ug umm ONES dvi" یئ‎ n تسای‎ 

——— —— :ستاب م نس ده 


دک Legg | WE RM‏ اش وږو اسي. Li‏ ز اوه وس 
CN‏ نج tno vel ut ae UN‏ ہے۔۔ 

dra‏ سر ه ینوکت تب سیر دی س 
— — — — 
ا s har‏ — 


LT ١ 
EI 

























E 





c-— —— COo—— 


139 


pondents were jim; eccrecitec at 





tha rate of seventeen per month.,  Approxaíseteiy i40 
authorizations per month were being issued co correspoudents 
foc visiting naval shore activities in the continental 
United Stetes. These Qutherinativons Gid net require the 
full security investigations necessary for wer cocreaponi- 
sat accreditation. 

Four personne] changes occurred in the Office of 
Public Reletiens in kerch 1943. Lieutenant Commander 
Edward M. testy, USM, replaced Lieutenant Commander Baggins 
as henû of the Nava) Dietrvicts Gection, with Huggins 
reporting to the U.S. Haval Operating Base, Bernuda, to 
head up a mew public relations office there; Licutenant 
Commancer Hareid B. fay, USHR. moved up as haad of the 
Review Saction, rsiieving Lieutenant Commander روا همه لها‎ 
Lieutenant Commander Waltec B. Neff, USNR, became the new 
head of the Avietion Section in place of Lieutenent Com” 
manger Winston; and Commander George W. Campbelli, UEN, 
relieved Lieutenant Commander Dill as the Assietant to the 
Director for Communiques. A month later, Commander 
Campbell's title waa changed from “Communigues Officer" to 
"Security Offices” with his eain function still being tha 
preperation of communiques. 

Lxcept for rotation of junior officers, there ware 
no additional personnel changes in CPR until October 1943, 
when Commander Deechar replaced Captain Derry as Deputy 


امه 
* — سس فص تہ دنہ om o Io‏ ہمد سر — ہے 
LLL‏ — —— 
آوچ سک فو واو nwa‏ 
1 تا موه نج سدس تسم uh‏ وس amai‏ 
ودن ab^ uii dis e‏ سر a mia:‏ 
°F ٦‏ نوم ورد حسُرسن ne‏ سوہ ماعنا یی 
انس دس فسپ۔ سسب و سا سر ee‏ سے 
ta mel UD‏ تفہ مس وسن mire?‏ سنہ سوووے 
صد 
سي دي د چم فلا > نت ات  ve— cow‏ ——-— 
Ap‏ کی مد صف ma! am cq nmn‏ ع ع 
اک موم وو T‏ ———— 
ee a neee‏ ...اه یل — 1 مس 
MEE‏ ویپتف دد جنب سجر م 
وسم وس r e‏ ند codec‏ —- 
| د در دو متس مر لس 
=h At) Am A pow -‏ 
=æ ' oM of edu ⏑ see‏ 
مه مه سدم مورد یت عدم ننس 


















































1831 
Director. Berry had been promoted to the rank ef captain 
in May and was anxious to return to sea duty. He became 
commanding officer of the UBS نی‎ after leaving CFR. 
Relieving Commander Beecher as Executive Assistant to the 
Director was Commander J. i. Collis, USN, who recentiy had 
been awarded the isgien of Merit for services as commander 
of a minesweeping division in the Pacific. 

The Naval Districts Section cf OFR was absorbed 
inte the Administrative Section in December 1943.  Lieuten- 
ant Commander Seay, who had headed the section, was now in 
charge of a branch of the Special Events Section calied 
“Organizational Contacts. - 

There were changes in tho Bureau of Kaval 
Persomnel's Public Relations Division in 1943 also. On 
April 16, at the request ef Captain Lovette, its name was 
changed to “Special Services Division” to avoid possibis 
gonfusion with the Office of Public Relations., Two weeke 
later, the first director of the division was transferred 
to other duty; and his executive officer, a reserve lieuten~ 
وه‎ commander who had been à public relations counselor in 
civili&n life, wes appointeóc acting director. On June 12, 
the division as such waa dissolved, with the acting 
Girector being named as Special Assistant for Public Rela- 
tions to the Assistant Chief of the bureau. This move was 
significant in that it representec sn awareness on the part 


Of the bureau that its public relations adviser should have 


4*4 

wie ase De abl es dd Peraecu maed —— mama 
۔ہ خوب ټک فص سے‎ hi marii w edes mew سڈ‎ que i 
ci» ed هی‎ wisuna mé Seed dame نی‎ 43:81 
وما ما‎ de و‎ CAAIAMD ون د‎ cadem aam rubea 
اس‎ s انك اسقصسم وهسوونلون از ن‎ 

7 اق Dda‏ ايب Cult deve —— te‏ 
ات اه ات کم تل TE a‏ ول 
mm men MB‏ — فا و د مہ یښ on ew‏ 
ea‏ 5 د مو«وسم بد دس mih ams il‏ میں رہ 

















w. armo amasi 
سس‎ jå sadi ndi dà eo mu sad" S وس‎ 
6 ہس‎ pini d دہ ھوھی۔‎ mima akir هوه تا‎ 


ممص سس dew Seem of MAy‏ 
اه ات ات دا ریو ره سر ی سس 
٥ه‏ ووی تو۲ حم بیو tt he De ae‏ 
غه — ع یکو و as‏ 
ین بس پیک محلب لاا موي ودس )د 
اک وق سو نس ومو سه کے مون 

ند 8 اسآ 
eddie‏ مہ ہے 
۹(« سس 


d 
























132 
direct access to the top level of command. So that he 
could concentrate full-time on the job of advising anc 
counseling, the Special Assistant for Public Relations also 
was relieved of msny of the borderline public relations 
tasks previously performed by the Public Relations Division 
~e~including the preparation end release of All Hanûs, which 


wes transferred to the bureau's Wel fere Division. 9? 





Poor handling by local public relations officers of 
an inspection trip by the Secretary of the Navy to the 
Twelfth and Thirteenth Naval Districts in July 1943 led to 
a recommendation for and subsequent establishment of a West 
Coust branch of the Office of Public Relations. 

Jack Hartley, head of the Radio Section cf GPR, who 
accompanied Secretary Knox on the trip, reported to Captain 
Lovette that no contact was made by local public relations 
officers in San Francisco with the secretary's party until 
twenty-two hours after their arrival. He added that 
contact then was made only after Frank Mason telephoned the 
Chief of Staff of the Twelfth Naval District and pointed 
Out that it was usual for the district public relations 
officer to meet the secretary on errival. discuss with his 
aide what was desired, prime him on questions that might 
arise at a press conference, and suggest to members of the 


press questions which might bring forth quotable comente 











ror 
ae sets om ہے دہ ہیں رہی:ز جو ومسعنت.‎ neon mS 
ہہ‎ bai d .کو‎ nett Ge ماشہ دست---وودہ تو >- سے‎ 
malio tiba دون مالس‎ ie qe ها ده‎ at 
anile? anitih SIDA say yt demi هي وچ عتسد2ل‎ 
nite هسو‎ IA e sani em Del emma td وزی نسنې‎ 
DÀ هو وې‎ wti ua A or سو خی هګ مه‎ 


۱ آ تت edi A‏ داحتا اس 
7 و مین Desal wd‏ وم ددج مس عنم ie‏ 
غه وتات git!‏ کن رلت مسد دد ا هور «As él‏ 
ban | ]‏ سا سن رمی es 3a‏ 
و کټ ۵ سه ho einen pede‏ ه et‏ 
کس بوس در چب ووو to‏ واه رموه 

"UN Y 1 2 BA , — — 
Dampo ve berayan pizt mpi oa moan, — t 
uyimi miq لے اوس‎ aime سه په — سے‎ | 
.سس«‎ aj 


v —“‏ ,- 
سے کے کا — یه کن mi‏ 


Ooo 
تا سم مسبت ریس‎ on bo See Be 
٢ نا 10 سب سر‎ e 


® ta g © « 


جو m an Em puc‏ بد 


6 — — = 











wu 
























183 

Hartley centanued in a caustic vein by sayin; that the 
press conference finally held was one of the poorest he had 
ever attended. “The Secretary had to ask each representa” 
tive of tha press his or her nave instead of being intr 
duced, “+ 

In Seattie, Secretary Knox attended a launching 
ceremony for a new Gestreyer. The district public rela- 
tions officer, said Hsertley, "did not appear at the 
launching and the Assistant PRO that Cid appear wasn't even 
able to supply tho name of the vessel being launched" 

Other factors contributed to the decision to set up 
a supervisory Vest Coast public relations office. One was 
the need which had existed for some time to expodite the 
clearance and release in that area of information which 
berdered on being classified. Previously. such news items 
had to be sent to Washington for approval, causing 
considerable delay. In general, there also was an increase 
in public relations activities on the West Coast et this 
time, "2 

On September 28, 1943, Commander Alfred J. Bolton, 
UBN (Retired). was named as the Assistant Director of 
Public Relations, West Coast, with additional duty as 
Motion Picture and Redio Liaison Officer. Mis office waz 
in Los Angeles, where he had been serving as liaison 
officer with the motion picture industry for the Eleventh 


Haval District since June 1, 1943, ané prior to that as 


sai 
ams Amo eigen qe مده‎ aident n MÀ Semanas e 
bad a نکر‎ bf De ore 404 Glad نودي‎ ôö— ⸗ —— 
نوس‎ ke — Pam cà adf scm نه‎ 0 
LO — 
gummi وسعب وس وږس د‎ ab AOR سے لم‎ 
tint »وس مهچمت جس عرویمر موصد هد‎ - ---- 
سورس ”تہ مه ووس پو نس‎ Bias 2004280 amnis 
ست مه نانیم ما تمہ و ر بسو ج‎ ⸗⸗⸗ 
تقلو ته زنب قفا مسا رعا تا مس اس دنس‎ 
e +a a ھر‎ a نت ——— سے‎ > 
کا تا تقاط شا باش له و سے نے ی ې‎ 
کف ن نتا دعس‎ Ped اله‎ E a 
ولب‎ er فلا‎ 
qh oe ازات سی‎ «co lom تس‎ gated توافتم مناه‎ 
بپ منت مه فت د بيك‎ Willd erase lee 
صه سے ایج > قور‎ tee 0-77 
مت صا لاف فت کے‎ 0:3 
am que saree dhiw jaod su o. فده ماه‎ 
سا لاست تاشت ف نت کته‎ 
wa sedis که ہکن نه‎ SUI مق سن‎ d 






























9 










194 
assistant district public reletions officer. 

A directive speliing out his supervisory reaponai- 
bilities was issued by Commander Lolton to all public 
rei&tions officors On the West Cosas? in October 1943, 9? 
Ali press meterial, including photographs, previously sent 
to Washington for security review, would now be submitted 
to him. Arrangements for radic pregrass ever national aad 
CSastal networks, and all contact with the motion picture 
industry wouldé be made through his office. And, whenever 
possible, his offics would assist publie relations officers 
with the handling of local visits by high Navy officials. 

Liaison With Motion Picture Im 
Bae همهم نقفعفصهفنسن‎ 
Shortly beforo the West Coast office was created. 





Lieutenant Alan Drown, head of the Notion Picture Section 
of OPR, made à liaison trip to Holiywood,. He reported that 
& majority of the motion picture studios "seemed to under- 
stand the Navy's problems end were anxious to be of 


assistance, ^*^ 


He wag diísturnzed to finé, however, that the 
Bureau of Yarde anû rocks hed arrenged with Warner Brothers 
to release B Soeabess short subject motion picture without 
consulting the Office of Public Relations. The Seabers 
also nad cooperated independently with Republic Pictures on 
the production, "Tho Fighting Sesbees,° authorizing casera 
Crews to visit Seabse Training Centerg without proper 


security clearances. In Lieutenaünt Brown's opinion, the 


TCI 
و اني وس مانس حفاصي‎ 
aa qood venen Addi وس هت دنو دہ‎ 
— — —— 
Ak ونب ودږ یم غه دوس عونمم عم ونوس‎ 
ü— — ووو‎ 
ui با‎ —— a ام‎ 
we ia m — '-—— À 
ولهرو‎ us dilim mao AN tmm Lom 
ار ااا ہ, سو‎ die) ult سب‎ E 
ma emisia ciis نا انشا‎ Fa ah tdi ape 
سم وو زیر‎ ipis سا دم ای مې ر موو ۶م‎ 
ی ططصنة مساح اسم نمی‎ 
حسیہ۔ معاقفے سد سس‎ e نان کاب‎ 0 ۷ 
امه سم‎ — A ⸗ 






























دو ت ری nin‏ مسب سم atin vm‏ 
eee eee nh ni bat A pm —‏ دیو boy dul‏ 
٩‏ مرج تسد بر دسا امن وم که ١ے‏ 4 
aE‏ دیس ې وس اسما سس 
—— 
| — — — 
e‏ ووو سم راب سب . 
/ وم عسوت 












185 
Bureau 02 Yards anc Docks had replaced the Bureau of 
Aeronautics as the "number one preblem chiló" in the area 
of independent arraéngements and releases. 

in September 1943, Warner Brothers was filming a 
technicolor short subject about PT boata entitied "Devil 
Boats." HSM also was shooting a short subject to be 
narrated by Peta Smith, concerning naval aviation end the 
safeguarcs the Navy employed. During the same month, two 
combat photography unit films covering the lending on Kiska 
and the landings at Salerno were rele&sed to newsreel 
companies, as was a special l6mm. film of the surrender of 
the italian Flest. 

The Motion Ficture Section of OFR alec made avail” 
able to the newsreels an official Navy film of the 
September 1943 Norfolk Maval &ir Station fire, in which 
twenty-eight persons were killed and 250 injured. The 
handling of the disaster by the Fifth Naval District Public 
Relations Office received praise from mexbers of tho news 
media in tho area. Information personne] were on the scene 
within threo minutes after the fire broke out. supplying 
eyewitness accounts &nd photographs and compiling the first 
casualty lists. The public relations office itesif was 
transformed into a workshop for press and radio represanta“ 
tives, and special telephone Lines ware installed to 


facilitate clearance and transmission of reports. 








Tm 
OC-——————— To سك‎ 
نكم مجودہ‎ ⏑ seómm^ s oce Eom 
ښپ‎ iem 
& Qaaelil ee — one LD med A — 
⸗⸗ 
€—————— Mu 
ai? be melde شا‎ pinion ijina sasi y عبط‎ 
سس‎ oo nefel ثہ‎ en nima دی‎ agnkAwel edd bee 
ie هوی يټم‎ aff Kt "A3 Q--— Lop +n ممروغمنوو‎ 
fem ہک تسنمہ‎ 
-jism w n O G uama arid رنہ‎ am : 
عن فسات سس فان ود سب‎ heme اغ بو ې‎ 
saine så اال خن‎ wA levem Alton وموم سن‎ 
e ینز مسا که وسور‎ mew سد یاج‎ 
غدوومنکك- س حه اندب هم دږ عموونلۍ اسن‎ wt? فاعم مه‎ 
ہہ‎ att be pirami g7 amd e herima asiro یہ‎ 
mma ⸗— ⸗ ف قله‎ 
gause ieo meo rI mia cain لس‎ 
asm bisai سنتله تلهم دم الد‎ afi hf 
os دە فرع ها نصا‎ netii mle ها‎ 


یت نت p‏ - 






























386 

Eleven films releases were mate by the Motion 
Picture Section in the early months of 1944. The most 
widely used of these covered the seizure of the Narsheil 
Isiands and the first raids on Saipan and Truk. The latter 
footage was taken with 6mm. gun cameras mounted in the 
wings of the striking carrier planes. 

Army subjects appearing in the newsreels during the 
Sene period cutnumbered Navy subjects about two to one. 
The continuing itelien caspaign, Army Air Force bombing of 
Germany, the bombing of the Casino Abbey and General 
Bacarthur's pereonal cecupation of the Admiralty Iseilands 
kept the Army films in the spotlight. The Navy obtained 
e€xcollent footage ef the Kwejalein ami Haxin Island 
landings, but Gelaya in transporting the files back to the 
United States detracted from their timeliness am! eventual 
use, 

At the request of the Commander, Amphibious Force, 
0,8. Atlantic Fleet, Commander Bolten approached MGM in 
early 1344 to encourage that studio to produce a feature 
motion picture about the amphibious ferces. MGN seened 
receptive and indiceted they would probably make the film, 

The Navy's amphibious arm wae not alone in seeking 
publicity for its activities at this stage of the war. ‘The 
Deputy Chief of Havel Operations for Air and the Assistent 
Secretary of the Navy fer Air asked the Director of Public 
Relations for assistance in furthering public understanding 


èd) 
شم :0 -2 ني" ده ہیں‎ a E 7557 
— edi dw mede ک سو‎ TT فغکه‎ 
عب سس‎ s OR di uie نی‎ ORE VE 
الک اسر اخ ښمو ت0 بلند له نس‎ ir اس شا‎ 
ہ سم لق ماق اس ہو ت2 مسا پ اس‎ 
سك واست.‎ (baje. wi to QAI 
ai elie dee فت‎ i oe, يی هده‎ qun نه‎ 
a اش لك نت اه اب سم‎ 
$e patted ee یکی نیس ہف‎ 4 
ال سے قشم سا تن‎ 0١ لتكت‎ etd’ cpu 
suem): vélsmiadó en» باس ۵۳ چت تات اسف مه‎ 
مس موه‎ ell عو الف کل الم و س مس ټی‎ 
تمد متس ہہ نس سور ما سر کر اس‎ 
توت مت نا تا له بس‎ ui RIEN 
تعاس سے کس‎ i 


— — 







































—— wal bo E سس حا‎ 
قسسصحم انت مةه سر نن‎ ٠ Da 
ofi j ain d ات 205 يلق‎ 

۷ RM 
— ہے ہ۔‎ 

سا لف هلتلق د اټ مخ الا مت س ى 

لم ee ee‏ ید سا دام 











187 
of the wartime role of maval aviation. In response to 
these requests, the Motion Picture Section arranged for 
Pathe photogrüphers to shoot a carrier "shakadown" cruise 
film for public veleanme. The film wee sade aboard the naw 
Hasp and released in April 1944 as part of ths Pathe series 
entitled "This ia America." 

in further cooperation with the Assistant Secretary 
fox Aix, Mc. Artemise Gates, plens were formulated in the 
spring © 1944 to interest a Holiywood motion picture 
studio to relesse à color film made by Reavy cameramen 
aboard the new Yorktown. S 

in March 1944, the Office of Strategic Services 
(088), in coordination with Supreme Keatquarters Aliled 
Expeditionary Force (SSAEF), developed plans to make à 
éocumentary motion picture covering Navy participation in 
the forthcoming landings in France., OBS affected a trang- 
fex of one of its officers in Londen, Lieutenant Commander 
John MoClain, UGWR, to the staff of Commender, U.S. Havel 
Forces, Europe, for the purpose of supervising the aes of 


67 When OHS 


Navy combat photography units in the project. 
director, General Villiam Donovan, informed Captain Lovettoe 
that he intended to substitute Commander John Ford for 
MeClain, the Navy Director of Public Relations immediately 
became concerned. Ford, the Hollywood movie director, had 
affronted the Nevy in the past by “pirating” some cf its 


photographers for other governmental utes.  Lovette'a 


mu 






và C ہمہ تع ت‎ aee PO aer aims sst ae 
لے کی مب ريدم بارحم ود‎ aM یدوسطف‎ con او‎ ۱ 
— "putem. quse o وم کسه مه سم‎ 
نو وی نع و ہس مر بی سور تس‎ a 
‘enat a نم‎ Dalik 

a margins ale aver manson deren غه‎ 
—— cm aaa aa aa ده‎ bA دض‎ 
wu subg mire imi i o mrmi ۶غه به‎ iu ip 
ene zu wı sim امیس د مدنت اللہ‎ b4 وسلو‎ 

یس کم مہ سے "ا 

ت سس مد کس هاس emi mnê apamit ip‏ 
نو ممم مونم سانا دوو ونو سو miiia‏ 
—“— لد سم e> a)‏ 48 —-- 
شو ٥ه‏ چې ۶ ابو انث لہ — —— 
شو نت or QUAD‏ ر Veen‏ پا سمه عړم tert‏ 
Qe‏ می غه وت دد سس 












اله 





















189 
assistant, Commander Collis, wrote to Lieutenant Commander 
Barry Bingham, VÆR, the public relations officer for the 
Wavy European comand, cautioning Rim te retain complete 
control over the Navy photeyraphers in the O55 project. 

"We frankly doubt.” Collie sald, “chat Leo MENGE 





would be content to remain in an 'alvisory' Capacity. 


ents OSCARA 





Zarly in 1943, the Office of Public Relations 
initiated a plan whereby correspondents could accompany 
Pacific Fleet ships during Operations on a rotating or 
"visiting" basia. Prior to this, only these permanently 
&ccredíted to the fieot were permitteóc to esbark daring 
operations. Commander Beecher wrote to Commander Waldo 
Drake in early danuary, “The favorsble reaction of Admiral 
Nimitz . . . and yourself to the proposal to assign six 
billets to visiting War Correspondents was indead 
gratifying. 499 

The first oi the billets were made avaiiable to 

Paat. Galliera enc other leading magazines. 
Commander Beecher estimated that about fifteen majazine 





writers had indicated they wished to take advantage of the 
new “visiting correspondents” plen. 

Mearwhile, Comaancer brake devxveased the number of 
هدیو وي‎ billets for the wire services to six apiece, 


reducing the other Asaociateé Press and United Press 





om 
یم روسمس مس‎ — — ۱ 
هم‎ 








TU — ی مول‎ oo | 
0۸۶ ات نس ری‎ e AJ gm ot rm ED 


ow‏ وووسوت۔-- ہے ےہ 
,ود ۵ئ ېوا ممصا سا اس dansa‏ 
امت ا د سن cartes thet ean‏ 
اللہ تد UR‏ وني سوہ و sy canas‏ 
mia aa “piai‏ ته at imm Qe A‏ 
e e‏ ورس dad èl jepi aa‏ نس وس 
— — 
تاوس ١م‏ مسان Sd eh dU Meet a" amet‏ سرون 
sab "> SCORE‏ ب تش وسین dds et‏ ہے 
له دپ كم 2م به یمس مو مسب 











1 وب مہ ت سب وو مو روس‎ n 

Conia 0-8 ۴‏ سا ime‏ اموس ماسر 
ere >‏ عون aunn meti a W‏ 

30 - وات ale’ av‏ فج وم س 
J‏ 





















si n ot مي میت‎ ee a ٢ 
ee a ہمہ سد‎ Wile! امت‎ va eA هوشو‎ 


mw "i 
d 









wv 


185 
correspondents in the Central Pacific to the statue of base 
correspondents. Strategic placement of the six seemed to 
defor: any iomedinte protests from the wire services over 
this limitation. 

Because Of the visiting correspondents plan, there 
wes leas room also to accommodate representatives of the 
foreign media. A request from Walter Farr of the Londen 
Bally Mail to return to the Pacific Fieet as @ permanent 
correspondent was held in abeyance because "if Farr is sent 
back out there it would be increasingly difficult to hold 
off the London Tima.” Ù? A plan to set definite limits on 
the numbers of ritish, Australian and New Zealand corre- 
Spondenta and te rotate them was considered. 

Admiral Nimitg hested about thirty correspondents 
for a luncheon at his quarters in January 1943 during a 
visit by Secretary Knox te Pear] Harber. The admiral also 
took time out from his busy schedule at this time to give a 
long “backgrounder” interview to Carleton Kent of the 
Chicago Tinga, who wes returning home from Australia. 

While the effert waa beiny made in i943 to expand 


71 


war correspongents’ coverage of the Pacific war, diffi- 
culties in transportation for the newamen were being 
encountered. Commander Drake wrote to Comuander Beecher in 
September, complaining that three correspondents had to 
arrange their own transportation from the Wast Coast, 
"arriving here yesterday in a slow boat . . . for which 


- سیا 

| — — پک ع 
ea cad) De med, ca adm —‏ سے: یی 
pen sciens ii —— m 05‏ 


— تمده جو‎ «i e © 2 


NN‏ س تا هسسیم ke Geology‏ سم 
وت A aA‏ سوسہ ہمہ سرسد وون به وی سے 
افطل سر cent lhl at ed amber of‏ د سم 
ew Cum fnt An ou‏ ا cm m‏ مې wet be”‏ )په ہے ہے 
ug CUM‏ سوہ P Qamdsemenmel si Aibo AR‏ وښو ویر ده سب 
٤ "٢" — ——‏ ولسم ود یوو ین می 














ce سي دس‎ caedes pma on wet quema wi didit 
e oriy a mel مو وسو ور غول‎ nin cmt a — 
سنه کک بی ید وھ‎ uua. 

ثآ هدو ني ټی دی مس کے وښ ټوب نی ! 

اا ان سب ېمس 
MAREA ame ES‏ 
4 | د ۰۰۰ mé‏ ۍم پس په 
ووو مع ہے — اہ تہ سم وور 

DUI DM 1 ÉÉS 4 "m 

























199 


passage they ech hat te pay 5119. * 


Drake requested that 
the Office of Public Relations write a letter to the 
Coumandan:, Twelfth Kaval District, reminding him that 
&ccrecited corraesponcente traveling under orders r&áteó the 
Sane transportation facilities as naval officers. 

Drake also referred in his letter to an incident in 
which ^ correspondent had his accreditation reacinded 
because of “vitriolic criticism ef the high comman’ .. . 
together with tone of his copy."  1he commanding officer of 
the hip ín which the newawan was embarked maxie a speciel 
trip to Pearl Harbor to urge that he not be given further 
Havy credentials. According to Drake, the commander 
involved was as officer *of excalient judgment and in full 
Sympathy with the press." 


tion With OWL 
Guring 1943, the tide of battle continued to tura 





dramatically in favor of the Allies. On February 9 , 
organized Japanese rasistence on Guadalcanal ended. 
bringing to & guccessful conclusion the initial ۰ 
offensivo ;9ve in the war. On Hey 13, enemy resistance in 
borth Africa came to @ close; and om June 30, Marine and 
Army troops were landed on Rendeva and other islands in the 
Now Georgia area, Solomon Islands. On July 19, Sicily was 
invaded, followed by landings on the italien mainland in 
early September. The Japanese had completely evacuated the 






















ub ei ll‏ ناس چې مسب بس يحمت À aas‏ مسالط 
Dura ai‏ فغغست دی em‏ وم ہے s o-à «dp ub gas‏ 
ن یا حیسم زی اوسن Xam‏ £4 .دا 
piriana‏ نه — 

= سا پ 

IER ناو سمس ذه یف‎ AS 
Wues e» karika Menn y mip = .) ۵ pud 
$ y m TD سہ سی‎ Ram له‎ 
یعاس‎ uerius mt 

Ju 1845414 موس نیا مس منہ یہ‎ 4 44 pe 

m anc‏ حسم لے شه D gem um ium‏ وو دید وہ موم نم 
له 4 ها — — — — 
ج دز u yuy yae be cninn, a H aL‏ نه 
e un 2 36, DUM — m‏ 
سه انرسيو i yy‏ جوندايه — 


روس یسر ووو — 








5 — E | 
| ۱ 





- = = 


ME ^ 


191 
Aleutians by July 257 enê on Movenber 20, naval, Marine and 
Army forces landed on Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert 
Islands. ^ 

Media interest ín the 19423 offensive operationa was 
extremely high, resulting in a contincation by the preas of 
the earlier complaints shout military hanéling of war news. 

In May 1943, E. Palmer Hoyt, former editor of the 
Portland Oregonian: replaced Gardner Cowles as head of 
GNI's Domestic Branch. Hoyt was a firm believer in the 
Yight anü capability of the press to inferm the public 
shout the war; and from the moment of his appointment, OWT 
began to take a stronger stand in sapporting the accusa- 
tions leveleé against the ailitery by the news media. ^4 

in August 1943, Nicholas Roosevelt resigned from 
his post as OWI'5 liaison offiser with the Army and Navy. 
With & note of bitterness, he wrote ín his letter oi 
resignation to Eimer Davis that "so long as the relations 
OZ the OWI with the War anc Mavy Departments rest solely on 
the basis of petition and suggestion . . . Only you . و اه‎ 
can Go anything further to improve the public relations 
policies of the Army and Nevy. * 

Devia accepted the challenge from his former 
liaison officer. He once again approached President 
Roosevelt concerning OWI's problems with the armeé services. 
às à result, the President, on September 1, 19423, sent 


letters to beth service secretaries, directing them to 







— " 

as wow bes ——— ہج‎ e دې‎ | ١ 
rums ot) wh neat eee مهم وس‎ N FR 
207 8 


اک اه ویب ږ. wae Ol an‏ مهم سے 











ونا کات في تنج که نارس إن مر 
اوت نا سس ed‏ سد یس 
S‏ مى) سم وی رس خسویا مد لم w eee‏ 
p‏ کس 9ب وښ و ا ووا att‏ میب 





V nen amni dor ul uU n undae Abreu تسه‎ 
ہسو ہے‎ a mph a ۳ 
سم‎ e اعون عدت إل سے‎ cada! a a e نل‎ 
fo verde سر نو در‎ uj anil Û oo o سب‎ 
ونورا‎ ahi Ge رمس‎ uy” و‎ eben! ه۵ لف‎ 0 

و نح م tm ans ano‏ میا سي پو ېسا مې یې 
17 يي SES‏ 7 — 








192 
coordinate nore closely the release cf military war 
informetion with OWI. Tho President's letter to the 
Secretary of the Navy is quoted in parts 


The intensification of the war has increased the 
necessity of a fuller public understanding of the 
progress of military affaira. Closer relationships 
between the Navy Depertawnt and the Office of War 
Information are therefore highly desirable. ... f 
should lixe to request you to put the following 
instructions into effect in your Departmenti 

i. Whenever the Director of War information 
Geterminea that the public interest will be served by 
the release of information (including motion pictures 
and photographs) in the possession of the Navy Depart- 
ment, such informetion shall be released by the Navy 
Department at such time and in such form as the 
Director shell determine. 

2. Where objection is sale by the Navy Department 
to the release of information on the ground that such 
release may prejudice the security of neva] operations, 
the Director and the Secretary of the Wavy shall 
attempt te arzive at a satisfactory solution, giving 
due consideration to the interests of public Gig” 
closure on the one hand and of military security on the 
Other. If an agreement cannot be reached by discus 
sion, the natter shall be laid before me at once. 

3. All news releases an! statements concerned with 
materi&l other than naval action, prepared fer issuance 
in Washington by the Navy Department, shall be cleared 
pefore issuance with the Mews Bureau of the Office of 
Wax Information. ews role&ses, communiques sni 
statements concerned with naval action. prepared for 
issuance in Washington, shall be cleared be fore 
issuance with the Director. 

4, in the event ef disagreement as to the form or 
phraseclogy of a news releaec, communique or statement 
prepared fer issuance by the Kavy Department, the 
decision of the Director shall be binding on the 
Department, 

5. The Director shall have access to 4 
restricted arê confidential {but mot secret) motion 
pictures, photographs, amd information ín the avy 

tment wis naver such access ig necessary in connec- 
tion with any staty being conducted by the Office of 
War Information. 76 





0 نتسووموک سکھ تس کو دس nee‏ وا in‏ عدي 
سا © سوه + ره 





193 

Secretary Knox immediately sent = letter to Captain 
Lavetta, with copies to Admirals King and Horne and the 
Conmandants of the Coast Guard ami Marine Corps, quoting 
almost verbatim the contents of the President's letter. 

In early October 1943, President Roosovalt stated 
at 8 press conference that more war news would be given out 
in Washington. At about the same time, the Navy announced 
thet an attack was underway against the Mercus Islands. 
This represented an important departure from previews Navy 
news policy of disclosing @n action only efter it was 
completed. Another change in militery information policy 
was the release for the first time in the wer of official 
photographs showing American casualties. 

While Davis did net have to refer eny decisions to 
the President, he reperted that the services were still 
5 1 in ceoperating with OWI, and in many ceases failed to 
obeerve the directive to clear through him materials other 


than military operations. 


On September 15, 1943. Prime Minister Churchill 





made وی‎ apecch befora the British House of Comsens, in which 
he revealed seme good news 2bout the war which hai been 
withheld from publication in the American press on the 
grounds of security. He announced tke following information 
which, from the Navy standpoint, Admiral King in particular 








سا 

—— یاه یس فان مس » لو نې و دن دعم 
thiis a abeo Dio -‏ دا سه ېټ ca; ed‏ 
و ۱۵۵۳ ودی ۳2۷۳۵ ۷ ural ‘Art all‏ 

SKI eem ed vr REO‏ ۴بدنښه! heraa‏ نس 
s ed‏ ساب وف جسر ہو سے ہے مہ سید په ریس سه 
غه ضرم شه غي uo fé Fem‏ رولس ال اس صر 
oird od aas‏ مہ لسم ۸۳۵۹ ۱ اسا ااننحام. 
یه ——— wert cem maet‏ وام شی 
aw Si Eo even‏ 
ولنمد mii bima qlila p u AA‏ 
مب کو فیٹمممز نما حا وم we atn ad it‏ ور روان 

"٢‏ عوآئد A‏ مها یس ت د س اون په 
غه اسم لت ماد رم Game nines mi‏ ویزرر 
سه ته سب سغې سی ود سه ام ې سم ar Waah‏ 
سی وو “ — سدس 

















194 
had bean highiy desirous of keeping secrets 

Ho mexcchant vessel hei been sunk by enemy action in 

the North Atlantic in four months; fewor ships were 
lost by the Allies in August then in any month since 
the U.S. entered the war, and in the firet two weeks of 
September not one United Nationa ship was sunki by Axis 
submarines anywhere .75 

Churchiil further reveeled that the “massive ship~ 
building pxogram of the U.S. had fulfilled all that had 
been hoped for and more, and the nət gain of new building 
Over losses since tho beginning of the year exceeded 
6 million tons." 

The American prees reacted strongly ond immediately 
to the revelations of the British Prime Minister, Criti- 
cism was directod at the President, OWI, and the public 
relations offices of tha Arwy and Bavy. ^" Raymond P. 


Brandt of the St, Louis atch suggeated that the 





President appoint “aggressive civilians, preferably news” 
papermen, 8s assistant secretaries of War enc Navy, to 
handle public relations, ...”" Roscoe Drummond of tha 

k stated that Elmer Davis was "too 
frequentiy vetoed by the Army end Havy on thin grounds of 





military eacurity." ie recommended the application of 
Strong pressure on Washington “to make gure that over- 
cautious arguments of military secerity shall sot perpetu- 
aliy defest the cause of acdequetely informed public 
opinion. " 

Ore immediate result of the Churchill discloguras 





ہے em e nia rua‏ 
dám)‏ نه د بما ماحانله rm ida‏ بپ 
— میسن تد سر سي سه ad)‏ ها و ود سے سا ناسر 
ووس ram 1 O ml peê eo «mca exten]‏ وس 
دز وعم اميسل 

په لیر وت وت سم ما سن 
ده نش کاو ) عضو maisa mb be‏ "نس سز حا 
e‏ ب نی وب په نش سه 

۱ ای نسحم سه سمل" Jb beue‏ 
ومو ما مس مر مس رامد اہ مد به 
اوھ (nime‏ خپوسول جن الم perry‏ س۔ 
ou — — 2ö darane, u mea‏ 
سن وران رنسی. acm ١ .  .‏ سس وب مور 
دنل نمه انما معسیيا د دس من oes c‏ 
ve yd em ire e‏ هن د لس وی وشل چوس و۱ 
و 6 oot egg?‏ انسنہ ہ 

— mun cm qiia d" ampia 
— — f 

















| 
۱ 














19s 
was a plemmed joint monthiy commanique by the President anil 


85 The texte of 


the Prima Minister on submarine operations. 
theee announcements were tu be discussed in advance with 
BAmericen and British naval officials. eas well as with OWI 
and the British Ministry of Information. However, Davis 
reported that “these communiquas were Baldor very coumuni-~ 
ative,” because the President and Prime Minister too often 
supported the security decisions of their respective naval 
officiais.°* 

Meanwhile, the sttacka by the press on military 
public relations policies continued. Draw Pearson even 
charged that naval intelligenee officers "shadowec" hia 
heme after he revealed in a story certain naval losses 


Sugtained in & Guscalcansl sea engagement, 9? 


FR BY BOT 
obtained the information from the testimony of © vice 
admiral before the House Saval Affairs Committee. 

The Newspaper Adwisory Committee ta OWE issued a 
statement on September 30, 1943, to the effect that the 
Meerícan people were not being fully informed about the war. 
The Comaittee stated: 

The reeponsibility for this cannet be attributed 
altogether to the OWI ner to public relations officers 
of the armed services, nor to the establisheó sedia of 
communication. It stems from the disinclination on the 
part of some high naval and military euthərities to 
evaluate yat is information to which the public is 
entitled. 

Elmer Devis himself et this time joined in the 

attack on the military. In & speech in New York City in 


2 


E 





بو 
idi ag r‏ — 
هش هس ولیب سر ہہ نہ مسوم ۱ ۱ em‏ 
ea‏ میسن مت بر ف زاب مسر Û‏ وون 
سم سم وسم چو موصسهم مر عون ہف دی وي 
a —— 4 ۱‏ 
اوویسسا ”اہ سرت نت amis yie siid‏ 
«ea mov —— —— — N‏ 
وو sraa r 2? Fk ma Omê GE aE‏ 
M‏ 
۲ھ سه م os saset sd? qi e‏ ادیب 
&id 'o-—." ۳۵۷ 0 ۵ sema sanr berasid‏ 
û A ae o‏ 0 ېښ 
سیس۸سب رل nameg ba Lina‏ سد 
سس وت c- o» "4 cend deser sd‏ 
مس ات جات انس mianga a‏ ار ہے 
S‏ ھءۃءۃ ae e‏ شم وام habmüi TEM a‏ » 
سم سپو٢یښمه‏ ام همر بر mE)‏ مس رس be)‏ 
فووسم یسو سم مر ام ري اى اسا نس رف ۔ 


E i 
عست‎ — 


— 
a Sia ee 
3 وتنا وس‎ 
m si aiot us oin an Linn don ٢ 
ad Ws beet cat اس >1 مسا تو‎ ۵ 




































196 
late October 1943. he sal€ that official reporting of 
events “had been worat* in the Solosens and the Aleutians, 
beth of which were “under the control of the Navy, not orly 
as te giving out news to correspondents bur also as to 
cansorcing dispatches, „84 


As criticism of military information policies 





reached its pinnacie in October 1943, Eitex_ 
peported that the Navy was relaxing "its tight grip on the 


85 he publication cited as evidence an &nnouncauent 


TWE» 
identifying the VOS gutb Dakota as ths “fasous battleship” 
which shot down a great number of enemy planes during a 
depanese air raid in 1942. The mawe of the battleship has 
been withheld fer more than a year, The Navy also released 
for the first time details surrounding the sinking of the 
ARCU. 

in December 1943, Admiral Híritz announced a change 
in Wavy censorship policy concerning the use of namea in 
press copy and newe colonses Shout the Pacific wer. In the 
past the names of navai personnel included in correspopncents' 
stories were deleted by censors "unless they had been 
previously mentioned in a Washington communique reporting 
the action. ہی‎ Aa a result, many stories of personal 
bravery were related enonymously, leading te poor morale on 
the part of Wavy men whe noticed that men in the other 
services were "getting high praises, while their work 
received very little public notice." This viewpoint was 


5 

ear 
ae ee ee 
c. æ oie ate (o lacum N tee” = فا ده دوم‎ 


سسدا e‏ ادا e e‏ صت وہتعری 
ومد wi, a‏ نه سل متا لاو سور وني 
anair as ques ahi AM ۵‏ ۴ ولیک وو مر ہس 
n m‏ نفد ودن ١7 AS wer le‏ لابه دده as‏ سس ہیں 
فقسد وپ بب: سم سه ونودو وو ہے -pifad eset‏ 
è ü— —— ⸗⸗— n‏ 
ee‏ بت ee‏ انا کی سم oa Gawler a‏ 
کت ibe‏ وس سد نو vR ag h‏ ای ااه 
Yo Siida M Simeri bHan cie ads an‏ يې 
wA‏ 0^ 

crier Dabasi omnes 7‏ فوووممن د ü—‏ 
e e‏ ا ا کا ت پا ی al‏ 
اس3 ت سات چ عام 
ado UN‏ سن prese Ve‏ په سر zi Ca] cmd‏ 0000# 
( 00 ییا ې یک ریت مب سد ہے 

























pirena rpt b ni em ar‏ دیس نس 
ook mu i‏ ع > ووس ووم هي mady ti‏ 
se ej iag e ۷‏ پس = 


۱ 2 — 
amie ei e) amm Mdb قفہ تسا‎  :+ سه یس ده‎ 

⸗ متا سم سے جو Fees‏ 
سه اوس وسرت مك سرت »سییر ټی 










EI 
= 


197 
reported by Foster Bailey., a Bew York fisas correspondent 
in the Pacific, who claimed that many of his stories wera 
Gelayed up to eight months in some cases because the Davy 
“saw no renacn for expediting them.“ Hailey added, "It's 
the fightingest Navy in the world. But it doesn’t know 
public xelations." 





As tha Central Pacifico Force. under Vice Admiral 
Raymond A, Spruance, poised to begin the massive amphibious 
thrusts designed to place U.S. treepa on Japan‘a coorstep, 
there was evidence of a significant change in Navy public 
welations policy in the Vacific. On the eve of the Tarawa 
invasicn, Admiral Nimits released to the media at Pearl 
Harbor the text of a directive he sent to all Pacific Fleet 
and Raval Shore Activities in the Pacific: 


Projective cifanaive Operations in the Pacific 
proviése opportunity to present te the American people 
and to our &llies throughout the world the accom] ish~ 
ments and needle of our fighting forces. It is to the 
kene fit of the Acmy, the Navy and our Country that we 
Gevelop thia opportunity to the utmost. 

Fleet, force and unit commanders are directed to 
provide al}. practicable cooperation, including informa~ 
tion and physical facilities, consistent with security 
and operations, to aceredited representatives of the 
press and of the naval and military forces assigned to 
eoverage of the Pacific campasign.*: 





At Tarawa, a new amphibious flagship. the AGC, 
equipped to handle the myriad communications needs of a 
landing operation, was introduced into the fleet. The AGC 
permitted a major step forward in reporting che news. 








ta) 
Dir دت ۴م ناس‎ ' QRALIAmSS ae وو سن‎ 
ee ٭مینٹی سے ےجمنعود‎ ainai 
سم‎ 4) c-— amen - مسب ب‎ "màs حم‎ qe opaha 
اتود ۰ مہ حر‎ ee 
سس«‎ >" 
Cae tony aito 
۱ افص‎ onl) ۳۵ Sep ۹ Ote di پ‎ 
-———— dn «û acer 
سے‎ ag سم م‎ ta act, لوک ه‎ V. 
گا ھا فی شوہ سم مين وب بس‎ 
ها سم ویب پاټ‎ ely لای هوی مس اسر ۵ء‎ 
penam um مسن‎ «i» or Debes .ادا ایسا‎ 
—————— LLL ۵ن کل‎ 
biui owdi Da 

















E 





i98 
Previously, press copy nad to be sent Ly mall to Pacific 
Fleet headquarters cr other authorized commands for 
censorship and onward transmission. Rear Admiral R, X, 
Turner, the amphibious commander at Tarawa and Makin, was 
the first Navy commander in the war to allow press copy to 
be filed "literally from the benBch-hesc" through the radio 
facilities of his flagship. o 

This "play-by-play" report of the Tarawa invasion 
received high praise from Palmer Hoyt, whe resigned from 
his post as OWI domestic director at the end of 1943. In ۵ 
farewell speech, Hoyt complimented Admiral Nimite and the 
Navy., the Marine Corps and Coast Guard for arranging the 
fast sccounts of the battle, which in his view was "the 
greatest job ef coverage in the hiatery of wer fare, "7? 
Dezgpite the great distances invelved--Tereawa wes 5,000 
miles from the U.S. West Coast and over 2,090 miles from 
the nearest telegraph--news stories of the battle were on 
editors’ desks in twanty-four hours an& still photographs 
within forty-eight. 

Although Tarewr marked @ breekthrough in Mavy radio 
transmission of news copy, the practice was not to becom 
etanéard for many months. As laste ae June 1944, Admiral 
GSpruence imposed complete radio silence during the Battle 
Of tho Philippine Sos (see nots 33). 

Full publicity for the amphinicus forces also was 
Slow in coming. The Office of Public Relations issued a 






پس سي wi ny MAE‏ مک pt‏ مس سم جزلا 
e e‏ ماقا ee ee‏ 


> J tee يعن‎ —— 5 
m» si nk cios لکت تت ده(‎ 


— ردي ټسټ سو په 








= بويد‎ titi ate 
admo ear e? we Sewer umani eur - 
‘= diki reise ور رس‎ eee ran pO e e ee 
سب دم دوم سم سسم هنم وای مید حلت‎ 
— — — — 
لیے‎ mii د مف السا‎ e e e e n ات‎ 
VÀ. ann me اووس وز‎ ed? à cum Do div, 
015. P ee tne Lewes Rari mem md. 
ae eee ee قا‎ 
اورت سي مه‎ tee میت‎ ee taal ف‎ 
— Lit pt dee سور‎ ayes يساق ند‎ ee 
اف ا‎ 
بسن‎ qed ni مې تایه‎ delete "٢" 
— à aae نتس مر به مسان سو‎ 
الك هى امد غسټی‎ UA دب‎ vem ویر‎ nimm 
سم سرسب سب مب سرد سی‎ ١ 
VN ال رت حا بت اسا گا‎ 
وه يم شه بات ماعن‎ J— 
































ووړ 
national news releese concerning the training of these‏ 
forces in dune 1943. Kowevar, throughout the sumer and‏ 
fall, vestrictions were placed on release of information‏ 
about anphibious activities. No local publicity of any‏ 
kind waa authorized, and all material and photographs nad‏ 
to be cleared through the Director of Fublic Relations.‏ 

In December 1943, it wae concluded thet a publicity 
campaign was necessary for speeding the production of 
landing cxaft, so vitally needed for both the continuing 
Pacific auphibious operations and the forthcoming invasion 
of France. Accordingly, a statement wy Under Secretary 
Forrestal, directed primarily at shipyard worxers, was 
given wide dissemination throughout the naval ومد واه‎ ° 

On January 31, 1944. Marine and Army troops were 
landed on Kwajalein ami Majuro Atolls in the Merghaill 
Islands. This was followed by the seizure of Eniwetok 
island a few weeks Luter. 

While the "island-hopplng" in the Pacific continued, 
an attempt was mace by Admiral Harold ہے‎ Stack, Commander 
of U.S. Havel Forces in Europe, to enhance the coverage in 
the British press of the Mavy's Pacific war rele. ie wrote 
to Secretary Knox in March 1944, requesting that à naval 
expert on tha Pacific war be assigned to his staff. 
Specifically, he asked for Captain K. M. bcNanes, who 
handied U.S. Navy news at the weekiy Ministry of Information 
press conferences in 1942. 


— ۱» لص شتو‎ re ARA 
— — — — — Ans san AL iis 
— dS bd abeAl Wa mA LG Dew 
p= وا‎ Ilan lao) غه‎ MANE 
wi سیا ې مومسم ہد ۱۲ مسووما مس وم هو‎ 
وما مسم په مسوم ہب ہسدء سسسہ۔‎ ed MÀ 
سب تت سس سس«‎ 
سوب "یب‎ "wu e 
—— — — ہیسوہ ہی‎ r om جوم‎ ld 
نک نسر‎ — —— —s——⸗ 
— — SE. 
ae come heute a ridi baid, daara 
' واو‎ Let شه‎ haven) sh) RARE e RG 
nee) ret ee arte 4) ال‎ Ge په‎ 
iiam مد سرود ود ووی کد وله‎ me ينما‎ 
سدم‎ ta راس‎ a y OLP ولس صا سب‎ 

































— — ur e baniak 
An به‎ Poet ده ہے‎ egy ٭ت‎ wid مسا‎ 


رقی ون رس پښت نب · — — — 
اا v u — — — (BF DE‏ !^ 
کر ال غه بد راہ acoge‏ صاب vem‏ دوه مم سیب 
ERE‏ سس ابرح سد موسج ب ء مب 

um sid oy ingest ا‎ | 














— سله لح ہی‎ s 
——— 
سس سە‎ 2 s sms a 


The <۵ چب‎ imoreve coverage of the Pacific 
conflict was recognize? om a very high polley level in 
London, It was felt that more complete coverege prior toe 
the Normandy invasion would seem sorme! to the British 
public, whereas an effort in that direction later might 
appear too obvious a davice to stimulate Anglo enthutisen 
for fuller participation im the Pacific war. OWI had been 
working for some time om s proposal fer 3 special Pocific 
press conference to be held weekly in London, and V.S., Army 
amë Australian officers already het been nominated as 
epekeemen. In urging Captain Lovette to push for guick 
setion on Admiral Stark's request, Lieutenant Comaander 
Binghan wrote, “A Pacific conference without the U,S. Navy 


would be like ‘Hamliet‘ without the Prince of Denmark, 491 





Although Admiral King had approved the relaxation 
of news restrictions in the Pacific, 59 laste 56 October 
1943 ha was still holding to his proviously rigid position 
with regaró to submarine publicity. Be wrote to Secretary 
Knox: 


« « « because of the far-reaching and harmful results 
of any incorrect decision we might make as te the 

publication of infgoruation having to do with the epera" 
Tons ef our submnBrines, the matter has been under 
careful serutiny for some time. 

While I am edwerse to any step that might result in 
deprivation te the public of any information we might 
properly give them. f feel] thet in this instance none 
of us is able to state categorically the amount of “aid 
and comfort” to the enemy that might result from same 









سم tere. CMON fees SI" © oy Gage‏ ره 
ې ams ton amm FL‏ بې e Tia For OT‏ 
مس D‏ ادن ومجریٰ ہس ot) ee tee‏ ۷ ۸ ۳ 
| مو combs‏ نے Ps send snaiprid cals‏ 
máu 454 |‏ د یسال ېي ورااس اص cA— Bü‏ 
0 مې )دص اسلنۍ چی. غه ae Get‏ 
ودس اس diemong a ms mi‏ ہچ د nit Lise‏ 
سل سل مسل لل پس دد ۱-۷ سا 
٦۹۵۰ am‏ ممم U‏ ع perm Mal‏ ان ہے و 
کم le e VITO) AOS pas‏ ہی diba‏ 
هنم og NAO‏ اندو مهدح — 
ومک ٣‏ ۹ہ یر cun eim‏ جب ہے تس rah GA‏ 
سا س Comes and)‏ مور ےہ رہہ وہ nm‏ 
ات شت هوی تا تعس ee‏ 
prre sd‏ 
ما سی تلضف قد ہے دصي ع ديس مم سے 
























201 


amail pieca ef apparantly innocuous information. I am 
reluctantly constrained, therafore, to recommend to you 
that until Japan has capitulated, no book or article 
Gealing vig» Our submarine comoBt operations bs 
pubiishned.?2 


Knox'a reply was emphetio and sércastic in tone. 

It expressec vividly his bitter frustration through two 
years of war over whet he considered te be an over-zealous 
application by King of the security argument in the release 
of information. “I have just read your memorandum dealing 
with the publication of books on submarine operationg . .. 
and must gay that I em ast at ail impressed, "7? he toló the 
admiral. “The effect ... is to argue thet nothing at ali 
be printed about submarine activities until the war is over, 
anê the justification of this position is ‘security.*”° The 
secretary Claimed that the sane position could be taken 
Shout Sireraft carriers, since “the tactics of the opera~ 
tien from air is y, exactly as Oifficult as sttacx under 
the water.” le continued: 

Fron the point of view of a man who only sees 
security invoived, it would be infinitely wiger to not 
print any news st all until the war is over, end this 
type of man constitutes the majority in the Navy, but 
this simply cannot be dons. 

Unfortunately the war ie not being fought by the 
Navy alons and the Navy is utterly dependent for both 
personnel and material upon the public. The public, 
properly and naturally, want to know everything that 
can be told them about the progress of the war. To say 
that nothing can be told then abeut sulearine opera- 
tions because that would ke giving away secrets to the 
enemy ig tantamount to say that we cen tell them 


nothing about destroyers, Or Cruisers, or battleships. 
« » o That is preposterous on its face. 








Shna am pams mR 00‏ یھ 
۸4 —· ےویم ہے — — 
Po ad‏ سو موی مس غه مكحي يي شت cm‏ قر مس یز 
وه و be ald‏ سی پس لہ ج — 
owed 5°‏ _ اع wore bee‏ پښی ورضهی نصاف/| 
وره وه —— —— ه 
سم eh feum‏ عمسم اعم سم عر ديم ریسا“ لى ټول د 
rp di pha a oa os .-‏ 
کم aane aee tamna Gaming‏ سے ai)‏ هت غه مس 
هط له yaa 14 O A ۸ me a,‏ بہ 
eats Geese ۲۷۹‏ سب مم AO‏ روف سس oa)‏ 
so" -+- . 07‏ مت نس عو “suo iiy‏ 
ai, ar AN i add‏ مسجو مه ا و ريست — 





















202 

Knox accused King of returning to the sane type of 
opposition te publicity that the admiral evinced early in 
the war. The secretary reiterated that he, personally, had 
taken over the conduct of Navy public relations in October 
1942 to "prevent a rapidly growing public casentweat.” He 
added that there had been 8 definite improvement in both 
the apeec and coumprehensiveness of avy news im the past 
year, amd pointedly stated, "I propose to waintain complete 
control of this particular part of Navy activities,” 

Knox ended his memorandwn with the following 
caustic admonition to King to keep out of the publicity 
business anc confine himself tc mattere of lecitinate 
security reviow: 


XA observed ín a memorandum I received from you a 
disposition tO put someone in the Cowkat Intelligence 
into some position of authority over publicity. I wish 
this order to be promptly cancelled. I want no further 
interference with Public Relations seve only that 
defined ir a recent memoranmium te you which provided 
that a member of the Public Relations staff would be 
named by you to represent the Commander in Chief's 
offico. He was to pass upon ail questions of security 
involved. In caga the decision involved questions 
which he did not feel competent to pass upon, he was to 
refer these questions either to you or your Chief of 
Staff. I want this condition continued without elabor- 
ation, and certaínly I want no changes made, in the way 
of creation of now authority over publicity, without my 
approval. To put the matter bluntly and briefiy--i know 
I have the authority and I know I have the experience 
to handle. without assistance, the question of Public 
Relations of the Navy. I propose to assure that 
responsibility and exercise that authority with the 
sole provision that questions of security will he dealt 
with oy your representative in the sanner I have 
descxibed. 





م 


ہے 
سب سم مس د هم بویا 
pra bu‏ * 

kk i A‏ ق „imbs ıê‏ سا 
eos saj‏ نہ مسل *a‏ ادن وسناه ود ادهلسی mów al‏ 








الله پښ o‏ وش وم r“ ae‏ 






نه هود ښک cendi ls‏ د اول ایےیسسے ہہ 
ه و د موسی من دا سے سس a âl‏ قد 
IUE 08. 1 e‏ 
ناما اة چت و io‏ م سوير كنت > 

سم وت سل ات valalıih wi? Addr‏ 
کون سے طفبہ سب LITTERAM EM E wus‏ 
d‏ سا سف سلاد m‏ ہمد ہو xani ria‏ 





~~ 











203 

Despite the authoritarian tanê of the secretary's 
wemerendum, Admiral King still was @bie to place an almost 
complete esbargo on submerine stories thet remained in 
effect until a few months before the end of the war. His 
edict vesulted from the publication of several stories 
Which he considered harwful to our submarine operations. 
Prior to his action, there had been a trickle of submarine 
publicity. particularily in the Pacific Fieet. in 1942 and 
early 1943, Lieutenant Commander Drexe, the CINCEAC public 
relations officer, allowed a liciteó numbor of correspond- 





ents to interview returning marine commanding officers 
on &n individual besis in Hawaii, In the summer of 1943. 
Commander E., W, Grenfell, USN, the newly appointed public 
relations officer foz Commander Submarine Force, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet, refined this procedure by having the war 
eerzespondents question the aubmarine sxippers in group 
meetings, with public relations officers present to give 
prompt ruiings on matters of security. 

The early submarine stories, for the moet part 
positive in neture, were credited with raising morals on 
the home front. These included the observation of horse 
rages in Japan by one of our submarines operating close~in 
to the enemy shore, a periscope photograph of Mount ۱ 
Fujiyama, anc the sinking of a Japenese carrier in tha 
Battle of Midway. Until Mey of 1944, however, when the 
rescue of twanty-two &Rirmen off Truk by the UGS feng was 


we 
tire twee = te aod OW tele ae eóógMma 
— تي رمس و‎ cdd» c —— 
Ci هه ہبہ مھٹوٗین+ نسہ ووسننہی؛‎ ô eal 
«ih .-- od) یہ وع مسب نس مسا و‎ e سنا‎ eee 
ceived daar € masan E سض مے سی‎ mids 
تنس نان‎ vå مشق‎ 
abaia jo acini t یم ها هني میس بعد كسس‎ ۷ 
سد‎ CHA ad heed dT a l pauar ام‎ 
بان ز سر‎ SAMD ۰م‎ Qe. dee) — meh) «(WA gese 
ومن عاعنه. ماومسره لنساسد وسو ب سو‎ 
siin 
` Gaj te eem deb) ol Albee ot تفه‎ Joined وه دې‎ 
کک ف تساک ود ت مص سوپون جور‎ 
= — — وراو اټ وکس‎ 
n 
— — — — ö— 
——P— — 
itemm de cnr · — 
انه سويد جه‎ vel اد صن تسل كونبى.‎ 
A ٢ 
—— یل کے کہ‎ 
سه سس‎ )« cum c ee ot ont 
— — —** سے‎ eai 
G^ an ما سه ې * مد ه اوس وسل‎ - | 
"—— تنم نانش ا‎ d 
Si a anb eria e 






























204 
announced, very miniwal publicity about submarines was 
permitted other than in the general language of the 
official Navy Depactment communiques issued frou Washing~ 
ton. It was during this embargo period that the submarine 
branch became known as the “Silent Service.” 

An exemple of how stringent the censorship rules 
were concerning submarine publicity occurred in the South- 
wast Facific early in 1945.  À Dutch submarine Gepartec 
Australia on patrol with an accredited Dutch war corre- 
pondent embarked. When word of thie reached the Commander 
Submarine Fores, U.S. Seventh Fleet, the submarine immedi- 
ately was recalled to port to debark the unauthorized 
¢otrespondent and confiscate his film."4 





In Deceuher 1943, the Bavy’s strict security 
control over news regarding the German U-Boat war in the 
Atlantic came to an end. A now revision of the Gade of 





. published by the 
Office of Censorship, no longer listed the Wavy Department 
&s the solo appropriate &authority for the release of news 
about the ginxing or dene;ing of merchant vessels. The War 
Shipping Administration (952A) now was authorized to 

epnounce such news. IZ matters of naval security were 
involvod, WGA had to clear its releases first with OWI, 
which “in practice . . . will check with the Navy Pepartment 








EE ۱ 
=s amima a سس«‎ Çe am ا‎ 
روسان سس«‎ 
e ہے‎ es ST RTS واقس قسج‎ 
بت مسا‎ air مسین مسا‎ ۲ ED amr A — * 
iminy AMP a au a — 
ama mir ام‎ arso Cini aq امہ وومسس نم ومسان‎ 
began a RAS ET A ih Al سار‎ LIS وود‎ 
- was mw tte سح‎ 
———— aie bo bee o -umuman ومهم‎ - 
dhai anaa ds سا اک‎ e 
"de co. ^00 c——— 
— = T oe — wd 

son a "OAL ar صوسۍې اا‎ di 
ی‎ 


te aac em b ^e moy suam‏ دين فیا 




















205 

on cases involving security. 495 

in the cmenódments to the censorship code, the 
Office of Censorship assumed more authority for the clegz- 
ance of all news materials about the war, including 
announcements made officially by other government agencies. 
Byron Price sdmaitted that the revisions reflected the 
opinion by government leaders that more war information 
could now be disseminated without endangering national 
Security. "This conclusion in no way presupposes èn early 
end to the war. It does take account of the fact that the 


war has taken an i: 
96 


mortant turn frow the defensive to the 





offensive," 


Qffonsive 





The improvement of the Allied position in the wer 
contributed to a relaxation of censorship procedures and a 
sore positive approach to public relatians by the military. 
By 1944, naval reserve officers were clearing stories sent 
to Washington ané Pearl Harber with “little reference to 
higher authority. 497 Public relations considerations wera 
an integral part of the planning for the Horaandy operation, 
OWI was working closely with both the Army and Navy on the 
proposed prese coverage Of the European invasion. sno Elmer 
Davis alsc met with the President to discuss these plans. > 
AS a result of premature disclosures of happenings at the 


Cairo and Teheran conferences by foreign news agencies, 


sp sib ub G&S 0۵ 

٢‏ مهم صن کے و ت مت نض :سیه 

TTT سے‎ da cnt eiiis pens La اک مد‎ 

— le اچ‎ 

ami hd rwe لافنا‎ bidan! amtoe yi 

7 ا عه "مس ہو سن یم سور 

ہے ٤‏ فتاه بث محمد ad a i Ro‏ بس 
م قد ue ewer‏ رسب ہب wine‏ ہے وہ 

— 






















c- e— a b tiem aL LEA edi Tas crm A 
————— —— No oed 
ailli» m p لواو‎ siba موه بہت‎ 
mee miw praejo mr meo مسبت‎ Lees جع )و‎ 

Ay zebad mori fem ununi dmt qr‏ یریب واسسستا نو 
سو gadaa aA‏ ——— 
R2‏ ,0م A‏ در مدي «asûr‏ 
۱ سه Are‏ به مي بدا ee‏ سي انس 
^ مج بے OAR Ts Ree‏ ۱۵ 155 
* دت سر 0 
on opone po emma‏ = 
مھت سن ium un uidi‏ 


















206 
Presigent Roosevelt cirected the War and Navy Departments 
aod OWI in becember 1943 to eliminete their practice of 
issuing advance releases for publication at a specified 
future time and data. 7? inetead, the President ordered, 
“all such information will be given out . . . at the 
earliest possible moment consistent with national security, 
for immediate publication and broaódc&kst." 

In April 1944, an agreement reached with the Army 
and Navy by OWE brought about è closer control over the 
authority exercised by theater commandere in the release of 
Haws. 108 The agreement called for immediate submission for 
review in Washington of any news items withheld for sonr 
ity er othox millit&ry xe&sonc. 

Captain Lovette, in R letterx to the Commandant of 
the First Keval District just prior to Christmas, 1943, 
expressed an optimistic viewpoint over the progress made in 
the past year by Navy public relations. “Some of our work 
has been very uphill, but we Go feel here in Washington 
that strides have een rade, &nà that, both in policy ang 
organization. we are well out of the woods. 4191 Lovette 
eeceoupanied Secretary Knox on a tour of European and 
Atlantic theaters two months eariiser, ami he reported in 
hás letter that: 

The whole subject p public reietiong/ is very near 
the heart of the Secretary. With his broad and long 


experiance in the field of news, public opinion, and 
politica, he is fully convinced that the good will of 


~ 
وسونوصہ سےوسررد ینوی مب مب P‏ د وپس 
qium‏ یسمو يویا ب »یمسج سی ومني مه 
Avy aem ma‏ بمج ۱١‏ 8 دیس وبا 

سو يب سا مس اه مس مص عوسی جوت واو ب 
ځا وم غو وس میں so. ta mmi ow‏ ده ې 

agemus emt md asa AA 

poe wt dake enews ان خی‎ JAVA NÉ لے‎ 
سس‎ ۰ 

۱ 1 لا لوا ۲ lir semel! MF ah enh eam‏ 
a ei) uc Om Wo‏ —— — — 
e e e 2476‏ عت ری ء رسرف: ah‏ ——— 
تیت بې نه و sc cha]‏ ناس وس سټاټیم le‏ 
وف Loewe send)‏ یت ery‏ وجني Gy‏ کاس دس 
ve es See‏ " 
MD ES‏ رچ ې درو وس aam m si‏ — 
چو وووعقف په مب خم سا رت مه نه لب tm‏ 
مي م مه سر مه ۷۰ یی سی (S‏ سي 
پس ا یسومې ده د ےم مر میسو کا 

ور ہے اھ هح یل ے سا ےج نہ اه 









































دسر جج تا 


aie‏ حت 


2 


207 
the public end of the legislators will be a major 
factor in determining the sige of the Savy .. . after 
the cessation of hostilities. Much of the groundwork 
-5 - way of public opinion and good will must be lsaió 

The observation was the fizst hint Ouríng the war 
that the Navy was beginnlng to think in terms of long-range 
planning in its public relations program. 

Despite the more iiberal approach to public rela- 
tions by the military in late 1943 and early i944, public 
satisfaction with governsent information policies dau limi. 
in April 1944, a #inal survoy comcluctod by OWKI'a Survay 
Division prior to its sbolilshwent, showed that only 57 per 
oent of the public thought that the ameunt and quality of 
war news was adequate, compared to 74 per cent in February 
1943.19? As sar as handling of news by the Army and Navy 
was COnCcerneC, therzo 2156 wa& à cewnwerd trend in public 
confidence, but Lt was much more pronounced for tho Awry 
then the Navy. Seventy~one per cent ci these polled had 
given the Wer bepartmen: a "well done” rating in this area 
in early 1943, but oniy 58 per «ent voged this opinion in 
April 1944, Comparative figures fer the Navy during the 
Stee periode were 63 per cant and 55 par cent, a Gecress« 
of only 8 per cent. The Bavy still drew more complaints 
for not releasing news soon enough, whilo the Army was 
Criticized sere often for incomplete reporting. 





ies blame. ad وسات‎ Crees ae ae eee} 
وسر‎ dE (ORA ba CA سک ع عم علااانسې ده رس‎ 


(hA 6 BAD‏ — — موس 

sf uni. aO‏ امھ سس یمر TOO me a‏ ےی 
جاک ۷۵ غۍ ا co i n‏ ا vs Pree‏ 
دد سب — عا یسا مم ٠‏ ہے Cus A à ae‏ 
و له پر ې ے سی تہ ul‏ هر path‏ ا سے 
اكه ماس سو "TE‏ 
⸗ — ہے ے سم ee ex ue‏ كبا الك نے 
— — —— :اکس پر ہے 
دم ای رتسي ع موا ووس ' ae‏ دې ایب پټ 
هنو نس مسر عد — BÉ ecu) ger com‏ سسس یہ 
وپټ سل ده پ: مس so Qum oO om‏ — 
| رس مس دس ونه sm end ut‏ 
-- — 
تھے — — - 





















208 





in May 1944, Rear Admiral Baron Stanton Merrill, 
USN, relieved Captain Levette as Director of Fublic Rela“ 
tíons. "Tip" Herrill, es he wag Xuown, wes à combat 
veteran of the South Pacific campaign.  Commancur of à 
Oruisar-destroyer taek force, he led naval gunfire attacks 
on Japanese positions in the Salomon Islands in Merch and 
June of 1943. In Hovesber of that year, his forse sunik two 
enemy cxuleers and two destroyers ducing the Battie of 
Empress Augusta ېږو‎ 93 
these operations, he wea awarded the Wavy Creas and the 


For bravery ami efiielency in 


Legion of Merit. 

Secretary Xnox, uring his visit to Pearl Harbor in 
Jenuary 1943, had been impressed by the energy arul concven- 
iality displayed by Admiral merrill when be “vaulted up the 
stairs with a big seile on his face. 4194 When Captain 
Lovette. after Almost two years in Washington, yearnad for 
a return to dea duty, the secretary personally selected 
Merrill to be his successor. The admiral nad no public 
velations experiente ané “he grumblec et texing his swivei- 


195 ! | n dins ۹ 
But he had A great deai of “battle 


Chair assignment.” 
lore and pereonaliny.* and officers who served under him 
predicted he weuld do a creditable job. 

Captain Lovette had served ag Director of Pablic 
Relations during a difficult amd critical cime for the 


Navy's information program. When ho departed, yowsweck 

















٠‏ وسوی د پس ومیس اهم نا سی نټ 
SAM‏ تم جع نا ج٭- سه amiga aid‏ هس imi‏ 


١‏ ميا مه هرسم aes‏ اند [ated‏ دز 
۱ | چو یوي" مو جوم بو منومنسم یہ 


به we ao Pr rma a ane oe‏ 
— 
quem ll.‏ مب لست min‏ سا à ————. CASA‏ 
AMA ana‏ مسا مم همس یې امه — Se‏ 
مس پټ مم Larmi‏ کل eciam mm‏ یہ ہہ 
ووهه نت © eid‏ اند ند دب یې ۷۸۰ سے عا 
, مم ېر لو mem i) arm‏ سوه سا 
۱ هده ۷ے clie — — a^‏ ماري دما 
یم ي M Did «rome AM‏ وہ 
— سب حم IPLE‏ 
و m‏ عم م — — 
I" AM‏ مرم اس سه عیصا سين 
امرب مره د + سپ Gm‏ 

meat we سوام‎ as amaes 6 











B 













LE JI E ^ am.—— هم‎ rg 


وس ديم ا ona‏ بس — ~ 
کا wann ormat 6 ot‏ 


205 


paid him the following tribate: 


Lovette was fully aware ef the barnacles encrusting 
naval press procedure. He nevertheless scraped 
willingly. Sith Enex, he inaugurated of f-the-record 
background conferences, saw thet communigques from 
combat areas were issued simultaneously in Washington 
te give the home front a swift break on news, end 
eatabliaked so close B working tie with the War 
Department and OWI that he elicited the heert felt 
thanks — t of Eimer Davis for Pacific wer 
coverage. 





BOTES TO CHAPTER IV 


ivadm, William b. Leahy. USE (Ret.), i Bas Tmexxi 
(London, 1950), 142-163, pABa ia. 


: 
"U.S. Office of War Information, Bews Bureau, 
Xigtary. 3:32 (December @. 1942), quoted in Lamar Mackay, 
“Domestic Operations of the Office of Bar Information in 
World Wer II," unpublished Ph.D. Gisssrtation, University 
of Wisconsin, 1966, p. 198. Mereafter cited as Mackay, 
"ONL. ° 


36.8. Bevy اسا هوم‎ offica 24 Uu Ra lations: 
savaj Districts section, Éx let tone Bellet ip 
Jenguary 1, 1943, p. 3. shaped fees cited as rrr 
Copy contained in U.S, Ravy Department, Office of Informa- 
tion, "Historical Recorés of the Wavy Office of pen ion, 
1919-1951," Job Order 61-RÀ-2740, teem 19, Box 1545 
Washington Xationsl Pecorís Tentes, پا .12 ااداکه‎ lake“ 
after Gited as “Philibert 9 * 


Suackay, "ORI," 202. 





We 0۶۶362 of Wer Information, 


ars LEX Bows. Special Memecandum Xo. 42, Narek Ge 
1943, cited in bió., 174-725. 


"capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, “Navy Public 
Relations," ÊXIN eng Navy ADAR]. speciel edition entitisd 
"United States #t Wars Decenber 7, 1942--Decesber 7, 1943" 
(Pacewher 1943}, 174. 


Tuema., Lt. Cmür. William L. Huggins, USNR, to ALl 
Public Relations Officers, January 28, 1943, Philibert 
Collection, Box 156. 


—E message, Eecrettry of the Heavy to All Kory 
Activities, 121411/9. Jenuary li, 1943, Abid. 





rtr. George Fielding Eliot to Prank Knox, 
March 18, 1943, Frank Knox Faperz. Menuserfipt Section, 
Library of Congress. Washington, D.C., BOX 1. Hereafter 
cited x2 “Knox Papers.” 


م ۵۵ Frank Knox to George Fielding‏ سورد 
March 22, 1943, ibid.‏ 





212 
hier: Secretary of the Kavy to Haval District 
Commandantg, March 13, 1943, Philibert Collection. Box 156. 
,دو د‎ Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet ané Chief of 
Raval Operations, to All Ships am? Stations. June 7, 1943 
(Serial 01792), U.8. Navy Department, Office of the Chief 
of Kaval Operations, Kaval History Bivision, Operational 
Archives $ranch, Clessíifiod Files of the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Gperetions and Files of the General Beard, 
Series 441. 

15 essago, Naval Command Loncon to Commencer in 
Chief, U.S. Fleet, 161226, December l6, 1942, U.S. Bavy 
Department, Office of Informetion, Administrative Fillies. 
Job Order 76-A-2140, Item 4, Box ,د‎ Washington National 
Recerds Canter, Suitland, Mú. Nereafter cited as 2 
Administrative Files." 

- رر ټوو‎ Lt» Cmax. Willian i. Ruggins, USNR, to ALl 
District Public Relations Officers, GGR-6 (15613). 

February 25, 1945, Philibert Collection, Sox 156. 





l5capt. Leland P, Lovette, USN, text of radio 
interview on Blue Network Company program “Thie is 
Official,* May 33. 1943, ibid. 


1 

195.8. Mavy Department. Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, Maval History Division, “United States 

wal Paministration in World War II," unpublished narrative 

history of Comuancer in Chief. U.S. Pacifie Fleet and 
Pacific can Azara [CINCPAOC and CINCPOA), 396. Mereafter 
Cited as “Administrative Histories," followed by pertinent 
eqmaand title. 


17 


‘Sout Regulation Ho. 4, Supplement Ho. 1 (3690), 
195 iner Davis, remarks made before 5 conference of 
zeval district, Air Training Command anê fleet public 
reiations officers in Washington, D.C., April 26, 1943, 
recorded in mimeograghec minutes of conference, p. 7, ibid. 
Hereafter cited as “1943 FRO Conference.” 


20 


Frank Knox to James K. Cox, February 5,‏ بب 
Knox Papers, Bow 4.‏ ,1943 


9 nullatin. No. S, July 1, 1943, 9 


Mackay, "OWI," 200-201. 


Frank Knox, 1943 PRO Conference, 3. 


ji; 
mirii lrea* zs ہی سے‎ wet? 

Api em «ao moi LO هع‎ — — 

walt MA uud ep‏ 4 مه و 


رت — نس کي 0 [A‏ 


ey te anian B‏ روت و ۔ 
vM Po Sui hes‏ .دی 
















44 me dV a m au EA 


212 
و‎ 
First, Eighth end Minth N&val Districts. OOR-2 (11715), 
December 9, 1942, Gi Administrative Files, Job Order 
76-À-2140, Item 4, Box i. 


24 ure, Capt. belani P. Lovatte. USN, to Capt. 
George B. Wilson, USN, OOR-1 (10584), December 3, 1942, 
ibid. Captain Wilson was the comeanding officar of the 
VSS تسل‎ 


rhe above information on Navy photography in 


early 1943 was compiled from the following scurces con- 
tained in Philibert Collection, Box 156: PR Bulletin. Ko, 4, 
February 1, 1943, pp. 1-2; Navy Degéertment Press Seminar 
Reloase, Jone 20, 1943; and mamo.. Chápt. Leiand P. Lovette, 
USN. to Ali Section Heads, Office of Public Relations, 
January 15, 1943. 


2552 2ulletin, No. 3. 7 1, 31943, p. Be 
hia. , Me. 15, September 1, 19423. Ee 2. 
2 » Mo. 4, February 1, 1943. pp. 12. 


29, er. , Secretary of the Kavy (Director of Public 
Relations) to multipie addressess, OOR-2 (22625), June 2, 
1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156. 


rer, Lt. Cmdr. Mildred fi. McAfee, USMR, to 
Capt. Leland P. Lovette, UGH, August 4, 1943, inid. 


3 Secretary of the Havy (Director of Public 
Relations) te Naval District Public Relations Officere, 
@OR-2 (24165) of June 26, 1943, OOR-2 (27957) of Aagust 6, 
1943, and OO0R-2 (27954) of August 6. 1943, ikid- 
sty omoranda, Cmdr. We G. Beecher, Jr., USN, to 
Lt. Cmdr. Kelso Daly, UGH, GOR-A (24968), July 3, 1943. and 
Lt. Cmdr,. A. A. Alien. USE, to Director of Public Relations, 
December 13, 1943, conteined in OI POmiínistrative Files, 
ول‎ Order 76-54-2140, Item 4, Box 2, file A7-3 (12) and 
Bou 1, file A2-14 (5), xespectively. 


996. Kerrigon Niartley, "Navy Radio Relations end 
Procedures,“ rewerks made before à conference of naval 
Gistrict public relations officers (First through Ninth 
Naval Districts), Washington, D.U., September 28, 1942, 
recorded in mimeographed minutes of conference, p. 77, 
Philibert Collection, Box 156. 












34 aniniatrative Histories, Office of Raval 
History, 598-59. 








> دس‎ uani A bahia ما سل‎ 
men eT —— 


N 
man mo یو‎ 


D‏ اع ص ا ود ee um‏ تا 

— پو‎ na ظ0-:‎ - 
ws 5i اوم نه هو الصه سوه‎ ee Pure 
| eoe dip s a 





313 


٧ Secretary of the Mavy (Director of Public‏ اب 
Reletions) to Naval Diatrict Public Relations Officers,‏ 
February 19, 1944, Philibert Collection, Bex 157.‏ 


Treasury Departaent, War Savings Staff,‏ بب 
Field Memorandum No. 607, Mey 7, 1943. contained in ibid.,‏ 
Box 156.‏ 


7 pe suatia. Ko. 3, FANEY i 1943, Dn. 5. 


38 Xe Secretary of the Navy (Director of Public 
Relations) to multiple nócressees, OOR-A (12966). 
January l6, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156. 


395.390.000 Set as Model Plane Goal in 1943," Navy 
Department news release, January 22, 1943. ihig. 


SÜ«Statement of Labor Relations in United States 
Navy," enclosure (8) to letter from the Secretary of the 
Wavy to multiple addreasees, August 6. 1942, contained in 
بت‎ Navy res rode gems aes of Public cr arn 
(15-7-43). Hereafter cited as Ph. Manual. 


- ; Chief of Incentive Division to Director of 
ود‎ Bere December 12, 1942, lihid.. Art. 7رت‎ 
15-77-43). 


Chief of Incertive Division te Director,‏ بی 
Office of Public Relations, June 12, 1943, Philibert‏ 
Collection, Box 155,‏ 


s ier., Chief of Incentive Division to All District 
incentive Officors, September l0, 1943, ibig. 


^5, tr., Chairman of the Navy Board of Production 
Mars to multiple addresaecs, Janvery 12, 1943, 
PR Manual. Art. 5.424A (15-77-43). 


eme. , James Forrestal to mltiple edéressses, 
April 13, 1944, OI Administrative Files, Job Grier 
76&7ÀA-2140, Item 4, Box 1, file A2~14 (5). 





۹ Aobert Greenhalgh Albion end Robert Hows Connery. 
L5 a رو‎ (Hew York, 1962), 209. 





43 


Ltr,, Secretary of the Navy (Director of Public 
Relations) to haval Dietrict and Air Training Command 
Publio Relations Officers, OOR-6 (13222), Janusry 21, 1943, 
Philibert Collection, Sux 156. 







سي اي 


— 7 awe 





enistehs acinus SS Sais‏ ی ‏ صف. وحوف له 
i!‏ سو — 


dj Jamiel ty nee -— امو ود‎ T d 





214 
لن‎ . Randall Jacobs, UBN, 1943 PRO Conference, 
55. 


Ore, Chief of Maval Personnel to All Shore 
Activities within the Continental United States anû Ali Sea 
Frontiers, Pers-101-MES, February i, 1943, Philibert 
Collection, Box 155. 


Slier., Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief 
of Naval Operations to Secretary of the Navy, March 8, 
1943 (Serial 1429), inii. 


S Administrative Histories, Fourth Naval District, 
19-711. 


rer. Becretary of the Navy to the Chief of 
Haval Personnel, March 9, 1943, and Secretary of the Navy 
{Director of Public Relations) to multiple addressees, 
608-6 (17098), March 18. 1943, Philibert Collection, 
Box i56. 


Aree. ¢ Cit. W. ©, Beecher, dr. UGN, toa Cadr. 
Robert E. Vining. US&R, QOR-A (26918), Geptember &, 1943, 
Anis 


35 rtr. Secratery of the Navy (Director of Public 
Relations) to Coommandantsa Aili Continental Naval Districts. 
November ll. 1343, ibid. 


Svar ious Girectories of public relations personnel 
in OPR, the naval districts, fleets, air cowmarmis ani other 
field units, October 1942 to May 1944, contained in filo 
"Directories," ibid... Box 157. ^ Hovomber 15, 1942, 
directory of district ané fleet public relations officers 
listed only 215 names compared to the 274 in the similar 
January 1343 directory mentioned above. Although na 
supporting documentation could be found, it is believed 
that the Hevember 1942 directory was in error in that it 
did not contain the names of ai} public relations officers 
attached to air commands at that time. 


9 رج‎ var Department Bureau of Public Relations 
Directory,” Aaguat 15, 1943, contained in file “War Depart~ 
ment Public Relations,” ipig.- Box 146. 


58: هروه‎ Report of the Office of Publio Relations 
for Fiscal Year 1943,” contained in letter from Diíroctor o£ 
Public Relations to Secretery of the Eavy, OOR-i (272811), 
July 31. 1943, U.S. Bavy Department, Office of Public 
Relations, General Filea (EN-117), Record Group 86, War 
Records Franch, Kaval Records Saction, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 





n 2‏ 8ء ا قام , ہے از 
MEL ue ct» qv T.. :‏ 













vmbra" rue sU AAD o 





—— — 
اجس‎ eo ا‎ oa an 


4 رت سا سا 
T, mc‏ 
Pn utat |‏ ات ME a‏ 


5 ٹب ع BETE aan‏ 
vom ise‏ ا سر ھ؛ا irea‏ 
سر ٭ ۵ زا هس ) 


UIT uh 
4" PEE نس‎ | 


















215 
و 0۵2 و ۵۳ ج59‎ data eR personnel changes were 
obtained from monthiy ١ personnel directories contained 
in file "Directories," Philibert Collection, Box 157. 


60 iministrative Bistorises, Bureau of Ravel 
Personnel, ¥-1i. 
6l aas., 4. ü&rrieon Heartiey to Director of Publie 
Relations, GOR-3, August 2, 1943, Philibert Collection, 
Box 156. 


2 suinistrative Histories, Eleventh Neval 
District, 63-64. 


SF er. Asgistant Director of Public Reletions. 
West Coast, to All Puslie Relations Officers, West Coast, 
October 27, 1943, Philibert Collection, Pow i56. 
64 emo. Lt. Alan Brown, USNA, to Diroctor of 
Public Reiations, OOR-5, September 29, 19423, ibid. 


Fifth Naval District,‏ ی 
.147 


66 emo. . te Alan Brown, TEHR to Director of 
Public Relations, OOR-5, April 7, 1944, Philibert Collec” 
tion, Box i527. 

67 .عد , .هدي‎ Carleton Mitchell, Jr., USNR, to 
Director of Public Relations, April 19, 1944, OX Adminis- 
trative Files, Job Order 76-A~-2149, Item 4, Box l. 


$8:tr.. Cmdx. J. L. Collis, USN, to Lt. Cmdr. Barry 
Bingham, USWA, COR-Z (43998), April 11, 1944. ibid. 


OP ere, mdr. H. G. Beecher, Jr.. USR, to Cmdr. 


70 1 

71 E. Cmór. Waldo Drmke, USER, to mér. W. G. 
Beecher, Jr., USD, January 12, 1943, OX Administretive 
Piles, Job Order 76-A~2140, item 4, Bex i. 


Quir. Walco Drake, USER, to Omár. W. G.‏ لل يې 
escher, Jr., UBN, September 11, 1943, ibid.‏ 


735.8. savy ¬ سي‎ of —— gear 
Liaison Branch, An è له‎ rang tarr of World 















5 اف ېوس‎ 
Tes — دس‎ 
— ham AC A Lente —⸗— 


malts ea A — 


— — 
A —— z‏ ری وود سم 


T1 3 
مس‎ ee 











d‏ سے 





4 


- — . 


2N ای‎ p — 


- ^ 







re we 
د‎ E - -- ٥ 


۱ »يې 








236 


War ii. MAVEO P-3024 (Washington, Juno 5, 1967), 6-11. 
Hereafter cited ag Office of informetion, Abridged History. 


T6Mackay, "OWI," 391-92. 


"Sew York Tiwa, Àugust 18, 1943. p. 17. and 
August i$, 1943, Pe 418. quoted in ibig.. 393. 


rts. Franklin D. Roosaveit to Secretary of the 
Navy., Septenber 1, 1943, contained in personal file of 
RAÀdm,. HAroló B. Miller, VSN (Ret ode entitied “Public 
Ralations Policies ami Directivos." Hereafter cited وص‎ 
"Miller File--PR Policies." 


Tlwackay, "OWI," 394-95. 


7S ibid. 396 Mackay's source for Churchiil's 
remarks was the New York Limes, September 22, 1943, pp. 1 
and i2-13. 


. Washington non Iincensed Over London 
روو متا‎ di مہو افو بش ہہت‎ October 2, 1343, pe 6. 


Psa 





Mackey. “Oni,” 398. 


Ble mer Davis. “Repert to the S — Sub” 
۵2 + ۲9۵ on Government — da AM. | X Do 

1. 3 Ans S38 Sian. Part 2, esth amem. Let 
Session (1963), 227, quoted in ibis. 









92 pearson Charges Washington Uses Gestapo 
Eaiter & fablishexs. October 2, 1943, p. 19. 


9*5uew York Times. October l, 1943. p. ll. quoted in 
Maekay, “OWI,” 401. 
Bd izide. Cetober 23, 1943, p. 10, queted in Mackay, 
"WE," 402-03. 
OS wavy Censor Relaxes," i¢iter هغ‎ 2ublianer., 
Oetober م9‎ 1943, p. 42. 





Tactics, ” 


SSuyoster Hailey Lauds Navy's Sew Policy. °" db. 
Deceziber 19, 1943, p. 1l. 


87 united States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean 
Avees Pross Release No. 165," Novesber id, 1943, Philikert 
Collection, Box 156. 


Histories, CIHCPAC and CINCPOA,‏ ی مه 








a slum 
| تسه ی‎ 





سه A‏ کو رنڈ eo‏ تس بر 


— م کی وص م اب مودو oh‏ مسب 


dli 7 a وسم‎ 
















ca n^n sn 


meum — m 








217 
Prompt Hews is Worth 16,000 Sermons. Seye Hoyt," 
| 5 77" le 1944, ye Be 


90, cea. Secretary of the Nayy (Director of Public 
Relations} to Naval Gistriet Public Relations Officers. 
OOR~2 (24145), of duly i. 1942, and OO0n-2 (37412) of 
December 31, 1943, Fhiliberzt Collection, Bex 156. 


lher., Lt. Cue. Barry Bingham, USNR, to Captain 
Leland P. Lovette, USN, March 24, 1944, OI Administrative 
Files, Job Order 7ó-A-2140, item 4, Box 2. 


32 uais9. , Adm. irnest J. King, JS8N, to Socretarcy ot 
the KAVY: Oe tober 4. 1943 (Serial 93417). ihi.» Hox هم1‎ 
File Al6-3 (9). 


۶ 2 و‎ » Frank Knox to Aêm, Ernest J. Hing, VSN, 
Geteber 12, 1943 (Serial 6309002), Judd. 


“4, sm iniatrative Histories, Submarine Commance, 
UG. Pacific Fleet, Vol. i. Pp. 3249-356. 


er, Director o£ Public Reletions te Naval 
— Public Relations Officers, OOn-10 (35235), 
ecember 3, 19423, Philibert Collection, Box 156. 





96.8. Office of Censorship Press Aeloesse 5i, 
Decemnbe:z 10, 1942, Aid. 


I omdr. Harold Bradley Say, US, “Consorship snd 
Security,” U8. Ha ۱ 2 Gencinga., 79:136 (1953). 





93... 


Mackey, "OWI," 4121. 
99 و‎ , Franklin D. Roosevalt to Secretary of the 
Wavy, Decomber 18, 1943, contained in Miller File~-PR 
Policies. 
1O0.Wavy'a mew Voice," Mawswenk. April 24, 1944, 
p. 82. 


101 ری‎ Capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, to RAám. 
Robert A. Theobaló, GSN, OOR (3711901, December 29, 1943, 
Philibert Collection, nox i56. 


1025.6. Office of War Information, Purvey Division, 
"Public Appraisal of War information," Memorandum No. 77, 
May 12, 1944. cites in Mackay, "OWE," 370-71. 


1030:f1ee of Information, Abcidued History, 9-11. 







| 40-21 سب .رر 
silañ to iem) qo au wy‏ 
I^ "mu T uw o.‏ 
11 ریمس مت ACT‏ 
r —‏ نهف مح ود تسیا " 
ol‏ — — — 


soho — —‏ اس ود 


cond —— ———‏ ہے بس 
ج 


Prete ارد‎ 
db دا‎ — 
عا علد‎ Fem nt ee ا وق‎ 
A — — ima mm 
سس سر یں سير‎ ' —— 
S aT 








B کے‎ 




































218 


Washingtone 


14 I. ertz, perscnal interview, 
D,C., bhpril 16. 1969. 


195 «aves Gew Voice," Oba cit. 
106 id. 








THE FINAL PRASE OF THE WAR 


On April 24, 1944, Frank Knox died unexpectedly of 
a heart attack, Twelve deys later, Under Secretary 
Forrestal was named by President Roosevelt to replace nim. 

Writing of Knox's death, the Little Rock Arkansgsa~ 
bhemocrat stressed tüe import&nce of his public relations 
role as Secretary of the Navy: 





Hie concept of this job id not call fer interfer- 

ence with the trained career leaders of the fleet-~the 

admirals headed by stern-visaged Ernest J. King. . . . 

On the other hand, as hes occasionally said, 4 "aid e232 
for standing between the Navy and the public.i 





Knox also served ag a buffer between the stron; 
wills of his two chief subordinates, King ani Forrestal. 
The Under Secretary and the admiral were vastly different 
in temperament and methods of operation. They oftan 
Opposed each other's plang anó recoastendnations, particularly 
in the matter of logistical support for the fleet. Had it 
not been for Knox's conciliatory efforts, the two might 
have clashed openly early in the war. Ag it was, they were 
“held at bay." so to speak, until they could develop a 
"kind of frosty mutual self-respect., »2 

The strained relationship between Forrestal anā 

219 








veas «di عضسم‎ ô Ê MAIS uA =D 
شضتید ہے ودل ا خسم‎ adi bë pisya اک شرب‎ 






۳ — سے t‏ ده سی ہہ ne‏ 
جم مه نمو تن e‏ سرد انس فنا سہریں s‏ 
ss «‏ | و سم ہر وس جچے:, E-‏ 
—- خي mi aromas comin’‏ 
ur‏ 


220 
King di not prevent the new Secretary of the Wavy from 
planning and implementing a greatly accelerated Navy publie 
telations program in the final year of the war. According 
to Rear Admiral Robert W. Berry. USE (Retired), tbe former 
Geputy director of the Offices of Public Relations, 
Forrestal wës “towher than Knox . . » end thus overcame 
King's security-consciousness."" 

By this time, however, Admiral Aimy obviously did 
mot feel the necessity for as strict a security posture هه‎ 
he 0416 earlier in the conflict. ime, Commenting on the 
&nmíral'a first report of the war, issued on April 23, 1944, 
Observed: “The Navy, Ernie King could now say, was in good 
Shape. . . . Now he could afford to let the security pers 
Gown and tell what sad shape it had been in, eariy in the 
war, "^ 

The King report was the counterpart of Genera) 
George Mershall's account of U.B, Army activities in the 
war, released in September 1943. The Chief of Naval Opere- 
tions’ 59,000-word statement told fer the first time many 
Geateils of naval battles that had not been revealed in the 
official communiques. For instance, the public had not 
been informed that ten U.5. Navy combat ships were gunk or 
damaged in the "first thundering quarter hour” of tne navel 
Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13-15, 1942. 





"E don't mind telling all. I guess it's part of ey 


اي 
۱ انام فا سر مس ار مه ملس و شم سم پس 
S‏ سعووسیا یې ء پسسای سودلعښا ښوېي سن 
رونت بی ن جه ا پیر ن pe ip‏ — 
ده wien‏ سا poma‏ ٭. adr Domas "VNO NA‏ — 
قوس Me ars‏ تہ وت سر سنہ تد — 
vamer ? -— à» + o. c- came enm aw 0320-76‏ 
کو مره مخت سم له 
igor yal ODA (mn YS AN YF — ⸗‏ وله 
-- هس عښه e Vises è han ww 9 Chee‏ رر 
لو دي <<« wuidemmen dif‏ س من 
und tar re Hama e dol‏ سو ات -- QAAE Cr Lise‏ 
rn‏ ”اہ وا mdi‏ لس بپ زه owe ams‏ مص ده پټ 
سم مه د دي ماسب و و په ومان سم 
- دلو سو سو یسو ته ییو موو یو موا یں مس 
الات oF‏ دوه نو و نف ماج و weet‏ 
yy D‏ سور دن مرم وسوسو نو می 
وو eessä ai Radiy‏ وم لاه ۱ ۱۰ ا د 
EDE amend Heo em‏ چو اغ ویم mum we‏ 
=r‏ 8 رت بیت ت یا سس س ن کا 
d‏ — را تعیب ای om has nile‏ 
Med tasti mM‏ و فد سوم مسب ورم و وساد 
de‏ سرت ووو ښوه مد تو ټی 






















4^ *o پس‎ tad asy d سوک مرل‎ ele je يک‎ 


221 
$05; but piease wien you write the story, would you minü-- 
well, leaving out the éri 

Although these words were spoken by Juss Forresta, 
during en interview with è reporter who was writing 8 
"Horatio Alger-type success story" about the new Navy 
secretary himself, they provide &n excellent insight inte 
hia over-a11 publie relations philosophy. Like Frank Knox, 
Forrestal was intensely mindful of the need to inform the 
public of the Navy's role in the war; yet, unlike his 
predecessor, ho was determined en prepared to exercise 
direct personal control over tha Navy's public relations. 
Unguided information efforts, in his opinion, wouló result 
in inconsequential “drip” that would not accomplish the 
important tasks of gaining recognition for the Navy's war~ 
time achievements and support for & strong postwar Navy. 

Forrestal‘s xemark to his interviewer algo was 
indicative of hia inherent modesty; he shunned pereonal 
publicity throughout his governmental carear. On the cay 
of the Hormandy invasion, he calied reporters into his 
Office and immediately turned therm over to an assembled 
group of admirais with the crisp remark. "You've comm here 


for combat news. „6 


Although ho had a personal hand in 
procuring the swarm of landing craft and other vessals thāt 
earrieód our troops into France, Forrestal did not went to 
"shoulder his way into the limelight.” 


Later in the summer, following ® trip to the 


ie 
فن“‎ wo ۷ 
ا مې سم‎ —— 
سے سے ونودن د‎ Herel » ati Wael a ey 
ایا تاه ناس سم رس ہیں سے‎ IIR 
mar vein تا وم نخس سس نس‎ ME 
یه نم اښ ټم سف واا )بس‎ ctv که‎ 
.کر فص ساسا متا وتان نہ سور‎ 
سی سے‎ 
Jiet ےک بل حايس مجلم‎ PP nma TAL 
سوت اند واي م کس سر شیا دی‎ 8 
ده و رسہے ہے۔‎ — 
سب‎ memos vemiie — — — 
Pee eee ee) | 
سوب ات س پیک‎ Amand ase T 
سص«سسسسسسآس‎ adit dh | 
لجنيس عوجوم رو له فر‎ ad cumin Madam 
ہہ جع ماه‎ ue سه ففغاننسن اپ د‎ 
هک اه سب که سر سے یی من ہہ۔‎ 
— — — ۹ 
دنا مر مسر مه‎ am mer 


سو سا | 







































E ۱ 







e ae‏ ر 


22 2 
Mediterranean io Obscrvae tbe landings in Southern France, 
the secretary wrote to Cari Vinson, cheéirman of the House 
Naval Affairs Committee: 

I am enclosing a diery of wy visit to Admiral 
Hawitt's Fleet which I made primarily with a view ef 
getting for him the credit which it seems to me ne 
deserved. The news Gut of the Mediterranean area so 
far as the Navy ia concerned has been rather slight. 
but Y think there will now be some improvement. My 
mission I think was fairly successful on this score, 
with the qualification that I got a little too much 
publicity myself . . . It ia uy view that the وط راودیما‎ 
of the Nevy can be of only slight use in Bugmonting 
Navy publicity. 

Although he avoids personal exposure in the news 
medie, Forrestal did use the medium of public speaking to 
get his message across tO the American people. Bot & 
Gynemie speaker, the tagk was difficult for him. Meverthe~ 
less, he spoke to a variety of audiences throughout the 
nation. His first talks were written by the Office of 
Public Relations, which “was accustomed to grinding out 
speeches by the dozen for celivery by officiaia and 
officers toe busy to write their own. 48 After Listening to 
him drone through these «arly “canned” addresses, however, 
Forsestal's staff anceuraged hia to do much of his own 
epeech-writing in order to be effective. 

The San Fransisco Chronicles. in July 1944, commented 
favorably about the secretary's personal public relations 
effortst 

. « e Foxvrestal talks to the American people ahout the 


Situation in the Pacific like anh aduit man talking to 
other adults. . . . ZHa/ Giscloses no secrets. . . . 








a‏ . نس S‏ ————— ري 
 — — —— Pte‏ — 








223 

But he talks frankly and officialiy to the people with 

a statement of their cage that is without neecless and 
m/sterious concealment,. It is an agreeable novelty.? 

Forrestal raai siz newapapecs every morning anc 

a@lmest daliy telephoned OFR to discuss itens appearing in 
them. Me kept à personal clipping file, with many of the 
articles being sent to him by acquaintances in the news” 


paper and publishing fields. ® 


By cultivating the friené- 
ship of such colwanists and commentators as Hanson Raidwin, 
Walters Millis, Arthur Krock, Walter Lippmann, demes kaston 
and the Alsops, he sought to reach the "thinking" minority 
among the public. In a letter to Arock, he expounded upon 
his personal philosophy concerning public relations anê 
government service: "When I came Gown here, Ll remarkeóc, ànü 
Z think it may have been to you, that anyone serving in 
Government had really two functions: (1) ne had to do a 
goog job, and (2) he had to convinces the public that a good 
job was being dene. * 

Rear hómiral Harold ظ‎ (Min) Miller, USN (Retired), 
said thet Forrestal “likened the American public to stock- 
holders in the Savy.*** The secretary felt that if the 
people at home who were working in the war industries were 
fully apprised of the realities of war and the difficulties 
faced by Ravymen in the Atlantic and the Pacific, they 
would "redouble their efforts.” Ee also thought that this 
“desirshie public reaction” could be achieved without 


violating security. by concentrating on full disclosure of 





ext 
مود ااا‎ WD m اک فا اناا‎ 
Bu ir, سوه" . و چک‎ > 
بل سسونپن وسې سسسلب سد‎ n ii ! 
u dibap esii kiui d مس و سامکسمس يور‎ 
ف بز ع ا‎ bali و و ہ وجسو‎ 
epee ۵0ء تو سه غا ان اب سوعلهلفغی نر ف‎ 
aaia بك‎ possessed رک سی دانم تشد يڼ‎ 
‘cheats میا تون سنا یبود حو وض‎ Mu). هک‎ 
در نیس دس ہے‎ men AN "ار سار‎ 
قا كه اعود )نا فو ت اخ ا > اسن‎ 
se ناسا‎ md اود یش قە‎ UE ao 
t gnait sirit کان ہا سو تسیب‎ dE 
mi DT مې مس سر‎ d ia miam Darin 
ai نید وم رت مل سی ټې زی‎ | 
s cá a kar ki 1" لا کرت ادو‎ 
بسانت اف باه کم ہے‎ «s wd a» DR) سا‎ 
ble فصب‎ 
isay ner . سوه صشلاعا مس د اسم دنس‎ 
tena we LAK "سه ری ماس‎ 307006 i 
هله ته نتن ۴ ت ست هه هة زو بك‎ 
erem یناه‎ asm RA اس دي ټی ني دی‎ 
wee) eee ee ee o 7 
quis فا فا لتو س وم می‎ - 
bhis amb) adem, axis eb سفن ودنم"‎ AL "بن‎ 1 
| — — سی‎ oa wee 


vor 







































224 
events that head happened and not on what wes going to take 


place. 





On April 24. 1944, four daya before Frank Knox 
died, hearings began in Congress before the Woodrum Commit- 
tee to consider an Army plan to merge the armed services 
into = single department. The long-standing unification 
issue had remained comparatively dermant in the early part 
Of the war, until it was resurrected by tho War Department 
in 1943 with a specific proposal to create a single chief 
Of staf? for the armec forces. 

The Army move veprasented a awitch in pesition. 
Prior to 1943, the War Department hed joined the Navy in 
Opposing the Army Air Pores fight to become & separate 
service within a unified system. The change in attitude by 
the Army evoked an immediate and predictable reaction from 
the Davy. Pearing that it would be “submerged,” not 
"merged," the sea service trained its biggest guns on the 


unification concept. Secretary Forrestal testified at the 





congressional hearing thet, in his opinion, no one person 
was capable of administering a single service with an 
annual budget of @imost $190 billion. Admiral King anc 
Marine Corps Commandant General Alexander A. Vandegrift 
iso spoke cut agtingt the plan; and Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Air Artemus L. Gates observed that if a merger 


















ےھ صرف سی يعد غه لم oui‏ 
وپټ نب دعسا دم ath‏ سدق صن 
هه مسب م وس پا مس سم دص نم کم ای 
B‏ ووی unl my meme‏ نکاس aneidis‏ 
ena bai a‏ نی Sel‏ ضف req lee‏ 
وص هه came‏ سس« 
ا Unisa e dote‏ وصور è sisma st‏ ماه ا 
۸ ۱۵۵۵ هت تب — — 

nm pmi m‏ — — تا ند وه انس 

اه قافا سب سا ېل سسنرز ات ۷ 
اود مې دل مس e amp‏ یج — 
A) meom wn wey aibi > waen‏ ماس ڪھ 
ERO‏ سیت کے شه سم بت 
tæ ————— — — — ——‏ 

w e emy sarpeju هغه سه هغه« لټ اساسا اف‎ 48 
وو دس‎ in aman psa "p 
— — — 














7 





225 
was necessary, the Ravy should serve es ite besie because 
it could operate on the sem, unter the sea, in the sir and 
on the هوو‎ 2 

The opposition by the Navy influenced the Woedrum 
Committee net to make any chenges in the corposition of the 
eased forces» at that time, But Forrestal knew that the 
truce was only temporary, and he felt à gràve necaasity for 
instilling in the Havy'g military hieraárchy a sense of 
urgency to take action before it was too lata. In Saptentoar 
1944, he wrote to Palmer Hoyt, who had resumed his duties 
as publisher of the Portland Qrecasian following his resig- 
nation from OWI; "I have been telling Xing, Himitz and 
Company it is wy judgment that ae of today the Savy hes 
lost ita case and that. sither in Congrees, or in a public 
poll, the Army's point of view would prevail. 4ء‎ 

One of tha first actions the new secretory took to 
involve naval officers in the political &nd public rela- 
tiene arena surrounding tho merger issue was the establish- 
ment of a unique “ad hoc" eomsittee in the late spring and 
بژ هه‎ summer of 1944. Consisting primerily of naval 
Officers, with no civilian public relations specialists 
imeludeg in its memverahip, the committes was chargeé with 
"cultivating views favorabie to the Navy among care fully 


„t3 It was chaired 


selected greupa in the public at large. 
by Gaptain Lovette, who had been asked by Forrestai to 


ferego for the time being his desires to take command of a 


u1 
— ü— زار‎ 
جا‎ ws جم ود ده وغم‎ ce أله وې‎ ee 









— 
سا كود عاونا نم و لف دول آ٦‏ سس apo wit‏ 
"um‏ نش مع مې نس ان لغ سسوسل یی ہو ہے 

ae 1‏ سم ado D wee Lara‏ 
سر او اه "2" 319 $ sup‏ مصمنس سا 
۹« 
الله سش می ټم رم بت بس را > 
ب سس ند ام ما ما نا سنم رم نیا 
اس سا ات شمسا انیت تج سر سے سی 
^1 ات نی هر ہے apii‏ سا 
دوس لاو وال نکن قا مر پټ وړ ې پټ 
ee‏ نت zd leds (ae‏ قسوسچی ہہ تہ پر tite‏ 
ات ابا VS Gilby‏ ملس سخاا ovens‏ ے* 
bis Qui) MU ado WR. OR‏ سو cases‏ سی و 
سم تا مقس که ات مادنا سا پاک ټون 
کی و په سوښت یي ون سی عق اتی ناه 
عالء چیه ووا انس له ری دس im gis‏ 
— — 0-7 »1 مسا 
ها " Oe‏ ن وتان اساسا سا اه 
٠١‏ اث سفت sry dala‏ سواون عا يا نه 
a‏ انس niim‏ نہ ہی شي سم مسا 
nlla t i= —‏ س — ame 4i‏ یدل بد 
—— — سد سر سر دو لا 
asd prde ——‏ فت a do mamor mas o‏ 














































226 
major ship. When the Wootrum Comittee hearings ended in 
June with no Lameadiatce threat to the Navy, the new agency 
was dissolved by Forrestal, primarily in responses to 
Lovette's plea to be allowed to go to sea. Such duty was 
imperative to s Reguler Wavy officer's chanesa for 
promction. 

Aithow;h this first "ad hoc" comaittee never 
actually began operations, ita establishment was signif- 
icant in several respects. It marked the first time that 
such a group, wliose tasks were quasicpolitical and involved 
"benind-the-scenesg" public relationa oetivities, hed ever 
existed in the Navy, And it became the prototype for 
similar &ajencios set up by Fersestali in the immediate post~ 
wer years, when the merger iseun erupted into fuli-sealis 
and bitter inter-service rivalry. It also was bn indico- 
tion of Forrestai's determination to blend into the Navy's 
Over-21i political strategy an organised amî systematic 
public relations campaign. using Ragular Navy officers as 
well ag reservists and civilians. “Probably no leader in 
the Havy's history up to that tima, either civilian or 
uniformed, wag sore convinced than Forrestal of the polit- 
ieal importance of effoctively utilizing public relations 
techniques ده‎ .. M 

in a graduation address et the Naval Academy 
shortly after he took offico, tho secretary stressed that 
each naval officer should consider himself a publie 


ui 
r hes mala an oct eh ma olet ant 
ee al LAm Aarand e امیس‎ 
ا ل ا كر‎ um Lampe 9 تاه هه اس مب‎ 








لصف نما واوو —— — 

srwm edé 0‏ ممسسوىے trie aan‏ 
— — 0 ساسا ee ae‏ 
ums lend r aa u aie‏ مس 
— — سیفن دی ماد سی 
ee‏ ——— 
مت دنت وو پو yi‏ مهاد نم ناساس ومد 
دک veu‏ مص اس عسہہیب دوم <وعصتد او ایا ژسسسال 

5 اه اووس وم وله دی لے يمف 
وکو ۱ اہ ر فس مرت یہ ویو at? aces‏ نس ان 















ده اسټټې ee ee‏ 
سے تفه «سومه| be‏ ود وسور ب 











ہے aer û‏ اهم ممھمے 


àse paise‏ سا 
ه هنک ټون وس 


ماي 





27 
relations specialist. A yeer leter., again epesking at the 
Annapolis graduation ewercises., he elaboratad on this 
theme: 

I ask each of you . . . te consider yourself a‏ موه 
purveyor cf information About the Mavy and about our‏ 
national need for ite continuance. Bavor get tired of‏ 
the repetition of this story, nor take it for granted‏ 
that it is already known to your listeners.‏ 

There are many barriers to each communication 
between the officers of the naval services anû the 
public but those barrierg must be leveled if wa mro not 
to return to tiw inerti& of the 20 ya&Bzs before the war 
on national Óefonse . . . yeu have /an/ obligation 
e o e tO constitute in yourselves one means of keeping 
the American public inferred of whet the Navy is and 
what ite needs are.27 

Thus, in tho summar of 1944 Forrestal undertook the 

education of the Havy' officer corps on the necessity for 
a continuing ami expansive public relations program on the 
Mavy*s behalf. In this effort, he enjoyed two advantages 
which Frank Knox did not possess. Firat, there was the 
dire threat posed by the merger plan. This alone gave the 
Secretary the attentive ears of the officers. Secondly, by 
this stage of the war, many of the naval aviaters who had 
sted their public relations inhibitions in the prewar fight 
against General Billy Mitchell and his supporters were now 
in positions of authority and influence in the Navy's 
leadership stxeucture. These officers--Admizals Marc 
Mitacher, R&@lph Ofatie, Arthur Radford, Thomas NH. Ronbins, 
,ملاک‎ andi Forxest Sherman &uonj others--wetre sore receptive 
to Forxestal'’s arguments then the older admirala had been 


to Knox's earlier admonitions., In the opinion of Vincent 


uan ona hire‏ مهه ART.‏ هم اه 








vato a + ay EC 


.2۔9 چو f‏ مي 
شش ور راب COM ce me tue tm ER ec umm‏ ود ور coo‏ 
© فص س amc‏ * ولت میدوس مروف روا لو 
وپ dirt‏ —— ——— 
ف — sw cc‏ سه سب و سه دنا 

شا — ود ہے — — ميو —— سے ےم 
سا سنہ مس ہا دیو it dD‏ ~~ 
دص aec meng ms ah ainda pokey athe wheel‏ 
اوس ۰ سس سم ہہ 
ا ووس بر سر بد سد سس نه عن هېه 

سشسيبت پټ سم ن نسوور 
دو fom a) alo Ake me^‏ 
A (e mam € am‏ 

















225 
Davia, a perceptible chango in tie attitude of Regular Navy 
officers to publie relations activities already was notics~ 


able in the epring of 1944.1? 


Another task facing Forrestal in the firat month 
after he became secretary waa to direct a Navy Court of 
inquiry into the Beaxl Harbor disaster. The President had 
appointec the Reberts Comaission io investigate the circum~ 
stances surrouncing the attack shortiv after it oveurred. 
This body had placed the ajor shere of blase for the lack 
of military rosčinesa before the attack on the Army and 
Navy commanders in Kawaii at the tine, Lieutenant General 
Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband Kismol. These officers 
Ware relieved cf their commaxis and had not been given any 
other assignments in the war. However, they continued to 
request an Opportunity to present their cases before duly 
constituted military courte-martial. Congress intervened 
in their behalf in May 1944, directing the Secretaries of 
War and Havy to conduct new investigations, 

The resulting Navy Court of Inquiry began holding 
hearings on July 246, 1944, ané conpieted its sessions in 
October Of that ,هد‎ It revarged the findings of زې‎ 
Roberts Comission, clearing the Havy of any blame in the 
disaster except for questioning the judgment of Admiral 
Harold C. Stork, Chief Of Kaval Operations at thes tive of 


Ar 








semm اتید‎ uis al M 

es amy miuus aded 4 ⸗⸗‏ خ+سمے مو یسم b.‏ 
ےر — att‏ اچرسنل مه سا 
—ôů —— — — e‏ 
·J — —‏ — 
وا مرب سز ہم سی سا ده سی و به بحم 

ana oon‏ عوسی ہے Pune Rs‏ ہی دس سم سنا 
semis mv un dam al ccm‏ نا مهوم سا سوا 
ء کک لسم سا صقل ما کسی ی د یل 
pm baa aas sumoo Liis — —‏ — — 
salii‏ ساسحا دم دی que) ot “was‏ — — 
RA‏ سی مہمی: یجس ہو 
۲ ۸4460 سم روه à apte mao‏ 
وھ ——— 
à uut run md 2a‏ نمل Dikimi aasi‏ 


























229 

the attack. The Army court cam to similar conclusions. 

Secratary Forrestal and the White House wanted to 
give wide poblicity to the findings of tha two courts. 
However, Aidmiral King objected strenuously on the basis 
that thís might lead inasévertentiy to the Japanese suspect~ 
ing that their military and Giplomatic codes had boen 
broken. King's view prevslled, ant complete information on 
the Hear] Marbor investigations was not made available to 
the public until after the war wes concisded, i? 


ny esion 
The Navy public reletions role in Operetion Cver- 





lerd, the invasion of France on June 6, 1944, was a 
Gomplicated one in that plans had to be coordinated with 
the British and the U.S. Army for embarking a large number 
ef correspondents in the invasion fleet. These reporters 
were to be briefed in advance and their copy had to be 
censored once they were aboard. Admiral Stark, the Xavy 
commander in Europe, requeateé from Secretery Knox several 
wenths earlier the personal assistance of Captain Lovette 
in directing these public relations oper at ions . 3° However, 
Lovette was not availeble, and the responaibility for 
supervising the Navy's efforts in this area remained in the 
hands of Lieutenent Commender Barcy Gingham, JSW, Admiral 
Stark's public relations officer, who before the war and 





after was publisher of the Louisvilic (Ky.) Gu 


7 
چو ems ame am e. A, ١‏ 
mre e‏ ص e o Rm‏ حسم سے رہ 
اول تو نداد ص دب "La. D S s‏ 
buma gaas (erika —‏ ووب مسار ند نقد وسواو 
اون یی مره اسا < -proma oami me‏ 
کی kar ace aldea mu queda Mac) pad‏ سم 
م اس دند تاا ما سواہ میس - 
Wu‏ د سب سم نو سب سس ہے Ghee‏ ساس ب 
دوو یوز bi‏ ووه نه M wie ex) ime‏ 
"- 











- هر یی سروس 

—— مت لو دوس سردي‎ embalm sihin r aff 4 - 

oom مي ې —" د :ہم‎ an 

وتا کیا نے Mm mela AA‏ ہے ہے مطل وس prie‏ 

وم سذ نحص QAUM‏ مس ےہ miine‏ د« )هوپ می 

mereg evel) «eel? 2E EE. 

f e‏ سح سور یی بس جين مو ووب 

Tw» ty (n d? ايسا‎ a quem vu) stmt A 

n) am‏ سی ہسپیہ وے ہم ہییہں کے وہہ 

شی سا اس سس 

العم ہہ رسرب مرب “Tamms tee‏ سو 

یي ویر هني وت c‏ مھ یہ زی 

ms a amy aren tnn i anime et gt it, wi 

em FD لېس‎ “ep 2mm à 

Ww * p cep الم کم‎ vt MAN s" 
Jamaat (pI sierra amt ve اه‎ ۹ 
























One of Binghen's assistants, Lieutenant Jay B. 
Smith, VSR, was assigned the primary daty of conducting 
the public relations briefings for the correspondents, 
According to Smith, these briofings were given on almost د‎ 
daily basis severa] weeks before the landings, partially as 
a device to deceive tha enemy as to the enact data for the 


operation. - 


These “faise alarm” sossions came to be 
recognizeó as such by the correspoments, who for the most 
part accepted them graciously if sot enthusiastically. 

When the time came for the actual final briefing to 
the press prior to embarkation, Bob Casey o£ the Chicago 
Tribune asked Smith to be excused for a owent to get his 
typewriter. Knowing the past history of the Tsibune fer 
receiving "signals" from itg reporters when something big 
wee About to happen, the tieutenant refused. Yn fact, ail 
Of the correspendenta wera immediately placed under guere 
&nd taken directly to the individual ships in which they 
were to be embarked. One writer, Ernest Hemingway, wes ill 
that day anc thus missed the initial coverage of the 
invagion. 

Commander Haroló 5. Say, the head of the Security 
Review Section in OPR, hai been dispatched by Secretary 
Knox to assist Admiral Stark in the handling of censorship 
for the Normandy eneration. Proeadures for censoring copy 
aboard ship, Say reported, were refined to the extent that 


2 


Very few problems or complaints were encountered, * in à 


انا 
E °‏ مهود( مسا wat mn‏ کہ 
mihe be yii yir — —— — —‏ 
ataa anuai n |‏ مت رف ⸗ — 
cm |‏ — —— 
جو ote Js a a‏ ہن [Diran nn‏ © 
الہ نه ضملے ققضص کی هذ نه اف aj u oe 3n‏ 
۱ ۳ بت لات کے یقت ol of wate‏ 
m—r———n —Ó—À!‏ 
* — ہے وخسنوس وم ۱۸ صد -Ti jind inimi‏ 
ee Ae BM. Il I I‏ 
ډوم عحهسمد سات >١‏ زه imeem. P GA Ueurim‏ له عا Ma‏ 
وی وو هه ےھ رف اهم هووب Lip fm 9 ier‏ 



















ھے_ 










231 
pre-D-D&y meeting with correspondents, public relatione 
officers and censors explained in detail what news could be 
Cleared and what could not. As a result, a Eaturday 
iveniag fast story of some 5,000 words was cabled back 
8hortiy after the beginning of the operation with only one 
word changed. 


A significant depacture from past censorship rules 





occurred at Normandy when Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay. the 
British commander of the naval operétions, allowed the 
namas of capital ships participating in the landing to be 
used by the correspondents. Ramesy told Sav, "The Germans 
ean tell these lé~inch snelis are not coming from 
destroyers, and thay can Ges the ships from their aixplanes 
anyway., GO why not identify the Tan., Axkansas., Nevada. 
Warepite, ete.2"°> 

Matters of real security were protected assiduously. 
however. Por lastence, no mention wags allowed in press 
copy of the artificial porte constructed by the Allies tc 
receive supplies. 

During the Normandy landings, ae at Tarawa, facil- 
ities Were svbilable board the AGO comman ships for con- 


Eentators to radio béck Cirect reports of the action. 





While the Normandy invasion was in progress, & task 
ferce of 535 ships, carrying some 130,000 Marine and Army 


troops, was enroute to the Mariana islamis to conduct 













د0د 
سه دا — Û„‏ — 
کر جط —ö‏ — — 
wees a Siia è sÊ œ aon mate Mu dm‏ 
سر me he‏ — — — — — 
— 
“⸗— کسید نس سا مر ein‏ 
Ques qu 5 ۹‏ مش فصصعه! ٥غه‏ دججدھ مس <- 
"m‏ 
umg gia aage e‏ د سس يمسم مه په 
Sh or Ol‏ — سست٠أم‏ پم)م «YAD‏ ہیں — 


















—— —— —— M ۰ | 

s —‏ سض سس = 

= silii ot gt amram efa Anila. a 
سس ا‎ 

— — p 

کک کے ی یی ف کن کے 
ale ve e s‏ سا Tuin‏ — — 


— و ست سی می نه لغ‎ ‘= oem 


a ia ےه ھک‎ 





— — 
سج‎ — — 
o éd n 





232 
landings on Saipan, Tinian and Guem. The first island to 
be invaded was Saipan on June i5. D-Day for Guam, 
originslly set for June 16, was postponed when a large 
Japansse naval force was sighted steaming eestward from the 
Philippines. The force was intercepted, and during the 
ensuing Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19-20, an 
overwhelwing defeat was administered te the Imperial Fleet 
by ghips and aircraft of tha U.S. Pifth Fleet. 24 

Guan and Tinian were invaded in July, and organiged 
enemy resistance on both islands ended in early August. 

The loss of the Marianas, representing a penetration by 
U.B. forces of the Japanese inner defense ring, resulted in 
the dewnfalli of the Tojo government, which had rulec Japan 
since before the wax. The victory gave the United States 
advanced naval and air bases within striking Gistance of 
the Japanese home isiands. Additionally. the defeat of the 
Japanese Navy in the Battle of the Philippine Gea virtually 
destroyed ita capability to interfere with future Allied 
operations in the Facific. 

While the Marianas campaign played a vital role in 
the ultimate victory in the Pacific, there was 8 growing 
feeling on the pert of Secretary Forragtal and others that 
MacArthur and the Arwy in tho Southwest Pacific wore out- 
flanking the Wavy on the publicity front. Even be fore 
Saipan fell. the Columbia, &.C. Bagerd took note of this 


Havy concern with a rather caustic comments 


ver 
ص عزوم ادد ما س إسم روز تد‎ 










وک و Aonaid aw‏ سا اجر eas‏ 
6 ۱ ۵۶ یلد اد ت پات اس بن 
bas adis |‏ سناسا تسس نم دا شتا ۱4 
1 وود سب r Ce Genin‏ بي عدوم "al‏ 
بي m eA‏ وتسا sas"‏ نس م سو —— 
رس od c wien‏ او s— vom 3) te‏ 
uci ba mol wm‏ هاا تن ماي ه ame‏ اوت یي 
نس هخښ وښ ساسا نه 
جا سب رنہ مرج وسم niae‏ سه روس وې 
طلست بپ وي دب هر دع الو موہ بے سوہ ü—‏ 
یوسمېېت 1:۳۵ atd 124P bo‏ مدعا ااام شو نو 
غه eee‏ اې تي شه ہو و 
کوت a Vp alie cm ord que‏ ان أووفى سه +ہنعسسری 
8۵ ۰4۸ ۱۵۱۱۲۰ لر many (dba cesi vnbnà‏ الى 
wis ¿‏ سد تک 

— اللہ ېو سب لس اا mies‏ نہ 
: “ بآ« 
له why‏ به تسب ۷۵۵۰ دا Umm (١‏ مي اسيم 
رو غه دې مج ca? a)‏ سی ابیونف we nu‏ 

ee |‏ مس ے ویر 

rass ye tne am فووا‎ lo 
— — i 


o a کک کے‎ — 
























—— 





233 


fhe Navy is beginning to be jealous of what it 
calls the srmy's “high-powered publicity setup. “ 
. « » But apparentiy the navy’'s only remeódy is to com 
plain of what the arsy is doing instead of making 
available navy information to correspondents. Por tim 
navy in itself responsible fer ita own bac press. It 
should have corrected this situation ieng ago. It 
ahouló correct it now instead of complaining. 25 


Priex te the Taxawa invasion im the fall of 1943. 
AGmical Nisitz had directed hia cow, 





Kers to cooperate 





fully with war correspondents and qiva command attention to 
the public relations aspects of furtheowing operations. 
Yet, film taken by civilian ani Mavy photographers et 
Saipan arrived in the United States too Late to be of 
timely use, and prese copy On the Operation also was 
Gelayed. Censorship officers stebsec away with the fleet 
while correspondents were left ashore for five days unehle 
to clear their atories. - In addition, as wes previously 
mentioned, Admiral Spruance imposed radio allence during 
the Sattls of the Philippine Ges, thus preventing the 
broadcast txranamittal of news reports. 

No evidence waa found to indicate that Admiral 
Spruanece in any way interfered with or discouraged public 
Seletions coverage of the Marianas’ caspeign other than to 
impose radio silence for security reasons. However, it is 
interesting to note thet the over-all commander for the 
operations in the Gilbert, Marshall and Mariana Islands, 
and later hfe Jina anû Okinawa, avoided personal publicity 
throughout his wartine service., “fhe name of Raymon’ 


uz 










یز o“‏ = د۸ 


A‏ و 
dm 0‏ ` 
ال لی یم موی وسسسم ننه منہ سیر دم بجی 
9 ءامسا ہہ مسستےمع ده موس 
9 0ًفً19پل< 

© arm سم ےتسب‎ "- survie ye sammy 
نفا دی س واا وټم چېا عم دنه سد دن‎ 
جک وسم‎ tim yas aa adr qA 

لف لاناک مه ںود سے — — 
له الف "beds ee‏ چم ۱2۸ا رھ حم ہہ پوس سد 
سک melas salad”‏ ہے اندب موس Aisi‏ 

acs ce eel 6‏ ذیر رسب ست سے یس دي 
مس سوہ 
——— 
يم )تكو سوب سه توه ae oe‏ ومنت 

i e sA we a ae Les 
aw aw — 

— elise e r mad — ad — 

1 — 

— —— — 





























m ا‎ 








234 

Spruance is known only vaguely to pany in connection with 
the Pacific War of 1941-45, aná too few cen ۵۵11 just 
what he did, or why they comenber the name at all. «27 

In contrest, the name &nd acconglisieents of 
Admiral Willian f. (Bull) Heisey in the Pacific are weli- 
known. Halsey had a colorful personality and a flair for 
the dramatic-~he mace good prass copy. Epruance, on the 
other hand, was a reserved, intellectual, almest withdraws 
individual. The news media experienced great difficulty 
in glameriging him. At one point, Spruance explained his 
reasons for shunning the spotlight to a classmate from the 
Naval Aeaódezy. His philosophy on this subject is suffi- 
ciently thought-provoking to merit wention in some detail: 


Personal publicity in a war cen be a Erawpack 
because it may affect @ man’s thinking. A commander 
may mot have sought it; it may have been forced upon 
his by sea@lous subordinates or imaginative war corre” 
syendents. Ones started, however, it is hard to keep 
in check. in the early days of a war, when little 
@bout the various commanders ig knewn to the public, 
ani gome Aémiral or General Cocs & good and perhaps 
spectacular job, he gets a head start in publicity. 
Anything he Goes thereafter tande teward greater head< 
line value than the same thing done by others, 
following the journalistic rule that "Names maxe news," 
Thus his reputation snow-balls, &nó soon, probabiy 
againgt his wlll, he has boconse & colorful figure, 
exedites with fabulous characteristics over ari above 
the competence in war coweand for which he has been 
conditioning himself ali his life. 

His feme may not have gone to his head, but thare 
is nevertholess danger in this. Should he get ta 
identifying himself with the figure as publicized, he 
may subconsciously start thinking in terms of what hia 
ceputsties calia for, rather than of how beet to meat 
the setual problem confronting him. A men's judgment 
ia best when he can forgot himself and any reputation 
he may have acquired, and can concentrate wholly on 


Bee 
4623 CALAREACER ni gaw ed (nsn Wine اس‎ 
نم سر خی سز یہ‎ Das e Ae pet BLEUE 
—€——— L0 5 o “a 
ماد ہے سل‎ wed al تنكل اللہ 7 اسنا مقر‎ 
نه‎ aint وی اد سای سا د‎ l M E . ۱ 
so m a a — — اد‎ 
اادد اسن ی باتوی‎ a a a a 

















235 
making the right decisions. Wenca, if he seens to give 
intesviewers and publicity wen tho brush-off, it is sot 
threugh ungracionusness, but rather to keep his thinking 
impersonal and realistic. 2 

Gporuance did erect definite barriers for the press 
when it came to granting interviews or discussing his role 
in the war. For instance, when he was Chief of Staff to 
Aémiral Nimitz during the interim períod between his 
command of naval forces during the Battle of Midway anc the 
Tarawa landing, he conducted interviews from à stand-up Cesk 
with no chairs for visitors.  Beedless to aay. under these 
conditions, "few loitored sn time wasg conaezvec, "7? 

irrespective of Admiral Spruence’s personal ideas 
on publicity, the public relations efforts of the Navy were 
to be concentrated for the remainder of the war on events 
in the Pacific, sinco its role in the Atlantic and European 
theaters was now one primarily of support. In the gunner 
of 1944, however, there was considerable diasatiefection 
in many quarters of the sean service over the Pacific 


Fleat'a handling of public relations. 





This dissatisfaction actually surfaced esrlier in 
the yeas. In the spring of 1944, Emmett Crozier, B writer 
for the New York ius, Conducted an informal survey at the 
request of Assistant Secretary Gates into ways in which 
naval aviatien news and information services could be 
improved. In the course of nis inquiry, Crozier talked to 










eim سے ها اووس سال‎ w o8 
ني‎ Lees th Pe بس‎ ae (mde RUE AU" 
454 امام سان بهت فهک په تمد ننس‎ 

bo Num‏ ما هنس اشم ةع په سردا Ta‏ اجتعسر سا رس 
آسوعنئ هغ eel RÎ mmc‏ ونت د نې ده 
oe d‏ عم ی می ند عم ووي eme‏ 
د ېټوب پا مت ——— — 
بس یوسرےه سا ع لست +الكسلانة fe‏ ہم سن eru‏ 
وسوا سا انه نے مسا دو ہجو یسه نت وموں 
یو inisin ate‏ ولعت لالع دنله نا کلم —— — 


یں — — سپوسی تد — 





















— — — —— a رز ےو‎ 
p ی‎ nea "a 
dpi E = 

لاك aaa ea A eR‏ سورس ب 
Vc |‏ تلقنت سود اساسا د سكاس 
| 1 مه رم اوت همسجم ور هت 
a‏ ——— 











gem 








236 
gixntean newspapermen and naval officers who had been in 
frequent contact with the Yvacific Flest public relations 





office in Honolulu. In the opinion ef those interviewed, 
Navy public relationa in the Pacific left much to be 
desired through iMi and most of i945. The primary com 
plaints xevolved around "needless" delay of press copy undi 
photographs ani “unreasonable and arbitrary” censorship. 
As a result, there was considerable bitterness and tension 
in the relationship ketween the press and the fleet public 
relations officer. At one time, Crozder learned, certain 
members Of the press corps in Hooolulu actually decided to 
boycott the Navy in the Pacific by writing ne stories at 
 &11 about its activities, but their hom offices objected. 
Crosier concliimied that while conditions had improved since 
the fall of 1943, the public relations situation in the 
Pacific wea still very bad. 2% 

Going far afield from his criginal assignuent. te 
study aviation publicity, the New York Limas writer leveled 
a strong indictment against the Mevy’s public relations 
efforts in general. Se claimed that “there is no clear 
conception at this critical period in the war of the Navy's 
informational ebligation toe the American people or of the 
soumi advantages to the KAY of an onlightened. constructive 
public relations policy.“ Ho described the sea service's 
publie relations office as being that of a "cogoperating, 
not an originating agency,” ani added, "It is by turns 








ai 

— — — 
sr‏ 
او fa "Uni mS "E Ae‏ سمه اسو احا 
e a SO ES‏ 
ا با بت بے eo yor a +e‏ 
هسر مساب یمم اسم مه نم = aes YE rere‏ 
۵ د 'ووومنوسښتاله هذا مكلف Cota‏ کد صو او 
او و سس مت سو متفه شام لوسو وم وسور 
wm pang cii eee‏ يی جع وی 
sd acp GA 4‏ دد لم ەد 
قو د« به ووس سو a oshish lisma iisipan ah‏ 
mia mi youn wo‏ الال اي ماي ص sairam‏ "© 
د د موو عمې ډو نوم camel pind? fed‏ واتاوو ore ae‏ 
veida‏ — ایا um acd P mon‏ —— —— 
٥‏ مد اهف خا ew ualde‏ ورس cd sedan‏ اب 
Siad guo iiin gi‏ 
⸗ — - 
1 عنم amd Oj ee wa Coie‏ ریم ناس 
سنلیب اوہہ تاد نف تمہت مجغغل مس 
ودوم ته وسیسد جو — دوس اتس نه ہپ اس 
اد د ا کدف فد له ب ت در مي صم 
































= 


237 
modest, loo’. secretive and arrogant in its dealings with 
the press, radio ané public.” Me continued: 
The Heavy has failed to give the American people a 
clear, comprehensive picture of its work and ite 
problems. it has failed to tell, ex permit others te 
tell, the human story of the men who are fighting and 
dying in ite service. it has failed to tell, . . . the 
great story of naval air power. 
If the American pecple sit by impaseiveiy efter tho 
war while the Navy's a@ir arm is wrenched away .. . the 
blame çan be 1aid squarely on the present lack of z 
eonstructive public relations policy in the Navy. 
Croziar‘’s harsh en&lysis seere to have had a 
profound effect on Forrestal’s direction of the Navy's 
publie relations program durin; the final phase of the wer. 
in future correspondence am discussions dealing with the 
subject, the secretary continuslly stressed tho themes 
keyneted in the report to Secretary Gates. Me algse impie- 
mented many of the apeeific recammendations made by the Mew 
Work Tinga staffer for improving the Nevy’s inace. 

In June 1944, Forrestal wrote to Admiral Merrill 
outlining his ideas for possible chanyesa in the و یه‎ 
public relations program. 81 


Waldo Drake be repléced aa Pacific Flest public relations 


He cecivemended that Captain 


efficer by س‎ "vounger, more vigorous officer" and that some 
of the “abie young" public relations officers in Washington 
and Londen ke sent to the Pacific. “I believe our publie 
relations team in the Pacific should be the best wa have 
anywhere.“ He believed, too, that it was tine for the Navy 
to urge the rews media to seng thoir best reporters and 
photographers to the Pacific aren, “With a few exceptions 


۱ . 
djir ma a) u j'en Vot 





T 
siyan ms e momma sams na rete à 
S M qe seem Dit m ne cene enira انر‎ 
"oL wit ې‎ sem و جم ری‎ gr rman ml si سم‎ 
end ot ed sie anl mme adi hemn ووهه مخ نا نه‎ 
—— ا ستہہے لیمینس لو ټس له جج‎ 
وی ہے اساسا با ص ارد‎ [dd prt n arm e 
e qr a ad GO aê Cian RÊ RESO eM, 
ai fhe) © ° ١× 
ول ده ۱۲ اناد‎ terit هگن‎ mt temm) amd چ‎ 


2 چو تہ 


— سا دہ 


TE E 
— es ot tame افيه‎ 

oan ot) om oll om al سم‎ 
سا‎ n 
٣ o |. 


D‏ - نع 






















PS — 


236 
they have sent their seconü-string men to the Pacific." 
for the Washington public relations effice., he hai 
the following suggestions: 


(1) Met up/ a small staff of excellent reporters, 
Officers skilled in eliciting end eynthesizing facets. 

Z heave in mind thet they will handle BSpocial projects 
whieh wili sccur to you and me from time to time. 

(2) A vary small graphics section should be set up Lto 
produce/ . . . presentations fer Congxyeass es well as 
the public cf the Navy budget, its building programs 
amd pergonnel trencs. 

(3) We should consider actually making in the Navy, not 
turning over te movie companies, shout six Navy docu- 
mentary films & year. 

(4) Books on Navy actions ghoulé ag security permits be 
alioweü to cover current actions. 





the eecretary concluded by saying, "The success of 
public relations Gopencs on the excellence of its staff. 2 
think we should continues to insist upon the best possible 
officers. releasing any who fall Lelow standar.” He 
particularly was interested in the quality əf public rela- 
tions personnel as opposed te quantity, emphasising chat 
any inerease in numbers of people should be avoidad. 

The nmemorenówuwa was a forerunner of many letters and 
other correspendernce by Forreatal which dealt in great 
detail with specific procedures ané activities in public 
relations. It definitely signaled his intention to exer- 
cise personal direction over the Navy's entire information 


Progr an. 





In iate July 1944, Admiral Merrill neadec an eight 


man inspection team sent to the Pacific by Secretary 








ati 
pam ao cn amm pinima piatt man mad ۔ وج‎ 

tee c ua mide sáb Apan په هم‎ 2 

— — | 













M — گیا تسد‎ 
رجا ولو‎ Aai 
هم ېو وت کا‎ 1 1 —— . 
IOo Aena وہ نی‎ enti. 
sagan مج دن سے‎ miei Rs یں نس‎ 108 
e mee ایا سی اسرد‎ uh ale e em 
“oe «lg So UI wi A) Mumpguhal te oic Er 
s سچواسناواص‎ cpi نک سه وب »» مسا‎ 
اه سوسنضدل‎ Alsat sipiy JE حم نسنټ تم موی‎ 

eee ^ 3‏ رج me cua) el qe 5o amount‏ 
Wilh‏ وسم تی مود بح aka‏ ہر سد 
قفا له وماد وت عد سا رن له وساف 
صسصسسس<<< 
هه سو اسای ص ور وو ووس 












1٢ ہمے‎ 





229 

Porrestal to explore ways to speed the flow of press copy 
and filz fros the ocbet zones. Accompanying him were 
George Haaly, ONI's cemeastic director; Rey Macklend, a 
vepresentative of the Still Picture Pool; Major John Dillon, 
0885, who replace Frank Masen as Special Assistant for 
Public Relations to the Secretary of the Wavy shortly after 
Frank Knox ied (Mr, Manson returned to New York to give 
full-time attention to his position as vice-president of 
uc?) ب‎ three officers from OPR-~including J. Herrison 
Hartley. the head of the Radio Section, who recently had 
received a lieutenant commander's commisaion in the navel 
regerve--and s Msvy radio technician. 

With the full backing of the secretary. Merrill was 
able to gain Admiral Simitz’ approval fer the following 
innovativo measures in future operations: 


(1) Plane service would be established between the 
command ahig and Guam as soon after D-Day as the mili- 
tary situation and weather conditions permit. Copy and 
photographs would pe censored aboarc the flagship ane 
then flown from Guam to the United States via regular 
air naill service, without having te be censored at 
Pearl Harber ag had been the casa in the past. This 
procedure would make it possible te sliver film and 
eateries to the Fast Coast within twenty-four hours 
after release irom the flagship. 

(2) in order to provides for daily radio voice broed- 
casts from the scene of action, @ pertable transmitter 
would be instulied in the cosmend ship for transmission 
of a five-minute newscast each day, which would be re- 
transeittec over a high-powered transmitter from Guam 
fer further نای‎ to the mainland vía Peeri Harbor, 

(3) Facilities for shore press headquarters, to inciude 
censorship capabilities, would be set up په‎ soon after 
D-Day &s the military situation peraitted. 33 





en 
—— 
بسسس‌نم باه سم‎ aao — اول وھ رف‎ B 
سس‎ angg 
omoliàf ey. (AR jrd meni 170٤ al Pa a amay 
هد اف مس ہی ومس ته سیر نمی ند په‎ 
xana vials Quad ab» ٨١ بات نې‎ D hlad 
۳ 

»ات دسا eld vi‏ :نھ سے نویه 10 
١‏ .- مسان 

قو صا له سه وز مد شا دایص بات bam vIlem‏ 
s'annanna aair] d aim‏ سامت له Gamma m‏ 
ع E Jm‏ نے LL «ff‏ — سم 
طیلع ap‏ ردو کروی ناد یی وم رس لال 
—— س سي E‏ 



















— | 


240 

The mejor changes from past precedures in the new 
plans were the arrangements for radio bremicaests and 
special praes planes, and the provisions for censoring copy 
et the ecene of the operation rather than at fleet heai~ 
Quarters. 

Two studios were to be constructed to handie the 
broadcasts fros the forward areas, OM at Fear] Berbor snd 
the other at Guam. Beth facilities were to be equipped 
with disc recorders; and the studio sz Sunn was to be used 
for voice bronüemst, filing press copy and radio picture 
tranatíisgion. The Guam station algo would serve as & baga 
for network correspondents ani recording temis., The Rawy 
start which hanóled radio coverage of the Normandy isncingk 
was to be tranafersed to Guam to ogerate the studio there, 
with Lieutenant Coucander Hartiey remaining in the Pacific 
to supervise the installations anóí the b5eginnaning of oper&- 
tions. A target date of early September wee set for the 
completion of facilities. 

in order to ensure uniformity in the new censorship 
procedures, a aystenm of rotating officers between the 
Security Review Secticn in OPR anc the Pacific Fiset 
Censorship Office on a 50-day temporary exchange of duty 
basis was initiated.“ 

Certain procedures were left unchanged after 
considerable Giscussion between Admirals Merrill ani Nimitz. 
The present policy of met accrediting women correapondents 


"n 
e- ms u پس وووحسےے‎ 3 — ٢ 
مد‎ co e ame! dp de. —— — 
e las پت ند‎ 
— — — 









— ہت c4 O/ Com "t‏ سج لے o’‏ لیماف ہے 
SS ———— d‏ ومر مو مس 
hemebebm nó b) AA mtm em -— ". o» ab‏ 
ies quib dil‏ چو حم وسات Wr‏ کوس Uu adm‏ نو سے 
ama eae TU‏ تل اعم واد سے سد دس ولس 
et An o E a‏ سید et = oe‏ 
— —— — — — — 
د به ده هو ——— وس ټی 
zano ee‏ ی امد میس صحلحنےم نه رض بيحارت 


















— |! 
m 
س‎ - - 


پر سس 
e |‏ س حسے رت 
an‏ —— وغه qm tema CoL‏ 








241 
to the Pacific Fleet would continue because of the lack of 
preper facilities, partieularly in the forward areas. And 
any decision to allow the use of the names of combat ships 
&nü personnel in news rele&ses 8nd prass cOpy was to be 
referreó to Admiral King for consideration, It also waa 
decided to continue the simultaneous release of CIMOPAC 
comuuniques at Pearl Harber and Washington. 

in forwarding Admiral Merrill's roport on the 
Pacific trip to Forrestal, Eugene 6. DoffielO, a stafi 
assistant to thes secretary, expreasad his opinion that 
Gubstantial rosults haü been achieved. However, Duffield 
cautioned that "we cannot rest on our laurels /becausg/ 
MacArthur is fitting out a special press ship <. . . his 
whole unit will be cos the scene whereas we are dependent on 
& plane courier service at the discretion of the 21 
commander, 5 

area in which Merrill was unsuccessful in gain”‏ مون 
ing Admiral Nimitz’ approvai concerned the replacement of‏ 
Captain Drake ag Pacific Fleet public relations officer.‏ 
Captain Levette had warned Merrill that Nimitz was extremely‏ 
fond of Drake and very appreciative of the fact that he had‏ 


436 However, after confer- 


“taken most of the early knocks. 
ring personally with Drake in Washington in Septerber 1944, 
Secretary Forrestal wrote to Nimitz thet he definitely had 
Gecidad to make a change, ?? The secretary apologized to 


the admiral for hia action by stating, "I realize fully 













f^t 
Pe و وب دہ وس سج یمم محمد ےد ماد تسم‎ 
ےت‎ Jua am Uwe; یواد انم پس جېر)ولم ان ےہ‎ 
سک دوک سس بات موہ‎ SA a ال دوو‎ 
ہعم مو ۔‎ yp assag Da bp*waelos ses سس په‎ 
کیہ‎ <6 essal wnai leis oir amire وہ‎ 
— — مت ومع‎ 

4 — مجود: ہمہ air‏ 
on ADA‏ مدا وښ 3 «Mimi‏ هم وه ملا 
قوقاه ده سس 
د ۸۸۵0 تھا سس hU vua oC borai‏ 
سیر on emi e‏ حم مب اعصله asl,‏ 


سی حم ..— Gifs moog [aD‏ ۔ ۔ . 834 
rhe as‏ مزح ہو ہو میٹ ویو مدع مم wm mmg <a‏ 


besal mis to عم ہہ خاستم نی‎ vblro m uianga و هخه‎ 








-T 





—— مر مدا‎ tet 


— — LJ 





242 
that . . 4. CONTE should have the untrameried right to 
pick their own subordinates." Ue justified hie interíer- 
ence on the basis of the vital importance of publie rea~ 
tions at this stage of the war, claiming thet it had two 
aspects--"ths tre&tuent of news ln the action theater .. » 
and the results in this country." Se aided, “You, of 
course, are the judge of the first; it is our responsibility 
back here to judge the second. " 

On October 19, Forrestal messaged Admiral Nimitz 
that he had procured an assignernt for Captain Drake with 
GWI and that Captain Harold B, (Kin) Miller, USM, former 
head of the Bureau of Aeronautics Training and Literature 
Section who had bean assigned a month earlier as Pecific 
Fleet Photographic Officer, was to be his relief. ^ 





in late August 1944, Admiral Nimitz began to imple- 
ment the improvements agreed upon in his díscussions with 
Admiral Merrill. In & lettor to the Comuander, Third Piset, 
he stated thet public relations officers from his staff 
weule be assignec te the task force commanders of forth~ 
coming amphibiovs oper&tions for the purpose of censoring 


39 Ae to broadcasts, he instituted 


anë releasing press copy. 
an even more liberal policy than had been called for in the 
plans. Civilian correspondents would be allowed to 


transmit two five-minute voices newecasts daily via neva) 


٤ 
رو مہ‎ Mimar ml rr Melê donian o p 
هم حسنلکمي " هس اسصائطلنة نيذه اود‎ 
TALAR alja یہ ىر‎ [eels see ١6 د سه‎ 
— R3 ONU AT NU 
|o. WabeeK) mÀAPU شه‎ 14 ewes ia موم معوستر‎ 
T 2 LN". 1 PT" L1 
vallrdiamesawa له سه‎ Û | موي ود به‎ lp مور‎ 
-D سم سسب نه رفوه مه‎ 
بي مښتاب ټی‎ lapsai jC pee . , .ب‎ 
diis s chupa >e teerpimno cy bewocyg bad si 
LE NT | د‎ a a ره‎ 
سودرف اا اسامي مها بسن‎ ko وہ‎ mir Jn نم‎ 
TS OES Apta Lu کچھ هپرو‎ 
V ation wie wow WM s نو لننسند‎ bun 


OOO‏ زم ai ayot‏ بپ ته اچي)ب- 
seg berry déc mmo edi mum‏ لك كله 9لیخهدشحو dide‏ 
MISMA‏ ا ` shiva ê‏ ذه نے جہسےب. ۷۵۸۵ reels‏ 
muhyleóó i‏ ہے اش ہف سوب شاه h‏ و 
سیا were! ia eoa‏ 
ممطب سې." غو ہے .مه کنو 
دا امو و ar PN UE‏ 
LESE i‏ 
سس iren gas Ua‏ 


د m‏ سے ہپ 4 o‏ - — 





































243 
radio from the assault expaditionary flagships, anû newe” 
casts also were to be originated from shore-based neval 
yedio facilities La the ferwaré areas. Written press copy, 
tog, would be sent over naval communications circuits as 
operational massaga traffic permitted. Media representa- 
tives were to be afforded the seme sessing anc berthing 
facilities as commiasioned officers and would be landed with 
tha troops &fter the fifth asmecit wave. 

Shortly afters this implementing directive, Secve~ 
tary Forrestal proposed still &nother innovative public 
velations megsure to Nimitz, The secretary expressed his 
desire te embark in ss many ships as possible neval officers 
"who ars c&gpable of writing for prompt release àn account 
of that ship's action." Ü these officera would not dupli- 
cate the afforts of civilian war correspondents--since, in 
most cases, they wers to be placed on ships which had no 
Rewemen Shoarc. In meny respects, the plan was patterned 





after the Marine Corps condat correspondents system, except 
that 211 materiel written by the Navy officers would be 
forwarded to the Fleet public releticns office for use by 
the accredited civilian correspondents rather then being 
released by the Savy directiy. 

in explaining to Nimits bis reasons for wanting 
publicity on virtually every ship in the Pacific, Forrestal 
again voiced his conc 





orn About postwar unification plane: 





وس 

فا int Qe pania bar wp mes‏ سپ 
ansan‏ وعم -ee‏ سی سس bano reon‏ رسہ۱ 
Ai dh‏ ېم یہب a‏ سسب cge sar mi‏ 
سو w ariris uaaa Da e ua i‏ 
Donotique‏ هی با ag‏ سیه وھی ہے۔- 
Needle oe aT ome N‏ دی ہے miia ha piam‏ 
ةافعم یف وس شس Aiii baat bt biboy e sabe‏ 
ewes ee‏ عب o cina i‏ 

e mah mà haa gud ales veh Ure‏ تمع 
موه Arena‏ وویم eed woe) adumes (ida‏ ورل 
هاس oiui u mt‏ په el mapa ü—‏ 
"P «imb‏ — تفت سا ü—‏ 
ون او جفہہورو ون عمو دی ce modes soy‏ سس 
و شي av Ae cmm onis‏ شب Wee‏ ېد پور 
"T"—————— ANE i ati‏ 
seam qai) mem Fun‏ *- مه bed Civ mod ıa tamig‏ ون 
a) ums qm o do qr‏ جم وی حم banen‏ 
ووه نت قسات ضصوب ہہ مہو ہد نے — — 


ميو سوط لب ساد mi piam‏ 


uiis sud? ab t‏ زی نے ادس په وم )ی 



















244 

Z would not impose this task upen you except for my 

compelling conviction thet the future existence of the 
Kavy as an independent military organization depends 
upon the public's appreciation of the Navy curing the 
next &everal months . . . . The people at hows, who 
cannot see & single Navy ship or plane let alone 
imagine a task foroe in action, sey receive & vary 
iebalanceG picture in which the Navy eeems to be only 
the transportation servise to the beachhead, And these 
people, through their representatives, will decide . . . 
whether the Wavy is to be consolidated out of 
existence, | 

For this reason alone i commend for your very 

serious consideration the whole subject ef public 
reistiona and particularily the new proposal suggestec 
in this letter. 

A week later the secretary elaborated on his views 
in another communication to the Pacific Fleet commander: 
"Whether we like it or net, there is no question but thet 
the Army, through its great sige and ite multiple avanues 
of communication and the aggressive publicity actions of 
the Air Forces, has hed a profound effect on public 
opinion. 44 He pointed out that other interests wore often 
dominant in certain theaters in which the Savy operated. 
For aexáuple, Machrthur in the Southwest Pacific arc the 
British in the Mediterr&ne&n . . . "not through any 
conscious desire to be unfair bet just in the very nature 
of husran beings, have certainly not been active in enphagiz~ 
ing the Amwexican Wavy’s part im the war.” 

Forrestal admitted that there was no easy solution 
for the Mavy's public relations problems . . . "but i an 
writing to you in this detail, as i have talked to Admiral 


King, because Il consider it part of my duty to interpret 





د سلا رت کا کچ و رامس نه اہو ہب 
و ot coldness‏ عات فم نه الس دوسا 

کس الت اه جد على سوه ذه ar‏ ات تا تا wa‏ 

— P 

RE‏ تد تج 

1 الله سیق سر a ad‏ سے رف بك ان 

و ۴ ف کہ مع مم تحص ماد ووس 
سم al‏ نل سم نم ټصضط اك سب د همف 





















245 
fox you the drift of public opinion." He reiterated Lis 
belíef that a5 this time the pubiic was overwhelmingly in 
favor QE a single department of defense, &àanó he urged an 
ali-ocut Navy Sttewet to reverse the trendi 

The time is late to effect & change but I believe we 
should make the effort, and I think the start must be 
in a change of attitude whieh reaches from the 
Commander in Chief down to the skipper of the smallest 
landing eraft, to the effect thet we shali do our best 
to: (a) earn the good will of the presse as indivicuals; 
(b) make constructive use in every possible way of 
whatever media ere available te see that tha facie of 
the Navy's accomplishments are transmitted to the 

le. » » o Qll hands meed to be indoctrinated with 

the idea that intelligent transmission of news ia as 
much a part of war today as either training or 
iegistics. 

in response, Admiral Nimitz, on Beptember 10, 
directed hia subordinate commanders to assign quelilficc 
Gofficera in their units to “prepare narrative accounts of 
their ship'g action, and any other material considered 
newsworthy. 452 Significantly, he explained that the 
improvement in the Allied position in the Pacific now made 
ít possible for a more complete secount of Navy operations 
to be givan--since security was no longer aa vital a 
consideration. 

On September 30, 1944, Admiral King, at Secretary 
Forreestal’s request, instructed all fleet commanders in the 
Navy to include in their future operation plans eani orders 
@ public relations annex “to systematize ami clarify 
arrangesents for news services. „43 Although King felt it 


incumbent upon himself to add te bis directive the warning. 








ر هم | 
ae o e: mio wid bath‏ خاء۔ 
8 نہ ۱۸ ^« e‏ چوہے سوت la arsooms‏ 
اقشاع داو ooi rw‏ بط ټې ویب ہد رز كسم سعد 

me reit Mar Oe سه‎ ee وای‎ . 
موه‎ ams dA T me^ ah وسانتم‎ l^ wm 
— تھی می‎ As Jae — ve 


wm men AR‏ سد نه اندوع م 


که ینس پس سو دندز حاص 99 pauso‏ 

0 ار al sicker teeth bia Saree!‏ سی 
| — — — 
beets mre |‏ 


- په 
سو ردد 9 ميس ادا لل سا 
شس — سے بی دا ہر 





















246 
"Nothing in the foregoing is to be cenatrued es authorizing 
any celanation in standards of necurity,” the step was an 
extremely important one. Mot only did it require tam 
foree cowmendera te plan in advance the information sepects 
of an opezation, Lut it &15so placed pon them 5 direct 
written responsibility for the propor conduct of combat 
public relations coverage. 

ia concert with his desiro to facilitate news 

coverage from the Pacific, Forrestel strongly believed that 
the war there needed core ^jCpersonalizing"--that it was 
remote mentally as well as gecgr&phic&lly to the Americen 
people. “The sons, husbands and brothers who serve there 
&ppoar to their صمصددادمه#‎ to have Gissppeárec into a void 
containing nothing but a series o£ strange placo names. 4 
The secretary's earlier suggestion to Himite to place naval 
officers on ships as combat correspondents was in pact an 
attempt to incre&se the number of “personal experience” 
stories about the Wavymen in the Pacific. He also planned 
in October 1944 to dispatch to Peacl Harbor a close friend, 
Mr. J. W. Martin, president of Advertisers Servioss, In., 
of Hilweukee, to discugs with Admiral Wisitz & proposed 
system fer “collecting and distributing to small home town 
hewsphorera--storioes bout. the boys in the Bavy from those 
peppers’ areas.” Ne. Martin had worked en a similear program 
in World War I at Grant Lakes, 111., Haval Training Station. 


bi 
timi sete سي اس نه دو نه مسر نو عن‎ chí ودي ار‎ 
هه‎ ab ele ade "rr usen T د دم ےم مس‎ 
رهد‎ himet d) tab سم سن‎ oe ee CRS 
asc nad mam) cC nee hé sd moo e uu O: 
à— ·— — — دم‎ ۸2 Pes — ia 
— وي سرو‎ 8 
wo — C — MÀ 
ہس مس زوس‎ as دن هد و دندز‎ ec yiii می‎ 
hier 6 ated به پوس واموسمسومط‎ nabii وس‎ Rf adag 
a a o aC ااا العا‎ 
ادا هنت نه وسم بی وع مسما‎ ٦+٦۷ 
ra maq ak ane senin mê û aA مغ‎ ٧۴-٨۰٢پاو#‎ 
——— P A pr a 
ee ee ہآ —— — دس موس ای غو‎ 
. ور سح و اروس لاه هه‎ of diaBqnAA D) BAL aere m. 
وصنمہ ےسبنسی وی‎ ha asias eA —— 
سمسمم‎ o chmid baim AI“ یوعد‎ yr paii 
مو‎ 
admi) سی بد يږ د موي دې‎ OD — 
"arpew) 4 
فان إن لفلف ناک‎ 7 




























ا 


247 





With the mandate provided by the Secretary of the 
Xavy, the public relations organization and operétions in 
the Pacific began à period of accelerated expansion in the 
fall of 1944. In addition to the sophisticated broadcast- 
dng facilities discussed earlier, a special auditorium for 
press conferences and buildings to house corresponcents and 
Cantor were constructed on Guam ag part of the new 
advanced fleat public relations office there. A buildup in 
personual actually hg begun earlier. By September 1, 
1944, there were thirteen full-time public relations 
officers assigned to the Pacific Fleet staff and eight 
others on duty in forward arcas and with task force com- 
manders. Seven more officers were added to Captain 
Hilier's headquarters public relations section in September 
ami early Ostebe:s. But this was oniy @ modeat baginning. 
By war's esd, there were 90 officers amit 250 enlistec men 
in the Pacific Fleet public relations section iteelf and 
ever 400 officers serving full-time in public relations 
throughout the Pacific. 

in personali letters to Admiral Merrill in the fall 
of 1944. Captain Miller spelled out his plans for using 


these personne. *° 


There were to he experlenceé public 
relations officers in the Third, Fifth and Seventh Fleet 
Commaánd$, 8&8 well ae with the suberdinate division com 


maners Within those fleets. The primary function of the 












vac 
ee 
ووو‎ fr aA me e aia aw mi: OOF — 
ü ۳-7 
دو به نف هساک سی‎ aiai at ګرا هټ اقنفل.‎ 
uu LO A oe eee ee. a 
— — — — — وغه ساسعسصتو ها اد دا‎ 
ea wi o 4e. - eu ا که‎ eee ee ae 
"ILL oui 
ي.‎ --—M— h اطعصت سممورل ہہ وحم ولیہ‎ 
یدود سے عبر‎ cue? نمی‎ amo «] Owiame "isa 
دص سب فدہ سے‎ las ANO. 



























⸗ — 
4 ووسر غووودسبت چم هدمه اراز نه مس مځ 

às Cesta ami OU vue جو‎ 
m ir mamo peun A ene ch 






B 


245 





efficer in each division commend would be to keep the 
eivilian war correspondents properly cistributed on the 

four ehipe within his Givision. In this way, “We sheuid 
have no difficulty in insuring thet ne Leic/ ship of the 
fleet is overioaded to tha extent that & commanding officer 
concludes that War Correspendents aro a nuisance,“ said 
Hiller. 

A crucial etep umiertaxen »y the captain was the 
"education" o£ senior operational officers on tha necessity 
ami value of public xelstions efforts. “I have begun the 
practice of showing films te the daily 3 e*clock conferente 
of Admirals, Generals. etc. and they cat it up. We have 
been fortunate in showing soma of the combat pictures whieh 
the senior officers never knew existed.“ 

The censorship arû public relations functions in 
the Pacific were separated in the fail of 13944, ending the 
“plit personality” of public relations that had existed 
Since the beginning of the war. A special censorship 
Section was established on Admiral Ninits' staff, arû the 
number of censorship officers in the fleet was increased 
six“ fold to handle tha screening of press copy from the 
compat zoneg.  Aecording to Captain Miller, public xelations 
tem@ined in a "strong position to ínfluence censorship and 
we have liberalised their policy in a@leost every way.” 

By Novenber i, the empanied radic facilities in the 





a‏ س کات وت موه توب رساي مو ولب 
WM‏ سک ما نن ena‏ و ورت سن میں ھی 
wd 8‏ ۹ کس رس «zb we eO» m‏ 
8 اه تیه ۸0 ئي مس جے: × مصصس صن اد 
کم سف wm‏ همت Ames Unnin 6 oe‏ 
—-L‏ 

۳ ا27 وو مهست )حك رسیم ہے بف 
ویب Ke‏ میټ wt We‏ بد سن ری 
are, & ai WM‏ ات با ان ...لا u ay ww‏ 








ari ماسم‎ W pies sh) uy تا الي‎ Du ایت‎ 
عه و هم‎ — — — 
mis robat eds a ja a pi i A فا‎ 
"ed 
















ت سات اس استاس د( بصت as ewm que‏ 

aoit: رس ښپ‎ ۱ 
——— áÀ 
+ me ته فیس ووس‎ ilog U 

sihn my?‏ ار دا اس نه سي 


Ww‏ یی کچ رر T OOOO‏ سے 







E 


249 
Paeific already were paying dividends in the form of 
widitionai coverage 2n this medium At this tine, under 
the continued direction of Lieutenant Comaander Haxtiey, 
the Pacific Fleet bromicasting station at Pearl Harbor was 
producing about Sorty prograus per week. Captain Milles 
&lso ned Keen abie to Obtain an agxeement from Admiral 
Halsey cO use the battleship iowa for transmission of 
direct radio broacasts curing future campaigns. Admiral 
$pruaànce, ücwWever, remalnaod alAmantiy Opposed to breaking 
zadio siience to reléey presse copy; anû Xiller roportoc that 
^it is going to be very Giffieult te plead ant prove our 
Cause with Syr uence. * 

The Pacific Pleet public relations officer was 
receiving fuii cooperation, though. fron Admiral Mimite and 
his chief of operations, kear Paüsirail Forrest Sherman. 
Sherman briefed the wedia representatives on what waa to 
take place three or four days in advaneae of each forth 
cuming event. The support fron the top echelon of command 
prompted Hillier to observo, “There is little question but 
that in the past there have heen many smiles cast in our 
dixection. i believe that in the past six weeks we have 
preven that this is a gerieus job which is closely allied 
With the totai war effort." Ne cited as One example of the 
new attitude on the part of the operators the inet that 


ill Baidwin of the Glue Network was allowed te embark in a 


Ore 
نهب م‎ af: 2) لصحف‎ ques — — نون‎ 
i-——— i4 M — دفعق امه ونیو نے ایت مدا‎ 
اسهمس وومسمهم سد‎ ana 
مھ مو کرو دس‎ AE ت‎ 
ورم سي هد مسوم مه سے ومهم ماو‎ 
وا سا نس د بن یرل سے سعدہہ تم تمد‎ 
Pc marnm ست ہے درنس یی ره‎ a^ NÉE 
میسو‎ و١‎ mame ——— vasi mmn 
۱۰۱ دا سس‎ owe وريه موب‎ qu4uS m4 mde cdi 
c —— لهس وه‎ or شسود‎ pr m a اف هه چشنےہ‎ 
MI 1 موس ليلدل‎ 
سسا‎ scialu misis mu ur جت اسداس‎ L4 kvl 
PIA 
ae es اا‎ mele, نے‎ OURS — mms NN 
— ہب‎ Ae a اس‎ Ok Ie a ا‎ 0 
on مسرلاب‎ th a4 o سنس سا رت یہ دس ری‎ 
تہ کم پیوم ہے مغ جم کس کر“ مسوم دہ جس‎ NN 
— مو وید وب سه‎ — — 
وبس‎ Kad) عیهححمد حه‎ alr be ۷ 
u aa ټی‎ melis ae pma 





























— 


fleet submarine for a 45-day operation. Since almost 
complete security wee still weing maintained on suuwarine 
operations, Baldwin wes not authorized te release any 
information at the time, but wes rather to record it for 
future relesse when restrictions could be lifted. 

One problem facing the public relations organization 
in the Pacific in the fall of 1944 was the lack of coordina” 
tion with General MacArthur's staff in announcing news 
about joint Army-Navy operations im the Seuthweat Pacific. 
As & result, a “highly garbled repert” of the Battie of 
Leyte Gulf in late October reached the american public. 8 
the three~cay engagement, the Japanesa fient was turned 
back frow its attempt to disrupt Mechrthur's landing in the 
Philippines. Aithough the battle was primarily & naval 
One, Army bombers did assist Havy carrier-based aircraft in 
riving baek the enemy warships. MacArthur's commend 
issued information on this phase. while the Heavy told its 
side of the story. Thus, "two different versions of the 
battle came out at widely-spéced intervals. 457 

Despite the absence of coordination. the Navy was 
pleased with the coverage it receiveé on the Philippine 
Operation.  Admirel Merrill wrote to Captain Miller: 
"Excellent photographs have been coming in with great 
regulérity anó the press just eats them up. Admiral 
Nieiltz' over-&811 communique was è sasterpiece of clarity. 448 


OWI took sacco of the creóGít for the improved 












eee 
نسم‎ mAs mmr ua a O mece کم‎ 
m" ee ee —— 
موہ نر بے‎ —— — anii mit ہے‎ re 
— — —— 42 ⸗ 
me imme ni sla a ونو سات‎ 
اسر زود‎ amma عند سے کد‎ em¬ AC. ۹ 
te ے فآ وسیف هوم" عا ته جچورت‎ ain a 
نی‎ „mhie maim Gu) mme» ده ہب سیسوہ‎ Lie ۵ 
atte! =e sont? meme) لاہ افد نص سی سی مھمنم . دس‎ 
ټی او نصا ای اښ‎ RON مو ٥جم دغه مسېښچم ته شيو بيو‎ 
©) Reeds سے ہے ہس جوم‎ ia Aa paims فصن‎ anm 
eme ose «Ree — ie em (e a dud gnitiab 
wti عنم مر‎ ami ae’ ہے‎ «ode age o 
— — وښ من‎ (Po wma ووو‎ 
am عون‎ au else —— — — اچ‎ 
!اولب‎ ه٢‎ r mM kemlan — sat? ووا سیه‎ 
ته انید‎ ae Gres Lim ee یوسووودم.‎ 


ûú— —‏ سی ممسننو ہو سے سمد 






























ہے وس — La e-»‏ هم ما مس ہہ ےد 


251 
coverage of actions ín the Pacific. Elmer Davis, in a 
postwar report to the President, stated that his offica 
“got fron the Navy a were explicit aecount of the battia of 
Leyte Gulf... than hed originally keen proposed, "*? 

in the weeks that followed this pattie, the Third 

amd Seventh Flesta continued to support HacArthur's further 
landings in the Philippines. However, as wo shall ses, the 
problem of coerdinating the release of information between 
the Army and Navy in combined operations in the Pacific 
temalned è formicable one~~until firs agreements were 
reached between the respective public relations offices 
just before the close of the war. 





At Gecretary Forrestal's request, ۵ survey of zli 
public relations activities ef the bureaus and offices of 
the Navy Department wae made by the واپ ولا‎ Management 
Engineers Office in the summer of 1944. The study, which 
wae headed by Commander Richard M. Paget. USE, rosultec in 
recomendations for iesprovements in the Navy's public 
feletions organization and ultimately led to significant 
Changes in the nekeup anf ebtectiver of the Office of 
Public Relations. 

One Of the initial areas addressed by the stuily 
group wae the relationship between OUR and the public rela” 
tions offices of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard. A SECNAY 























am 
sab مس نم رس توا کی ص مام‎ si 

VA‏ مد ما یم وټم ہے ےد ےه مھ 
nt eat‏ نا Anhi raa pea‏ ا لہ ما 
o: NAAR ۵۸‏ . عس Demi isg‏ وس سو Mo‏ 
یي سس سس" سس 
قوف مون AA‏ وسم نه موم eee‏ 
دبس کله لته امام نت سر ہمہ مها am‏ 
^ اه — پم ست 
uns anin ôö— —‏ 




















+ سس * 





ja prne s mami vinyot qamh A s 
v. e) —⸗ وا رز‎ mirim mistisa ALA 
ma y بو یه‎ Ae A ډو دس‎ 
Sim صسه نی‎ aag po aroan زو غې‎ miM 1M scena as 
à مہ مسا‎ tee دت د‎ gt Reread وم‎ 
ysu vma mr o mmi A DOOL 
وو‎ m سنت ما مالک اې کے‎ e ee 
ve mmo a ie area کفوح ايم اي يسيس عا‎ 
فد وور‎ 
—— — ج‎ 

sun inne ecd 4 - 











i 


— 





252 
disective early in the war asaigneé to GPR the teak of 
Supervising the public relations setivities of all agencies 
of the Havy Department, including thosoc of its sister sea 
wervices. The Managewent Engineers servey found, however, 
that in actual practice the Navy office oxercised littie or 
no control over these organizations other then to provide 
general policy guidance and sacurity clearance and to act 
as a releasing outlet to the news media. The study group 
concluded that a vagueness existed as to the proper 
relationship between OPR &nü the Marine Corps and Coast 
Guard, and that د"‎ more concrete definition would appear 
degirz»le. "7? Ho evidence was fours’, however, to indicate 
that any specific effort ever was uade to do this. 

As a result of the survey, it wes determined that 
QPR would 
discharge of ita responsibilities. To this end, four 


pt a more eggressive general policy in the 





bread public relations objectives wero formulatedi 


To S#ISFY the American public's justifiable‏ مه 
interest in the activities of the Navy.‏ 

b. To PROCURE for the personnel of the Bavy public 
recognition commensurate with their eccomplishments. 

€. To INSURE continuing public support for tha 
prosecution of the war. 

d. To FOSTER a sustained interest in the Havy in the 
post-was period, 51 





7TO help in achieving these goals, each bureau and 
Office was made responsible for gathering and preparing, 
fox diasemination thxough the Office of Publie Relations, 
^&ll pessiole information . . . which will interest or 


ء٤‎ 

3a دس ست خهلنیسم اب چجټ بس بس‎ ml wi nci dtum 
و پخ ته سس«‎ 
— — 98و لد — — — — مہب‎ 
pon — ہہ‎ aiina وو ات ۱۵۵ ۷ دغه سم‎ 
amece ^) ۸) د و وس عبت دہ ھ‎ fal iain 
dear? موث‎ gee la mi me AD qe qudranisuem 
ل تل سس‎ rm ma €` د‎ e A 
یہ شمان وید‎ eremi — — mm omae وي‎ + | 

reli bodiamapsò bòs pi pein et be tives è IA 
mı al RELY ۱ہ ”می 00008 د مه مسموست پسمېسا‎ 
—— 























253 
inform the public." ht the sare time, OPK wes directed to 
xeviow immediately the current status of the public 
relations effort of each bureau and office and to “lend 
full essistance in developing m adequate staff anc 
program." Officilsl public relsetions officere were to ba 
designated by esch bureau, beard ami office: ant these 
officers were to be Sesigned aiditional duty te the Director 
Of Public Relations so that cleser cegrdination with QOR 
could be maintained. 

The Menagewent Engineera alse recommendad a new 
orgénisation plan for GPR itself. Secretary Forrestal, 
impatient for the plan to be implemented, requested fron 
Admiral Merrill in early Decesber a progress report on the 
reorganization. The contents cf the secretary's memorandum 
are quoted in detail ae an additional example of his 





intense personal irterest in and attention to the public 


relations programas of the Navys 


l. What were the principal positions contemplated by 
the revised organisation? Have they been filled? 
Who ara your principal sectien heads and what are 
their qualificaticas? 

2. What progress has been male in establishing our 
Public Relations abjectives? What devices and 
pregrans heve we underway to achieve each of these 
Objectives? Do we have any method for checking up 
on what progress we Bre making toward the 

` Gbjectives? 

3» What arrangements do we have fox communicating our 
objectives to the District Pu»lio Relations 
Officers and for checking up on their activities? 

& Gan you give me ehch week B very condensed report 
of activities eo that I can keep track of what 
Public Relations is Going amd how wa are facing in 
newspapers, periodicals end phetegraphy? I should 





tel 
هککت کی سا در د دس ال غا ال امو ی‎ 
صساف تکساسي ت مس من ده نه مدا‎ 
میاه نس وہ سا نه یم‎ cate Ve 5 
ie Vär mii P wan ee) zi eurhasheds (UN 
ا شا مالس نلم ټس ند به‎ ° 
aedis اما ده بي می کس نس مب سم‎ 
سار منداغکسنا تس ب ول وموم‎ oo We Weald ات‎ 
سانكم سرہے فصن‎ remi» jui a وصهرنسم‎ vim 9 
tt a ik 
-a s bon sal piini? empia 0 
۱ pijas Piai aa ونس سام و ہے دم‎ 
كه م‎ c p) mÁDQ We ved هکو‎ 
-— pe (teres وجري سمسں 8 ي1 سیسصہ‎ ot هکت سا دز‎ 
0ج بسچ«‎ 
حسون يه علد‎ ule 
مهه‎ aM) سی یرمس صد ود‎ al ا شنت‎ 
——— 


4 ' 
^ co 



















xu 





254 
like this report to measure actual results in terms 
of the uss to نھ‎ 9ur materiel is put rather than 
our gross output. 

A week later Admiral Merrill answered Forrestal ‘se 
inquiry, outlining the organizational and personnel] changes 
in his office. The new organization provided for three 
principal executive assistants to the Director of Public 
Reletions: Asgisthnt Director, West Coast; Deputy Director; 
and Administrative Officer.  Comeanóer Bolten continued to 
filii the West Const billet. Captain Campbell, the former 
Comannique and Security Officer who had been promoted in 
the summer of 1944, relieved Commanóer Beecher am Deputy 
Director in August when the latter was detached to ses 
uty. The former position of Executive Assistant to the 
Director was merged with that of Leputy Director in the 
reorganization. Lieutenant Commander 81. Le Srown, ولک‎ 
USRR. replaced Lieutenant Commander Parker s&s» Administra 
tive Officer on August 1, 1944, with Parker being assigned 
az executive aesaistant to Commander Bolton on the West 
Coast. 

The major reorganization of tho office consisted of 
the placing of the individual sections under three main 
branches -program planning, media and technical services. 

Commander William C. Chambliss. USR, forwerly 
attached to the Incentive Division, head 





G the new Program 
Planning Branch. Commander Chambliss. & naval aviator, had 
been a newspBperxan and a public relations counselor before 








ans 
Saar نلک ور جوم رم‎ 


— یه ور کم Een‏ مشه 
وونمسلو «س سب مد Of‏ مد موس وس AAAS Jo‏ 
amaia — — oae il‏ 
ae‏ ادا دا ee‏ سس و ووم ودب سید ےہ 
دن غه وض ماهد at? ltt oles‏ ص 
هدپ شين لاب اهم si meen) ms ML mb DIED‏ 
i‏ — — — —— فا سوہ 
ad MEE ns‏ سس 
misra? h mirid tme e «qed‏ خو دص به at)‏ 
da da dale yee eon erent‏ سی وام ود له mua‏ 
—— — سم تن ood‏ ىي میس ےم : 
ای وسم ور Exe SML QI repel‏ وعصصہ سید manen‏ 
Din mi? ⸗‏ سم دب ھی 























ورس انه mát] «D We‏ ماما ا 





ima WIL reme —— الس‎ 





255 
entering the Navy. Umer his direction ware three now 
secciong--evaluation, planning end liaison, anê combat 
types. The Evaluation Section replaced the old Analysis 
Section and hed expanded functions. It was to metaure 
usage of official releaens to 511 media, evaluate coverage 
ang effectiveness f news regarding the Navy, amt determine 
subjects in whieh the pubiic was interested for the سنوي‎ 
Bhce of all sections in the office. Lieutenant Joe Pellder, 
Jle, USNR, was naxe acting head of this section. following 
the departure froa OFR of Commander Gaivin, who hed heated 
the old Analysis Section since befors the war. Lieutenant 
Dan Clark, USAR, a market analyst an opinien poll expert 
in civilian Life, was retained orn temporary duty to help 
organize the new section, with Belden officially being 
named as head in march 1945. 

The Pienning and Liaison Section wee get up te 
perform soma of the functions of the old Naval Districts 
Section. I aseisted the buresue., diatrictea an! mecis 
Offices of OP» in developing public relations programa and 
procedures. IK was headed by Lieutenant Commander Arthur 
Newayer, UO. a former newepaperman and public relations 
consultant. The Combat Types Section simply was 2n exten 
sion of the old Aviation Section, with the added responsi” 
bility of Gieseminsting special material on combat ships 
as well as aviation subjects. Commander Walter Neff. chief 


۵۶ the Aviation Section, remained as offiewr-in-charge of 






















en 
ریمے کے‎ rump qoe temas سل اه سب عنم‎ 
ls سے‎ oes سو‎ ley 
شا اغ دنه‎ ۰ gn xelet, malt t 
alee os CON mmt ی‎ 2 
یم له حم یې وسن سر مسوم چ وہ وسو‎ 
— بې‎ — — ۹ 
شم دو 1 — سیسنج‎ » 
— — بد مر‎ ae, Ep, - 
اص د وو مس مم ممنسشیں ے؛ ےہ‎ 
int شيد ور یں‎ ue benimaez uo bii 
mm scum s um cares co ie 
سم يبز‎ cà چو وی‎ 

ووسر tert mie‏ ټم چم ی جج 


















sow مر‎ ale cdi ro melee ge 
mie ca moni lm)e mamei oi مش‎ 





یوي ما هور imira na‏ وید عون amen‏ سم 
دور روه صومئ ېز دیس سم سسب بوم 
meagre pam am anges r‏ 
سا وسل T‏ ا ura‏ 
5 رہہ مس وو 
© یس با 








1۹ 
"S i په‎ y 






e 27‏ 2 -ه. 0 ہے امس سی ہس 








256 
this new activity. 

Five of the old sectione-~presa. radio. pictorial, 
magazine and book. and motion pictureas-“were placed under 
the new Media Branch, along with the farmer Special Events 
Section which wee renamed “Special Activities." Tho ols 
Combet Photograghy Seetion was abolished, with ite func- 
tions being taken over by Pictorial. Commander ۳۷ 8ء‎ 
Gordon, USN. who as a Lieutenant servec as OPR's Adminis- 
trative Officer from 1940 to 1342. ceturned from destroyer 
comments in both the Atlantic and Pacifie to head the Meéla 
Branch. Lleutenant Commander John PF. Conley, USER, 
formerly with the Baltimore Gun. succeeded Lieutenant 
Comeancer MeCarthy as chief of the Press Section wher 
McCarthy was detached for sea duty in the Pacific in 
Dbecexber 19464. The other media section heads remained as 
before--Hartiley ir. radio, Leng in picterial, Kerig in maga- 
zine and book, Brown in motion pictures, ani Courtney in 
special activities. The separate positions of Communique 
Offieer and Security Officer were eliminated, with the 
responsibility for preparing cowmuniques being returned to 
the Press Section. The sub-section within Special Zventa, 
“Organizational Contacts," also wes abolished, with 
Comanter Edward M, Seay being transferret to cther duty. 

The Technical Services Branch wes established to 
eoordinste the clearance of information with Admiral “ing's 
offica. Three sections wero included in the new branch-~ 


o 
۳ 


bes 





وای cielo ome‏ 
e dl‏ وس [جہحرن: صورربیہ۔۔ ہی ډیا 
Te weer 2D‏ سف موا دم عا عم یہ ao‏ 
ET E lil. ABO M ED‏ 
Font b) heb‏ دم هسدنه مه وبوا ېب سس وب idw‏ 
— — ——— — 

tute mubscheh cep ois bo هنم هش تې وی ان‎ 

ai >o oe mi bara a praa‏ که اس غه 

افد بت mine aldm ii‏ سمل وس سا اح 
em «Aha: nû lm nd‏ نم gim CIC ewe‏ له “ipte‏ 
cern cored aed Gale‏ اه ملاس eme MiA‏ سا کسه اه 
یئ E Aa‏ بب دہ 1 re‏ 
فوصت لب ee ee‏ می :ہمد سدن ہد 
سسوم هدروم سه eee ee w) agm‏ 
mv pair “aromo Jamiii‏ مسنتديدل ململ 

vae sm o em ctam c td 9 qut اس پټ و‎ 
ودوہ ز خر مه‎ mes سست‎ ——, — N 


— ee 




























257 
security review, biographies and research, and the public 
relations library, Commander J. L. Collis, USE, the former 
Executive Assistant to the Director, wes named as acting 
Chief of this branch, Commander Harold B. Say remained as 
head of the Security Review Section, while Lieutenant 
(junior grade) Bloisa English moved up from the Photographic 
Library to take charge of the expanded Public Relations 
Library., Biographies and Eesearch, B new section, compiied 
background material on navai personnel an histories of 
ships anê other activities, and researched answers to 
queries from the general public anû Kavy public reletions 
offices. it was headed by Lieutenant Commander W. A. 
Millen, USER, a former newsp&perman who had served in the 
Press Section. ^? 

On August 31, 1944, Secretary Forrestal created & 
separate motion picture office, which operated unger Dis 
control and was not a part of the Office of Public 
Relations. This agency, degignated the office of Navy 
Photographic Services on November 20, 1944, wes under the 
direction of Captain Gene Markey, USNR, who had extensive 
experience in the motion picture industry. It represented 
the Secretary of the Navy in all motion picture matters 
pertaining to the Navy, Coast Guard ant Marine Corps; 
eoorcinated the planning and production of motion picture 
Combat reports that were requirec by the Commander in Chlof, 
U.S. Fleet; anû served as è lireison office with tha Army, 


ds 
ارپ سا‎ od . نس سال سب‎ 
paima وم‎ hens بده‎ ac uui) adà of )مه‎ Uri sp 
— — هن بد ضله سیجہ‎ 
کش سس‎ ik ei amie دم‎ mif Ae ومد‎ 
سسسسسسس‎ minak) 
هم لم سم سپ < کے سمس گرم حا دده‎ 
Ie spi mieja Da mand oreo me Al 8ص سه‎ 
هد ةمد نمك‎ li اسم‎ n Dh غصہ اپ ها‎ 7 
ü— (]ee*érshl pd bobosc aw fa 

هلوم عو م ووس سوج مع ہد وید نہ mds‏ 
وچو سربے۔'٭ 

سم تا شنت عر رفدد. چووووپوے رعوب٦-ومئئ‏ دپهومه د 
—⸗1o‏ — 
SIAN fc "wi eet Dn i94 2 ion sew jm jv‏ 

Qm do دازلم‎ | 

١هفوو me ım emli‏ .تخد عم رم یہ 
A‏ دد مغد ere mene‏ يہ لان bal‏ مح عمرب 

| له لښه حدسه E qawani manny‏ یس مسووسدت 
1۶4 زور وت ای هنا ودای ونجتہ وود مموع 
ومو( prsi sd?‏ میں مو مر او gue‏ 
هخس وم ومیس سه پنیسویزنې ٠‏ مو جد چە 

| 6و مو مرو یور کہ نه يور 






































259 

Gther government agencies, and the motion picture induatry 
in the production of entertainment fiiss pertaining to the 
Navy and the procurement end distribution of films to naval 
activities. "^ 

A gignificant achievement of the Office of Kavy 
Photographic Services wag the liaison with and provision of 
film to Twentieth Century Fox for the production of "The 
Pighting Lady." This documentary motion picture wag made 
from lémm. color flim taken by Havy photographers aboard 
the carrier ¥Yoxktown in the Pacific. It was releagec 
nationally in Pebruacy 1945 and gubsequently shown to 
millions of people in tha United States. Bil profits fron 


the fiim were donated by Twentieth Century Fox to the Navy 
55 


Relief Society. 





in response to an inquiry frow Mr, Torrestal, 
Commender Paget furnished figures on the numbers of person“ 
mel engaged in public relations aetivities in the Xavy, 
Marine Corps and Coast Guard in December 1944. 96 Kis 
personnel table showed a total of 2,156 people employed 
full-time in publie reletions in the three servicesc-625 
officers, 1,313 enlisted men end 218 civillans. Of the 
officers, 510 were K&vy--97 in the Washington ares, 178 ia 
the continental United States and its territories and 235 


in other areas. including zones of cosb&Bt, The latter 



















eee 
eee —ñ—— د‎ 
ao wigii ی کو وھ کے کے‎ 
دنات نا وی‎ “Yo وا كد ستكف‎ dmé سس‎ 05-315 as quad 
قد دہ زر وی پر له‎ 
كن ينون‎ minho ols tè Gewda اووس ةتارصم‎ © ۳ 
فت تة س ولنم لل مسا وسم تعن وه‎ iapa 
ند سو دي سے يور وز سے‎ piedi a فلا‎ 
m"———— ٤و مه‎ galley 
ت اف تقد واپ نټ یې غه هديو موده تسن‎ 
قهن فه شی مس رونه. وو سم حسم‎ weld د‎ 
o aes سس سد مسوك‎ 
نت لا تم اہ دت سلاسه مس دد ہجو و‎ 
سے وف مم وښ وو‎ alet فا کد هه لام بي‎ 


—— — 


nt —‏ یر مہو بی جم 

جم aevum we cd aem‏ ہرس QUAE‏ سسوو:ل, 
سو س« سس« 
amiran hAg a dn‏ ات mS r gî‏ 
2-0 -ص 9 - 9 ns ‘iti samal ni‏ 
olen MLS by sates a temm sida e.‏ رېم 
فا -م نه لاه مهن إن qmi‏ شا رس وس وه 
tio A o ate tlm A‏ شا :سه 
Ui‏ خې وم امه as bti sam‏ 
شيع Sam‏ لاخ CEL dw ged) rr‏ 
e + — —‏ ا 



































— 

















259 
figure vividly iliustrates the significent increase since 
the summer of 1944 in the number of public relations 
offieers assigned to the Pacific. 

Officer persomel in GFR remaired at a stabis level 
throughout 1944. There were seventy-three attached te the 
offios on Hay 1 and weventy-two on November 1. Aa efficers 
keperted to the flwet commends in the Pacific, however, the 
Humber attached to naval district, air training end other 
field offices in the Guited States declined. Gn September i, 
1944. there ware 195 of these, with this figure being 
reQueed, as we have seen, to 178 in December. The slack 
wae taken up by assigning officers to part-time or 
"collateral" duty in public relations. ‘There were ninety- 
threes of these part-time officers serving in district and 
other field offices on September 1. 1944.” 

in late January 1945, Admire) Merrill requested an 
increase in beth officer and enlisted personnel fer the 
Office of Public Relations." Citing the acceleration of 
the war in the Pacific and additional functions assigned to 
his office as a result of its rzeorganizetion. he asked for 
fifteen additional officers ang eighteen more enlisted nen, 
The current allowancs for GPR at the time was ninety-two 
officers, eighty-two in the Washington office and ten on 
the West Coast. However, as Admiral Merrill pointed out. 
the Washington office had heen operating at shout 7 per 
Gent below its authorised strength since thes expansion of 





rr 
— — وهو‎ | 
ہ6س ہری‎ ano er کل سی نن نپ‎ 
سو .)نر س پس سد ہ و سے بے‎ ٣ 
wt ot مویہ‎ do m الجن وغ هوه‎ compere 
ASN N i on a are u E N e E 
ہے‎ ated (orn حسم د رل‎ BERI) ur QU انمع‎ 
do فون‎ © cmád ۰ ےہ‎ uae Ae 
u ani ddr) Mie لسن‎ 06 Orama امن ہے ا‎ 
i mi MP GU سر‎ et or oe seme 
یات چو‎ e اسنام بت‎ ge لاله .دیو‎ BEN 
مووا پل لومون سا‎ es اټ نی هم دن(‎ 
ve spry یر کک‎ m ناا۱١ وو دا له‎ 
ند‎ rua? تدز سوا‎ OA podiat amit aA -٨ 
لھ کک فووا سا مانن پر ف بے‎ 
ʻa màfia w plain — ٤ 
































A pamila —— — — جس‎ 
— —— — n 
nter am pee Pee 
کسر ج سز موی ہش میں‎ 
تضم ع به‎ e, 
Vo مسپهمانه‎ ^ nemo d 












266 
public relations personnel in the Ravy was halted in Mareh 
1943. 

Secretary Forrestal endorsed HMerríll's request and 
forwarded it to the Chief of Naval Personnel. However, the 
secretary i not give “carte blanche” approval to more 
public relations manpower in non-combat billets. In March 
1945, he wrote to Mexrili, "I would like to passa om the 
increases in individual complements ae they arise. Frankly. 
some of them seem @ little large to me, especially if we 
Qannot find reductions elsewhere to offset them in large 
part. ab? 

A small reduction was found in Mareh 1945 when the 
Office of the Assistant Director of Public Relations, West 
Coast, was abolished. Hine of the ten officers attached to 
the Weet Coast office were #anigned elsewhere. However, 
nder a few 





Captain Bolton, who had been promotel from comm 
weeks before, kept his statue @s Motíon Picture and West 
Coast Radio Liaison Officer of OPR amd as Staff Public 
Relations Officer for the Commander, Western Sea Frontier 
in San Francisco, a post which he had assumed ag additional 
duty in the fall of ۰ 

The Gan Francisco area, being the terminus for the 
arrival of news copy and breadeasts from the Pacific Thea~ 
ter, was given top priority in public relations planning in 
early 1945. To strengthen the organisation there, 
Forrestal decided to order Commander Gordon from OFR to the 


mS 

AA ١‏ یزو ناس — — ند وچ 
سے 

کسهد لپ تور AAS‏ ډر ما ومس سو 4 
ib panna‏ سم ودس مرب پ>ی مس ' وی ہم سر 
mimi ]‏ — ⸗ — — سم 
ك ma DM iliria a a‏ ارس وه وعدم po‏ رس 
CT ‘a ED l aaga ihini al maaa‏ 
m! 30 -‏ مس نلادی oT 4v‏ دلواي دد me‏ 
O‏ — ۰ — — نس می tac.‏ 
ما ے. . 
ہہ نۃ iden‏ وروص لغيه e‏ فیا به teda AL amm‏ —- 
۳ 
رس UT)‏ سے جسسص+ےے بے 
جا کو اس هپو مهوم مه موه دنو ود un‏ 
| فنا یت دہ پوت ibid" haay? sa‏ 
42ص ته نس وسو tye‏ ۱۳ جرا 
5 اه o o SA MA‏ پس مص ېی پیر وټ پو سن Cemi‏ 
اسو وم „Abel 5e còmh wy‏ 
ده me mem‏ سني بع عحنسم o‏ ہب 
| س هد —— ر 
— — رمن ن۔ 
i‏ | ری- کی دک aj a‏ 






















261 

Twelfth avail Distrlot ags pdsiic xelationa officer. Gordon 
wa& detached on April 2. with Comaander Chamblleg 7۳ 
texzing from his post æa head of the Program Planning branch 
to replace Jordon as chief of ths Media Drench, Lieutenant 
Commander Wewmyer moved up from cie Planning and Lisisen 
Gection to auccwed Chanbiiaa, ani Lieztenant Commander 
مق‎ RK. Poiagon. JENA, teok over Hewnyex’s former position. 

lee on Agsil 2, the Combat types Section was moved 
from the Program Vlianming Dranch to the Nedin French, with 
its titie boing changed to “Aviation and Surfece Types 
Section"; anü the Special Activities Gection war trans 
ferred from Mecie to Program Planning. Lieutenant Consenéer 
Henry Roberte, UGU, culieved Lieutenant Commander Coucimey 
&s eificer-in-charge of Gpecial Jctilvicies &t the same time, 
and Hiss Helena JIhilibcU wés nane! to beat a Special 
Kescareh P¥ajects Unit in the Technical Servicag Prawi. 
An eayiier personnel change in 1945 sav Lieutenant 
Commander Carleton Mitchell, Jz., fermer bead of the Combat 
Fhotograpay Suction, soplace Commander Long as head of the 


®ietorial Section. - 





Epeciat Activit. 

Throughout 1944, Hevy public relations officers 

became involved in cort&in speciol sctivities connected 
with tha w&r effort on the hone front. In early May, OPA 


wise requested by tae Director of Naval Communications to 


"D 

-— Juni ساي نمت‎ Alda ab ئی نس‎ a 
ديح‎ àb€blawm CO i-e dlxw . [im^ c» 
sinet vil 20 ف بے کے‎ CER Gail 
— کے هس قد ته سیا — ھ ےه‎ 
0+ لک شه ې تل لل ا/سمساوۍ ما‎ 
Sa رر‎ 
— دلا تمت س کد س‎ 
ج ما الد نه سه وټ حاومت مس وب‎ 
442 — ده ای س رفس مه دا اه‎ 
زاین‎ sett Get mse ا دوف تمن سب چي‎ 
-aa عصد دوي وتنس‎ 
— — — د‎ 

لته andy" diii ad SEMEL‏ 
uvarum mam E‏ 
فل یم قض ‏ لال سفنت سہتے dunk‏ 
WALES a‏ پر نټ خی غه لست ہم س 
lle‏ نة اسب „a‏ اموس سات دي ott‏ —— 


— — تسم سه اه حا ٨٢‏ سم 
9ه - 
T CEU‏ 


هه 0 Dale‏ لفصا مر نت رس پس سر 

seis sir otide yria A) e 
— — — mu tài ina nd ۸ ano 
کے س سے یر س سے‎ Ae EA 
— مهم مر مسر‎ — 


٠ 























































262 
conduct a publicity campaign to inform the public of the 
explicit reasons for the unavoidable delays in delivering 
mail to Wavymen overseas and on ships. On duly 30, the 
second anniversary of the establisheent of the WAVES was 
commemorated with another extensive publicity drive. The 
theme for this obeervance was a ealute by civilians and 
Navymen to the WAVES. The effert wes tied in with a Kavy 
War Bond Drive scheduled in the first week Of July. with 
all bonds purchased by members of the Women’s Raserve 
during this period being epplied to the buiiding of two 
motor torpedo beats. which were Launched on the day ef the 
WAVE Anniversary, ®t 

A nationsi cawpaign aimec at civilian de fense 
Workers wke launched in the summer of 1944, involvin; 
public relations and in-plant incentive action. “Vietory” 
flushed headlines, concern over cutbacks ani cesire for the 


security of peacetime و09‎ 


were contributing to an 
alarming labor turnover rate in defense plants anc 
threatening Navy procurement contracta, One of the incen- 
tive devices used in the campaign to keep workers on the 
job waa the production of three films in Hollywood anû New 
York, dramatizing ior workers the “long road traveled 
before final victory can be claimed.“ 

Navy art exhibits were given extensive exposure 


throughout the nation in the summer anû fell of 1944. “The 
Navy at War," à collection of eeventy~five paintings and 








eet 
ته 45م نمه وتاه ور مس‎ pingue» yea» 
له زاس دی‎ opf ومين اهيل‎ mit un ameua > 
am للا‎ gine © می‎ as 1ل سووم سم ما‎ 
سه‎ jw ate سم من می سيج بست و‎ 
ort وس نسئ مم جہ۔زہ۔۔‎ "١ مف جسم وص‎ - 
— —— — - 
سد‎ à ddl» نو‎ Ree eee See oer Jet ada st * 
نون یس‎ Vo fem peas) wa أ —— نہ‎ 
— — — — سم سغست ان‎ 
na ua سیپس‎ wis vr ج دغزه ونما ماص ټوننما‎ | 
mdt fe qe a مه‎ betes! owe Mua مو‎ Depar 
٥۸ ما مسب‎ 8 
و۱ ای نوی‎ da Ment دنسر نی‎ Š — 
رمیس دم رس‎ M) Vo vamus wr, si am! me موک ده‎ 
“umut” ambu نا‎ Aag سن ہہ یم اد سس‎ 
وةحما سی هنټ وہر عانعن نا اما وود بت‎ 
وناڪ دی و‎ Te دک ون و ری ووو‎ 
wti basti مو ہے‎ sl «ret weenesed لته‎ 
ہس بر بل اس‎ eG e من‎ 
لمع سا در لف سسسلم دم يعوو سوہ کو ول‎ 
يسا سے‎ omic sû ali وکو‎ U— اك‎ e" 1 
پور ها‎ Bapa لس دیا دو چو هم مس الس‎ 
hinin = ana افو ہے بب‎ 
e sonido م اس‎ — e a e 


























prb 















263 
drawings by official Navy corbat artista wes shown in 
department storzeg in connection with war bond promotion. 
Paintings of naval avistion and of naval medicine ami the 
submarine service. nade under private sponsorship by 
civilian artists, also were exhibited, °° 

۸ special photographic display. “Power in the 
Pacific,“ a pictorial record of Navy, Marine Corps and 
Coast Guard combat operationa in that theater, waa featured 
during the year at the Museum of Modern Ast in Bew York. 
The collection of stiil photographe, compiled by Captain 
Edward Steichen, USER, wag put inte book form in early 
1945, "so that the largest possible number of Americans mèy 
gee them. a*t 

in October i344, all public xselations officera 
gain cooperated with the Kavy Laague in celebrating Navy 
Day. Posters were Cistrikuted. speakers’ kits prepared and 
Wavy speakers furnished for the svant., On the West Coast. 
naval district officers provided a "mat service" of reaóy- 
mede photographs for mali town newspapers in the area to 
use in calling attention to the special ceremonies. The 
BMavy Day observanceg throughout the war. aided by the pre- 
velling patriotic fervor emong the people. were a great 
success. In 1944, 16,000 radio programs were arranges and 
more than six million persons participated in luncheons, 
dinnerg. Secheol &ssenblies and parades. °°? 


& final project during the year for Navy public 


on 





mi baon aa سس سا ۳ سس‎ 
بی‎ HEB تسش نی‎ ueso le ba کمن‎ feu Tb siot 
ومس نون رہ‎ Dri ,ماق ان‎ a 










2۵ نوزم ىن‎ sce Gus — 








٤‏ سا نة نات همم ف اف 

Gum agw miwn pat hy rats: IT ۶ + ee 
mium wen رفانس که بف راه‎ a ور‎ 
— wl ol pak سه ور مودو‎ add Fé یس‎ 
دو هوت یو تن هوی ونما ینومن‎ 
gims ak gaot ام تا‎ nq oe ویک کس‎ a 
9ك الك ہہک سنہ مس یہ سے کے‎ 
| غه‎ n سر‎ 

ف کن کسان سے میج 
se rages Ae‏ ا هې دنړی تد نتوی ا 
دي um n‏ دس تة د ناء چیا من 
مف وی ads "b i‏ مب ^ tone? "ael urs‏ 
ما à bam pen. vredliàe HEAR‏ نا سا بج ^y"‏ 
سے ته سا ví poe eds «b eve" ad mer?‏ 
J‏ سا بت "ES‏ ساسا miii‏ ہب 
Lew edt et belie — —⸗‏ 
ماوق دنا ما fever «p wma‏ سل وسو 
اغ خي للا تی ماامی پسه مسا XR‏ سمسی 

































264 
r@jations officers was to spotlight the third anniversary 
of the Setbees on December 29.  Sesbee construction anc 
combat highlights in 1944 and other feature material were 
given wide distribution to the media by the naval district 
offices. 

in January 1945, the practice of issuing CINCPAC 
communiques simultaneously in Pearl Herber and Washington 
was discontinued, in accordance with the wishes of corse” 
spondents in the Pacific. The dual~release procedure hac 
been established at the request of publishere in the United 
States. With cancellation of the simulteancous release, the 
24-hour officer watch in the Press Section of OPR, which 


had been in effect since Hay 1941. aleo was eliminated. A 


press officer now was on duty in the Washington office only 
$$ 


from 8 a.m. to midnight. 





it will be recalled that one of the questions 
Secretary Porrestal asked Admiral Merrill in December 1944 
concerned the progrese made toward establishing Navy public 
relations objectives. Merrili replied by reiterating that 
in his opinion the primary objective should be the 
"complete and accurate reporting to the American peovle of 


7 ne added that 


the activities of the United States Navy, "* 
under this basic policy were threw secondary objectives for 
Havy public relations to pursue during the remainder of the 


wars 





n 

هله mapili a me HES‏ یہ رويد میں 'ٹوحمں 
⸗⸗ بعد ے۔ mm imeem ana)‏ 
ویم سه ê mitts Ab‏ شه حت+ p‏ ې مه لاو له 
ویم اا 

۰۲۷۶۶ ۱ وشو نف ۱ اس‎ o EFL aN ^ ^ 
erly 9 99 —— 
عسي‎ fd aa". ید بے‎ N0 اروف هنسوم نوود. د‎ 
taj apta هویم له د ”سوقط چس وم -جم نعتع‎ 
بسصسسسصص<<<<‎ 
PUSILLUM. NM ud 
weise p Le ی یندم‎ aea cà sem هلنم ونی‎ 
2 ogue جو‎ or LI LL btg 
UL TI E EI 
^^ veiuntde nf om چو و‎ 


o c——! -œ‏ ۱ | | | ۱ ت 
=s OH =‏ نفد نزمه تم كنذا مد نما molikiy‏ 
؟ تیه ه فیس فسا از وزرا ده ie‏ 
sias axelryeaq «i» be‏ تسا ده و جنس دس پ وه 
“— وف 17 اسان pe‏ اسه دم هه 































265 

a) Winning peblic enderetending of the problems of the 
war in the Pacific end winning public support for 
the vigorous prosecution of the Pacific war subas” 
quent to the end of the European fight; 

b) Securing public support for = strong postwar Bavy; 

c) Contributing to the maintenance of morale of the 
men serving et sea aml overseas by securing publie 
recognition of their outstanding service to their 
country, 

The admiral then listed carrent individual projects 
which his office was engaged in or planning to support the 
general objectives. Ameng these were the publicizing of 
the 150th anniversary of Navy Supply activitina anê 
pecrulitment of workers for navel bases and defanse plants. 
Both progres ware tied in with the necessity for all-out 
support of the Pacific war sni were built around the theme 
of logistics in the Pacifico, Two projects were mentionec 
as being planned for the future~-one designed ta publicize 
the Navy'z personnel rehabilitation program anî the other 
aimed at public understanding of the Navy’s demobilization 
plans and postwar personne] policies. 

Admiral Merrill concludeü his report by suggesting 
that he and the secretary hold periodical conferences te 
review current public relations objectives and pregrana am} 
to decide “whether any new progran should be added to the 


Liat.” Forrestal respo 





Jed favorably, agreeing to meet 
regularly following his reoeipt of Merrill's monthiy report 
on accomplishments. The secretary requested his Director 
of Public Relations to eleborate in greater detail on each 


تفع 

“es be يد | .ی‎ mig 
dign € | d 

iia ao to achain 

| premi " — 

























selerna vleqe® mel Yo assum 701‏ سا 
ده دص ls c sileh To‏ سےم سو سے سس چا سا 


سه یسوم سونو مسوم صا col‏ وای 
(eod 1824 7 4‏ 









266 
one of the major public relations objectives and to 
Circulate this elaboration to the naval districts, bureaus 
ané fleets. "Then it should be made current and recireun~ 
lated each month in the PRO news letter. "98 

Thus begen in January 1945 a series of monthiy 
statements on Navy public relations policy prepared by the 
Office of Public Relations and dietributed in memorandum 
form to all Mevy public relations officers. These policy 
statements were issued throughente the remainder of the war 
anû for several months following the cessation of hostii- 
ities. They were profaced with the remark, "This memorandum 
is sent to you fer guidance in the carrying out of your 
duties. It includes: a statement of cur permanent basic 
objective, all current secondary objectives, and 171 
specific programs which are to be given support in order to 


63 The statexente aleo required a 


attain our objectives.” 
monthly report from each public relations anit to the 
Director of Public Relations on the "conorete steps taken 
to carry out the individual programs.” It was made 
explicit that "these objectives require tho uge of methoda 
other than mere reporting of Navy news. They caii for 
vigorous and intelligent use of all of the tools at our 
Commanód--7seminars, speeches and radio adórasgos; the 


inspiring of magazine articles; the use cf contacts with 


civic and othar organizations, etc." 


ومو موک سم سلله 
موسرمب سر hêk Fini‏ یر lul‏ ہر سد سوه 
ما مس Md ne‏ ملا Là‏ مت مسب — 
+٦ + + +9 bd mee End» Beg]‏ 
1 كه faint al cwm)‏ سم دس زی بب سیت 

م سی ومسف مموم پاللم ۷۲ r Ti‏ 
ren lie or amak‏ یول — maf? .awmii*c‏ و په 
منمسم سم مه وسم m Ng‏ = 
aaron asya xeb ân‏ ورااسطنمۍ کہ “Lipant ba mirigo‏ 
watt embed‏ سم سرټا eleme ie i iy ailê‏ 
یه عد vey e?‏ هد diay‏ اه كله pe pp‏ ۱ سب 
هدنوم ده سوه © دوک سیز عو ده Tias mne‏ 
+4 >4 فلا دس 4+ وو 0 بس. فعلا lis‏ 
مهن وسم ښام وم ےہ وہ وہر سوو:جر نہ ح-ف-ہ لم 
وون a bm mle popia E? °» ,  -_-‏ 
صوصمن ti wLa pian M e n‏ ہے وله 
tmb allen 1o oaeen‏ ےی لنت مې به Sees and)‏ 
څو ودسمې موه ہف jil OE AND‏ مس پستت 
— وسو سعد وواه یله وا e‏ 
eni‏ مه مره مل عا »ور سي پس داد "A‏ 
انهه سوط الود دقاو adj lu Lia Sa nta‏ سوفن ےہ لكا 
ومس mE — amci‏ 
وتو و« MEER LL o eminent‏ 
an mo atrii M‏ — 


























۵ 
o 
d 


The objectives contained in the initial policy 
statvuent in January 1945 closely paralleled those outlined 
by Admiral Marrlil in tis December wemorendum to Secretary 
Forrestal. Explicit procedures were delineated to pursue 
the over-all objective of winning public backing for a 
strong postwar Navy., Included were efforts te mold public 
sentiment in favor of the Navy an t separate military 
cervice and for the continuation of naval aviation as an 
integral part of the Bavy. Also, plans were made to 
520113 support for pastwar compulsery military training. 

Examples of the type of activities undertaken in 
early 1945 to promete naval aviation were & tour of air 
facilities in the Fifth Maval District fer a group of 
editors and publishers from the Eighth Naval District, ara 
à cruise at sea on board an aixcraft carrier for persons 
prominent in the theatrical world. 

in March 1945. whea victory in Europe wes imminent, 
special projects were added to the policy statement to 
prevent a "let down" in the war effort after Germany's 
capituletion, These consiated of the preparation of public 
statements by appropriate Naval personnel fer release on 
VE-Day in conjunction with other government agencies, and 
cooperation with the Army-Havy-TreB&ury Department Pacific 
War advertising campaign. The latter involved the use by 
Rational advertisers of copy designated to maintain publie 


intereat in the Pacific war after و سوب‎ O 





tes 
velie) (AANA. op, a penn anita a _ 
Paige, وعدن ميت ديت‎ imola CHEL yatuma وس نم‎ 
—— —— — ebi si tin 
— دای پا تا‎ 
یښیر‎ ——— 
views اب سم ما اناد و سالد‎ Lra smeza peate 
mankiin amass aaa ypt mis تم ےید و‎ 
وی یور په مه‎ lo وس‎ sa? som hem 
os stam omy analy مد سه وسې. ہمد‎ rump 
ا سپ مه وہس مسب میس سی‎ 
دنه سوه نم‎ Mp السو نوم حا جب یت‎ 
مذ عن‎ nr n rns ده ود جدننس‎ E EiUae 
—"——— IT 
ماس مہا ہس امہ کہ بے کرت عو میس سے‎ 
wna vq ممحدئمم فص‎ Fortis m) مه بت‎ as 38 
ا ر‎ — 
—————— d a 
سیر مس ب‎ — 
میں‎ saris chic nev mit سه لم‎ Fal" à 
———— — vea? am 
د ماع وه‎ Summe DTi N AE 
— 
— — spiso xam 
“few bb mulas w* 14 — | 
"oa کر میگ‎ Simi «dd al | 


























b ss 
















































LA رد‎ os SS رل‎ 


263 

Also in March, media representatives were invited 
to embark in the new cruisers §&. Paul and Chicago during 
their "shakedown" cruises, and arrangements were made to 
have local correspondents cover portions of the shakedown 
eruíses of Bll newly commissioned cruisers and bettleshigs. 
In addition, twanty~thres Washington correapondents end 
five members of the House Naval Affairs Committee were 
provided air transportation to and from Norfolk, V&,, for 
the launching of the new Midway. 

In April 1945, a specific program wes designed for 
the “selling” of Gsiegates ant correspondenta in attendance 
at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. 
Arrangements were made for daily visits to naval activities 
in the area anû flights in Navy planes and blimps over Sen 
Francisco. There also were air demonstrations, tours of 
airecaft carriers, film presentations end tripa within San 
Franciace Bay by Bavy small craft. 

In Hay, a concerted effort was made to provide 
public relations &ssigtaánce for the recruitment of ship 
repair workers for West Coast yards. The USS Laffey was 
exhibited at Seattle ani Tacoma, drawing 106,000 visiters. 
The Thirteenth Naval District Public Relations Office 
arranged extensive local and national press, picterial and 
radio coverage for the ship's visit. Five newsreel 
companies filmed the event, end there were broadcasts on 
four radio networks. Also in May, an invasion exercise 





مه 

ce o‏ ×نندن۔ ہد ہدسجوەسسہ سو عیدہ سر 
اتہر ہو ee LIU‏ 
شا ند وسوی وسم دو مه ونم وس وزی غو ook‏ 
in (ti dmm! quid‏ ریس een‏ ورس 

په ېی وتف mezg mily © AM‏ مون اوور ووس 20h‏ 
سوه e-drleisre penan œ adian hihi wO wa anoa‏ 
غھ هغه ٭جدھ aii and‏ نہ وم ویو مو ناد سوہ 
9ھ sont?‏ هایس ہے جرد سجو-تہہ Guam! am‏ سو 
BLA «ximo A‏ مد۸ا‌لدوو سا ڈیہ سداد «Be‏ 
6مفنعہ پې کې ووي محلب ءددوی 

و کم هې © «hirer, oi rika age Swths Barres‏ 
öæ‏ سسسصسسسسسس 
0 وت ۲ حقلمسب- سم دہ mina amisit‏ 
⸗ سس 
allen.‏ وسو eh‏ کل وپل ام نقد ده —— 
oe cha cum Am n‏ وص 
م لے مرت اغا به دو تم نس مدای 


















1 





269 
involving some 260 ships am landing craft was staged near 
San Diego in connection with the Seventh War Loan Drive. 
This event attracted 86, 000 persons. 

On January l, 1945. the 1:35 Atlantic Fleet some” 
what belatedly jumped on the Navy public relations band- 
wagon by appointing officers fer thig function in ail fleet 
units and issuing an extencive public relations manual for 
their guidance. Six months earlier, two admirals hac 
voiced concern over the amount of publicity gained by the 
Goast Guard in the Atlantic and European areas relative to 
that reecived by the Navy. One of the flag officers con” 
plained that it seemed to him “the public believed that all 
attack cargo vessels and transports are Cosst Guard-manned 
anû “operated. 43 

To assess the impact of its pregrams, the Savy tock 
steps in early 1945 to gauge the public pulse with regard 
to the subjects addressed in the policy statements. Kr. 
Duffield wrote to Secretary Forrestal on December 298, 1944: 
“A part of the rejuvena&tion in public relations involves 
keeping in touch with public opinion and our public rela- 
tions effect on it. Pantune has ayreed to devote one of 
its polls to the measuring of opinions in which the Navy is 
interested. We need to givoa . . . Mr. Elm Roeper a list of 


Guestions by December 31. „73 


Shortiy thereafter, Lieutenant 
Belden, OPR's Evaluetion Section chief, visited Princeton 


University to discuss possible polia with the Office of 


w 
LU ووه ٥ه دید پیجیےوں‎ ew ai 
-eme Aea amlas د. ات دم واه‎ Yee NOS — — 
pond nimio وو داد شب وس نہ‎ hege برس٨و »وله هم‎ 
sc jomer maitaha لمعنسو عو مو صدہ: وص‎ àa اسان‎ 
ait yd baiso ومس دمه سم دم وجرندرون‎ re hake 
ور‎ imin وسم سد‎ “es cimaisé دی وغه‎ Bae seen) 
ماس سب‎ welt et) Sa هه یس مي جحد‎ beamed Galt 
118 ضار يصون ريد‎ {ucan ”کت‎ aad نه‎ gà Fut? "نلم‎ 
Dum 
ms — Fo&xmé oÉ' سه چو وووومی‎ 
ampri iior mim offen ate apap of DEAS gaw ai qen 
ous i-o» weldo, « فد ورس کرو هشتوسمد ده‎ 7١ 
pbi o-p ome —— سه‎ LAMAN SAUD ه1 و ته‎ 
Simm alay مته وہ ہل مہنع‎ saver ab pig 
ee 50 anye a EDA a mn Av am 
«(<< اف اوو‎ 
سو‎ «ios مہ‎ cm4D G9 s - - ad وشو مت لہ‎ eee "١ 
(wet: 179090-79 نتتاسد زہ‎ MEL Essi 
رسوہہ لوہ ال ۰و دہ ووویب ہا‎ ani MF vr UV ANO 








270 

Public Opinion Research there, Ne also plannec to centact 
Dr. Gallup. ^^ 

Ag a reguli of these efforts, at least two surveys 
were conducted which were pertinent to the Navy's public 
relations objectives. A Gallup Poll released in the summer 
و‎ 1945 revealed that while 70 per cent of the public 
favored compulsory military training after the war, less 
than half of these thought that action should be taken 
immediately to set up machinery for such training. A 
survey by Faxtung at about the same time concluded that 
most of the American people desired to depend on the air 
arm ag the first line of defense in the post- 
war period." However, a June 1344 poll by the National 
Opinion Research Canter, University of Denver, showed that 
Gå per cent of the public believed a large Air Force was 


more important to have after the war then & large Navy. ^? 





The emphasis on “personalizing the news“ about Navy 
fighting men in the Pacific, begun by Secretary Forrestal 
in the summer of 1944 and made possible by the agaiqnacnt 
of naval officer end enlisted correspondents to ships anc 
fleet statis, created the need for a separate offica to 
process the thousands of stories te honetown newspapers. A 
form was devised to record basic information ín the person- 


hel record of every Navymsan, and the goal was set in the 





v1$ 

ree mar es ain ale E cae Sua OLA ACO 
۱ و سے کل‎ 
serwa ut Jabal 26 SUVS umi ta REY © لل‎ — 
alida ںوس اي دس سب‎ Ree Gage Sere va 
ہی مہ الا + ہس‎ Lio Qual a دنت وهای‎ 
siid why 80 date وس‎ UT tite ما ان‎ (MENO 
cant a ly orir aae partis هو لاسو سم‎ 
b minno meg wò conim yp اه ته موه‎ 
Ha Secs au مسب‎ Giz نټ‎ fo a qvi vor 
HI e p auae OF 1۱.ص وا تست‎ OUR. 
1r ee ee 
Dee دی‎ em oe) es oe “eee 
9043 hemp .ue $a -,-ف0- --- 00:1:0 پ 2 كما دوس دج‎ 1/0 
سد‎ oust b» pest s ےر نوج‎ — weer seq BS 
H op ی اس‎ ee Sw at VOOR نطو وسم ہم یو‎ wi 
am. a æ ~ 
ہے‎ , a c 

vet +e سس ورش ہے‎ = siantan m 
mna, erna i cand فوفص سم افق الال ايلم‎ 
سه رش + روه سدم رهس لیم مسا‎ nate de v Je. 
— مي م‎ ETE 4 vod. 
۸ supp agunt. et tune د ور‎ 
"mmm, AI o) سه منم‎ ١ 


— وعم سير عبر ده > 

























24171 
fail cf 1944 to send in at least one story on each man in 
the Navy. 

Initially, the naval district public relations 
office in which the man's hometown was located recuivad the 
materiel and forwarded it to his erea newspapers. This 
procedure proved to be quite cumbersose, however, am on 
March 29, 1945, the Secretary cf the Navy directed the 
Commandant of the Ninth Naval Pistriet to establish in 
Chicago a “Fieet Hometown Digtribution Canter." The center 
was to be responsible for “the processing of ‘hometown’ 
news stories and pictures received from public relations 
officers attached to forees afloat and the transmission of 
such stories to &ppropriate ‘hometown’ newspapers, radio 
stations End other media throughout the continental United 
States.“ 

Hamed as tha firat officer-in-charge of the new 
activity, which came to be known as the Fleot Hometown News 
Genter (FHTNC) later in 1345 and in subsequent years, was 
Lieutenant Charles W. Payne, USER. He was assigned twelve 
ether officers of tho rank of lieutenant and lieutenant 
(junior grade) to serve as editors and reviewers, ang 4 
enlisted personnel--clerical workers, writers and 
photographers. | 

The first month's output in stories alene for the 
FHTEC was 10,340. This inereaged to 39,479 in May 1945, 
and during August 1945, over 100,000 stories and some 7,000 





r 


"UN ». al yoi mac schij — — i 


تپ“ + مسین وروت 
.له عنم بت سه مسټ يی wed!) Carus mta tl‏ 
be‏ صمت اؤ سا له سمه 5 47 "T‏ 

so اسا‎ use mwa —c—umym silp al se وب‎ « 
a: ered ےہ ےد‎ Do ت مەک‎ 1 . 

تا أ نت diaid‏ سم وبابد di di ap +r‏ ان 
نە سه ۰ مو t o drm ed ben dsda pd mmi dmmali‏ صے مم 
میا اتسن سه "شه يبټممناس uaea o‏ 
که عنلله تا اکا موده ات تا تفه ادها انا 
سم واوله نه مو ح یمسر Math‏ ایا سی اسل fa‏ 
nike: awa aojo” mv uM C‏ 
aa‏ ام تل نموم وف تا مسا tabs‏ 
يووا ++ + 

i‏ سس هه tele‏ دعاص 9 ä‏ — >پ+ ہے سب 
نید a eq on Geen cede‏ و ديم اكبدم — — 
cac y epee ol dew Oe ab ond EE) wate‏ سم 


ولد وی ——— ہم ہے 
| وموم Doss] Ann an] ba tta mA be‏ 


۷۲ ipa oque Anà eue PS صل‎ 
ee emt hae شود هد ہز‎ — * 































- 






Ai ph mph ntt ape: 


To. Peon © "m 
٢ کسی کہ ہے‎ TC —— uie e 


274 
pictures were processed by the center. Altogether, in a 
seven-month period Zrom April 1 to October 21, 1945, the 
total number of pieces maíled--including copies of stories, 
picture prints &ni xüts--amounteóc to 1,455, 140.8 

The key to the success of tie hometown هماج‎ program 
were the reporters om the firing line-~the Enlisted Navy 
correspondents (XNCs) and collaterai duty public relations 
officers. 

in the fali of 1944, Captain Milier rounded ap 100 
experienced newspépermen fires the enlisted ranks is the 
Pacific Fleet ami aseembied them et Pearl Harber. Ag à 
test, ne embarkec ail 100 in عا‎ battleship fer three days to 
write at least one story on each of the ship's crew members 
for hometown Cistribution. The bettleship ekipper was 
extremely reluctant at first te participate in this experi- 
ment, but was finally persuaded to do go. “Within three 
weeks.“ said Miller, "the clippings from hose town papers 
began to reach the ship from folks at hose. Suddenly this 
ship's crew showed a marked gain in self-esteem resulting 
from the personsl recognition Che wen had received from 
home. "7? 

The 100 ENCS wero agsigned to ships throughout the 
Pacific for the express purpose of preparing material for 
hometown release on individual Wavymen. The System was 
later refined to include "roster stories," in which à 
single account of an exploit by a particular ship was 





im 
su mbala پمپوږو:..‎ a eG هلهوو سعه.‎ 
wt رہف وف ادا‎ Lebzog سو سسجت‎ 
انی‎ le ester واعسے بسئنہ- لعبید تب‎ to. wee Levey 
M بی مده رو‎ m we Aue ALES vatis 
مس وولو کو یم وسوس )د نف السو سم وښ پس‎ 
سا شش سر‎ alr mi RAIS خر بب‎ — aaa 
amun nida yat لكك عن عن ندم‎ evinen E 
— 
انەد موتح ب زه‎ cise EE Ne it ae دب چک‎ 
ته د‎ onimi imd m d کهونهد که له منم‎ 
عاسم» طوۍ پټ‎ xa qitenissed 4 of bol toe komader کہ‎ Fami 
ولاو تہ سس‎ etd M We ue quecs جوب مر وغه مه‎ 
-ieran 6647 al aqila 4۷ ۳4 ۸ manele: Vi ar sae 
بے‎ eee ےط وص‎ a a Ea) E o oe 
سنغب, "ياك 4 دم سس مث ممیت‎ Djan " می‎ 
Abd? gc o o s 1apdD cp vod» دہ مه تخت‎ eae 
دم‎ Mar U nm cà map criar s bemulo vers ualde 





























273 
processed by PITNE and sent to the hometown publications of 
each erew mezber of that ship. 

The rester-story system was described quite acour- 

Btely, albeit with a great deal of satire, in the followin; 
passage from Ron's Ga Neax tae Water: 

The exec leéneG forward exciteciv, 

"Do you begin to get it? We get up 5 story on the 
avent with some blank spaces in it, mimeograph it off, 
then simpiy fill in the man's name from the ship's 
roster, like ‘Slank Biank of BSlenk was aboard the 
UeS.8. Missouri recently when that ship’s sixteen- 
inchers disabled Yokohama,’ and fire it back to the 
guy's home~town paper. Visualise it)! The Miapeavri 
alone haa 2,700 men XZooard. Any time she did anything, 
just anything at all, that would automatically mean 
2,700 stories in papers 211 over the States. 

". e »« Think of iti "ihe thousands of ships we 
have: The hunérecs of thousands of men--Navy menli--on 
them! The millions of stories that would be gushing 
irom them to ûs? From us to the thousands of tanktown 
papers ín the U.S, We'd swap them under? Why, this 
thing might be to naval pubiic relations what the . 
invention of the machine gun was to lend warfare! "50 

While not ès flamboyant as the "exec" in this 

fictionalized account, Captain Miller neverthelese was 
enthusiastic sBbout the potentiality of the EXCs and the 
hometown news program. On Juna l, 1945, he wrote to hear 
Admiral W, H. P. Blancy, then commander of an amphibious 
group in the Pacific, "Wo will need fifty te a hundred more 
of these writers +۰. in order that the Navy's story cas 
be tol wore fully . . . 4. Gut of these men I expect to get 
not less than 400,000 stories. ^ 

Paring the Okinawan campaign in the spring of 1945, 


the £uCa anc collateral duty public relationa officers 





TI yi dman‏ سط مہ ہو ہے ہہ 
— — ۱ ور 
Je s ۱‏ 
1 ۱ ۰ 0 | 
Aa |‏ مهم | 8 6.4 
be Xe Le sep 4 AA sedi‏ یہ * 
bul ti |‏ ادع سس 













à يبي‎ RE ۱ 
T ai Ed vot c) [LN سان — الم‎ 1 
عر‎ a | و‎ 
E «wm ed MEI Q5 me "OO 8 
ae ته‎ MUNI 
















x= | —‏ | 
وزو Vase.‏ لم a‏ 
سد تفم مور سان peis‏ 


sap "CTUM 
| û . . اك مص سك مال‎ 

: شید ا لے ہت —— — 

S ] miu ^ d 





ا نه اء ق 











274 
wera credited with writing "so many goo$ action stories" of 
the men who menned the invasion ships that "tbe American 
publie received the sort of information it so deeply 
eraved. . . . Steries containing nancs and addraases of nen 
who took part in the action proved to have high priority ín 
the columns of hometown newspapers, "4 

The news service on individual Ravywen seemed to be 
very much appreciates by newspapers throughout the county. 
Typical of the enthusiastic response echoed by the smeiler 
newspapers in particular was the fcliowing excerpt from & 
letter sent to PRETEC by the Claremont (N.H.) Baily Eagles 

Your news reolesee about the Landry bey fran West 

tebanon wis indeed Welcome. In the future we shall 
semi you tearsheets of the articles we receiva fron 
you, 60 that yeu could see the number one spot the 
story got on page 1. We are mare than grateful at 
— M. m on your mailing list. Seep the news 

In the summer of 1945, a nationwide survay of $06 
dally and weekly newspapers throughout the country-- 
conducted for the Havy by the Rational Opinion Research 
Center--found that American editors desired more of these 
hometown stories. Nearly IOG per cent of the editors 
polled "agreed that distribution of a greater Quantity of 
news about local men is the most important single improve- 
ment the Keevy can make in its public information program. 484 
The editors alse believed that the "hometowners" were "one 
Of the moat effective ways of presenting the EBvy's pact in 
the Pacific war.“ 


bet 

١ * واي موویص‎ dian 
ppa ها اداوس دم مه‎ d ساسا‎ 
im iy وسنلواېجۍ نص نا عضن عمسم‎ av ووهه‎ 
اش دم دم‎ ups «4 mr hene, co mdr AL ه٥‎ 
rungs sarr ie مورمسې‎ 
et ot ens a aie o mA ERE. ا‎ 
psu ودې رفک‎ cam وو مب پس نام اخ‎ 
سلا يح‎ dd رسسسس اوس ي‎ 
swn apa pt با‎ «e سسسداب نس‎ 
نید‎ bia LEN — — سو‎ 




































کپ ند بس موم اسر و ema Glu a‏ و لہ 
erwin‏ 

—2— da — any p y 
سسسه‎ ee torte اا‎ wart pe 
ce ae سنہ ہف‎ a OK Uo cO" 

dud bete"‏ سي وسوی ند à‏ وس (viewed‏ نا 

| مه قم teem MEN MM‏ لمك اسو 
1 کے ر ب دا سس سس ها 
d‏ جم ہبی — — — 
$i tul rum am guam pe‏ 


= S 














275 

Perhaps the beget evidence of the effectivermas of 
the hometown news progran weas obtained from è content 
enalysis of & representative croup of newspapers coniucted 
by the Evaluation Section of OPA from March 24 to July 21, 
1945. During the first eight weeks of the study, the Kavy 
reeeived 12 per cent ofl the space ellotted to 2 
gervicemen. In the last half of the paricd, the average 
percentage devoted to Navymen jumped to 20 with a peak of 
30 per cent reached on July i4. The Wavy at this time had 
48 per cent of all U.S. personne] in uniform. The striking 
increase in hometown coverage of NWavymen was attributed to 
the greater number cf stories forwarded from the Pacific te 
the FHTNC end, as we shall seo later, tho relaxation of 
censorship rules in the summer of 1945 with regerd to 
publicizing the names of ships, bethle damaya and sub- 
marine operations. 


orded 





in Hay 1945, the FHTEC began forwarding rec 
radio interviews with fleet personnel te the naval dia~ 
tricts for delivery to local etations and subsequently to 
the families of tbe mon. One hundred seventy~five of these 
"Voices from the Floet" recordings were processed in the 
firat month. ۹ 

in June, & school was set up at Pearli Harbor to 
train Enlisted Navy Gorrespondentsa. Those who were already 
petty officers kept their old ratings but were assigned 


full-time as reporters. The non~rated men were designated 


mS 
ہے سم يښب پا‎ 
چم 0 ۹۵ 5۵۲۱ 1 کنات دا‎ evi CT 
rra sre! Vs ویو‎ kase ens هو‎ 
JE ws v à جس مب يم د هنمو‎ 
بان سب‎ 1" 170—717. 3 












IM E E 09‏ 
۵ یر مہ چسودہ le deer s dile ba pe‏ 
cdd de pum ow ed iy ao tema, Aven zug 6‏ سس 
«N Ao tamm zeg AE‏ نه — 
که ۳۷۲۳/۳0 ee‏ | سم máu dd aba‏ له 
oe homot i — capess, eli‏ دهشت اسودالش؛ » 
س رس سل سا apt‏ ېد 
eee Ghee,‏ ده رې پس يم EL‏ دغه وپس لد 
تت ېه سم یه وام ووغه ma daten‏ 
ودب موسدص سس ۲۴ 
وون ت و اھا س ج سہہ سسس س 
CH‏ سس 
134 د وااس زه اوا mdse‏ سط — 
a pabida‏ كله ھم مہف نود د د دی 
loquendum 7 ۱‏ سے سے بت سس زر (-o‏ 









5 
۱ 








تسیر رو رب ب ب a sant fel ms‏ 

ھ هع میا حسم تدم 
oam panao nie sata N‏ مہہ مہہ ۱ 
و جن bendi dec mum im banco‏ 


ہق یں 


T 
— — 


« 


27% 
Specisligts (X) (C) and given gimilar assignments." 





The final phase of the naval war in the Pacific 
began with the invasion of Iwo dima on Faehruery 19, i945, 
followed by the aasauit on Okinawa on April le 

By the time of the Iwo Jima operation, public 
relations planning ani assets in the Pacific had advanced 
to the stage whereby full suppert to civilian correspondents 
and Navy reporters was being provided. The public rele 
tions annex to the Iwo Jinu operations plan consisted of 
Getailed instructions on media coverage, including 
provisions for a large number of well-qualified press 
censors to accompany the news media representativas and for 


tranemission of news copy from the AGC command ships. A 





minimum of 5,000 worós was authorized for broadcast on 
D-Day alone. The public veletiona plan was tested along 
with other aspects of the Operation in a rehearsal heil on 
Maui in the Hawaiian Isiands, ° 

Two weeks prior to the Iwo Jima landing, Admiral 
Sherman briefed the civilian war correspondents in groat 
detail on the strategy for the assault, using maps with 
phase lines, forces involved, etc. The press representa- 
tives “returned the confidence," with no leaks of informa- 
tion occurring. "Of course, it might be perenthetically 
stated that the Navy controlled ail outgoing communications 


Channels," Admiral Miller noted after tho war. 


m 8 
— din rag uu ٨م‎ erablalou 
— Û a. - 


—— مت شش سے پیک سے 
مهم سا دناست ذا هه عند At peer, ae‏ دی 
دی ص ویر a; Lipy w b m‏ 

"ide. amg rad) Aw. «d Pa maf ۸م‎ ۷٧ وو‎ 
— PD cuim 





















سس« 
٤٥٤ onsale‏ مه D vemm‏ رم و وید ہیی 1 
8 ,په پس یی u aso sob mb‏ 
emus poe‏ ب nint pt‏ م ام شی ما ہجو ela eet‏ 
| 22556 له ه بدا رحد سر 
— — — 
ې JARE, akena malı i û rai toe‏ 
jaa‏ — —“— — —— — 
نه هن ۲« red» t aiae‏ 
oup union) quenti‏ د سب — 
ع ad‏ مو( اووس * سے س )ہس a) te‏ 
TED :‏ وې مه Gene‏ 
ue Li» ۳ ۱ —‏ ھا مسے جه 
cou ain totes ban” 1k‏ 

















277 
“weverthe less, mutual confidence had bean well established 
with @ respect for cemsen interests.” 

During the movement ashore at two dima, “125 cameras 
-“hemi-heléd, mnounteü in landing craft and aircraft-- 
recorded history in the making. 499 The exposed fils was 
collected shortly after the Karines landed and flown to 
Guam by seaplane, where it was parachuted te public reala- 
tions personnel standing by on the ground and guickiy 
transmitted by radio photo to San Francisco., News of the 
lending wae flashed py radio direct from the USS Eldoxada. 
flagship of the amphibious force commander “while the 
beach-head was stilji being secured. 1د‎ 

The arrangements made for rapidly getting the 
photographs end press Gop| 
other public relations handling cf the eperetion received 
high praise from Time: 

Sore of tho war's best photographs case oot of the 
Pacific last week. The up-close thick-of-battls 
quality of the pictures woes evidence of the bravery and 
ekili of the photographers on Iwo Jima. مه‎ . . The speed 
with which the pictures appeared in U.S. newspapers was 
evidence of the Navy's growing press sense. 

Just 17% hours efter the karines landed on Iwo, the 
first invasion shots reached the U.5. .. . The nows 
traveled even quicker, thanks to a radio transmittes 
which the Navy hal installed on a warship a nile off 
the Iwo shore. Each day U.S. resóera and radio 


thus got the direct reports of newanen on the‏ وآ یسب 
acone,"-*‏ 


back te the United States amd 











The magazine characterized the Iwo Jima press 
errangenants ae “another notable step toward bringing the 
Navy's public relations up to ite fighting arm's high 





٩٢ 

ی ونورا می ا فت ما سان سے 
pegaer © ia‏ چھ eet oy‏ 

جورع «غه سسمستږن cute‏ ےج ہے جن ہس 'ریۓج وسس ت 
— سوت à‏ یت دہ مسا دنور 
———— ہیس د وغ سب 
هن سمل مس ہج وو ات مه انس یي 
کہ او مراف uma n) ane‏ ہت دا دال کد 
liman Leen os‏ ہے 0 يرصم سا وسل 
bèahianasgs‏ فیا نطاب پست ہے فس s) to wem ghe‏ 
سم بد ats‏ ممیت سم موس اوزل ہہ 
منیو چټرږیه بع مہرئ) یدنم سے ۲"*۶ 
.5 | 77 هوس0 M sue‏ دس الم s mbro‏ 
nd mid quoc eae e‏ اس ernst Revie‏ سد 
۹ وشزلم یم سم شسنام" ی: اله شيج ہھ یمم — o‏ —- 
۷ ووملمہ aml el‏ 
هه د هس 'ه ء٢١۶‏ پس سټيه معد ہم — 
ED ub. PEE‏ بس اګ بل 
















278 
standards,” contrasting them with the courier arrangements 
for dalivering press copy dering the invasions of Saipan 
and Guam, “which meant it get to the U.S. eight to fourteen 
Gays late.” Major credit for the Kavy‘s improved press 
relations in the Pacific was given to Captain Miller, but 
Secretary Forrastal alao was complimented by Tims for the 
impetus ha provideds 

Captain Miller's go-ahead stems from the fight of 
press-couscious Kavyj Secretary James Forrestal (a spec- 
tater at Iwo Jima last week) to loosen the tongues of 
the Navy's tight-lipped top admirals. Secretary 
Forrastal hes made it plain that the Navy must make 
frienéós with ite employer, the U.S. people. 

Earlier, i5 B= typically mest gesture, Forrestal 
himself paid special tribute to Admiral Nimritg for his 
support of the public relations offensive. In a letter to 
the Pacific Fleat commander, he remarked: 

Z appreciate what you say sbout better coverace 
stemming from my own efforts, but I em fully aware that 
my efforts would bo meaqer and unrewarded in results if 
you were not backing them up, not merely with per func~ 
tory conformance but strong personal interest. Success 
in getting thie tremendous story . . . teld to the 
American people must depen’ on awareness of its inpor- 
tance all the way down to individual ship commanders. 
You heave been splendid in the way you have gone at 
this, and partiguiarly in the wey you have backed up 
Captain Miller.’ 

Despite the pressures from the news media and public 
velations planners to "go all out” in coverage of the Iwo 
Jima landing, Admiral Gpruance maintained his stubborn 
etance against breaxing radio silence while at sea. He 


wrote to 8 friend just before the operation: 


te 
خی دوواد سس‎ (hin wut? تفع د موہ سدم‎ 
aroas jo emirerri olf سی ضر لیم مععمہ وو نوک‎ 
curê ce ete 2.0 We OF Mee Fh HS o" سا دس‎ 
eng ere سم"‎ a» UM دو غفا" مساوم سهد‎ 
مر بے اس‎ AMAD oc سم‎ caw اساکہ‎ ate صقن له‎ 









نوس اټ —9- رب to ‘scat‏ 
oad n‏ ھی -۔ 
— چ- 


5 د دک یٹ رک عل وج 
oor —⸗ _ —‏ — 


ہر مہا سی پش ft‏ ومع 
ليسم estis pies tae ١‏ ہم wh snl? it‏ عب 
be ! ٠‏ کله وشمای Ro crime) tend rale‏ میس P‏ 











ساب ہہ ہے ود سید مہیپ برد 


>a spi i وهو نسپڼې‎ as 
DI 





279 
Everything went @long very smecthly st Pearl this tiae 
except that J had to de some arguing with tho public 
relations people to make them understand we were 
fighting a war and I would not break صا ظط‎ slilence just 
to sétisfy the newspaper correspondents. There mey be 
Complaints from the latter. but I intend to have TP 58 
keep radio silence and lots of it. just ae we did going 
inte Truk and Palan., they can sen all they want from 
the landing objective, 54 

Complaints from the press were at a minimum, 
however, ae the correspondents were weli~satiafied with the 
€SpeeGy tranemittal of news copy from the inversion site. 

The Marines also benefited from thie arrangement. Stories 
by their combat correspondents were dispatchad eariy in the 
Iwo Jima action by wire service reporters ambarked in the 
command ship lying offshore. Also, the P-bey message ky 
the Marine commander te his treepa “just be fors their 
landing craft churned toward the beach® wae recorded by 
combat correspondente and delivered to the radio networks 
at home the day after the assault, resulting in its broad- 
cast over two national networks, ^» 

At Iwo dima, for the first tine in the war, woven 
correspondents were allowed to cover operations in the 
forward areas. Captain Miller's office had been besíegsó 
with requests from female reporters te travel to the combat 
zones since the capture of Guam in August 1944, Finally. 
as advance bases were built and other women auch as Reġ 
Croes workers and nurses were stationed there. provisions 
Were mate for the distaff writers to be represented at Iwo 


Jima. Among these going ashore were Dickey Chapelle sand 





هس سس« سس 
کہ  .4 Ar aan —— mie aminn‏ ےہ 
یې Cees Sh‏ وچی سس 
THREES ives srin yi livê kl owl‏ ساسا o‏ :—— 
at?‏ سن self” soon «hü ee win)‏ اس( Lind?‏ 






ee ee 
———À LÀ سسا حفس نه‎ esas ودی جات‎ ih OP et د«‎ 
I meka iia a r seas 

coves OF OEE ES ô — ——‏ موسرو پےے نہ ذف 
اوہ ښسوسویر دو دب وجوم x‏ ا سض 
m) snc Do mque ode cmn nimm‏ وہ بس ا 


د و سه ده تحت سس مات 
M OP E‏ ا ا — = 





















289 
Barbara Finch. Admiral Miller later recalled an amusing 
incident concerning Mrs. Finch (see note 90): 
One unusual situation occurred in which Barbera and 
Perey Finch, a husband aná wife writing team fer 
Reuters, were on Guam. Percy cavered tne Iwo Jima 
landings from & battleship and it wes some tine be fore 
he got ashore. imagine his surprise to find that we 
had put his wife, Barbara, absard the first plane 
loaded with murses flying into the landing strip on 
Iwo. Barbara thus scooped her husband on the actual 
“Z was there” story. 
Before the change in policy, Miller had refused 
Miss Chapelle’s request to accompany the troops ashore at 
Iwo, exclaiming in a conversation with her. "I'm not going 
to heve 100,000 Marines pulling up their pants just because 
you're on the beach! *"° 
in the Oxinewe invasion, ene of the women corre- 
spondents wag embarked in a hospital ship during the 
landings., She did not have permission to go ashore, but 
throwh subterfuge persuaded a Navy coxewain to take her to 
the beach in a notor ieunch. This pronpteó writer John 
Leardner to include in a filed story the statement: "This is 


a now war. We now have a Woman in the treneheg, 


Rot 
very long thereafter, Rear Admiral Kelly Turner, the 
amphibious task force commander, sent à torso message-~ "Get 
that women out of here" 

Puring theo Oxinawan campaign, it was net feasible 
toe fly news copy anc photeoyrephs to Guam aa was done st Iwo 
Jima. Instead, a Bavy B-24 Liberater bomber was sent aloft 





Sew suras alan ui uhr abu —‏ ووم 

نه ve —— of aE "LAE‏ 
شه punisa‏ اک cad iN ciate‏ د دمه رتس 
هه دوه 085001 نوف وو ندو دي دس وسور اود سم 
ووو هم جو رممیس P^.‏ 

mean کت مس‎ im s" ees) وات‎ ME ها‎ s» 
حسم ہی‎ yids bariaed ٭‎ A) boning Wy voae 

کس کي وړ بوا وی ویمسنهو نی دږ ې ووس ہی 
سی دم دې هه د وس c» we cur e clem‏ 
ao ¥ A amc adis‏ اسر Imtive feoyoory wit‏ هده 
تسد وب DALY o Ai paoli‏ سرب yin‏ مل (dà‏ 
ه غه سه See nee‏ کہ پس یی ا ازور 
ncn SE he‏ نه uve? Cit Pa‏ نم 
⸗ فد کے پک د یہ یی 
عم yo na mam‏ ور | 
٠‏ هوي سی — 
py m‏ جو «e cepa‏ سب یم سد 


— — — 
سس سو و تی — co.‏ 










— 





7 





261 
over the island with four poel correspondents aboard. The 
piane fiew to Menila for refueling the night before the 
operation and then took off from the Fhilippines on B 
etheduie which put it over Oxingwa bt the exact tine the 
first wave ef troops wes mnovíug aghore. It bad just enough 
fuel to cover the landings for two hours: then hed to fly 
to Iwo Jiwa for refueling and on to Guam, arriving there 
eight hours after the start of the invanion. "Press cOpy 
and photographs were transmitted to the United Stetse snc 
immecistely used nationwide, 98 

Plens were undo to handle wore than 250 corrospondá- 
ents at Okinawa. The operation was a difficult one fron 
the public relations standpoint, due to the length of the 
battle and tho meed for daily coordination of news releasgue 


and press relations with the Army commends involved.  How- 





aver, again the media representatives were pleased with tho 
arrangements. John A. Hooley of the Blue Network wrota to 
Secretary Forrestal from "aboscd @ very comfortable ship in 
the cabin provided for the correspondents by the Mavy,“ 
which wes, he said, °. . . symptomatic of the great and 
veal effort the Navy hag made te provide the conditions 
Which will help correspondents in their work. ,99 

A delicate sedis relations problem at Okinawa was 
the censorship imposed by Admiral Nimitz on the "kanlkage* 
damage to U.S, ships. From their inception in the fali of 
1944, a cloak of secrecy enshrouded the suicide attacks by 













in. 

n je papo توس سا بزب رس‎ nn 
همو ورو مو مده وو سورس‎ 
سب‎ att Heine نله‎ và. Penal) veo ممعت مع چن اید‎ 
الى نيال‎ ma 2 run gi e se et دد‎ ev ma 
وم هت مه وې سه انت ہے ہیں‎ edi 
oats وج لسن‎ an نه‎ a G امه ا نس‎ 
— ۳۳۳۳ سپ‎ yb 
ues سر١ سے روروسادوما جب ریہ ماود‎ AA, اهن‎ 
T. pumi Sanu CASA busi 

—— مس عورد سے ہیں مسب‎ gy an مسر‎ mN ے‎ 
Nn < iato a ser mire مده‎ ama ډوو‎ ۵ 
یسوم وب ہے‎ cd) OU e + MARS amas د‎ 
Lasakli sı mme 90 nA nino qus zw] bem wo Fa هغ‎ 
ow sale ewecle موم( (چووموغنمه ښستس‎ biia añs Nady voeem 
x* «ewe O ما نف د‎ pele) ein . ودی‎ 
ot ge ku amo quae + Mosa! mc اسس هدې سن‎ 
ON دی اه ادص بن یس‎ bakaran يہ مکل‎ > 
«#0 
سا ۳ سا مس‎ o3 ORA me Voca نو‎ idle dés — 

voaa ae artid +1. —8‏ سے و یو سم 
٠‏ وغه ah i‏ "ورام ٠‏ 
"oodd‏ 


pi siris otriasa ts base younas ba S e SEE 














202 
japanese pilots. Complete "stops" were put on all informa- 
tion concerning loss or damage to our ships from these 
raids. The rationale for such stringent security this late 
in the war centered around the fact that the successful 
pilot did not return. It was veesoned that the Japanese 
high command had no way of gauging the success or failure 
of the samikage operations unless we published the 
results. ° 

In January 1945, James F. Byrnes, Girector of the 

Offices of War Mobilization, wrote to Secretary Forrestel 
requesting that the Navy publicize the effectiveness of the 
k&sik&rze attacks in order to solidify public support for 
the war, particulariy on the homo manpower front. The 
secretary'sa reply to Mr. Byrnes elaborated on the reesons 
for withholding publicity on the caida. It was one of the 
few instances in which Nr. Forrestal went om xvecord in 
supporting fully his military commanders on a security 
issue: 

Xing hes given much consideration to the‏ تھچینصتھ 
matter Zof publicizing kamikeze reidg/ ani hes advieod‏ 
that the facts be spread ag widely au possible witheut‏ 
letting it come to enemy ears. In accordance with this‏ 
policy, a full statement of recent dasagea waa made to‏ 
i hope‏ هه . . Congress by Admiral King in confidence.‏ 
it will not be neceasary to go beyond this restricted‏ 
distribution fer the present.‏ 

. « o ny wide publicising of Japanese suicide 
bombing placas in the hands of the Japanese exactly 
the kind of hortatery material which they meed to 
persuade their pilots into these attacks. I think Our 
refusal to publicise suicide attacks has contributed to 
the diffieulty which the Japanese have had in procuring 


volunteers for these attacks. 
Latex on we may be able to accept the military 


vec 
رسد سه هدخ در مسب‎ m» "etat Sika جوسسو مي‎ 
sanis سسوںم نو سم لود کسی‎ ym amd praem ands 
روت‎ Rid? معدم عووٹی۔ے ہدلی‎ a aeiae asa, ملش‎ 
او که وهه — ممٹبویای‎ 
دا ہو وجیسوس تہ ہی ووس‎ ae Jom BAD SA 
— سپ ور پمسښنېی سج‎ an (eoi تا سه‎ 
سه پھیں می بے‎ alos تا د« داصت‎ afs وی‎ 
۲٩۱ assum 
ای‎ — arol 4 am, DAR) pomo Ab O کو‎ 
۲ وون‎ 
at سنس نودم دغه صې ماا«ای ده دصو با۲ سهد ۸۶د‎ 
فلکم ووی ده ودغ به ونان وسنند موېسمم ہے‎ 
nt ee ae Sle AOE ook DS Roe «ee 
ed 


















هکم هم چو دول دوا میا > کے ن 





233 
Gisadvantagea in order to areuse more anthuslasn at 
home, bat l nope that this will not be necessary during 
the course of the current quite difficult operstions in 
the Pacific, +0: 

Before the Okinawan cemp&icgn, tho Navy faced a 
problem of 2 different nature which was et least partially 
engendered by thu publicity spotlight its own public reia- 
tions activities had focused on Iwo Jima. It waa concerned 
ever the public's anguished reaction te the hesvy losses 
sustained by the Harines during the bitter fighting on the 
Pacific atoll. Hoping to offset this reaction, Nevy 
spokesmen took special peing te explain why Iwo Jima‘sa 
capture wae vital ever though tragically costly in terme of 
casualties. However, Ernest K. Linódley, writing in 
Naakan. claimed there was an ulterior reason fer the sea 
eervice’s uncasiness, namely "the affect of the Iwo Jima 
losses on the long rivalry between the Savy and the Generali 
of the Army MacArthur over Pacific command and strategy. i» 
Liíndiey conclodec that: 

- è 4 û the Navy, knowing from experience Mschrthur's 
grip on the imagination of tha NMoericán people . e e 
YAS to see ro last week as stories appeared in the 
دق‎ press contr&sSting KacArthur's landings, mace at 
مهمه‎ 11 cost on undefended or lightly defended shores, 
with the frontal asgauits on such heavily fortified 
bastions as Tarawa, Peleliu, ami Xwe Jima~~all Marine 
Corps operations . . . under the command of Fleet 
Admiral Nimitz. 

Forrestal expreseed his anxiety over public 
Appraisal of the severe Marine losses in a March 1945 
letter to Nimitz, in which he introduced Bill Lawrence of 


the New York Timma as a “personal friend of mine who is 





d pe خلت 7 روڈ‎ — 
اسست د‎ oe ال‎ tees oes اله‎ ote 5 

nm oiim rm cà ای تا‎ aty wt belong 
oes ow تمورس د الت خنع د‎ ba tala SIG UNE 
bassai یبا عم وون او هرموس ید ند یہ دی یح‎ 
ute we اس بولسص‎ cm عددوون‎ Rana ووی ےپ زب‎ 
AIT صا سید میناد پا ته ووس سب کم‎ 

TRE ed 
اجن بو‎ alee) د‎ nett شون نس‎ 
وام مەد مھ کس س‎ e ame شب‎ Genter شب‎ 
کی‎ eat act to mwite e” pemer exui اص ار‎ — 
I. eorr in Lenn IST verê aa a E 






















d |‏ س۳ 


دی m‏ ن 


و —— 






i‏ ۱ 7 — چو 








234 
going . . . to the Pacific to be permanently assigned, "193 
The secretary told Nimite that he had asked Mr. Lawrence to 
brief theo admirali on "the effect of the Iwo Jima reporting 
on the public underetanding and appreciation of: First. the 
necessity of taking that Goóforsaáken spot, and Second, the 
difference inherent in thet kind of assault us opposed to 8 
military campaign on a substantial land mass,“ 

The secretary waa quite active in early 1945 in 
personal correspondance with members of the news media. 
Following Iwo Jima, he wrote to scores of reporters, 
complimenting end thanking them for their coverage of the 
landing. * ۶۵۹ 





The Navy was anxious, too, in the spring of 1945 
over the succession of Rarry Truman to the Presidency 
following Roosgovelt's death. As we have seen, much of the 
effort exerted by James Forrestal to upgrade the Nevy's 
public image sprang from his belief that the sea service 
woul be swept under the control of the Army after theo war, 
The secretary had plenty of reason to fear this fto 
Presiósnt Truma&n. 

as & candidate for vice — in 1944, Trumen 
had strongly recommended unification. And. before the yaar 
Was Out, he was urgin; the Army's plan for merger of the 
Armed Forces on Congress. Indicative of the new President's 









te 
سس یہ‎ cat یز سہ‎ iw pais crimes Set Titian 








طلټو لوس ومومو ١ه su Wnty‏ 
اتب سای که وسو تفع ‘eve thal‏ 

تت وم at (06) sta ad oc we? ee pee‏ 
تاش کات السب الت مومه eo‏ سوج وه مور 

ret Se ول مېټمجو‎ iam Loo seda) نات صقن یا‎ 











—- 








- | — 
a m‏ تع تن sis «b oj‏ ودنس تم ١‏ 
ca 99 10 aedarhecmE f tere‏ ہے ہے ہے ہے پواوریسے۔ 
برس ۲ emm sd s‏ سم ہو دی 
مناہ جو دوه ١‏ مہ 

ه وو ود نع دن تد غه ہس piirsi‏ 
Do ·-—‏ اد بب وب اښ vem‏ 


235 
views was a statement mada by one of hia aides early in 
1945 to a Washington group: "During the Roosevelt adminis- 
tration, the White House was a Navy wardroom; we're going 
to fix کړپووع دزه‎ 

Forrestal was hampered by personally cool relations 
with Truman. The secretary stood alone anong cabinet 
members in opposing many of the key policies of tha new 
aiminiatration, and he was never per@onally liked by 
Truman. However, he remained optimiatic. and despite a 
conviction that President Truman's thinking on the unifica” 
tion issue was “predicated upon his experience in the Acmy 
Gurinj; the last war and in the National Guard since then," 
he hoped that the President was not "closeG-minded," and 
gould be convinced of the reasoneblenegs of the Navy 
view, 196 





Admiral Merrill was in ailing health eariy in 1945. 
ana ee fax back ag January of that year, Forrestal wrote to 
Amiral Nimita that ho planed to brisg Captain Miller back 
as Director of Public Relations (DFR) in April or May. anid 
When sounded out by the secretary concerning this move, 
Miller himself at first strenuously osjected on the grounds 
that he wanted an important sea command in order to qualify 
for promotion. Forrestal allayed his concern in this 
regard by promising fim an advancement te the rank of 





c 

B anb GUN‏ وسینو nd ah‏ مت دا له علض مسر لد 
یوس pe ud rae‏ ہے سید مه ای 
MR‏ الک نه بو هوې وسوی یی مسب 
QO‏ اک tie‏ ہی مد 
eos taet o ag ow o S‏ ہہ زمر دی 
imba ain —— y a‏ 
هک تي ېو وی و وون ir‏ زی ہے 
لاط نك زهان ست بت سب ټم پونسونن اسو 
سي لت Otte Selle‏ سد iat‏ ) 

ه کم شتا ات eid} ime ats oè milini‏ 
لم بوږ ټی جنات نة سیت ال سم ۸و هر بے هس 
نستې ات wer Seal‏ سا ati al‏ ہے : 
ad‏ سو هش eff‏ هماما مس عد لاال < بيد 
ونا Oty Va cami veco od‏ پر سیسسی اوت هو نس pe^‏ 































RAI ud wines داب‎ prilbe si وک رھ ناج‎ 
ct com وا‎ . nien nad lo (memeb wÀ ufu wA M AR 
ross maiaa siingi saias ne انس‎ e adi E zastati, 
DI we c Lhasa ab UMS merhARlén gib ۱9 ۵۳۳۵ مم‎ 
— — —— sit ê هوم مووەفنة‎ 
stance و نهد دبع‎ ⸗ 
۱ متا مج وو تت وسد:‎ ۵ 
sidr ai بی لے سد‎ 


— — — 

















286 


ہو 108 


commedere upon his assumption of the duties of DP, 
actuality. whem Miller did relieve Admiral Merrill in May 
4945, he wes promoted to reac admiral instead, becoming at 
the age of 42 the youngest rear admirel on the Xavy's 

rolis. 

A gxaduate ef the Hava] Academy and ه‎ naval 
aviator, Admiral Miller hac a variety of assignments prior 
to his public relations duties in the latter stages of 
World War Il. He had no formal training in peblic rele~ 
tions, but was a short atory and sagazine writer and the 
&uthor of a book entitlec Hevy ممسن ات‎ Early in the war, as 
bead of the Training Literature Section of the Bureau of 
Aeron&utics, he wrote instructional pamphlets for Navy 
pilots and crewmen, stressing the meed for aafety precaun~ 
tions. 

From the moment he became the Navy‘s new information 
Chief, Admiral] Miller made it clear that he planned to 
change things. Mewswen were “bug-eyed" end “pinched them- 
Selves* to see if it were really true when he first brie fed 
them on his public relations philosophy: 

It will be our policy while I em here to tell you 
just what the hell is going on, If national security 
is involved, we will tell you that, tee, and try to 
explain why. But we will tell you what's going on. Jt 
is our job to tell the country about its Navy. We will 
try to Keep ahead of you in doing that job. My office 
day. 109 doors, and all of them will be open ail 

This kind of talk was no mere "snow job" for the 


press, Admiral Miller meant whet he seid, In 3 subsequent 












لتا شه د ته 
imma 4 e. commos ram adi do cinere ٤‏ 


ودس besiis‏ عدا لاو ونت -isg pipis ١١‏ 
قله ditag‏ دی مخنصے ariaa‏ لو اه ۱۱ وک Vo‏ 

ha" d 73 we |‏ نه مس د اه سم لتد 
tangas Gon chore Peace e‏ نيد sí bes‏ 
د مذ ع نمدم ralione‏ وهم ميحد وع of‏ ننس سو خم 
te mecs sdi to misses sosveseri) gnáskary wo be‏ 
pon] omm ibatan uel — E‏ سل vr‏ 
nue am? hef e‏ درف سا سه cem, phu‏ 





4uaí dm ao ⸗—‏ م ست لدم د ست ا وتسس اہ 
هنود sice cactint mrisdi‏ دد واسسم رسد سه وکیسہا O€‏ 
owe o uius epee‏ سی q= ony a ‘Gap yet‏ 
at “ascia‏ دمه دد د سي eb mj com wo» qnie»‏ نہد 
i‏ ———— 


۲ سمل‎ ep mena pot lise ٤ 
J ۶ Ho 


۷ a 
3 


ded 
پس‎ yai ttt a Lhi سم‎ ۵ 
























297 
etter tọ Captain Fitzhugh Lee, UEN, anGther naval avintor 
who had relieved his as public relations officer for 
Admiral Nimite in late March 1945, Hiller atated, “There 
has been a very definite feeling of helplessness here fin 
Washington/ which can be converted inate one of responsibil- 
ity and decision. Thie I propose to do. oie Miller tois 
Lee ho felt the public relations organisation had becore 
"nothing iore or less than a mes5enger"Loy gut fit where 
copy is receive a then is run up to COKINCH by one of 
our boys." This, he indicated, was s rogult of the lack of 
a waans of contact between working personnel 
Be described copy being sent up through channels to s 
captain and then four aómíra&als until it finaliy reached 
Aümivral King’s major deputy, Vice Admiral R. $. Edwarcs, 
whe, Miller said. “hasn't time to go into these things." 

For these re£ssons, he continued, "I have changed 
811 this and have forbidden the Review Section or anyone 
else to make direct contact top-side. i propose to make 
&11 decisions down here and if it gets out of hand and too 
hot for we, i will carry the bali up above myself." In 
effect, Miller said, he planned to bring the responsibil~ 
ities amd prerogatives of public ralationse back to the 
Office of Public Relations where they belong. 

Later in the letter, the admiral wrote 5 lengthy 
paregraph which suacarized his intentions am? revealed a 
cautious optimism thet hie ambitions ideas could be 


ree 
عد عسل سج م‎ —— 
WA وب لل س مودله وبس واااس‎ 
بسن سے‎ weeks لمحد عدت بنج‎ mi د‎ - 
لس شک سصعغه نټ باش کت‎ 
(Litters [> gem (us terre دب ېي‎ de ١ 
"CUm 
مہو سے‎ Gin ae a 
کے کے کے کک کک س د‎ S. 
be mid cs Ve لد دت تت‎ 
Jpu-————————— Mn 
im simm amA Em 
لن باجعا سه‎ tiom ajani د مد اسم هت‎ 
— oP د‎ hasida y eg السا مس‎ 
° «IAMS جسہ‎ O/w) oo o w^ rio” تا‎ 
—-———"—PE 
نود‎ E IL LN انه ج مد‎ > wb e ie «ufi Tio 
—— IH Tar 
پو و بوس سا يم‎ si سا رد‎ cud s m ھ‎ 
= چ م ا‎ a EET 
ا‎ 





e 






















































— p 
e 


ev 








an 


SE 4 F. 0 i 


— — — 
011 0  - 771 
— a Snes weed ت کے‎ A 





259 
carris cut: 


Ido not believe that Admiral King or Edwarda will 
in any way atifie our efforts. They appear entirely 
cognizent of the need for this type of thing and >> have 
had no less then a half-dozen editors tell me that this 
billet of mine is the most important omne in the Kery» 
There is @ definite trend throughout ail ranks and 
branches to assist us and make possible the accomplish 
ment of our Objectives which to ma is to place the ۷ 
in every home in this country,  Grànted--thet in my 
time it may not happen. Also--grented that it may be 
the fear complex which hee brought about the changed 
viewpoint--the fear of losing the Esvy's ideatity. 

But, whatever it may be, we will make every effort to 
do the thimy we think sheuld be done. 


Partial evidence that Millex Gid heve support from 
within the Havy was contained in separate correspondence to 
him from two admirals in the Pacific. In late May, Admiral 
Blandy wrote te complain that the smaller ships were not 
receiving sufficient publicity. In responding. Admiral 
Miller declared enthusiastically (see note 31): 

I can't tell you hew encouraging it is to me to 
have officers like you. Who have seen the Nevy ao 
clearly both ashore and afloat, express their thoughte 
regarding Public Relations. This perhaps is one of the 
most hopeful signs . ə . that the Wavy has become aware 
of the great importance of its relations with the 
public and the taxpayers. 

On June 27, 1945, Rear Admiral Robert B. Serney: 

Chief of ataf to the Comsander Third Fleet, expressed to 
Miller that he thought the Navy had a “great story" that 
was not being told concerning the losses inflicted on 
Japanese shipping in Manila Bay by Task Fores 38 uring 

the re-taking ef the Philippines. ul a. strongly recom” 
mended that correspondents be invited to "view and doscribe 








mae ¢ 1‏ سنہ سوہ ا سن 
* م feet) iy ims aol?‏ مسجدمرمسہد یم 
ia hid ad ۶ —‏ اس نار مه سا e‏ 

" هغ لسسع دردد mo‏ 


— — 
— — 


irs | — P - سم سو‎ 
u orv meian rais aitan 





259 

the damage" there, 

in tive afcrementioned June 4 letter to Captain Lee, 
Admiral Millex atressod that he ssened “to detect a 
definite trend in tbe Fleet to desire more ant more cover” 
Ago . . « ." On June 26, he wrote to Lieutenant Coamender 
Nate L. Cr&btrec, VENA, one of و أ عه‎ public relations 
officers, “Frankly, I an delighted that they Zmenbers of 
the cruiser-čestroyer force in the Pacilfig/ ara becoming 
concerned ebost the lack of public relations in their 
organization, fer this will provide the most 56۷ 
stimulus our pregram could possibly have. 4113 in the 
letter, Miller denied that naval aviation was getting moro 
publicity than the cruisers and destroyers “because i 
happen te wear wings.” Rather, hé emphasized, "The weal 
reason behind thie is that some three years ago we made & 
definite effort to make Naval Aviation conscious O£ yood 
public relations and now Naval Aviation is beginning to 
resp proper dividers,” 

Miller suggested to Captain Lee that he ask for 


fifty more Enlisted Haval Correspondents to help the 





individual ships in theo Pacific get mors coverage. Ke also 
ROted that the number of requests from civillan corresponi- 
ents to be accredited to the Pacific Fleet had increased 
Bignificantly since ۳-۰ Dey. He arrenged to upgrade the 
standing of war correspendents by gaining approval for & 
change in their insignia from a "fouled anchor" to a “gold 


ےھ دې ⸗ — — 

suam or mst g beris vill LAUREA 
مد‎ nis ل تیا جت له دول سه مد‎ Al bln 
— —VE 1 3 Y Wt. 
سس«‎ > ot عة‎ 
ات۳۳۳۳‎ 
ا م‎ e سی دم تس‎ EE o 
striimi duce وټان كن‎ Lii 0 — 
پسصلون نسټې ۹۶۰ ی سب‎ Op uoa a 
> قفا هه د ذٗعْاممعت مد سیسوس‎ 
جب ور‎ m — س‎ a 
be, be sisimo miajn iraa dams aë Cuban maitia 
۳ 
` نس‎ e en 

٭ انت segue ae See‏ 5 ہس له سے اب 

— * 
a سه نید دس‎ ee ee کلب امو‎ 1 
ee oe ee «Mo us 
ie — بت‎ doe? sitas c ad aS د-‎ 
ووس اټ‎ BE barre که سر بس‎ 
سم و‎ Levy ھ اې پساوای‎ 
Ga” پس‎ eee tact” © اوس‎ 


ma: 





























299 
oak loaf.” He inforwsd lee that the reason for thia chenge 
was “to get the officers ahoaré ship to give them the 
civilian corre&pondentg/ some sort of humane treatment caw 


aia 


mensurats with what wa desired, The gold ork leaf was 


similar to the rank device for « lieutenant comeander, 





Às evidence of the new direction Admiral Milier 
planned for his office, he instituted a change in nem. 
Miller had seid that he felt “public relations" wae an 
inappropriate titie fer the job his office was supposed to 
be doing. so on dume 19, 1945, the name was officialiy 
Changed to Office of Public Information (op). 4 The 
directive by the Secretary of the Navy affecting the change 
further stated that appropriate title changes would be mace 
at all Navy Department. fleet an local activities. 

"Public relations officers" would henoeforth be called 
"public information officers." 

“The change was made in order that the titie might 
more accurately escribe the activities of this Office," 
Geclareé Adwirel Hiller. whose title also was changed from 
Birector of Public Relations to Director of Public Informa- 
tion. "Our mission is the distribution to the public of 
information concerning the Wavy and its many activities. 

We are essentially a news and information service, "t1 
Like chenges Were made for the Marine Corps and 


on 

ATE‏ ہو لوت تي شم p‏ وس c‏ وص سے 
ا ok ME EE‏ بت ماحد 

o Va a‏ تمصن يم 
ته یی 85209 هله لو د زٗیویسہسہ: مسوون۔ 


— مسب سمسیی - 


a فل‎ mirid e— nee lo cys at - 
سوہ بے ہس‎ 9 mum) سي‎ «eA A Tu DNA 

antais‏ دمه nium dish x dad Mew‏ ره لدج سه سه ټم 

ی ن منرم کم دس کر مک neppe ar milis‏ + 
مب انه چاو دد مدننه Miio ioonist‏ سے 
ele e ia >>‏ 
سه birr mase ke a NY a amia‏ ہیں سے 
aig‏ وووسمه نوی ودللنمنو. - 

- می ایر‎ lu wind. ال‎ editsnet pamanot دو‎ 
سسے۔‎ Stun sa aoe od تنه نفس‎ to سنوی‎ 
T——— v Ó—— «d 
——— 
Jik زج لحم‎ 

im eme mii a û a mi eA mh ا‎ 
















J -— 
— 












Coast Guard, too. The kerine Corps Division of Public 
Relations became the Division of Public Information, am 
the Coast Guard Office of Public Relations became the 
Office of Public information. 

Taking firmer control of public information activ~ 
ities and changing the name of his office were not the only 
things Miller had in mind. He promised Captain lee thet he 
would “go out and beat the bushes" in search of more quali- 
fied public information officers to assign to the Pacific. 
Among them was the former chief of OPA's Aviation Section, 
Commander Robert A. Winston, who was dispatched as Pacific 
Fleet Pictorial Officer, At the request of Secretary 
Forrestal, Winston also essuned tho tagk of assisting in 
the establishment of a printed daily newspaper for fleet 
personnel. The Navy newspaper, with wire service copy 
edited and forwarded from San Francisco, would eventually 
become "tho absolute source of news for all of Gua," 
Mililez predicted. He also anticipated similar newspapers 
for Navy personnel on other islands, such as N@nus anû 
Leyte, 16 

The newspaper project proved to be difficult to get 
Off the ground, however, with one of the main obstacies 
being the procurement of a press. Finally, one was shipped 
out to Commander Winston; and on July 25 the fizst edition 
of Hayy ARNE. هد‎ fouxr~paye tabloid~-sige daiiy paper was 


published on Guam for personnel ashore an’ afioar, i37 











ten 
هد ینود سا عرزيو‎ eyed — ——— ټون‎ 
هف ک«هموسد يم‎ ۱١ 09 
گی اس«‎ 
دنو‎ "MI 12 1 1 
wi ars se^ Ate? مین محمدمد‎ -biie تق‎ Ua paitis aptid 
-iiawp bee "4 dace "مه له‎ Gt سه سا سم‎ y 
2421009 ar ندفمسعدتف ووو ری لم موربے دی‎ 1¥ 0 
دن‎ e "C We Pelo اع راس وو مه اماس‎ 
i) sw" de EEA ame se پسویب موي د ام‎ 
پو )یم‎ ay مع دخا ١واروسو. په وغه سچټۍ.‎ Peete 
مم جریں:‎ cojan kiisi tsi قشعم تاه هو‎ 
vira ume Aor ساعن‎ mii wa فص اونا‎ a 
4 2275.20 RA 6 نې ره وواه وسوی‎ wid 
سروه مچ‎ ce Ce. (a mafia VeRO se [Dese غه عغې‎ 
— 00 اچ لس‎ 
یو وسوس په سم سم ہہ 0:۳ له مه‎ ۷ 
————— M قووګكکه‎ 
gos ہہ‎ aur i پستہ‎ Lo ambire اقا نو‎ 
۱ — 
«4 ۱ A 
قوسي ل‎ tho hu Demprset sU E 
































232 

A sensitive probiem which Miller had to face was 
that of public relations officers doing writing ani nows- 
work on their own-~for reimbursement. Meny of the Navy 
information officers, of course, were active newspapermen 
end writers before they went into the Navy, and it was harê 
to restrain them, in a July 1945 letter to Lee, the 
admiral expressed his opinion that the job of public infor- 
mation officers was to stimulate stories from civilian 
correspondents. “I cannot help but feel that if our 
officers were writing on the side that they couid not 
honestly fing it within their power to give out ideas which 
they themselves could use after 18300 46 p.ma/ at night. 148 
Miller admitted that the Navy information officers who were 
professional writers could prebably de the beat job for the 
Navy, but he admonished Captain Lee to “by ell means, dis- 
courage and prohibit columnist activities by our 
personnel." 

À July issue of the RPACEISET Public 
Bulletin, a new guidance Oirective for information person- 





nel in the Pacific distributed twice monthly, spelled out 
more precisely just what the rules were for "budding wawy 
authors." All manuscripts had to ba censored by # fleet 
press censor; all material pertaining to professional 
matters, naval subjects, political or international aub~ 
jects had to be forwarded through the chain of command te 
the Magazine and Book Section of ths Office cf Public 





ہے وه نهډولۍ oe tol nal Aim neng‏ اعد وف 
رسصسصسصسسص۲ 
تا ۱ 
pere memi cris iem coca J ۰۵6۳۱۵ 18۵6‏ 
0( سس س«ِ«««۳ 
Gules‏ سس س<<س<س۳<س 
mn‏ ایا ۰ موجن meo fà &à44 La ma piad‏ 

yai mas maie oni m Mim ee aranikio‏ سرد وس 

ht piahi pp mip or سی وہس‎ siue và bed gimeni 
م دا ددا مت مد جدہ 2 یسا مهو ما‎ 
غه نه ہپ کمم و د تنسح بد یہ‎ — set LAN 
ah cot) at red + sb (Rr Ld rmn naa} دنسم‎ m 
-alb anims Lon qe? pa aer وت یې ته واستاتبد طوېووسله‎ 
aa vı waalıi:m وه نف یم سیای‎ Aa oon 

* i One RE. 

iden سصسنند‎ oe mis (a weal bA 0 0 
wo halis sidema siod Reed ws ساد ون‎ mir MA EE 
quel quilted” of برس‎ 
>ar e p bemes s at has azqiwomomée L4 "ation 
-fse شمصسو وف امسد‎ 1a DemiKiioy .fesiHum فقفصسن سسسی‎ 
"————PoÓ وسو ینو وه سر‎ 
wiist to musto m> Ye سو اسو همونامی‎ enisegaM mid 

















233 
Information: authors should always state whether or not 
they are public information officers or Enlisted Navy 
Corzrespondants; enc each erticle should include the state~- 
ment that "the opinions or assertions contained herein are 


the private ones of the writer End are not to be construed 


as official ox reflecting the views of the Navy Department 
119 


or the Naval $orvice &t large," 





Admiral Miller also faced public reíiations problems 
engendered by race. in May of 1945, he told Captain les 
that “four or five Negro enlisted corresponóesnts h&ve been 
ordered to you." The reason, he aid, was "an effort to 
head off any adverse criticism from the colored press." 89 
He noted that he was about to recoive sevoral inquiries 
about what work OFR hac done for Negro personnel., No aleo 
referred to an earlier "mova" by Secratary Forrestal to 
have a Negro officer assigned as & correspondent aboard 
each Negro- anned vessel and ghore est&olishsent. These 
officors were to gent stories through the Negro Press 
Section of GWI to interested Negro newspapers, In &ctusl- 
ity, this pian never saw fruition, Rather, the Negro ENC's 
whom Miller sent to the Pacific were by June 1945 forwarding 
stories on Black Navymen to the PWEIEC, where a tegro 
officer especially assigned thero distributed them to the 


Black media, 2 





‘Se 
dem c9 4m cA veis CLES efa eat 
وسسری سي‎ «= o fe. c ee Aire ad? to a omi 
IL nores د‎ mira mea قلس‎ Œ 











Enê |‏ ۱ ۳ | هم دوه ber‏ , نلسے ےم تعمد سا - 


waLang vaslan nios eñ wl وم‎ wed 


— ده alas alos wl ۱ to om‏ نتس 
wo ۵۰‏ —— ——— —— 


———— چب‎ — 
Ml. querer bala adr mov meant ha دند سي‎ baad 
هو لاال‎ srhoses o? punts cow ad ced? bare 
لها حك م عر ممست قد ىف‎ —— 


وو "weet alison e‏ ہے )۷۲۳ مهو ده( اص 








= 
(009 —— انیس س‎ 
a ND 


















4 هو چو 
: لص په nds asima inea‏ ہت apy‏ »بمب 
و ساپ سح نے سج ames m‏ 


=) oes wa» eab وبغناس‎ aa aena asig | 





294 

The bid by Secretary Forrestal to publicíse Negro 
personnel in the Savy was spurred by the launching in April 
1944 of two ships which were manned entiraly by Black 
crews, exeept for the officers ané leeding petty officers. 
The experiment in manning for the destroyer escort Hagan 
and patrol craft PC~1264 breke with Navy policy and tradi” 
tion and was an effort to "wipe out stereotypes aout 
Negrces &nó the Navy. 4122 

The push te get more material published on Negroes 
in the Navy continued. In July 1945, Miller wrote lee that 
“the Gecretary is very keen at this time to get out stories 
on Negroes. i23 He suggested articles on ali~Black cargo 
handling companies. The edmiral alse said that the Navy 
was enjoying excellent relations with various “Negro 
Societies." | 

in August, Miller moved in another ares to get more 
favorable press coverage on the Navy's treatment of Negrona. 
He sent à memorandum to Secretary Forrestal ralating the 
efforts of a Hegro officer attached te the Ninth Naval 
District who, at the @émiral’s direction, attenéed a son“ 
ference of Negro publishers in New York. The reaction of 


124 He rocommendeó 


the press, Miller said, was “very good. 
sending the Negro officer, along with a white officer, to 
stationa in the United Stetes with a large percentage of 

Hegre personnel, with a view toward stimulating the Navy's 


public information people to give the Blacks more coverage. 


" 
.1 1ل ھ۸ کو maa misle ml ve (enc‏ 
هوم لر غه سم ai paipai aa g Sku‏ || 
2 سم وشنوب لل سم موم وهر ما و مسر 
چو 0À magana‏ ععسنی amni pame pwd fi v‏ 
Aga‏ وې مه هود د دہ دوښ yaioa qred Cote‏ سے “chewy‏ 
Gr Publ. ^^ €" lam lj‏ موس مہ سسہجوس جحسہ 
ووس Ri. Quem «t bas‏ 
۱ هه وسه ۷۷ بې مس AEA‏ ان tabou um‏ 
په یم هم تا مر ی رلم مسر یس سم 
٣‏ لېت ټی سی مس مج ہتہ ود ر جا دنه 
= سہہے, EIE.‏ ق سس رج رد myers‏ 
می کت عن کر کے cem ws toate Clem‏ 
ها رسد دجسم مدع لمن ی 
٢٢‏ دا 
Sens Aa a an DE A A —‏ می نود سب 
ee ee‏ کے 
خسم ١‏ وهات th‏ يدك يون alr sme Cest‏ 
l‏ ۷۶ سی ر ا س تہ تو یہی 
ګکسو ah o AB‏ سوه نارن -css d bjo‏ 
Dew‏ —— و 
مه سي ول یی d "T^ peus Vue‏ ت 
٢ ۱‏ لا ی 




























295 
win took this 





The ۸۵ ت727‎ Puhlic 
message to the field with an article on the “Receptive 
Field in Negro Hewspepers,* which toid of the 200 newspspers 
&ad magazines anxious for stories about Negro service” 


Ime ne. 





Shortly after he assume! office, Admiral Miller 
began chipping away et the security restrictions which had 
plagued the Nsvy's public relations efforts for so long. 
in the aforenentioneG June 1, 1945, letter to Admiral 
Bilandy, he wrote that in his opinion security had been 
overdone, “Even though extremely neceseary in the early 
Gays of the war, I feel the time has come to change the 
policy. Our superiority is such today that we can afford 
to keep up With the times," 

A week later, the new Director 97 Public Relations 
sent د‎ series of mencranda to Vice Admiral Edwards request~ 
ing that publicity "stops" be lifted on several] heretofore 
unmentionsble subjects, "ubi Aor these were the Navy's 
night fighter aircraft and advancad base sectional drydocks. 
in the case of night fighter operations. Miller argued that 
ü “well-controlled Publie Relations campaign” was necessary 
in order to attract volunteers for this extremely hesardous 


Cuty. Referring to the drydecks, he pleaded that publicity 





m ۰‏ لفخ 
٢-ت‏ چیه اک نهک pi te bp Le su‏ 
سس 
A ν‏ سر ایب a gg:‏ 
one‏ = ۔ : 
سردل ۲۰۵ که — ملع coli‏ 
شه همو ده ان ما ۳۲ qme! v« v‏ 
أ يع لاڈ مسسومہ ہہ orm‏ £4 الشف لوس ون شتا اما 
nems Mad rimma meisie Aist ad nady adamm at agassizi‏ 
لامر "نمه فلس خوان٨سدل‏ ےفوص نه فلہ cihe‏ 
he mq jid B. asd Sod‏ وها م بد جاص ots‏ 
دو د سومکموان له botia ase me ade yatod Aue‏ 
LLLI.‏ 
د سه سو ان ہے ټوو ود ند awl aa‏ 
o eS‏ کے سس ماس مج 
د وسو ځا IE.‏ "که دروم م سووی یس مہ 
xr — —‏ ور e'qu-‏ 
Lime ada ocu eio Lun»‏ — 































296 
on their roie in the Pacific would do much to "boost morale 
of construction personnel.” 

in the area of submarine publicity, Miller asked 
Aémiral Edwards to lift the b&n on war correspondents 
visiting or taking cxuises sboard submarines. pointing out 
that any stories which might result would be subject to 
Strict censorship anyway. While he wes still in the 
Pacific, the then Captain Miller allowed Martin Sheridan of 
the Boston Glohe to embark on a war patroi in the 
UBS Bullhead. He later wrote to Captain Lee that when 
Sheridan's "I Was Moosróü" story is rolessoc, "It may be 
that I will have to confess that i put him aboard” (seo 
note 110). 

Milles was aided in his efforts te publicize the 
eilent service by submarine officers, In January 1945, 
Commander Eli Reich, USN, the newly named public relations 
officer for Commander Bubmerines Pacific, was dispatched 
to Washington to discuss the issue with Admixai Edwards. 
ag a result of this trip, è certain ameunt of msterial was 
permitted to be teleased after censorship at Pearl Marbor. 
In May, èt another Washington conference, the Pacific 
submarine commander himself, Vice Admiral Charles E. 
Lockwood, gained approval fer submarine commands to release 
&tories on their own--provided these stories remsinec 


within the stiil rigid security confines. **’ 


4 





upe p Q2 بس حم اه که اددام مسا ف سم‎ D 
' هع رژموولم پپ1مووسص ؛.‎ 

و ۳۳٣ OPE‏ سس سس 
aaae Lakah‏ ہہ رہد مس ےھ له evum mem‏ 
لہےے Oot ieee Nee e‏ ماو بلس ter‏ 
سی سن a‏ صن منوہم جرویژر ہمت at‏ وبرت یا یہ 
cikar raivis‏ مرس — uy a! fiire mee ab lem‏ 

od? اتہر ہے‎ ie» à nO Cmuaee کت دې د‎ E 

یو هع" ٣‏ هس pan “tenet‏ ده اسود wa FF‏ = 
See‏ © دسر oul‏ ته مرورمم و ٢‏ پک کات سم ol)‏ 
„w a‏ 

«d» وت نوات‎ m èria گت‎ ct Sate env Callin سے‎ 
LOE سب سو جم مروموے ے می‎ 
vol mien lla نمسا‎ obw adu مات‎ felt LOS لانو سپ‎ 
,سا نا موس ماس‎ cd 2a0 
۷ سو‎ ¢ a م‎ bo disset mM 
mna Teen! xa (Aes Seu banton w صا دو‎ 
سس‎ te” 

Su dades تسا انار‎ eee ى‎ ۱ 


وخ1 ہے 
| — —— — — 


فان كو و لاله مودو TE acne‏ 





























297 

By the middle of July 1945. these security confines 

were expanded to the point where considerably more detalis 
6610 be given out on submarine operations. The reasons 


for this further relexation were included in a message from 





the Secretary of the Navy prepared for the | 
Infarzation Rullakins 


The war has reached a stage where we can now relax 
some, but not all. of the security restrictions that 
have veiled the deeds of men in che silent arm ef the 
Wavy. the submarine service. 

From the earliest days of the war, they have 
carried on their missions with a minimum of public 
attention. Their own safety demanded this silence 
during the years when they were ranging vast stretches 
of the Pecific inside the Jep'sa lines. The reduction 
of Japanese control and power, which makes 8 relaxation 
of security rules possible, is due in no small measure 
to the submarines thomselves. 4 


By this time, submarines returning from Gea of 
Japan patrols received complete photographic coverece at 
Pear} Harbor, and their commanding officars filled in 
Getails of each patrol at prees conferences, Still, the 
corvespondents' copy and all films had to be sent back te 
Washington for review. The materiel Llenguishe? there until 





a message by Admiral Lockwood in early August secured ita 
rolease. Ironically. the resulting stories anê photographs 
were published on the same day the first atomic bush was 
üároppecG on Hiroshima, thus receiving “somewhat less" than 
front “page attention. 

In late 1944, periscope camerag using color Fils 
were installed in submarines to obtain motion picture 


footage for a special film about the underseas craft to be 


Te. 

ص غه مت to‏ ۷م لله:. اوی پډو اجن جم از ےو 

ا فة ت ناه ووجدہ وہ مسل مس مسان 
هله ته کلام به مس وساب ود ابه سی 





ib etm Pelng MA — —‏ نب 
مر ی ر مدر ماد دان Bad‏ یا بی Seed gee‏ ىم 
الېب هه پهبلنو. و Laisoisa‏ )مع دوس هلمع lis»‏ 
iza? a) ena) KA e open, ¢‏ ان دس دنم 
ومجم priri ws .qlianiaotd‏ ہجو esa‏ 
یی هنیا په له مس دس جيب الوم em. mmc shoes‏ 
ہہ at “Se Ls‏ 
۲ ات gan sine‏ 25 
وود مد کو چک 

ادو د ودنک «de ids alit‏ سه دسي ويرك ہو کیک 
















293 
patterned after the highiy sucecsaful "Fighting Lady." 
Lieutenant Commander Dwight Long, USER, who had felped to 
produce "Lady," was in charge of the project.  Unflortu- 
nately, although som excellent footage was obtained, the 
project got underway too late in the war to be com- 
pleted. 129 

In his June memoranda to Admiral Edwards, Miliar 
lao addressed the probleas enceuntered in the current 
policy of withholding; any announcements that U.S. Navy 
ships had heen sark by Japanese suicide bombers. He notec 
that Naval personnel on leave had wimitted such sinkings by 
the “kamikeses,” and warned that "tha Navy is getting inte 
& position whore it can aot control censorship on this 
subject," 

There were other reeasone why Miller wanted to 
spring looss the kamikase stories. For one. he wes Geter~ 
mined to give the American people an honest report on the 
realities of war. In his earlier ietter to Admiral Blandy, 
ke said, “I have had confirmation from many editers and 
publishers that the American public is anxious to knew the 
tragic along with the victories. They have been molly- 
coódled long enough and I propose to inject some blood ints 
the picture." In a June 4, 1943, letter to Captain Lee 
referring to the new film, "To the Shores of Iwo Jims,” he 
scl&red, “Everyone haa reacted favorably ta the grimness 
end horror of this picture and I suggest that you begin the 


—- 

مهف ——— Sp peepee Same‏ 
—— — —— — — — — — 
a‏ ان Ne rete at‏ ب وريدن كم او بو 
وہہ ہو An‏ تن ame‏ تفا نسح ای سه سب 
سه 21 m‏ 

5 د یل m Cr oss‏ عدہص سدم ارات 
— — — 

وام dito‏ شت سه حص - مت 
اش ےر ی نج جد — 
پر هد پد مس سنا gives rà ques m‏ فس 
بادا — — — 


— 
ااام عة س‎ — m 5 
^P GEM Gd ke ot — —— med mod) | 
مود مر ر‎ — — ۱ 
عخددیع عدمی هډ متسنٹ ۷اخصی‎ sid مسوور سم مو سل ل‎ 
um seoce yaw m — I°, صل‎ M 
ہے ےہ وه وهه‎ à s) mee tasse adf Pula T 
“Be په سار چب سه سم‎ "ARP unl 
نوس سم یسر نے‎ —— . | 
eaa abzgwum ur a l $a — i 
— —— — Y^" 


یا مس تاها ضس — 
ان موه نم وم اوی بمه 























7 
— ۔‎ 
© - o 





ہہ 


پ 2 








release Of stili photographs showing sse Of the mare 


130 Ha then reiterated the 


unpieasant things of this war.” 
views of the press in this regard: “There ig a strong 
Gemand on the part of editors to shov their readers what a 
tough time the boys ero having out there, We are relaxing 
consider&bly . . . and have the baching of both Elmer 
Davis and Byron Price.” 

Another purpose in emphasising cdamege to oux ships 
was the acute shortage of workers in #est Coast shipyards 
in the spring and Summer of 1945. It was reasoned that an 
emotional appeal was necessary to recruit new workers enc 
vetain the present ones. who were sorely tempted te return 
te thelr homes in other parts of the country following the 
victory in Europe. In a July 1945 report on actions taken 
to support Navy public relations objectives, Admiral Miller 
mentioned the release of “damage sterier” en the Bunker 
Hill end Sereteace end the exhibition in tes Angeles of the 
hespital ship Gamfexrt. end destroyec Ballers. both of which 
were heavily damaged by the enemy. He noted that the twe 
ships Grew crowds estimated at 250,000, 244 

Earlier. wide publicity was given to the URS Erami” 
làn upon its return to Eew York. The carrier had sustained 
eritical damage, yet suxvived. Admiral Miller told Captain 
Lee that the Franklin stery “hee proven to be one of the 
most beneficial thet the Navy has sver had. The emphasis 
placed upon this was the heroism of American seamen and the 





e i‏ دا هه مسم 

ub‏ سطع qu ee‏ نس م۰٢‏ سه وې امسا اح 
rv adir‏ پس )« ciao‏ مسوم سم mn a ot‏ 

à "ars رہم‎ tiès wat eee ⸗⸗ N 
anan os œ نی تور دم‎ PE ELEM 
mei? 29a To pastes ae سوہ‎ om un oc X 4 
انان بج‎ -- 

لت فسووینہ ےووہ جو سےشی+نسنۓ! دنسپ نی وی وسو 
مس دو تا di mcs um V b S‏ د یمم ساپس 
نم QUOS‏ سه LAMNI PP vanne‏ ۷۷ مو ومو نه سم 
ووئنچئ ووم “> اموس lic ٠٢‏ سه وو ها 
kee‏ تہ پسوبرہ سور be‏ مس ما c— m Sede‏ 
و تسل سب تو وی «Ao Su aiuta‏ ووو vedo"‏ بد 
لاه انیت + اس رم pacers‏ سه jokiam‏ بعد 
دم سپیمه (ee‏ عونت ہے رو سنہ ariin‏ مد تر wi ll‏ 
دس سب ډو ume‏ ووےارید جد امد بيسن 
دد Me‏ نس سا ہہ محعیبےم anlage! ast c)‏ ہدید 
E‏ ۹ سے ct‏ سا ہیمست سس میں kan p‏ 
— — — — — —— سے سہ ہہ 
00۷ ان موماسیمع غږ ہی ہی )34 

amd لے ع‎ HAM aiu» 
ees Bed B دغه هاس در ې تا کے‎ 1 
adr Vm - nh mea, an^ quor stilus 
تسر جس پاد‎ Hurt and qvem ك‎ 
سے سے سم‎ e هه‎ — — 

































200 
staunchness of our shipbuilding construction. “>? In the 
same letter ha stated, "The reactions of the pubiic to tbe 
release of such stories has beun splendid. For exaupie, 
the Cmnfort /Story/ resulted in wice-mpread nows gtories t5 
the effect that the American public were fighting mad over 
this attack on @ hospital ship.” 

Millar at this tise waa working on a formula whereby 
15 per cent of each type of ship could bpe nawd when tha 
ships returned to service after usdergoing repair. This 
was a significant modification of the long-standing “Leet 
Date Rule.” in which the name of a ship Gould not be 
released in connscticn with operations subsequent tû the 
last date the ship had been officially identified in 4 news 
announcement. ® milter emphasized to Captain Lee “that 
the time has com for the Japs to know how strong we are 
and that more and more ships are returning to do battle.” 

in line with thie policy, the CDICPAG Public 
information Office released more than 200 stories in June 
and early July deseribing ship amd air anit action against 
the Japanese homeland. To garner even more sews of this 
type. Admiral Nimitz sent a message (AlPac 64) directing 
all fleet comaamiers to nominate by mame anips under their 
jurisdiction "whoza &ccompiishoents are considered news” 
worthy.” On July 25, he requegted commanding offieers to 
furnish “at regular intervals . . , tha unclassified war 


activities of their vesss1s" to mayors an governors of 


- 

eee‏ — مہ 
پمپ با حي EI O‏ 
mec‏ 
ا "ma din «e‏ 
ااا مدنا هم muaa alae s me ww ssw md cli‏ 
Ad aw Posh px lees Gi Ve cR aha ١١ Pubs ven Kd‏ 
همتا دا سكاف mal‏ مهنع تاعا جيب 
ame $b enticed ten amtii 0‏ اس ورسد real”‏ 
دی 2 
eae i a‏ 
د و کي سل سه سه ووانام فرصم له ء: جب 
SU amena‏ سیت مپودمعزیست س حعوعل دس مم» 
يك تا ted dene as‏ نف كه ت اسه سه ps‏ نت 
هتمذ سنہ .تد gids suse‏ سه س مرش وسو - 
QUIM -‏ ضنف بنا هان arta weni ods‏ 
j uhan Cor wb aum kahin GELS ^‏ سے 
ما ج نشت سلس هلق هند مدد اة محفت رماس 
m‏ لوس ا ہیں aiu be ama nm amn ug uii‏ 
رپ ن اکت ست 
⸗ — 

— - — qui onm شی ”صت‎ 
— 2) SUP VES GB Pain 

—— E | | "e CRunm 







































H u t an lator undi Ve 


21 

Atlus and states after which the ships were "— n 
This practice was later extended to include officials of 
any community er region which hed a specia] interest in a 
particular ship, such as the birthplace of a men for whom 
the ship was named. “Even though goch letterg &re personal 
messages to an official they will often find their way into 
lecal newspapers, <adio stations anc other media,” ships’ 
public information officers were tolo. 

Predictably. the relaxation of censorship reles had 
@ palatable «effect on Kavy public and press relations. 
Miller elatedly told lee on Jums 15 that there was a "wico- 
apread foeling among the press that the Navy is now telling 
its full story" (see note 132). A menth later, in compli~ 
menting the CINCPAC pubiic relations officer on a 
communique which iaciuded the naases of verious ships as 
well as theic comaanding officers, he said, “The entire 
story wee wail played and the pres ia delighted to see 
this continuing trend of iibevalness and free thinking." 
He aided that he head recnived no static from his superiors 
On the stosy, but rather that it had been "reosivsi with 
wholehearteó approval back here." In a June 15 letter te 
Commander Murray Wara, UGIR, chief preas censor for CCPM, 
Hiller had atressed that ke had not experienced the 
“slightest Gifficulty in elearing material with COMINCK."* 
Significantiy. he added, “i have found very few of the 
taboos to De more than personal thinking. A certain fear 






iss 
اس دامع یا‎ v Seans nai w ad AT 
4 i proceed Limma © Med studs مس سم‎ gjit یا‎ 
a-— ah am ( > omiqunid als @ dee عا سه وسل‎ 
Lmvwo rug د‎ tse Cee Apot ar hais or G 9 
sias w- sum ber ede Libe ad Audite فدہ انه هه‎ 
منم‎ “thee ke úrs amistós Abis dupun j 
سے دیا۔‎ e2 cls alana وه له‎ 
مسسوحاي د په ټس‎ (9. mb du ati دا‎ 
م يدانه ېا وج ار‎ om eM O 
wahr e کس به روه امس مو‎ o سه سم‎ gree شنت‎ 
جت الات‎ bè yam سي دب وم ومد اس‎ elie وس‎ 
ics m b ha « سوہ دو‎ -- "ru dii md) 
درک پو د‎ semi&( ^ peiin 
ملس پر ټوو عا سو‎ cab) oid die Oe 
ہہ‎ ae Se malam — — Liae sa 8 
عفر فت 1ی ا س مسا ہے دحل ن س سر دنیب‎ 
— ———Á—A a—Á bmi 2) e xen epee ase ee 
a atua كذ‎ mê n Mr e لوانت اانه لاوما‎ 
هوو کس فوص فاد ممه موم ف ونوس‎ nimm 








































202 
complex entered the situation in which no ona would go to 
bat." 

Un June 26, Admire, Miller was 4ble to write 
Captain Los, "We have just eucceeded in breaking the night~ 
fighter meterial. We aro now working on è break for radar." 
On July i4, he infozoed Kear Admiral Arthur W. Radford, 
cemmbndor of Carrier Division Six, that radar would “come 
Out from under the lid" on August i5. “All the way 
around,” he told Admiral Redferd, “we have been able to 
liberalias celeases, Censorship, etu., and I belisve Baother 
few months will find practleally no taboos remaining.” Ane 
again, he proudly expressed the opinion, "Frons the preas 
point of view, the Navy has never onjoved such a high peak 
ef goo8 wili,^)9? 


in iine with Secretary Porrestal's desire for 
greater coverage Gf the Wavy in the Pacific, he wanted to 
have nowapeper and nagazine publishers visit the Pacific 
Theater, Earlier requests for such visite het been turmed 
down by President Roosevelt, partially because the 
President folt thet moet publishers--as nepublicane--wight 
ba hostile towerd the adwiniatration. On January 2, 1945, 
Forrestal sent Roosevelt a meswrandum listiny itema "I 
would like to talk with you about." It inciuded thia 
etatement: 


مال 


د laatia «i nen a‏ نه umo Om Oase‏ مونلا چ ف 
e ces, Sall‏ 

سی a.‏ میا مالا ج سل mue Ro‏ 

si‏ ه مم۔- 
en mt a" Satis Dada‏ سام جد + سے ہب سم 
وروا در د wales a n Aa am EAL‏ 
ↄ—‏ غه دل الد اعم — leer‏ مه 
م وسہ — ناو جونذ ور ود yew we A ki‏ 
mt "t‏ دا مس ووي درس مر حول ou‏ 
«cin Vise Lm EL L‏ نے ونیم سی 
QLAReu eus ómià (dim mon um‏ یي ونمو ud - decides,‏ 
وول re ergy CY Leen ôö oe‏ ہے ہے 
وی سر رن اب اس غی مت روم مسل د ینم پسیږ 
Lir mw‏ < 























303 
When Arthur Sulsberger returned fron the Pacific he 
expressed the view very Strongly thet the interest of 
the public in the Pacific war would be greatiy enhanced 
by permitting publishers to make the same trip he did-- 
he came back gr«otly impressed with the scale and seape 
ef our operations. I wonder if you would be willing to 
review yOur Original decision. I de not believe that 
we would have an avalanche of applicants. 15 
The secretary receivad no imeediate encouragement 
from President Rooseveit, but he did not lose euthusiaan 
for the project, He discussed the issue with Admiral King. 
and on January 20, 1945, King wrete to Admiral Himitz 
&eKing whether or not the visits by publishers might cause 
Any inconvenience. The latter stressed Forrestal's 
reasons for aliewing publishors to visit the Pscilfic. “The 
Secretary feels that it would be beneficial to give the 
publishers the opportunity to observe for themselves the 
tremendous problems involved in the Pacific wax wines they, 
rather than the correspordents, estabiiah the policies 
which govern the editorials and handling of stories 
concerning ths Pacific affairs. 2157 
Despite forrestael's anxiousness to have publishers 
visit the war zone, it wes not until aftec Roosevelt's 
death that the project agtually got underway. In a May 
1945 letter to Captain Lec, Admiral Hiller pointed cut that 
the secretary was able to convince President Truman more 
essily than Roosevelt “that 211 publishers were not anti-~ 
administzation.” Mowever, each visit hed to be approved by 
the White House, and the decision was meče to sem! the 
publishers out in tears, pairing a "Donkey" with an 











د نمست سم sad‏ خم ډور مه سه یس animi‏ 
Au e son Qui AVE CUR mmm n‏ 
فلې یې د ود بے اتقات م داص موه ور 
— — — پپپاټ اس دم ۰و 

نس a e e‏ ده aie‏ »سور ېې 
"mn E qua‏ 
⸗ وپ سوم و aep eme um ersesü s‏ 499 
r⸗⸗‏ دی ته mih dm"‏ سه سسم مسب 
«dr m; Caines‏ — 








"Elephant. = 

At thia time, publishera Rey Howard end Rəncy Lucs 
were Already in the Pacific, anë despite Hiller’s intima” 
tien in hia letter that men $uch as Luce and Howatü would 
be "difficult to control." the visits prove? to be highly 
beneficial to the Navy'e publie relations prog: æn. 

Miller wrote tee again in Jume 1945 to rssessure him 
that the time and effort being spent on those importent 
guests was paying off. “Ag@ein, I sey that in spite ef the 
tremendous nuisance these people gre. the net results are 
nothing short of maynifieent in the quud will bei»g crmeted 
for the Navy," 

Part of the goodwill might have stemeod from tise 
treatment these ovwblisherse received. in his Jauuery i945 
letter to Mimits, Admiral King suggested that consideration 
be given to the appointment of an officer to set as hast” 
to these very important guests. e ob&erved thàát Generei 
Eisenhower nad a former hotel m&nager acting in this 
capacity in Europe. And Milley promised Lee atine "Suazxppy 
Commander“ to act as “greeter” for the publishers if ne 
felt it would help. in the summer of 1945, Commender 
Robert W. Wood, public relations officer for the Bureau ot 
Naval Personnel, was assigned to the CINCPAC stati to act 
in this capacity. 

But it was more than goodwill being created, 

Miller wrote Ime again in June to inform him that às à 






















ipe 
س9 جک‎ 
Ja کے ہے سے با چس‎ > 
وی امو ه هبه‎ im cni band انلك‎ 
eri io eol ex dcin E د اښ‎ al 
لہ سی‎ su وول دغه مسب وہہ‎ mh Feeds d. 
cme mirim اج‎ 
— — Am) a س همو‎ 
saem سس‎ des JD add له وت دن سا دس‎ 















er‏ موی ö‏ کن ود یس 


هوشن — وحوح ا لشم در اد io hA alim em‏ 
ومهم at‏ سويد 

mà) ut) ee vet ante Lito اب‎ a ra 
اه دد نه دیما ته مس یم وم"‎ ae ضر‎ 






Lamec aes oe ono opone J 


—— سم سر تسس یدانم نو تم 
وساب جاسم خط اد وک — — — 
ar "ndn‏ سس — رس وو لد 
موم و ی سے سے ما مہ سے 

———— adang 
مده نه شو‎ WAV MES نو ته حسم هومس ما ري‎ 


1 ےہ 











—- 








— دی‎ ۱ 
a جه ب‎ agentes Oo 


305 
result of Luco's visit « compiete iasue of کشا‎ would be 
Gaveted to the Pacific war. Ke teld Ies that “the Secre- 
tary ia exceedingly keen that we give the widust peesinie 
Cooperation in order tc msko a success of this special 
issue, which, we trust, Will make the Xatíon cognizant cf 
your war." Part of the “eoaperation,” as it turned out, 
ine lied asking Lee to allow tuee's photographers to see 
&1l of 96ل"‎ 5 ۴۲۲" photegraphs. "Loth unzestrictec and 
confidential, سے‎ 





Ag soon ag Secretary Forrestal potsunded Presidente 
Truman to @liow publishers to journey to the Pacific, an 
Arey public relations officer phoned Admiral Miller's 
office "to ask if we minded if these people went on to 


4,1339 The kary offered ne objection, 


witness Army activities, 
and a procedure was worked Out whereby joint: invitations 
would ba issued. However, On August 2, 1945, Hiller wots 


te Lieutenant Comp 





der J. Peul Scheetz, UDHR, Captain 
Lee's executive officer, that “the Army tried to pull a 
fast one on us in the cases of Patterson, O'Donnel, and 
@ackson." Ee explained, “After owr agxkeement to provide 
joint invitations to the publishers, they invited these 
peopie separately, anê we hod tco foliow along. They have 
agreed not to do this again, 4 

The incident was one of several ducing the sweer 












4 
e ae‏ شا غ مسولم تی عا ندید سد ہہ 
NO‏ هم نعل lh me‏ مه wee‏ جاب سود adam.‏ 
alone‏ د رنہ بد mena å am‏ -= سب ونی 
RUMP Ge tháo amd‏ ا من وا Le masis le‏ 
غه سښبې ‏ و a m‏ وكام ری سے 
ums Se 44A‏ ء سنا ...شا an (wit) ose‏ 


50 “و 7“ 

ړب لر ونا دی etl, nn, n (AAA‏ 
cumul bm, mde at amp‏ تت پس ند لګ -Ar‏ 
e‏ ودن amiata‏ اداد ,وسا ص کد رسد 

airea e amdo pa ai Saite وس‎ d 
نم يس‎ ad سو © سب‎ 
ف مانت سے‎ ud سم موم بسن ون اتيس‎ 
ىا سم د ابد اسان کنل پښوجن‎ 
ü ctm d nt 
ee ee — نہ‎ m c سر‎ 
cheveu — — — پ" شه‎ 
یي نہ یم ویر بیس ج سم‎ 


5 - — 
































| € ہے 





306 


of 1945 which se¢gved io point up che eplrited competition 





among the serviges Jor public romwornition as the wer drew 
te a close. It want beyond 4 cape oF orefeasional jealousy 
~~the wergoer issue wes foremost in tlhe minds of all tiw 
military iesdors, amd the service which attracted the most 
attention stood tbe cest chance لام‎ getting money and sup" 
port in the postwar years. 

Ghiefiy, the Wavy was concerned over two issues. 
It was afraid that Generali MacArthur would get the “lion's 
Share" of credit fer winning the Pacific war; end it wae 
apprehensive that sa@yel aviation weuld be absorbed into 
General Hap" Arnold's Srey Air Force after the war. These 
fears were reflected in internal correspondenee within the 
Navy in the sumer of L345 and led to almost írantic 
suggestions on tae part of som naval leaders to mount a 
Last-minute public xeletions offensive. 

On June 27, Vice Admiral F. J, Horm, the vice 
Chief of naval operationp, wrote to Admiral King: “I have 
learned from a variety Of sources that there is apparently 
u very definite whispering campaign g@ing on in Washington 
and in the Pacific" to the effect thet naval aviation is 
doing a “poor job” and furthermore is sugtaininyg unneces~ 
earily heavy Losers. 41 fi@mizal Horne cautionec that 
"uniess the public is given specific information ès te what 
Haveli Aviation has done and will continue to do in the 
Pacific, this anti Navy campaign sey heave unfortunate 



















tee 
مت ریہ ےویم‎ ai pa میسن دم پور‎ gaap fni دد‎ 
m ce وې بب سم يسې وف وین ہبہ ہر ایر‎ 
سم م: وممیہہد ہراس‎ «٢ t) — E Ra 
سلپ ےہ مرا يسم‎ wo c) ro am mei mmm چو‎ 
fume mu eve tiw cmi شاب ہز رف‎ I 
سصسصسصچصسسسس‎ 
اهسسم.‎ w- e دږ 000ر اه ها سو وما‎ 
بک ےجس صمد ا پر + ړوو‎ kispi وس‎ D 
cm «| سد ص‎ thee of) atte وس‎ viewers le "ndi 
vu eumd — Ol ۱ ۷ penus صا‎ maaan 
سم‎ . EE wa عو رع نه‎ nipe eer Lone 
siamp seams py wi سم لو لف مسر وہ چو مس‎ 
ډه نې د‎ ree Deve m De c^ نت‎ m چوس ضس‎ 
vec m Le aalcel-: aiiin Pieten 
sar uy -— دد م.‎ darasi aii 05 مب . یله هب‎ 
crs +۰ (aed faces un m udia ذو‎ 2a ونه‎ 
IAN نم مس نه‎ ee Re mibi و هد‎ 
catu: 


"ala las‏ ته و .الو Lew sete‏ وریہ ہم ده 






















307 
results.” He suggested that “avery apesch made by anyone 
epnmectea with the Navy ghoul hereafter imc iude sone 
mention of Naval Avietion and its importance to the Pacific 
war," 

& wonth letec, Admirai Edwards forwarded Herne's 
mesor&ncum to Admiral Nimitz along with concrete proposals 
to combat "this whigepering campaign. nia? ہیں‎ recQsmended 
that future CINCPAC commoniques "repeatodly strass ə و‎ « 
the stxrategical amd tactical importanca cf Kavai Aviation. “ 
He Qlieo urged the prowpt release, "by neus." of the 
indiviéuai achievesents ef ships, carrier groups and men. 
"an compatible with security considerations." Ke aided, 
"Further improvement of transmission facilities for news 
material may de requira for this, but it is & requisíte 
for press space Guring the indiceted highly competitive 
conditions." 

, Admiral Edwerds’ remark about transmission facii- 
ities was especially pertinont at this time, Only two days 
be fore his memorans to Nimitz, Lyle C. Nilon, represent” 
ing the United Press in Washington, bitterly complained to 
Admiral Hiller that print media material was being waneces~ 
eavily delayed in the Pacific. "The Ravy‘'a insistance 
isigi Oh b&rring newspaper cepy from the instanteneous 
facilities of the voicecaust," said Wilson, "is in direct 
contrast to our experience with the Army ..« ٠ 15$ 

Miller moved to correct thie situation in subsequent 


د 
mj MA".‏ مفووصابعد سه اوسن وس مل ېۍ — 
vie‏ ما مز رورت سه ١م‏ ایعانست صا نس فلت 
> سیه سم ۱ 
TT‏ — — پټسټس ttt tam‏ 
—— فسات — ہوم 
Qd.‏ یسو اشف ح نس یہ :مت Lm mama m UM.‏ 
piate upon — —— —‏ جومموى ه د . 
فیک ومهم اموز سا — nem‏ یا هل اف 
که مه نما ته مه سنه و سس “in lo”‏ 
فساژونسون هو خصد)ه ۱۶ سے سی ریہ ee‏ ما دغه 
اق r CAY AD‏ قب تنس 
چیه Pr sol UIA eames) © weer‏ 
"etum oa a eo: a, anon. A pear‏ 
—— 
ame anigi‏ ماعا — حص صب عت ابوه 
ogi oi oner ei ml e‏ ومول — — 
LL LU‏ — 
و ehh‏ نا اسن ۲ — 
وت ہس شر سے پر ی 
Semin 87‏ رات درادن .به اہ کرس 
TN ws ESO 0 -‏ 




































i د‎ Xm 


inc 





398 
correspondence with Captain Iet. te also addressed the 523 
versus naval aviation controversy in an August 2 latter to 
the captain (mea note l4i): 

One of the suggestions made to cOmbat the B29 
campaign ia to try to gat all your Correaponos 
continuelly pouné the word "Esvy." In other words, 85 
Navy task forces, We note that 829 copy is now begin- 
ning to talk bourt alc fleets as woll as air task 
forces. it would not be well to let the public beco 
confused on this matter, because should they ða 20, the 
first thing we know they will consider that 529'5 sere 
doing the splendid job currently being Gone by Halsey. 
In other words, basically, it is sound to use the word 

“Havy" before reference to aircraft, tsk forces, etc. 
These axe mail points, but could have tremendous 
bearing upon the public's oncerstan&Bing of the 
probleme. 

Despite his parochial concern, Millers had high 
regpect for the public relations activities of the Army Air 
Force. He wrote to a friend on Auguet 4, "I attended the 
Air Forces Day dinner in Washington the other night, anc 
there is no doubt es to the impressivenegss of their Cum 
paign, «144 Earlier, he discussed with Captain Lae the Aray 
Pir Force's plan to esteblish جج‎ greap of hand-picked 
corresponóoents who would cover the Air Force only. The 
justification for this group--"which would eat, sleep end 


travel only with the Air Foroa"--was thet a general writer 




















would be unable to understand the complexities of si? 
power. The Army Air Foree esked Miller to aecredit these 
corxespondentse solely to the 823s. Phe sdmiral turned them 
Gown, but granted them normal accreditation with the 
proviso that they could request permission to enter what” 
ever araa they needa, Underscoring the intense rivalry 





١653598‏ نت وتا په د mela‏ شم ضف "^3 دس 
Pag‏ مل سا 
مود نه ې mi? 5] «d$ dues‏ لمع روہ>وعوہ le‏ — — 
وسٹس۔ ۹۶۰ سج سر ہم سوه یله نواعت بت جم دہ 
فو وسم پل سا سمه ينيو ع ومين ba‏ ايسا 
wies dA.‏ سیف ښ did‏ سر ټی روه د ipie Lees‏ 
T‏ یاه یم — — — —— 

0 وه اشع له nét‏ ناغه. كوه ستسلد ءا —— — 
Mots wft Samy vole‏ سوصجہ پوججملوونهه مه — 


—————————— I. 2 














339 
that existed, he adáedi "Obviously, there is no way wo can 
stop such a deal, Gur basic enswer rewains that of having 
Josh Hetain'a outfit go up and sock the bell eut of 
Japan, 45 

Admiral HcCEin's carrler strike foroa and other 
gerrier tasik group& Giá cenduct saturation raids on the 
dapanese mainland following the seizure of Okinawa. in 
مل ہجو‎ to expedite coverage of one of those Navy bombing 
«tacks, a pian was formulated whereby Lieutenant Conrancder 
George MoGhee, who Subsequently became Assistant Secretary 
ef Btate, “flying OR à 93-29 weather mission over Tokyo, 
redieed back a cede word cenfirming the fast that W.S. 


146 enis Mesage enabled public 


planes were over Tokyo. 
xyeletiíons personnel ët Guam to Yejosse mivance preas copy 
on the raid by Navy carcier aiscraft. 

The matter of accreditation for war correspondents. 
Which plagued both the Army and Navy &t Okinawa, was 
sstisfactorily sattiod in July 1945 following s series of 
meetings between Admiral Miller end Major General Alexanier 
D, Surles, Army chief of public relations, slong with 
Zepresentatives from the Army Aic Foron. A syatem wea set 
up whereby correspondents in the Pescifiíio would be jointiy 
accredited to beth the Army anc the Navy. The agreement 
was @6 worded that the Maevy would retain control of the 
local situation at Fear) Harber and Guan. 

Of course, Miller realised thet any control the 








و 
cme ee ee ee‏ 
Gee‏ نس مهه »همه همو سه وه اند هذزا جم وو 
سے +802 
جو چ ی 
ey Anr |e‏ سوسبر سسومدعہ ينوم سے ہے 
— سنس سز MPO asis‏ 
am‏ — — ذ سح فو ain‏ 
سوهجممو ی جن لی ےے 
ane te‏ ىښ در مه miuno ina‏ مہ Oan‏ 
لاس 
rete‏ اه سور msn AUNT Melo cou‏ سوا د الله 
ان ee‏ فت مہ جنس سو ملك اد 
یف gf slits‏ دش می سه ره 
— کال a ee ee‏ 
Mail‏ امسا لس gem uU‏ سټا سے بر ارد بې 
01 0 ۵۱ ۷ و وس بے ١‏ سے to‏ 
کمشعهاا لکت ننه عاف د سه مس مس 
se ey‏ ا چت وص — 





























و الك بك سس ماد کسه ^ sp‏ عءموم ^ 


تفصع 





وص سا ماد لم ئه دحاال نححان مه سلسں 
)تسد اس نس نادف سے — 
شم سښتلا سدینہ مسسہ۸ wld An‏ 

E11 


im مو سب‎ = | | 
i ۲ Er T quM ce — نے‎ — — 










levy retained over presa activities in the Pacific was 
dependent on the joint-command nature of Pacific operations. 
He noted that there wag a “definite trend in the praca in 
the East to call foc ù single commen 
Sttack on Japan. Should this occur, unquestionébly all 
Public Information activities will stem trae that cüiumanóée 
whoever he my 7طس ھی‎ 

0:326 0512, 18 would be General سڈ مھا‎ There 


jax for the basic 








wes very little the Navy could Go to offset the massive and 
highly successful publie relations campaign carried on in 
the general's behalf throughout the war. Thia campaign wae 
not just a figment of the Navy's imagination. On July 30, 
1945, Alexander F. (Casey) Jones, managing editor of the 
Washington Rast. complained to Generb&i Burlesi 


It is obvious fron tho release irom Guam fa this 
morning's paper, o o . that from tbis point on every- 
thing that transpires in the Pacific. from the Aræy 
stamipoint, is going to be publicised ده‎ the exclusive 
expleit of General — Maokethur. « . . This situa~ 
tion has been true all through the South Pacific 
canpeign end one always has te esearch to find that 
— wes any other individual connected with the 

The vere “Eisenhower's Generals,” or "fisgaorhower'& 
filer" never appesareá ln the public print to wy 
knowlege, Every leader got iuli eredit. And 
recently Admiral BHimitz net only annwanced the nanes 
of the ships taking part in the attack on Japan, but 
also all of the Admirals., The Washington Post وت ماپ‎ 
to no one in aimixetion ef the military genius of 
General MacArthar, Sut we do vigerously pretest the 
policy of his public relations officers in making it 
te Be مد‎ eee ho Ore exoept the Commander in 
Chief and to ۰ the impression that this is & 
private war, لذ‎ 

















ALL یس — پ‎ 
..."لت الم ہم‎ ai piris aan tey Diano gui 
— — ALA Ue cup AR romah, شروسفجب جہ بي‎ 
or <td ee سیب‎ U^ m sme sa-D i i تو‎ 
هه اه د سیه‎ yv ambo e aa ileo op smn mif 

ما Kw so‏ #كيمنة Qc do‏ پو ولو سه او مر 
قوای لسقسمیزابه asd time‏ یں ہے وص — — 
سے م مې پس Hoo‏ 

a wie ieee E" ALD. 1 AE 
bat smie air padia شم بن‎ Alo (uS ot) CAPS pur? ۷ 
al o berres piaga amaan alldag Lamm qal 
At wise uo Janna سه هد جچښچېیې نا نس همو ای‎ 
sis ie aiia pim am hach ار وې د‎ 























Sil 
On Auwjust به‎ When the aasauit on the Japanese none 
islands was stili being planned, Admirei Miller expressed 
to a trieand his intention te go to tae Facifie to take 
personal charge of Navy public relations there (see note 
144). Alec, to better accommodate war corresponüoncs 
during the invasion of Japan, the Navy in the sumer of 
1945 was building three “press ships." whose sole purpose 
would be to provide transportation and communicetions for 
veia representatives covering the se& service, 2 
fhe ships were to he patterned after the Army's 
Apache. a communications vessel used at Okinawa to transmit 
press and radio copy. and a iater Army "press ship deluxe." 
the Spindle Kye. The latter was a Victory ship taken over 
by the Remy early in 1945 and semodaled to serve as General 
Machrthur's "press flagship” Guring the final assault on 
Japan, According to Captain lee, it was cgulpped with: 
Aa large auditorium complete with 125 typewriters at 
press degks. 
Two 5,000 Watt transmitters Rmi several other trans~ 
mitters. 
A battery of recording mschises, end portaole wiras 
recorders. 
A sound motion picture stadic. 
two radio broadcasting studies. 
Aüministrative offices. 
Living accommodations for a larga mutar: of the 
The Navy also Had problems in the Pacific in regard 





to accreditation of correspondents to the British, and 
eventually formal arrangements were mate to station British 
corroóospondents with American forces there. Official policy 


Ue 
a- aa—— نت‎ iene D Ee ^ ,.< ای خدیہست<‎ 
venae salia ا ف مسا‎ 7 
سه وکټ بل سنہ ئ ې غلا ى مساق ب ج‎ 
كه اهما عه دن سرت ہی سیس سم مه سا‎ 
سنس‎ ———T m 
عب‎ dr 
-——— ae اعست‎ obese ۵۷۳ ۳۲ سب فص قد‎ isar 
— — — جات قرو سمه نت په‎ ۷ 
ور ندالخصم 6غ قور‎ em) Law sl er و‎ — 
٠ نس دساف سیب سا + اسع سي وس سب مان‎ 
-m ta pa PONDI s œ اله اون‎ oh siti تو‎ 
imase مه خسف شم از سوب مه‎ 0662 ob Give GE aay dM 
PT 
«déc Mua ینځ په یا سب‎ — — ⸗ 
m eiry) (42 dicm sh) aD به شلا‎ € 
— سیت 8 سوفن ےو ہف می مر سر لے‎ 
7 E 


















212 
stated that: “ALL facilities for the dispatch and transmis 
gion of press Baterii of all descriptions, ... which are 
availabie to U.%. correspondents will be equally aveilable 
to all British correspondents, 39i The @creement was that 
British correspondents would be Allowed on Averican ships 
nd installations, and Amweriaan cerrespandents on EBricien 
ships. it was wade Clear, however, thet "the number of 
British and American War Correspondenta will be proportional 
to the forces of each nation which are operating in the 
Pacific Ocosn Areas.” 

The vreagone behind this statement appear in &@ June 
1945 letter from Admiral Miller to Captain Lee. He said 
that he “foresaw the possibility that when V-E Day came 
along wi woul find & sudden influx of British into the 
Pacific." ?? qnis was more than a matter of logistical 
concern, Miller admitted, “Frankly, I have no desire tu 
have the ماماد‎ correspondents convey to the woriO press 
the thought that they have won the Farific wer.” 

Amiral Miller also was afraid that the British 
would try to smeak extra correspondenta inte the Pacific 
under the guise of being Something they were mot. “You 
will fin," he wrote, “a istinat tendency for them to 
Glaim that the Australians, slthcugh British, sre not 
English." He suggested to Captain Lee thet he stam’ fire, 
anê that ali “Colenijala” remain under the British gueota. 
if not. he seid, there would soon be a guxplus of British 





us 

زققخ وو ووی osos mtis Cd A Med‏ ملت um‏ 
وون و ناك سم وو ood Ven ieee c! Di)‏ 
P 10 O‏ نوي ۸۱7۰ ېښ ووہےے ہے جس 
2222 —————€ 


Ares E as exe stm Ks Yeme د‎ 


Ib س ہو سسس‎ ee e روپس پسہ‎ ae 
la IFO دم حب — نون هد‎ Eg 
ے‎ 60 oc ouo یې کے عص مہا ہت سمنتے‎ 
cA وسہی سا اه مہو یے بب‎ wfT اس ے۔‎ 
ساو ف وین ہس ے موہ‎ inadi aA w Wd 
ee II 
سس دود دد عاد ص ہے‎ 4 AUN Voss وا‎ 
ست س 4 ماس بد نوت دل‎ a 
ص‎ sde = e: Aa e EN e 
—— GG Rand 
— — — v ۹ 

ema taa D S :‏ سا از صابن 
o k‏ اک ee‏ —— 

e‏ ب م ییا سم uA‏ بب ې 
HOPES ud. ‘ 3‏ وس gue t‏ 


vs re n NE 
مع رجاہم صب‌هد‎ 


uses سے بے‎ ٢ و ی کہ‎ UP RE 




































313 
correspondents ani “ovar at BOOS you might as well fly à 


British Standacd.* 


A Base ta the سینا‎ 

The Navy pablie relations “ship” was moring mt 
flank speed in the summer of 1545 toward its gual 
“destinations” of incressing public awareness of the Navy's 
role in the Pacific war end gaining publie suppert for a 
strony postwar Navy. 

In the United States, the Office of Public Informa- 
tion was involved in a continuous stream of activities. In 
dune, it arrenged for an “air armada of naval planes” te 
tour smaller communities in the fast and Midwest in support 
of the Seventh War Loan Drive. It sent the chaplain ef the 
UGS Franklin on @ special speaking tour end provided a 
serios of speakers for the “Fighting Lady“ model on display 
in Rockefeller Center in New York., The ceptured German 
Submarine, the U-505. wee exhibited in ports along the 
Easter: Seaboard, tnd cooperation wae extended te Saturday 
for a story in its àugust issue on the carrier 
Rutergrisa. which was predicted to be “the best story ^n 
Naval Aviation ever carried in a magazine of that typa.” 





On July 10, the "Navy Hour," à new radio progran 
produced by OPI was aire for the first time on KBG, Piens 
aise were made to produce & separate radio show on neval 


aviation and to salute the 32nó Anniversary of naval 


11 
«oh Lie غه‎ ed oh س ټی عو مز‎ eee 
>. تست‎ 
— — al 
m jaime — Side en ډه‎ 
سم ویر مد ہت نے یس‎ mir نت‎ hooge 
tc وهم - ديه ۔ا ام‎ Mey pleco و‎ ۱ 
eee et oe law) di و‎ 
quem oor 7 
— to matte ait mara mop میم‎ E د‎ ^t ۱ 
do apr o mee یه دس‎ pend av oaks 
مې ی‎ 
کا مرہےوم نہ سوہے؛‎ rend سال امد مسد دناس لب سن‎ 
T-— y sisipe aD سے‎ ٤ —ñ⸗ 
eoo v», Ps لو‎ quale mq صحلہز‎ 9 se silini AW 
Auge سم‎ Lem لیم نصا‎ ao m جود‎ Vo اعد‎ 
کے ہوم ہت ح رہب‎ 9e) ee oi viret wel نس‎ ab 
e^ exte veme p) س موندابه‎ YO ED 






































Mum, pu po sun Ian d M LANE ~ 
مسو شو عوسي‎ ui xo 
نه‎ wv سب ما‎ 2 A iyan | 





314 
&viation on August 30. Also in July, extensive publicity 
was given te the Fifth Anniversary of the Navy's ship- 


emctiver conference of 





building program. in late July, 
navel district, finest, field and air training 201: 
public information officers was held, this time in 
icago. 
in the Facific, Admiral Himitz on June 3 issued & 
dixective designed to “strengthen the Public Relations 


»154 Tts main provisions 


ọrgenization in the Pacific Fleet, 
were the sttachment of full~time public relations officers 
to the "important staffs and comanda” of the fleet anc s 
requirement for cemomiing officers of all fleet units to 
assigna collateral duty publie relations officers. Cen” 
Current with the letter was a request to OPI for ninety 
miditional public relations officers for fuli-tiee é@uty in 
the Pacific. It also was announced that "periodic 
builetins" containing guidance in information metters fer 
these personnel would be furnished. Ae we have seen, the 
first edition of the somi-monthly PALZLLLT À 

tion Bulletin was published on July 1. Later in the 


Gummer, an EL 








WG also was pre~ 
pared and sent out to all BNCs; and a "Ship's Editorial 


Association Clipper," a news service for shipboaréà newsa- 





papers aüsptsbie to both mimeograph and offset reproduction, 


was planned by the Bureau of Naval Parsonnei. = 


ane 
nisliey —áumaamam poté a ods A eee کات نت‎ — 
مر هشپ ني‎ — — 

— — یز سس‎ vei 


— الله ولس له 


ر — — ر الد فلا hem Dos ot‏ * 
ob ۵۸۵ ۷‏ هچو مس دو سر لا Codi‏ 
مر a “en a e‏ عنم boisi‏ 
لګ دږ مسښښب . ایی راه وج وده 
وه قله ئیمس ههد مصتله ما سمہست- 2۱ شه تب سو 
سوام jjs Oe oA pelle wi‏ وعم ونس به 
ilem yh jJévesti tos miam‏ نهیواست Seine‏ — 
په — — e‏ نو pea cas TD)‏ 
ات لسن لت s) Qu abris: DÀ‏ 
نی srv atA A‏ سسہسصہ ےط ہمد ند 

nU NE obo | 


I 1 جرد خم بس‎ m fumus 
cede به و بد چو به سسا دنر مایت اس ند‎ 

28 EE ندا اسز‎ at 
— — — — 
— PA 


s 11‏ د ود ہیس وھ — 














































315 
The all-out emphasia on gaining publieity in the 
Pacific produced an sbundance of enthuglagm on the part of 
individual public infozmastíon officers. For inatance, the 
PIO far Commander Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. sent 
an open letter "fo War Correspendents whe want IDLASI" fn 
it ho advertised: 





You want to know Wi fim feature stories? 
« « « Pilis Relations of the Pacific Fleet Service 
has the anewer to th&t $64 question, 
ماه‎ Bexvice Force ig jam-packed with aterice . . « 
news features . . . magazine plewea .. . radio copy 
e » verything from aiventure yerne to Logistics and 
Science, 
مه‎ . AnG so this bulletin Des heen preperac to put 
you on the — of this story Gold Mine (and we meen 
Gals سنا‎ ( 
To the invitation, this huckstering PIO attached a jist of 
forty story ideas ranging from “The Filling Station Goes to 
Seb" to “The Grocery Store Gets ite Feat Wet.” 
fo facilitate transmission of news copy, a multi- 
plex radio teletype system had been set up st CINCPAC 
public selations office on Guam, providing four direct 
teletype channels to Gan Francisco. The system began 
operating in March 1945, and ny the end of Jume, 2,080, 769 
words of press copy Rad baen transmitted to the m&inlard. 
Broadcasts aleo were originated from Guam through the radic 
&gtation of the public relations office, "XUSQ." It was 
estimated that an average of aighty to ninety prograes per 
week were aired from this station Óuring the summar af 45 
by all four of the national radio networks. In one of his 











io 

چو imiia prising mm kinane riid‏ م - 
۱ متا د مس ٠٠١‏ امس ند is maq pti‏ 
موی ران سی سه مس at‏ 






















موم ہس یت نس مم 


term -‏ و شوہ 
oss j‏ + 3 ق سے یمم neal Apa‏ موہ نس 





















ee Aita c7) sé u— بې ود لت‎ 0 
dtc inpr وس‎ > » + ANNAA ama 

my eeds mO pA o a‏ = ای بھ اس مہی 

۳ .د د أهة وب ضٹھ بسا دوز رمو سس جس سید بے >m‏ 
FEL.‏ — قا EU‏ | بے 
Hr,‏ له ow Wal «ait bie a‏ سم 





cta uh‏ شی TN primiim SA‏ فص و او ی 
سم حسم ams adult Gebh‏ دص و نیو یسونے مس a‏ 
asm feb erà end amet — eer” as "het‏ - 

amila s‏ دسسنومنعہ a . ques s ja‏ سيا 
saba‏ اه سل مان ———D 3e 4» «o Aen) au‏ 
وګن واښنښی مخٹنے aee of‏ وعولعلم ile anh‏ 
má co mien anal‏ سہ — ۴ي جم APA m‏ 

eee PO Ses d) Vi cmo — ai‏ دی ای 


316 
programs, Tim Leimert of CRS pió special tribute to tbe 
brosmücasting facilities in tho Pacific: 

Today listeners in the United &tates can hear direct 
broadcasts fron practically any island we have taken 
and from ships of the flest. و‎ . . no matter whers they 
axa. In the last year facilities have expanded se thet 
we can now give > » سي‎ eyewitness picture of the news 
as it is happening. 157 
The broadcasts from ships eat sea were especially 
impressive to the media and th: listeners back how. 
Admiral Hiller wrote to Captain Lee on July 12, "Your 
recent broadcast from the nxa curing the strike was 5 
knoeck-out and all press peopie back here are t&iking aout 
it in glowing terme." In another letter to Lee on 
August 13, he exclaimed. “Each morning at eight, I listen 
to the broadcast from the third fleet and it comes in like 
& power house : * 159 On July 17, 1945, "à milestone in war- 
veporting was passed . . . , When radio commentators broain~ 
cast a navel boubarüsent of Kamaishi while it was actually 
in progress. „159 
Tha Navy's combat photographers received plaudita 
in the summer of 1945, too. Speaking of their werk in the 
production of the motion picture, "The Piset That Came to 
Stay." the tew York Tinga “Overevas Weekiy* و‎ 
د‎ o » the Navy has cona through with one of the most 
epectacular flims of the Pacific war. This is a blow- 
by-blow account of the savage attacks mefe by the 
Japanese Kanikazo . . . fliers against the floet units 
that backed up the Army-Merine assault /on Okinswa/. 
The 203 caseramen who photographed the action durin; 
the three-month Campaign displ COG), courage and 


resourcefulness under fire. This is only a twenty“ 
minute film, but it packs a punch one does not 











ده 
آله الهنصاه ذه كله «meibu) ldem Glee‏ من رل 
د جانا ته هس سا تد 
maib We! miu vami mist wi 24 wines‏ 


T ome sese cu... DS M ج کا‎ 


31 — — 
k‏ د وباك اكد وو — پوس 
al?‏ ادن ہم ات نه چهء نم qis lma‏ 
موس سیا اش La‏ 

ww لات عا.‎ me svi nLAAMAD wu دل تا‎ aA 

داج will sober‏ سه نس هس + u4l2b3‏ س = 
Age ened‏ مه خن ود نه وموین عم وم szi‏ 3 یہ so-‏ 
tana py a‏ وسو ویب ډو نس om‏ 
همه لاه نټریسی خم مسرس م می > boai‏ 
ته عق سکسښک کس لله الد وص عمد sa‏ جس رم رذب 
-aom Poraa dàn ui. . o: bans w ma‏ 
- و — —— 


manns ad 
a 
عت که سم‎ Vile! هذ‎ Weide! س ست‎ ts wend a M 
ېټ‎ ۳ yendo e E ien 






- 
4 








= 























37 

soon forget, *99 

On August 28, Admiral Miller saiuted Captain Lee on 

the Bcoonblisheente of his information personne lt 

The coverages your boya have been providing in 
radio, press, still exit motion pictures is sinpiy 
maeonificent. The encloged sheet from the New York 
Times this morning will give you some idea whet page 
three ia doing. Page fowr covers the ENTERPRISE ang 
Page one filled out the current activities. The pie- 
tures are excellent as you will nete from the email 
piece on page three. You boys ere to be congratulated 
on the grand job you are doing. 


The public relations “jucgerneut” that the Navy 
almost desperately had aseembled ia the Pacific te counter" 
act unification schemes ground to & halt on September 2, 
1945, when tho Japanese formally surrendered., The dropping 
of atomic bone on Hiroshima and Kageseki brought the enc 
of the war ard the diminishing of the public relations 
effort. The extensive worldwide soverme given to the 
Surrender ceremony Sheard the battleship Missuri. however, 
was symbolic evidence of the tremendous strides mede in 
publie relstions piannins and activities by the Savy since 
the dark days foliowing Pearl Harbor. 

The fact thet the Kiamuxi was used for the 
surrender ceremony in itself was 8 public relations “coup” 
instigated by Secretary Forrestal. In his memoirs. 

Jamoa PF. Byrnes recorded how the Mevy secretary "took 
BOvantége of the fact that Truman came from Missouri” to 
involve the battieship in the ceremony: 


re 
ui سس‎ .۴> 





maidh" -—‏ — دي سی 
کسه یمس ww ad Rede ue‏ مته ب مس 
ف نانو mede‏ سا ف د ay tae‏ حجن سلس J‏ 
Gand Ge Pus d.‏ ټسیو ۲ e‏ 
کا ناخ ەف pet eels oo‏ سمومد وكسيس بن سا 
ndr ٧‏ س ت فاصم ١١‏ دہ مد جیا wbili‏ 

ah of arti nonren impes aie لق كاله‎ 
— ee — 
— هس نا داس‎ Ais aoe 
cunts دنه وې‎ 
— — 

i el OS‏ یں 

Ow maiii aktda o his aita چ‎ | 
m 
— —— 
اسر" یہ‎ ant سم د‎ 
ه فشڪ"‎ 



















318 
When Secretary Forrestal ig really interested in a 
eourse of action, he doesn't sleep axi he doesn't let 
Others £il1eep. That night the telephone awakened me. 
It was DSecretarcy Forrestal suggesting that the Surrender 
cerenonies take plate on board the battieship Missquci. 
I was sufficiently awake to recognise what the Army 
would caji a "Wavy trick." Bad he saié simpiy "a 
battleship,” it would have remained a Qebnatabl 
question, but ween he mentioned the Miggeuxd., I knew 
the case was cicged. ‘The President, upon receiving the 
suggestion. of course thought it an excellent idea.162 

Forrestal also waa &bhie to convinos Byrnes, Shen 
Secretary of State, that Admiral Mimits should participate 
in the suxrender ceremony, since the Navy hed played auch © 
proeinent role is winning the Pacific war. The arrengenent 
wes mada to have General MacArthur sign fer the victorious 
Allies es a whole, while Bimits sigaed the surrender doocu~ 
ment for the United States. 

To provide coverage of the surrender cereneny, the 
attack transport Qo&amllo was eesigned exclusively for 
public informaation purposes and accompanied the MISSAL 
into Tokyo Bay. Nore than 3090 war correspondents were 
enbarked in the Misanuri. itsef. ^9? 

Admiral Miller wrote to Captain Lee om September ii, 
“The Xavy really swept tho front pages With photoes. pross 
etories, etc., of the ceramonies aboard the Mian, 77^ 
The blackout at Pearl Harbor indeed had been Llluminated by 


the spotlight on Tokyo Say. 





0 ۍم چوک iy‏ قشر السا Coos‏ تلو قوس 
۱ فا که — — بولسا بې وس اس پاسوښط دس د 
en‏ سس« 
ue xe e ee oe O MEM‏ 
کس yeemema cum Ue russi A r”‏ جوومصمسو وی 
mn oliba TE REVO‏ ہت سم زاس ور ی 
ولائلہ ham met‏ مسمسمہ ہب سس 
اس منم «A‏ — — — — — — — 
مس نه سه lines Mba‏ 
—- ت sje em ai eve wR‏ ہے نه وس زر 
w m i a ee —‏ 
سور ba re‏ عه تناها lei. possad s Pee‏ 
شلات دو مع سوب سنسو فا y osmini? oes‏ 













33.9 


WOTES TO CHAPTER ¥ 


“Little Rock AckangeacRamgarat. April 28, 1944. A 
copy of the article is contained in Frank Know Papera, 
Manuseript Section. Library of Congress, Washington, B.C... 
Box 4. Hereafter citeé as “Knox Papers," 





"Robert س مس سه‎ Albion and Eoberzt Howe Connery, 
سو‎ m x tay (Naw York. 1962}. 11. Hereafter 
cited ag ‘Albion and Connery, دلشطتشعنتصھ‎ Soe «lao, 







pp. 92-935 and 125-27 of ني‎ RASRA = پا‎ 
J. King and Waleer Muir Whitehill, Plant Adela) 7 
Bevel Becard (New York, 1952}, 639-631. 

hob&rt W. Berry. USS (Reat.}), telephone‏ بپ 
interview, March 17, 1970.‏ 


4 


"^ Royce powali, “ames Forrastal: Rupediter Extra” 


ordinary," سد‎ 4:11 (July 1944). 
mid. 


Titr., James Forrestsl to Csrl Vingcon, August 30. 
1944, quoted ins Albion and Connery. 22. 


S Albion and Connery. XORLESSLAl. 27. 


3-Straight Talk," San Feamcises GALOBAZl&. July 6. 
1944, Quoted in “Media Comment om the Bavy, July 3-8, 
1944," <2 report isaued by the Analysis Section of GPR, 
contained in U.S. Ravy Department. Office of Information. 
"Historical Recorós of the Navy Office of information. 
1919-1951," Job Order 61-A-2740, Item 10, Box 157. 
Washington National Becords Center. Suitland. Ma. Bere” 
after cited as "Philibert Collection." 


"Out of the Darkness,” Sime, May l, 1944. p. Sl. 


LAA. R. KM Eller, USN (Ret.), personal inter~ 
view, Washington, D,C., April 16, 19638. 


M, er. , dames Forrestai to Arthur Krock, 
October 17, 1945, quoted in Rlbion and Consery. Igrrnsmat&l. 


Harold B. Miller, USN (Ret.), “Typewriters‏ د 
ami the Navy." Shipmate (October 1965), 11. Moreafter‏ 
cited as Miller, "Typewriters."‏ 





PIU. * -— 


oa‏ بر زو سس دس 


— 
vad‏ — #ساسههه) iV Land‏ نس ۱ 
هوید مسا هم دنسم هه ووس مس ^ 


Ai سو‎ — we eee, 
انس‎ 


M 


] 
1 1 
: کې‎ La. 
* | 

E سا‎ ٩ ا‎ 











p. ; 
E ۱ 


"s هھ‎ — m ae مھ گور‎ Nn: | 


ets الم انا زا‎ AG ات‎ 
Ur- Dmm dud = n | | 









329 


23 و و ورد‎ and ا سو ې‎ Baxyestal. 25-2069, Gee 
also, Vincent Davis. T سو و‎ Mthe 87 (Chapel Hill. Bellas 
1967), 220. Mereafter "tre as Davis. Loy. 


4 vares Forsestal to Palmer Hoyt, September 2, 
1944, contained in personal papers of James V. Forrestal, 
National Archives, Washington, B.C, file S6-i-26. lage” 
after cited as “Porreetal Papers." 


1 avis, sé, 271. 


16 aid., 268. 

Inid.. 270. The full text of Forrestal's speech 
to the Annapolis radium Lag class on June 6, 1945, is 
reproduced in tie Cox ناوریا‎ for June 11, 1945, 
79th Congress, lst ووي‎ PB. — 


a 268765,‏ ڑب 








RAGa. Julies å. Pureer, الہ ہی الاق‎ 


DAR B Ras. 
o£ the Navy Dep&ctueot Án Werl ec Ii (Washingten, 1959), 
84-93. 


20 tr., Afm. Harold C. Stark, USB. to Frank Knox, 
March 29, 19544, Knox Papers, Box 4, 


leapt. Jay B. Smith, USM, personal interview, 
Indianapolis, د نتا‎ May 10, 1970. 


Powdr. ےہ‎ — y A — "Censorshis and 
Security, ° | که‎ AiK 


| 2 791138-39 
— 1343). 





23 apt. Harold Bradley Sey, USRR (Ret.}. personal 
interview, Washington. D.C., Jum 13, 1968. Hereafter 
cited as “Say Interview. * 


Ai 1 Ravens‏ ے ا ال E. P. Forestal,‏ م 
(Washington, ee) 125. :‏ هنت C. —E‏ 
Mereafter cited ag Forestol, 1235477 2+‏ 






Racari. duly 4, 1946, quoted in‏ (تئ٤)‏ درس زیڈ 
"Media Comment on the Navy, duly 3-8, 1944" {see n. 9).‏ 


26 omo. , Eugene S. Duffield to Ada». C. H. NcMorris, 
USN, October 19. 1944, Forrestal Papers, files 0-2-21 


27 vorestel, EREN. مہ‎ xiii. 
26 او‎ 








m T‏ سو 
کس نس په د lS Yo? s) QUEM‏ 





ےت 














۴ n^ امھ‎ ^“ 


الد 
se‏ ہم وک ا سر د e‏ — 
A ——‏ -- 


— — ات کا هه 


وہ 
® 


maid. 60. 
30 emo. » Xmmett CrógLier to Artemia L. Gates, 
May 26, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-19. 


dese Forrestal to RAdce. A. Stanten‏ .وسلا 
Merrill, VSN, June 15, 1944. jpid.‏ 


32. i. Mértz, personal interview, Washington, 
D.C., April 16, 1365. 


Director of Public Kelations te Secretary‏ . بب 
of the Navy, GOR (56193), August 24, 1944, Porrestal‏ 
Papers, file 70-11-10.‏ 
ay inturviow,‏ 345 
GNO. ; iuge Tae £. Duffie id to Sacretary of the‏ 25 
Wavy, Auguet 25, 1944, Forrestal Papers, tile 70-1-2‏ 
Bereafter cited ag “Huffield Memerandéunm. *‏ 

Capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, to RAdm. A.‏ رد 
Stanton Merrill, WEN, July 7, i944, containec in personal‏ 
file of RAón. Harold B. Miller, USN (Ret.j, 748‏ 
“Public Relations Policies and Directives."  Herea&fter‏ 
cited as "Miller Plle-~Pa Policios,.?"‏ 


di James Forrestal to Ak. Cluster W., Kimits, 
USE, October 19, 1944, Porrestal Papers, file 70-1-10, 


Jsuüaval Magsagc. SECNAV to CINCPAC (192254 GCT), 
Getaber 19, 1944. ibid. 


33er., Commander in Chief, غلا‎ Pacific Fleet سه‎ 
Pacific Ocean Areas, to Commander third Fleet, August 26, 
1944 (Serial 043523), Philibert Qoliection, Box 157. 

to Adm. Chester W., Nimitr,‏ 21ت نس James‏ عه لاله 
Papers, fille 70-71-19.‏ ر8ج عت ,1944 ,3 USA, August‏ 

flier. games Forrestal te Adm. Chester W, Ninit2. 
USN. September 6, 1944. ihid- 


42PACIFIC FLEET IIR 481-44, September 16, 1944 
(Serial 7315), Abid. 

43, tt. , Comeandger in Chief, U.S. Fieet anû Chief of 
Kaval Operations, to waltiple adóresseeg, Beptember 30, 
1944 (Serial 7379). dnid. 


4r uffiold Hemoraundum. 






٦ |‏ — — 
| وو ۵ ولا هوايرناجوصت mut nu‏ هف ب 
| 598554 ھ, رر APT‏ 


222 


455,8. avy Department, Office of the Chief of 
Nava] Operations, Naval History Division, "United strates 
Havel Administration in World Wer II," unpublished nserra- 
tive history of Commender in Chief, U.S. Poevcific Fleet and 
Pacific Geean Avean (CINCPAC and CINCPOA), 397-95. 
Hereafter cited as “Administrative Histories,“ followed by 
pertinent commend title. Gee alas, "Directory of Public 
Relations Officers: District, Air Training Command end 
Fleet Units,“ September 1. 1944, pp. 27-28, Philibert 
Collection, Box 157, &0d U.S. Navy Department, Office of 
Information, "Histery of Navy Public Information," 
undeted, Ye i. 


C&pt. Xhroló B. Miller, USN, te 8:48 A.‏ وج:45 
Stanton Merrill. USM, October Jl and Novoerber 8, 1944,‏ 
Hiller File--PR Policies.‏ 


S7 Administrative Histerins, CINCPAC and CMCPrOA, 
396. 


48 er. Rim. A. Stanton Merrill, VSH, to Capt, 
Harold PB. tiller, VGN, OOR-D21 (62653), Newember 15. i944, 
Miller File--PR Policies. 


46 Eimer Davia, “Report te the President," House 
— on — — Operations. Hearing Gi 

529 E slicies, Part 2, Beth Congress, lat 
Sossion (1963). 228, quoted in Lamar Mackay, “Pome stic 
Operations of the Office of War Information in World 
Wer II," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Wisconsin, 1966, p. 408. 

77 

50 وی‎ « Cmr. Richard HM. Paget, USN, to Eugene &. 
Duffield, September 7, 1944. Forrestal Papers, 
file 70-1-10. 


Shier., Secretary of tiw Havy te Chiefs of Bureaus, 
Boards arn Oificea, Navy Department, Getober 16, 1944, 
Philibert Collection, Box 137. 


James Forrestal to RAdm. A. Stanton‏ .وسوسو 
Merrill, USN, December 3, 1944, Forrestal Papara,‏ 
file 70-1-10.‏ 
he preceding information on the new structure of‏ 355 
OPR in Lecorber 1944 wez cbtsined from two sources: a‏ 
MON., RACM. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, to Secretary of the‏ 
Navy, OOR-Bl (54704), December 9, 1944, ihid., and ar‏ 
"Organisation Plan--Office of Public Relations, °‏ 
December 20, 1944, Phílibert Collection, Box 157.‏ 

































xe ali هې‎ "e "1329395 .4 


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t3 —— ہے١‎ yw? a AS = — 
qnn qea ts — 


JĀ A DP "QS ا‎ A هکين‎ 
MAC d ovege- Wt [E وج‎ 











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te ر سد مال‎ ,atitaTweball 








— re 


"T m n a l aE o” 
sump تما‎ — 


— 













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e‏ | 





J shen er‏ هټ 








۱ر ثتاا.  m‏ رغه يې وڼ ټم دا 
ہس ۵ perme Ot are)‏ < 
جا ے 7 1 | PEN. b‏ 
eit‏ و —— 


۱ ۳ ۱ رر‎ — ou — — 
ay ) (US "m. سیا‎ ۱ 5 8 ۳ 


— = a 
ڪھ‎ D. 


323 
ید‎ Herold B. Milier, USH (Ret.), personal 
interview, New York, N. Y., June 18, 1968. Hereafter cited 
ag “Miller Interview. ° 
555.5. Navy perma. Office of Public Relations, 
Naval Districts Sectíon, | LEN LOD i bin 
January li, 1945, Be le Hereafter cited زات‎ PR Bulletin. 
کب‎ ; Cmdr. Ricn&ri M. Paget, USN, to Secretary 
of tha Navy. December 5, 1944, Forrestal Fapers. 
file 70-71-10, 


5? «he bove figures were compiled from various OPR 
telephone liste and Navy public relations persenne] direc” 
tories contained in file "Directories," Philibert 
Collection. Box 157. 


$8: trs.. Director of Public Relations to Chief of 
BNaval Personnel, OOR-D (68297) &nád GOR-B (68341), beth 
Qated January 23, 1345, Forrestal Papers, file 7071-10, 
99 oum. ; James Forrestal to Rides. A. Btanteon 
Merrill, UGH, March 17, i945, ibid. 
Pyar oud internal memor&nda of tha Office of 
Public Relations, February 24 to April 4, 1945, Philibert 
Colleetion, Box 157. 


Sli ers... Secretary of the Navy (Director of Puslic 
Relations) to multiple addressees, OOR-2 (42127) of Hay 11, 
1944. and OOR-3 (50518) of June 13, 1944, ibid. 








635.5. navy Bevy Department, Incentive Division, “The 
Field Exchemn;e," August 7e 1944, Pe le kig. 
pg Bulletin, No. 22, September 1, 1944, p. 5. 


SA apt. Edward Steichen. UR, Powsxs in the Pacific 
(Mew York, 1945), p. 5. 


$5 ani £t, Xa JU 
tataa (Detroit, 1962), 1583. 


pe guiletin, No. 26, January l, 1945, p. L. 


$7u4sno., RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, to Sscre- 
tary ef the Navy, OOR "BA (65993), December 31, i944, 
Forrestai Papers, file 70-1-10. 


EB uomo. James Forrestal te Radin. A, Stanton 
Merrill, USN, December 25, 1944, ibid. 








MU "cor" cat A ed عي‎ 


* a Re. — ** am — مسج‎ 
— ae ag — bans 
— nmm gun umm ibm 


T. .‏ :امہ 









مس ١4 Me‏ 
ه1 تدم 
۵٩-۳‏ روا 








sim) سرو‎ 
لالان‎ arapi 











ena‏ هه په 


ry 176 : د‎ 
e — — 


t A d Mra — 





4 د 


69 amo. Rin. A. Stanton Merrill. USR, to All Mavy 
Public Relations Cfficors, OOR-B]1 (67232), January 16, 
21945, Philibert Colloction, Bax 157. 


TOnamo.. RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill. USM. te All Navy 
Public Relations Officers, OOR-D (71797), March 6, 1945, 


Tenor ana. pirector of Public Relations to 
Secretary of the Navy, OOR-D (75249) of April 23. 194%, and 
OOR-D (78339) of Hay 23, 1945, and Director of Public 
information to £ugene B. Puffield, OOR-D ($1675) of 
June 21, 1945, 51 contalned in Forrestal Papers, file 
7071710. 

7T!uamo., Capt. G. W. Campbell, UBN, to VÀám. B. 5. 
سا‎ * USES, OGR-A (59674), undeted, Philibert Collection, 
Box 157. A copy of the U.S. Atlantic Flest 
Balations Manus) alse is contained in Bam 157. 


ene. Eugene 8. Duffield to Secretary of thw 
Kavy, December 25, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 71-1-1 


14, er., Lieutenant Joseph Seiden, USHA, to Dr. 
Hadley Cantril, AU Dl (67135). نت‎ 231237 $, i948. US. B&vy 
Depeortment, Office of Information, Administrative Fiies. 
Job Order 76~A-2140, Item 1. Box 9, Washingtop N&ticnal 
Records Center, Suitland, MG.  Mersaáftsr citod as "OI 
Administrativo Files." 


755.8. avy 2:, GORA 
Pacific Fleet, ای‎ tot Bok ۱ 22 ; Alis 1 "M 
August 1. 1945. p. 6. Hereafter cited as رکش‎ Bu 
Copies of these aeni~monthly newsletters for public 
information personnel in the Pacific, which were initiated 
on July 1, 1945, and continued fer several months folicowin; 
the war, are contained in Philibert Collection, Box 127. 

















Cor in ot: U.8, 
y Bu LAE ao. ۳ 








75 ٣ Opinion on a Post-War Heavy, ° an undated 
Haval Districts Bulletin issued by the Analyeis Section of 
OPR, Philibert Collection, Sex 157. 


rte. Secretary of the Navy to Comeandant Ninth 
Haval District, A3-1/HND9, March 29, 1945, Forrestal Papers, 
file 95-2-24. 
7 یی‎ « Dixecter of Fublic Information to Gecre- 
tary of the Navy, GOR (93114), Meweaber 8, 1945, ibid. 


.12 " وڅ ۳ 19 





— — 


— — 








325 


lian Brinkley. Doni‏ 1 ػ2 
York, 1956). 92.‏ 


Harold B. Miller, USH, to Risin.‏ .متهم بب 
W., B. P. Dlandy, USN, OOR (79791), June 1, 1945. contained‏ 
in personal file o£ RAdm. Harold D. Miller, USM (Rst.),‏ 
entitled "Capt. lee & Pacific.“ Hereafter cited as‏ 
"Miller File~~Paci fic.“‏ 


SJcontained in memo., RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, 


VEN., to Sooretary of the Wavy, April 28. 1945, Forrestal 
Papers, file 95-72-24. 


یں م4 


tax. (New 








bo. 3, August i. i945. p. 3. 





Jaki. No. 4, August 15, 1945, p. 3. 
85 


Ko. 5, September 1+ L865, Pie 47$. and‏ مو 
Ho, 6, Bortenmboer 15, 1945, p. 7,‏ 

86 wo. Director of Public Information to Eugene 
B5, Duffield, OOR-D (51675), june 2i, Mes, Yorrestal Pagers, 
fiie 7071710, See also, x YF FOES 11 PK um. Mo. 3. 

August l1, i945, p. 9. 


S'RAGFLURET Anli&tin, Ho. 4, August i5, 1945, p. 3. 
andi U.S. Hevy Departeant, Sureau of Naval Personnel, 
Zournaliat l &.£ (Washington. 1961), 6. 


88 aministrative Histories, CINCPAC and CINCPOA, 





398. 

^ ات 

Hiller, “Typewriters,” 11°12. 

PO mid., 12. 
* 9l dninistrativa Histories, CINCRAC anê CIPO, 
* 

P224 Tight Lip Leoseans.” Time., Karch 5, 1945, 
p. 63. 


Itxa, James Forrestal to Fadm. Chester W, Simite: 
VEK. January lá, 1945, Forrestsi Papers, file 92—2-30, 
6 ك7‎ 1 Sarva. 170. 


9 5 opext Lindsay. This Jish Bam (Madison, Wia., 
1956), 64. 



















"- ۱ تب‎ 
ان مه مسان ل مسمس‎ ig 
Suniti à mad ampare Bnl 

Y MEC UE Ji —— 
M ied 345-73 4i سد‎ 
i نوز پر‎ "TM 
کر بس دس‎ — 
ها‎ Inmet OT 0 n 
ووو وي ده و‎ quale "Ta x 

i-r FT ہت کا‎ » — 5 7 
ewaz nm تتسد‎ e e — 
سم یت‎ — 


ret tere WEN وق املد اده‎ 


sew! 6 — — 
سم‎ a nem m ویڈو‎ 


A odii RA پا * | ای‎ 
سے‎ 


۱ P 
















F > 
























326 
Cailler Interview. 
I aillor. “typewriters,” 13. 
۷ب‎ 
99 John مم‎ Hooley to James Forrestal, 


April 14, 1949, Forraatal Papers, file 95-37-28., 


100 ور‎ “Gengerghip and Security,” 140 (see n. 22). 


10l re r.. Janes Forrestal to James F. Syrnes. 
damery 29, 1945, Forrestal Papers, 2ilo 95-27-31. 


162, rest ہلا‎ Lindley, “MacArthur and the Esvy," 
رهز‎ Maxch 5, 1945, p. 44. 


103, demos Forrestal to Fix, Chester WU, 
Nimit., VSN, March 19, 1945, Forrestal Papers, file 
35-2-33. 


104, n9 مو‎ Forrestal lettera to mexoero of tae presse 
and broadcasting industry are contained in ibid... files 
95-2-36 and 95-2 


105 a pion and Censexy. Korxaatal. 26i. 


106 avis, Luuny, 185-96. 

197 er. , dames Forrestal to RAdm. Cheaters V, 
Mimitz. USK, January 31, 1945, Forrestal Papers, 
file 95-72-30. 


108, و‎ interview. 


Swashington Evening Stas, dune 3. 1945, دو‎ 2-2 


li0.(r.. RAém, MArold B. Miller, USN, te Capt. 
Fitzhugh lae, UGN, GOR (79809). June 4d, 1945, Miller File-~ 
Pacific. 


۱ .دم ۸ وی2“‎ Robert B. Carney, USN, to RAcdm. 
Harolà B. Hiller, USN, June 27, 1945, OI Administrative 
Files, Job Order 76-A-2140, item 2, Bow 9. 


liZer., RAdm. Harold D. Miller, UK, te Lt. Gdr, 
Nate i. Crabtree, USNR, O (51979), June 26, 1945, Hiller 
Fiile--Pacific. 


123 ری‎ KAdm. Harold B. Miller, WN, to Capt, 
Fitzhugh Lee, VEN, OGR (52206), June 26, 1945. bid. 





SS‏ رول لب کس 


وس کی اہب جمد د m, S‏ 


pines 5‏ 3- نالهپ “ددح سي ما وف "yS‏ 
ټوا a‏ — 











327 


۳24 وریپ‎ Message. Bacretacy of the Mavy to All Navy 
Gommends (ALBAV 139), June i5, 1945, 0.8. Mavy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Cperationa, Naval History 
Division, Operational Archives Branch, Classified Files of 
the Office of tha Chief af Eaval Operations and Files of 
the General Board, Series 441. Bereafter cited as “Series 
441 * 


AAS sayy Public Relations Secomes Offier of Public 
Information," Navy Department news rejease, June 13, 1942, 
Philibert Collection, box 157. 


16, ez. RAdm, Harold B. Miller: USM, to Capt. 
سر‎ Lee, USN, OOR (3142€), June 16, 1945, Killer Flle-- 
Pa&cific. 





SAS. BO. 4, August 15. 1945, p. T7. 


118, er.. Rue, Harold D, Miller, VSN, to Capt. 


Fitzhugh Lee, USH, OGR (83230), July 5, 1945, Miller Pile-~ 
Pacific. 





No. 2. July 15, 1945. 9. 4. 


120, (r., Rhám. Harold 5b. Miller, USN, to Capt. 


Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (70850), May 14, 1945, Miller file-- 
Pacific. 


i2l.er.. Adm. Harold B. Miller, USK, to Capt. 
Fitzhugh lee. USK, OÓOR (61249), June 14, 1945, ibid. See 
Sligo, ltr., Director of Publie Relations to sultiple 
etdvesseas, OOR-D-2 (718084), March 7. 1945, Zhílibert 
Collection, Box 157. 


222-٨: موزو‎ Crows Recalleó in Book," ھ2‎ 
September 9, 1970, p. Ji. The book rsferred to is Eric 
Purdon's Black Company. .The Story at s Raval perinu. 


Miller, USE. to Capt.‏ & 29014 م۶ ox.‏ ې 
lee, UEN, COR (84726), July 21, 1945, Hiller File-~‏ — 
e Ce‏ 


124, omo. ٠ Rdm. Harold B. Miller, USE, to Secretary 
of tho Navy, OOR (055227), RAgagust 6, 1945, luis 


V ما تن‎ Wo. 3, Magust i, 1945, p. 4. 


llÓé,our of thesa memoranda, OUR (80440, 86441, 
89446 and $0447), all dated dune 7, 1945, ars contained in 
Miller Fiie--Pacific. 



















n ۳‏ سس یف ہد 
ېو برد ېرد g- ok‏ ,هو 
الس ny‏ 

+ د‎ weal M M C — v 
ute P EON eur ou 
oy لي تدع‎ e ړل‎ 


"IJ... e ود‎ oun. up 
ووس یی‎ AMO AF mos —— — co 


— — 
So ۱ 


—— 















a= uvm C 
24 ورك روس مه دم‎ 








328 


127 aninistrative Histecies, Submarine Commands, 
Vol. I, 352-53, 


parey Rullekin. Bo. 2, duly 15. 1945. p. 2. 


129 ساد بعر‎ Histories, Submarine Commenda, 
Vol, I, 354-87. Gee also, Miller, “Typewriters.” 12. 
139,(r., ^Adm, Harold B. Niller, VSN, to Capt. 
px les, USS, OOR (80134), June 4, 1945, Miller File-~ 
¥ac 2. 


| 133 orate RAM, Harold s. Miller, VSN. to ETR E S. 
Duffieid, July 20, 1945 (Berial O4581008), Porzestal 
Papers, file 7G-i- 14, 


232 رو‎ KA, Harold B. Miller, USE, to Capt. 
Fitzhugh lea, VSR, OOR (01254), June 15, 1945, Miller 
File-~Facific. 


283 omo., Rh@m. ^. Stanton Merrill, USN, to VAdm. 
B. B. Kdwardn, USM. December 4, 1944, Philibert Collection, 
bom i357. 


134 Ruljetin.,. Vo. 3, Pugust de 4945, Pe Se 
and Ho. 5, September i, 1945, p. “0°. The directive to 
furnish Cath On ships to mayors enc governors wes cen" 
ہت‎ ip متا مر 30607۵ ت‎ A771, Serial 6012. of July مش‎ 





Lt above infgormetion and quotations are from 
the following letters Seon RAdm. Harclid B. Miller, USN: to 
Capt. PFitzhugh Lee, USN, DOR (63653), July 11, 1945, and 
-— (81976), June 26, 1945; to Cede. Morray Ward, ۰. 
GOR (81420), June 15, 1945; and to RAZm, Arthur ۷۰ Radford, 
USN, GOR (84060), July 14, l945--all contsíined in Miller 
File--Pscific. 


nion and Connery. 5777 135. 


1 ese, FA@m. Ernest J. King. UBN, to FAdw, 
Chester W. Nimitz, USS, January 20, 1945, Series 441, 
یټ‎ à following letters from RAdm. Herold د‎ 
Miller, USN, were consulted am’? quoted in the Ebove Section: 
to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, US, E 72324), May 29, 1945, 
سا‎ (80451). June 13, 1948, OO0R (01432), June 16. 1945, aa 
COR (82416) of E 26, 1945; and to Lt. Cmdr, J. Paul 
Scheetz, USAR, GOR (93008) of July I2, 1S48-~all contained 
ín Miller File--Pacific. 























a wt „aiuola oriasit 
Ti سه هوي‎ han ain سه‎ ee DN 


۳ یو ا aie eee‏ 
کک یش تی 


وہ الع لقان سي D w‏ 


um ħabs som 


— € ia 
| ico Fue rdi — — 








Rate. Karola B., Miller, US, to Capt.‏ یت 
Fitzhugh lee, USN, GOR (79324), May 29, 1945, iis.‏ 


Harold 8. Miller, USN, to Lt. Cmdr.,‏ ب-- ‏ و 
Paul Scheetz, USER, August 2, 1945, ibid.‏ .3 


emo. ¢ Vado. FP. J. Horns, USN, to FOr. Ernest da‏ فا 
was one of four‏ ها هک .1945 ,27 King, USM, June‏ 
enclosed in a letter from RAda. Harold B. Hiller, USES, to‏ 
۳ء ,1945 è August B,‏ 3 ,و بن Capt. Fitshugh‏ 


Adm. H. B. üüwards, USN, to Fhdm.‏ , .مسديرة14 
Cheater W. Himite, USE. July 39. 1945 (Serial 43540008),‏ 
pr‏ 





1430... Lyle C. Wilson to RAdm. Narold D. Miller, 
TeS, July 28, 1945, iani$. 


14A, aer. . RAGe. Harold B. Miller. US, to Frank V. 
Weed, August 4, 1945 (Serial 855260058), ibid. 


145 er.. Rm. Harold Be Miller, USN, to Capt. 
Fitzhbugh iwe, UGN, OOR (93653). July 211. 1945, Abid. 


Saiar, “Fypewriters,” 13. 


147 عع‎ BRAÀm. Herold b. Miller, USN, to Capt. 
Fllo--Pacific, 


148, ere, Alexander F. Jones to Maj. Gen. Alexander 
D. Surles, USA, July 30, 1945. A copy of this letter was 
enclosed in a letter from RAdm. Boreld B. Miller, USE, to 
Capt. Fitzhugh iee, UBN, Auwjyust 2, 1945, lb. 


149 ویر‎ + ier Interview, The thzee press ahips also 
were discussed in several letters contained in Miller File 


Pacific. 
150, er., Capt, Fitzhugh Lee, USH, to hA&m. Haroló 5. 
Millar, UGH, Decamber 12. 1945. Miller File~~-Paci fic. 





151, ef. RAG, Harold B. Miller, USE, to Capt. 
Fitzhugh Lee, USE, OOR (801353), Jume 4. 1945, ibis. 


152 má. 


ُ ‪1 HAM, Harold B. Miller, USN, to 
Eugene S, Duffield, July 20, 1945 (Serial 84561008) ari 
August 22, 1945 (Serial $612360R), beth contained in 
Forrestal Papers, file 7071-10. 










را و ت ان 
uD vy meup ۱ —‏ 
1 4 ووي وسر | 








— — ا‎ aH 





. 3 وړ ریم 4 ساسے f‏ 
د وښو يم ته cb A Ia‏ 


Ua n 





متا هنتف A‏ ت مت ١ء‏ 
Lalas? taal‏ ا تم 









330 


1545)ACIPIC PFLLST LATTLA 28-45, June 3, 1945 (Serial 
281-65), OI Administrative Files, Job Order $3-A-2502, 
item 3. Box 78. 


5 
155, kr., Jud. Garold D. Killer, VEN, tm Lt. Cmác, 

Ü. Paul Dohesztz, USNR, August 6, i345 (Zoriai 65529090F), 

killer Pile--řacific. See aiso, IAGZILLAIX Bullesin. No. 2, 

July 13, 1945, Pe Å» 

156, copy of this undated latter is centained in 

Philibert Collection. Box i57. 

157 AGELEEX ARullekin, No. 5, September i. 1945, 

pe 6. The information en I e tolet type charnels at 

Guam was obtained fron ا 4 المت عق‎ 

August 15. 1945, p. O. 


158. trs. ¢ RAO. j karoling B. Piller, EN, to Copt. 
Fitzhugh lee, USN, GOR (03019) of Sealy 12, i945, and ۶ 
(Serial 8698700R) of August 13. 1945, Miller Pile--Pacific. 


۱ه trative Lietorioes, CINCOPAC anm‏ پر 





409. 

i60 ow York Times "Overseas Weekly," duiv 29, 1945, 
quoted in 7A FIST Gulletin, Wo. 5, Septesber 1, 1945, 

p. T. 


161. 6r. RAÓm. Harold B. Miller, USI, to Cast. 
Fitzhugh Lee, USS, August 20. 1945 (Berial 87962095, 
Miller Pile--Pacific. 


162 و چو‎ P. Byrnes, quoted in Albion and Connery, 
SOCERELAL. 1950. 
= 16s .ceinistrative Histories, CINCPAC and CISCEOA, 


164 er. , Rida. 7330318 B. Miller, USN. to Capt. 
1945, Miller Flle--Pecífic. 





CHAPTER VI 


“Sailors,” said the exec, when the gfficers were 
settled Zat a hestily called conferanca/, “something 
valle wutlear fission... has juat ramwd the Navy 
below the belt... . There'll be press conferences by 
the admirals to places this thing in its proper 
perspective. Meantime let's don’t let this incident 
throw us, Don't . . . ist us less the public relaticns 
war after all our menths and years ef work, “4 


This imaginary scene from fap’: 





wes not oo farfetched. When the atomic bombs were dropped 
on J&pan, one could almost gense à kind of disappointment 
among the Navy's publie information leaders that their 
"great" story hal come teo an end. Admirel Miller conveyec 
this feeling almost as succinctly as author Willian 
Brinkley when he wrote a racific Fleet information officer 
in October 1945: “The folding up of the Japa suddenly 
raised cain with èll of our plans. .. . It is pretty tough 
going with the ... Cessation of headlines .. o 48 
Earlier, he had written to Captain Leer 
Mow, with the fleet activities ceasing. we ere hard put 
s « . to Qo much about the press. We ave going to town 
on "How-it-can-be-told-storíes" دع‎ well eg deomorililzea- 
tion plans and conversion to peaowtime activities. For 
the mest part, these are not particularily emeiting and 


ali hands - pushing us to get the Mavy back on the 
front pages. 


331 












۱ لهذا ظ 
| ٴ7 - - . Gs eS‏ می تب hut ww‏ 
ERE‏ لک ال هګ له با سا لس 
همو سوت سه يي موه میتی 
مق — — — do dis * sexe c-‏ سب وروی" 
موم ee‏ اسو يبعز ېول 
an "mem‏ مه بس ہو یي ore cob Cma ee‏ 
pidot, abiy‏ — ساس لیت 
ای شی o abid dé‏ سا داد mentee snimma! rD‏ 
wqeo — —⸗—‏ ساصس 
AN Ga ERSA‏ 
s ciel dr —‏ . . سنت e‏ تخاس . ٠٠‏ 
T‏ سم سر — 
ہے سس ey ae ee‏ اس بک کت 


عو جج وہ عم | on ha‏ 
— — 


























332 
The rash of “now it can be told” epiaoóes, made 

possible by an almost total lifting of the security lid at 
war's emi, were an attempt to capitelige on reeidual public 
interest in individual war exploits. However, Miller was 
Goncernsd that such public attention wouid acon wane. Ke 
uxged Captain Lee to expedite the telling of these desós, 
cautioning: “Unless we get the Navy's story out at onee, it 
will be a dead duck, "° 


Thus, there was a conscious effort in OFX and the 
Pacific Fleet in the fall of 1946 te enhance public recog~ 
nition of the sea service's role in the conflict. Writers 
Were aseigned to peruse heretofore highly classified 523 61 
reports "to extract the magnificent tales that sbound," 
wecording to Admiral Hiller. Collateral-duty public infor- 
mation officera and ENCs were encouraged to Gig out 
“individual stories which give @ true picture of the 
important part the Savy has played in winning the war. «5 
Special thenes were to be stregseó--such a&$ the destruction 
of the J&paneges Navy, blockading, seizure of stepping-stone 
bases, maintaining supply lines and the bowbardment of the 
enemy's homeland by carrlier~baged sirerafz." 

The individual aecemplisheent stories. of course, 
Were targeted for hometown éiatribution. Shortly after 
V^J Day, the Evaluation Section in OFZ conductsd a survey 





















| 


وی 
دې coe 45 3a des)‏ ہے humum "Aber‏ ہی 
«à... E E iiil isea  . MU Wü ESE‏ 2 
دی لم وى سروب هم ل لب تینومز نہ د nilan Tedder‏ 
سد ذو بس یسیں جنم امليف saliin ere‏ س 
D RO banat‏ "———— - = 
وما وود تس ana eo cmm sima ue‏ مہ ایس tm‏ 
مس ی ^c‏ !^ 
ما ساماد 
cech ACRAS wd‏ تك 
Ska E — — ⸗ —‏ وس 
اسان واسد Gh‏ دی ہیں ہد ہس دي ûy ami‏ سحي 















êb 3é EA‏ مه سم بسن ہر ما “Magia‏ جېټس 


hegi qub‏ بت am‏ ستمتهم رلیه)) د ودولمه فر 
دای ف را ا جال Mesum co cabo‏ 

ف e‏ م ا کک که مر دم 
=w vib oi —— dri om‏ 

شه ۴ وسن انت cep‏ € ید ونس ںہ دے 
نيم پی د «م جساب دغه دمه اه ساحعصاسي دس سس li‏ 

۱ و eee) us AF vow‏ ير مه 4 اس وې دمام 
ewe — —‏ 
۱ هسو eu ys amana ty a‏ 













سوا وروس زی و ودي سیا سرو وي 


تک نل سل ۳ io‏ 
amen.‏ وې وہ lods wiroowt‏ 
— — — — — 


333 
of newspapers anû radio stations to determine whether or 
not such material wae still desired. The results were 
overwhelmingly in favor of continuing the program.’ 

Emphasis also waa placed om publicicing the Navy's 
part in the occupation of Japan and Japanese-held territory 
and the return of Havy personne] to civilian life. Navy 
Bemobilization Fictorial Project Tete. consisting of one 
ENC ang one photographer, were aszigneód to separation 
centers to cover discharges) and & pecial office wag set 
up at Pearl Harbor to produce “quickie” steries on service~ 
pen being brought back to the States in the 316-ship 
"Magic Carpet" fleet.” fhe latter proved to be an ingenious 
system for gaining mention of Havy ships in material about 
personnel from ajli the armed forces of obvious and ismediate 
interest to the public. 

in October 1945, huge welcome-homa ceremonies were 
staged for Admirals Himits and Halsey. and forty-eight 
Pacific Fleet ships visited East Ceast ports during the 
"biggest ever" Navy Day celebration. From è press relations 
standpoint. however. the transit of the ships through the 
Panana Canal wae marred when seventy Correspondents, sent 
down to cruise north with the fleet, “apperentiy ... 
found B very cold reception down there in the District. و‎ 
Recording to Admiral Miller, the poor treatment of the 
media representatives wag a throwback to the “fear complex 
of the individual commanding officer" that was so prevalent 






Kz 
دی ما با‎ $o 
7 یہاچ رہ پوسټپ سی‎ ka مغ که ویر لم نھد‎ 
تسواء‎ sis ر ام حلم سو رر مد جع لہا :اسم‎ 
وت سا‎ ii dab ۵ ۵۵۲ ate يا دد‎ 
متعررلم ربص سے‎ co اعمس‎ ya We مود‎ edi QUA 
aa NO pii amend (revert وندوف بجر‎ manidan 
AOA شتو یمیس سم دموایحما اد‎ eno he» PD 
ove wie Mily سول‎ * à نجع طلس سحيووع؛‎ «ey مهد‎ 
یې ات۳ وان ناه ۰ انا ناسین‎ Pues دد‎ qe 
وی وسوی لی ری غه سي‎ me deed Seeded Glad wee 
اتم‎ mm D€ ot boung سی مې )ریز ۵ چيا بیو‎ 
ba ains Al همو هه‎ Te مساغوان‎ uiris) xef موس‎ 
سس تہ‎ dem بش سن ہی غد هلس‎ 4 e Pinasa 
———— —— Ae eet یی‎ n 
مویہ یی‎ bel امه ډو ان با کد م‎ 
wht ولاک ولب لوه ورام سم تاه تن مسا دم‎ 
-— چ + کم ب دوک ۹س ق نونف اسا‎ 
di dibal babia i Ve Was y aba | 
inka اس نرتکاش مهم مه کمن نمی دسق‎ 
. معدا ساك مت بس "متمد‎ eal» uj قفا‎ 
تا لات سے‎ VU سات صن تس‎ 
نه په وسم مان‎ n "سوق اضق‎ 
سو » یسه ت وت اص سویے‎ 
ست مه دده‎ jet تتت ادنله‎ 


























334 
before and during the early part of the war. fe attributed 
its reawakening to the postwar cancellation of censorship 


regulations, which returned the responsibility for security 





to the local commancers. 

At war's end, Congress renewed its debate on a 
unified defense department, and the top military leaders of 
both the Army and Navy took turns at testifying. Teo help 
prepare the Navy‘e cage, Secretary Forrestal resurrected 
the “ac hee” committee he had created in the apring of 
1944, naning Vice Admiral Arthur Radford ag ite new head, 19 
inevitably, OPI also became involved, and in Decosmber 1942 
Miller wrote te Captain Lee "that everything is being 


Despite the‏ سا 


cropped to take care of the merger angle 
Sli-out effort. the يی پټ ھل‎ information chief was pessimistiese 
over the sea service's chances of winning the reorganization 
battle. Wis lack of confgidence stemmed from his belief 
"that we were about two years too late, to s&y nothing of 
our old tradition of silent serviea, "i? 

Miiller slao was frustreted over the rapid loas of 
experienced information pergonnel through desobilizstion. 
When the war ended, there were some 750 officer specialists 
alone serving foll-time in this fieiód throughout the 
d 
&üxiOus to resume their cíivilian pursuits. Fhe admiral 


Moet of them wexe naval regarvists who were 


@eatimatec that 50 per cent of these personnel would be lost 
by March i, 1946.'* 


c 
maaga aE نيك سے۔‎ e n QLase مه تا هم‎ 
— — — — 
— — 
فسن ص د‎ ot) هسو -سما‎ ib o" ns M - 
te eee) Gest qui sia am aa 
یدنه قت س اون‎ 4E sensi ښوا لټ ناو یی‎ QU 
ts نه جارس له دب ننس‎ ad یي وا سد رہ‎ 
ME isd که‎ i4] en ساعد‎ ansfyA locAabé pnl gujssm OU 
شس دس مس و عا نم شت بسا‎ 
نو سننس‎ amb qer*e feng" روم پس‎ at و جات‎ 
wo summ "usa سب‎ o ee AMD جو‎ 
سر یت‎ metum] GE malam] 24 حیرمدضدع‎ stwr so :ی‎ ee 
Valin! aly وعسسا لس‎ anli (6 !نت‎ all فخفعله:‎ 








































نزامو نا سا مستقست er cv‏ ال لس نیا 
نوفده مسامم ادشمم 4م316 :اند 
ههت فلا موس اع اد ساس یم ہم 


EEUU 


— Y I 








335 

in n attempt to entice some Of tha reservists to 
remain in the Navy in a public information capacity, Miller 
recommended to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of 
Naval Personnel that a Special óGesignator be estasblishec 
for offícergs serving in this duty, so they would not have 
to compete for promotion with contemporaries who had much 
more sea amd operational experience. Porrestal immediately 
approved the proposal, and it was favorably compeidercd by ë 
special board headed by Kear Amira] George ©. Dyer in late 
1945. However, with the mercer issue freeging practically 
all military legislation in Congress, action on the measure 
was not taken until 1947. By that tise, tho majority of 
the information-experienced reserve officers hed long since 
departed, 

Ag pertial companesetion for the loss of the 
tewexrvists, Admiral Miller wae able to procura about fifty 
Regular Navy afficera to help maintain as much ae poasihiea 
of the public relations structure built up during the war 
in the naval districts, the fleets and in Washington. “We 
have proven our value too completely to let it slip by us 
now,“ he professed. 15 

Secretary Forrestal supported Miller's contention 
by writing to the Chief of Naval Personnel in March 1946, 
“Zt is considered essential that the service of Navy public 


information continue to function in pesce as in war, فد‎ 








eee 
وہووہ ر میں برد‎ mir tc mee ماما‎ E Lu اک‎ (٢ 
E أن امسوم‎ Salter = الم‎ yee ILIA 
د دنه سس يننا جیب دنوه د‎ qu د٥ وېښس۴سسمي په‎ 
لم ار | یشن‎ lusty ine (theese © ORES دهع مها سه‎ 
ce tur Mowe اسن‎ c» erab elbs n prioun ووویسوی‎ wat 
té ded s Dos mes m iure cac me léevide e m^ 899 هون‎ 
o 00 dei amos fidam. s ww أن‎ Lee .Pre—qeeq gs) esere 
^AI سپ د یسو له‎ foco Wis e laa ee دود‎ 
immo m اس ونس‎ wee) eee a Sibe have .MMM 
— Pennad اس اه له له‎ yigiti RjÀ 
ic iiin aff oer mor ye ۵ Site pee مس ته‎ 
worse cml Sie good i vernon دنصوو و دلاحعمصمدمه‎ aA 
٠ت مجح‎ 
-— t ریب‎ —— —⸗— [aterey of -۱ 
سه ہوسی لہ‎ Des s E me 
aw ad pelus q Jiloe «mePOsrry» تمه‎ bim; azs ta 
ہی چم‎ wd. تر ہم‎ [smi gm cot males مې‎ emey oped 
— پو‎ ud "tm 

؟آ  bajenn yadro‏ مسومسے ع۸ سا یہر ای MA ewe‏ 

ا 1ص حع 
۶ څه وساډهسښما rm $ê era‏ ہایب 


cen  څ اګ‎ 






























336 

He ordered the establishment oí information billets in "ali 
staffs, ashore and «float, and in those other Neval activ- 
ities which special circumstances may ronger necessary 
e 2 « tO asauce adequate public relations coverage.“ He 
also directed that the Enlisted Maval Correapencent be 
inciuded in the permanent rating system of the Navy anê 
that the Fleet Hometown News Center be retelnud as a dis- 
tribution point for stories about individual Navysen. He 
further stated that he wanted provisions made for the 
training of personnel assigned to public infermaticn 
duties. ey 

Forregtal's continued emphasis of publico relations 
was instrumentel in keeping Office oZ Fublic Information 
personnel strength at & level only sligntly lewer than ite 
wartime average. A 1946 table of orgunization for GPT 
listed billets fer sixty-six officers and twenty-two 
enlisted men. By April 1947, the &jency--known once again 
as the Office of Public Relations--haé ectually expended to 
include @llowances fox eighty~four officers, forty-five 
enlisted men and seventy-two civilians. At that cime, it 
was headed by @ vice admiral with two rear admirala in 
ch&rge of suparate public informetion and civil relations 


divisions. 15 


hn QGvuuixlew 
Prior to World War II, the Navy ai?hered rather 





et 
(LA^ mà SU lad مد انم نه‎ a cdRllNMCR «D اک ەە‎ 
A en imin cafífdeq- cx vmm په قم‎ 
ہے یب ہد‎ s —— aS c) DINEM 
Abe a -- د ربا‎ d ond ool qas Mere? Seeks a ود‎ 
هه‎ ——- LO baszim4 Jw éALDONR چو‎ AMD. mm 
GP sesta siia. O^ پسرسه؛ عنعن دا‎ Bo guise 

imti tiae سیا لھ ^^ اغ‎ amumameno e" — 
دد الات ترا فسادېۍ‎ alme pigar نہ‎ Jeet sew 
Aaa نكست‎ su ي ارهد‎ je © oF £roeevje Lum 
1*2 - opimis do aias Hti A sapan mitro 

dd نے رص بیس‎ sein Mivks مج‎ a e n baren 
سص‎ 





237 
closely to its long-stancing silent service tradition in 
ite dealings with the press and the public. With a few 
notable exceptions, such as the extensive publicity given 
to the seiling of the Great White Fieet in 21908, public 
relations ín the sea service was handled on an informal, 
sporadic and often reactionary basis. A Navy News Bureau 
was set up in Worid War I to assist the news media, but 
austere economic conditions end public apathy toward the 
military in the two decades which followed relegated this 
formal organization to a caretaker status buried in the 
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). 

rariy in 1935, howaver, Rs war aleuds gathered ir 
Eurepe, OI was compelleé to eni&srge its meager four-person 
public relations branch and to estabiish subsidiary field 
offices to meet heightened public and press interest in 
naval affairs. In uly 1346, Frank Knox, publisher of the 
Chicago Dally Jews and newly appointed Secretary of the 
Navy, Girected a mobilisation of the sea service's informa” 
tion function to a wartime footing, aval reservists from 
the ranks of the mass media and relates professions wore 
brought on active duty: and separate sections were added to 
the public reletiona branch te sexvice the gpecializec needs 
of the various media, coordinate field activities and 
monitor trends in news reporting än public opinion. 

in Hay 1941, Xnox transferred the function from 
naval intelligance, creating an independent Office of Public 


هه 
sal o: qase‏ خضي ماي منم مسول وتا اسو Al‏ 
عم قحغږي ساوه mir‏ مس عدا اس ond dies‏ ت s‏ سا 
وول یلو دس نس ATS Pe»‏ ہہ ہے یہ با سح ال 
La (mm ae Lon ahan‏ .بے مو يسه 
4g" ad qp we Gm‏ مه د nnn Ae erm mit saby of‏ 
٢١‏ ——— 
DB iO‏ یز ہی -Qro LU‏ 
Aq mao qi‏ سیت ہی سی ab etiem nica‏ 
فقن" جمنھصنددجھ محسدة nt ans‏ سیدےھاای ہیں هد له 
aitte‏ ته ane bm ey woti seme‏ اش ۰ ند 
AM) viec co mis CE‏ ووش س ic n‏ داد 
ونم chisi‏ مو يما ^^i fa (mas at AUN sioa‏ 
غوهوس. وسین د LMA‏ بد دږ سا عوص — 
awake‏ وله of‏ 4 ینب jtara jamit pabis‏ == 
— — — 


مه يه 


کب i‏ سي 




















8 د 
Relations (OPR) directly under hie control end naming Rear‏ 
Hepburn as its head. A short time later,‏ ہی Admiral Arthur‏ 
the Chief of Naval Operations made public relations a‏ 
function of commeanó. Personnel in the Washington office‏ 
inereesed from thirteen in the sumeer of 1940 to over‏ 
ninety on the eve of Pearl Harber. The naval district‏ 
public relations offices also were aucmented, including;‏ 
personnel to man branches in various metropolitan centerg‏ 
throughout the nation. In the fall of 1941, when fuli~time‏ 
information officere were assigned’ te the Atiantic and‏ 
Pacific fleets, the Navy's wartime public relations sStruc-‏ 
ture was virtually complete,‏ 

Soon, however, the age-old nemesis toe full ة٦‎ 
sure in wartime--the necessity for military secroocy-- 
reappeared, Ag far back as 1938, the Navy already had 
instigated a series of security measures designed to mini- 
mize publicity on new ship construction and fleet maneuvers. 
in early 1941, Secretary Xnox himself instituted e system 
ef “voluntary censorship." in which the naws media were 
asked to refrain from mentioning certain naval subjects 
anless previously released by appropriata anthority. 

Upon America’s entry into World War II. formal 
censorship was impesed on many faceta of war information. 
President Roosevelt outlined the rules, stressing that 
nothing should be revealed which would give “sid and 
comfort to tha enemy." Significantly, he vasted the 


rtt 


ہہ کت ums Lopis bif sram‏ يد کی 
ورسم د ووس es‏ اه ادها ه ems‏ — — 
20 : سا وې مه دی نفک è mirin uitg‏ 


ato نه بب عومجم‎ Lemos ysi —“ 
Jo ar Hi وو‎ imm نس‎ Ok ووو صقن‎ 














D‏ — ےھ 


mitral) ہی مو«‎ — uari ya oes ali ım 
mil md bam mye n mls nolo مو لمب‎ Lg 
مہ ہی ہے‎ a ALS 
o UA adr ORL be LL o یووم غه مہ نوم کم‎ 
uma مه هه جماسنده‎ lane re e e Al 
“Hert and jeg ۳ emirgan 
مه سم د همد مسمول ده‎ 

wie? Lick ao بمہد رسپ وتسا عند‎ ann — 
m مهم وو سا نس‎ aie mh qune nó na 

ح۹همیسد. نم ده مه غا الد بيعم لاد ماس wnt‏ 
مود سیه Omp omenen yatua Re‏ تد سه 
O S a‏ اي ممم ې 
ee‏ 2ه سب بش 
ا سر ہے ے ہین یہ6 Jo EE‏ 
سم یہ ۱۶ (tn ismo — — mmt aisis‏ 


A. 


۔ nare‏ منسپټسرر ې موسو دكت Tum‏ وو د د۷ . 
وس الگا کی ہد 



























— — —— ومد 
aew‏ ود me bo apam pse‏ أ —— 





و رومد سیت بسند وای تعن مم 
وضو می i ag "ite‏ محم e‏ 


339 
interpretation of what date would fall in this category in 
the hands of the milicary. 

The firet years of hostilities was primarily @ neval 
war, and Admiral Ernest J. King, the Navy's top military 
commander, exercised nis censorship powers to the utmost, 
Only sparse detaile were releasec about the damage æt Pearl 
Harbor; news of ship ginkings in the Atlantic by German 
Submarines wag closely guarded; and announcements of our 
ship losses in the Pacific were delayed up to 100 Gaya. 
These actiona aroused suspicion by the press and public 
that the government was deliberately “sugar-coating” war 
information, since the Savy seemed to be stifling hat news 
while promptly issuing the good. Elmer Davis, thief of the 
new Office of Wax Information (OWI), personally took the 
Navy to task over its news policies anc, with en assist 
from the President, wag able to obtain timelier anc mere 
complete Cisclosurss by the fall of 1943. 

The war took & new direction in November ef that 
year when Allied forces invaded Horth Africe. With the 
newa spotlight somewhat diverted from ses engagements, 
Captain Leland P. Lovette, who succeeded Admiral Hepburn as 
Directer of Public Relations (DPR) in August 1942. was free 
to concentrate on improving Navy releasing procedures. 
Secretary Knox also urged Admiral King to relax certain of 
his security vreatrictions, particularly with regard tc 


submarines operations. However, press complaints over 











ut 
ea vemos نہ ال‎ iuh kirss dian Dù he ناذا تيو تله‎ 
نم ام ماو‎ 
Lama 8 qUib4-dg. bw bidelliósdd be "UU LL 
Jasas وه که‎ — 
1 je نك اص‎ oo تسا شقن مضا رجا‎ WAS 
دسم‎ yf ل سه رس, بت‎ punia vida fo aem ونی‎ 
nd Ch مهال تافام سما مسانسېها‎ e ق‎ 
الا سد‎ ze ست ېټ( د بي ہسنوں: مت ضیہب و‎ 
که یا 7-9 7ً 2-7 0ب‎ 
mem het pahiticm ق طلست كله ےم سمحمۂ ہہ هه‎ 
a 5p Àmice inv mali شاه رو تسنئ غه وخ‎ 
؟) . جلیووسنو دہ ہے‎ aol maa ده »نت ها اف‎ 
uds A debe dms ووتفدفمہ‎ nem ed) سی‎ Air لون نه‎ 
vote بارت هه‎ ulish m s ہے تاص سے‎ sd) medi 
Asti te , نت‎ wt نات‎ Gace 
hati مه ولوستکان نه شېو مد‎ Û Û, ټم‎ ae OO” 
کید وسر عو رت 414 مب‎ ered! Ball Magy andy 
titers الو لما بې ماد‎ mieonan وټ ېلرل‎ 
> فما مب ن‎ e کوابق مه ۷ مې‎ 
-— ame اند‎ pagt JÛ AM ian مهم م مت‎ 
are o جس‎ red Ki aE gs 
to cidruss silm فا تا اف وې نس۴ښا عب به‎ 






































340 
military handling of war news continued throughout most of 
1343, and in September of that year, President Roosovolt 
felt it necessary to dizect the Arey anû Navy to cooperate 
more closely with OWI. 

A turning point in Navy ceporting occurred two 
months later when a “play-by-play” Ssccount of the landing 
on Tarawa was relayed through the sophisticated communica~ 
tiona facilities of a new amphibious command ship. This 
practice was not to become standard for many months. how~ 
ever, since the comuander of the Pacific island-hepping 
campaign, Admiral Kaymond A. Spruance, frequently refuscd 
te break radio silence for public relations purposes. 

Also, strict security was maintained on the new techniguca 
ang egquipment used in amphibious war face. 

While controversy surrounded the flow of Navy news 
from the battle zones during thae early and middle stages of 
the conflict, Of anc the field offices at home were busily 
engayeé in a myriad of activities designed to enhance the 
pea sezvice’s over-all public relations. Cembat photography 
and combat art programs, beyun during the mobilizetion 
period prior to the wer, were fully operational in the 
fleets by eariy 1942. In Washington, & “beat gysten” wes 
set up whereby press officers from OPR culled news itoms 
from the various kavy Department agencies, Bnd a 24^hour 
watch and extensive phetegraphic library were maintained to 


assist the news media. Weekly pross seminars also were 





— ————— 


im Jane عالسماو‎ ~a 
— ⸗ 





verete mia, Tall a mieg paima? å‏ عن 
— ٦ار‏ وو miimi wi Pe am "vele‏ 
Qi‏ هرايت نٹ نمس دعب 
wre 4 be pedssilons‏ ودنس سسس وني aba:‏ 
- و wm GP‏ أبن مسحي ودسسعہ -u ao ye wA)‏ 
ut tu pokes als Guia |‏ سل نش نخښښتب 
| ې Jil Ie‏ تپوحصت ما مدق ene,‏ 

ار لب بت لح کان اک 
di‏ طدل سفنا نه مسان db‏ ما مسام 
که میلعت odia nidii Gl buns‏ 

= — ے۔ 
او MB‏ مک سا alui‏ ہے sudie što S tia‏ به 
لب سوفن وه ی dd baini KIM a‏ اسه س اس 
له و ووا ةؤ مەج ةمد لیت oj‏ ممه ده 
alkane e‏ سا WE TOC odes‏ 

almani kûs mi تن‎ agua لي لوس‎ 

ملاس سوب سب پت 

سلا وغ د  -,+‏ ع Jr‏ 
»ie‏ د ham, fi‏ ۸ س و مایا ی در 

5 | 
* د د حا بت da‏ 






















341 
conducted to provide background information that could not 
be divulgeó in the regular press conferencos held by tho 
Secretary of the Ravy. 

Barly in 1942, branch officos were established in 
New York to service radio networks and magazine and beck 
publishers. An assistant director of public relations for 
the West Coast was named in September 1943 to coordinate 
efforts there, especially those connected with the motion 
picture industry. 

In the fell of 1941, the Bavy hac taken steps te 
work closely with defense plants in promoting meréle emong 
war workers. Secretary Knox created a epecial industrial 
incentive Givision in hís office in July 1942 which enlisted 
the aid of naval district public relations officers in 
presenting the famed Aymy-Navy "E" Awrrós end other produc- 
tien citations. Radio networks and local] statione also 
were called upon to assist in industriel morale and played 
a prominent role as well in support of Mavy recruiting 
publicity, war bond promotions, Red Cress blecd drives, and 
such unique ventures 86 the solicitation of civilian 
binoculars for uso in the fleets. 

Wavy public relations personne] throughout the wer 
maintsined close iiaison with OWI and other goverment 
information agencies and with their counterparts in the 
Army, Marine Corps anî Coast Guard. Fubliec relations 


efforts of the latter two services came under the general 


EI 

cind bapoa‏ بہد کریا عور 
"ULL LL ÉL O .‏ 
)ال فد ew elle demons Side‏ دوہ :ند نہ 
غه سه وا Nee equates‏ سوکک کہ ami‏ 
ment‏ د paiana‏ فا حر siad ry Piden‏ 4 
لب اكاز جه بهد LATI Qmd Al baia‏ یہ دو وا 
ja Duns Up] bad‏ تبه نټ سه سا ند mim.‏ 

















dd Ago T2 7 A NEM‏ سر 
7 ماو ہل هويم pha niem pieg oi amen‏ 
[nieus Dui — ⏑‏ 
وې دمه ama‏ دږ rela maiso imid yit ai bo RA‏ 
hime izaki faves gv RU» ap‏ هالص ai paiho‏ 
we? pda‏ جسبر ہے peer‏ ٭+ سواہ سط elo‏ —— 
mall‏ ود« تحت mL amim Ic bm aom Diis‏ 
Whee) Al Sh AOE‏ مس با سج 
alòr‏ مهه له وم be‏ جح ان 
ملع سم سیا وسوا ar o"‏ ء نو ن۲ سو (wm‏ 
د — 
ma B ana Dur‏ اع كه سوب 
— 3 لاع عم ا تس مہ 
ameo aia im i AY‏ 
— — 
AM‏ عونو 
ې 7 سوج مر مره سم 






























342 
jurisdiction of OPR and the naval district offices. The 
Wavy also wes involved on a continuing basis in setting up 
displays ond exhibits of war materials, arranging inter~ 
views fer returning combat veterans, projects on behalf of 
the Navy Relief Society, Kavy Day celebrations anê the 
preperation of wer posters. 

in the mid~-war years, OF% began to adopt 2 more 
creative approach by actively seeking wedia coverage of and 
public interest in specific naval activities such as the 
launching of the new laxingtan. the traneit thxeough midc- 
America of the submarine Reto, the USS Alabama firinu 
trials ani the first anniversary of the WAVES. In addition. 
it sought to educate Navy information pereounel through 
annual] public relations officer conferences, a monthiy 
Publis lations tuligtin and the issuance of a detailed 
Public Relations Manual in 1943. OPR reached a personnel 
strength of 140 shortly after the war began; end there were 





274 publie relations officers in field commands by the end 
of 1942, including "Ziight" information specialists 
attached to new air training units formed in the summer of 
that year. 

Beginning in 1943, the improvement in the war's 
outlook tended te neutraliae security precautions and 
Eesulted in a gradual but steady increase in the dissemina- 


tion of Heavy information. Despite the more Liberal policy. 


4 
bp bam ده مضا ايه بهت عماسم‎ 
» د فا تس نسحت ۷ه منم‎ Pe Wusu ود‎ wads Qa 
-ui سپسءسنائے دد سو نمس‎ sow فتاه سا‎ iue سیه‎ 
Iure om وسم‎ 
wt: bo uci wkd تسن د‎ Trew quise Palias grot Wii 
سی‎ Vo. dd Se od quil 
dion فة مضت م‎ ٣ 
فد فانصا جنس ای دا سد‎ be Jauria ات‎ 
sis اناه مسا به‎ tavua sidious a) Sonila nia 
تدس ساد‎ "viaden/ àb ahihi vo y fo palea 
«1243 amm EE UNT OMD a aan ب‎ a aa 
مزالي‎ sà رس وپټ‎ ٤٤ vubelU/Lmas امت ف م تة‎ 
Awd £ sara ıs midam pex لو موو به سوووسي‎ 
Quem s peenes pers mai وسم په راه ذو وا‎ 
سامت‎ s Se ان ات دنت سا بت تسه‎ 
جد صا‎ e له لدا خت جات‎ LEN amisi s ات‎ 
«sae nar صا‎ (amen tow ait tes gous Bo! To لساك‎ 
bas adi ين‎ eto A E cC iiile ADDE WS 
——— 9۳ غو ای سای‎ 
— — 
55 ` a a 

نا دض فس بن لټ سه 
فتاه سه وہ ماد له ههد :۷ تسده Dm‏ 
——————— — — 
— — 


oe‏ ه- و 










































و و بھ — - o»‏ 


343 
however, public relationa in the sea service was consicerec 
to be in & state of Goldrums in the spring of 1944 when 
Jamas Forrestal replaced the deceased Frank Knox aa 
Secretary of the Nevy. Particularly in the Pacific, where 
there was a shortage of public relations personnel ani war 
correspondents encountered unacceptable delaya in the 
censorship anû delivery of their material, were short- 
comings noted. 

Forrestai*s immediate concern, however, was with an 
Army plan thes before Congress to serge the nation’s armed 
forees after the war. Fearing thet the Savy would be 
"submerged" rather than merged in any such scheme, the new 
secretary orûsreĞ a revitalisation ef its entire public 
relations program for an all-out effort in the final stages 
of the conflict. The focus of the campaign was to be in 
the Pacific, since tho Bavy's roie in the Atlantic ani 
European theaters was by that time one primarily of support. 
in the Pacific, however, the sea service faced stiff public 
celeations competition from the Army and Aray Air Force. 

Following an inepection trip to that theater in the 
summer of 1344 by Rear Admiral A. Stanton Merrill, whe heê 
relieve? Captain Lovetto as DPR three months earlier, 
numerous innovative measures were taken-~net only ts speed 
the flow of press copy and fiim from the combat are&s but 
also to convince Navy commanders of the importance of public 


relations to the war effort. Information “annexes” were 








Abt 
سم :و عق دہ‎ Karim Am ده‎ l omaja) ag abid ٠ 
andy 1241 So aimp جڈ قملکجمی 1د مہ‎ seye à Ai b 
— مس مو دی سوي. غه ومیس غه سب وان‎ 
دس © — — اسنات ردس س سا سر‎ 
یب‎ Di وصمصصسې وله هلېه‎ Demameecha ^ x 
eT a i e 
ا کے کے کے کے نت مه د‎ 
چیہ نی مر مسي ہر سد ا مودت م سا‎ veni 
سه سی اس انا‎ a mbi ox ods وای‎ 
www at MAR شر سدم بے سیا نہ سی نه‎ 
Sg pulang رر و تصش‎ 
سپ‎ langs mip al ssis soija mt vot هتسه ویو‎ 
نم‎ md be pee Arlo” ni je وسرو‎ uw aoe maa se 
eed ARDET ٢٢ 
-tus La ۱۱ جب‎ meus! سه‎ ١ سصم‎ hace? 
وشا‎ ise kean سنه‎ eee نی ان ہہ د‎ 
دل میس مت حصب بلج اعم‎ — — pan 
— —— — — 
نت نه سوه‎ os amt Gb Gamer 
6 
م مع‎ evade DO e a د‎ 
a cum Ca d ea | 


— ali avo sii bes + 











- ييچ 

























344 
included in future operational plans; flest censors 
&ccompanied correspondents wherever they went for on -the- 
apot screening of press material; ani sceres of full-time 
public relstions officers were dispatched to the Pacific, 
their number totaling more thun 400 by war's end. A for- 
ward base was set up on Guam to handle the increasing 
nunber of reporters who flocked to the Pacific following 
V-E Day. Modern transmission outists were installed there 
and at Hawaii to beam radio ani press copy. including 
photographs, back to the States. Dro&cc&sts algo wern 
originated from ships at sed. 

The turnabout in the Navy's “press sense” received 
high praise from the news media, with special aceclades 
handed out for the arrangements et Iwo Jim® and Okinawa. 
The public relations conscious Forrestal was not finished. 
however. In consonance with Captain Harold B. (Min) 
Hiller, the new public relations officer for the Pacific 
commander, he moved to "personalize" the Navy's war cole by 
assigning a cadre of 100 Enlisted Ravy Correspendents and 
hundreds of collateral~duty information officers to write 
stories on individus] Mavymen. To distribute theee 
&rticles to hometown newspapers, he established the Fleet 
Hometown Hewa Center in Chicago in March 1945. 

The secretary took steps, too, to improve the 
central supervision of the Navy's information programs. in 


the fai1 of 1944, OFPR was completely revamped, with more 


sal 
مهس ام تید سود دادن پات ند حم‎ eed 
صا ھیں۔-‎ Dk n ei remem ena DAGOS 
وز سا - بے‎ erme ket (led beT Ño painanne 4780 
یام مسا يی ال او درو‎ PIPOLÓAO كديفت بس مقنمتع‎ | 
sek د‎ bim نی ےوک‎ O) صوجد کت‎ — — iay 
ovletesws «63 slamad D gus وك‎ qm fee سب‎ imd عق‎ 
سسوم ما جود مو انوس دم — السا‎ 
onl) bailarai vow sivàfoe نتدسمسسنعمنوے‎ cue ۷ات‎ 
مه سب سي فا نس‎ alten eave دہ‎ hiami سا دد‎ 
sho مهنو فيفك رحس حغعانپه غه‎ 
ېه هساسا‎ ao e r نم یه‎ aaa — — 
سار وواد ماه‎ «eim Fes Hf aw n ahang apis 
سنے٭ھ.‎ am wale oe hee MA xe AD Bees 
lai) .- hira iddia An oe 0م‎ cere 
ہف خست؛ ناہ‎ amh riie قلتت تا وب ونت مه جامخه‎ 
“i wice ame eel aie Siimo" نے‎ bored of tdm ⸗⸗ 
رټ او ارس کم تسس یناہ سا‎ Re دسسفوسنس « مس‎ 
athe of SOLO — قسف مج وود‎ 
san eal rain لي‎ rg asim co nelle 
peel) رس‎ meas «mmm aed o oA 
یں‎ orm سے ہن‎ 
ہے 79 نوم وس‎ Aqu) حدم‎ eder OED C s 





















345 
emphasia giver: to the planning ani evaluation phaace of the 
publie relations procesa, Monthiy statements cf specific 
objectives were begun in January 1945, end * feedback” 
reperte on actions taken to achieve them were requires frou 
Bil Navy public relations offices. In May 1945, Forrestal 
transferreó Captain Hiller from the Pacific to head OPK, 
promoting him to rear admiral. Miller in dune changed the 
name of the function to "public information" anë &ucocoodec 
in removing virtually the last troces of security restríc- 
tions preventing a free flow of news. 

When the atomic bombs wero dropped on Hiroshima and 
Bagageki, the Navy wes about to léunch three "press solipa" 
to bs used exclusively for public relations coverage of its 
part ín tha invasion of Japan. Instead, it had te settle 
fox a "bright spotlight of publicity" surrounding the 
surrender ceremony aboard the bettleshnip MIAGORKA in Tokyo 
Bay. 


من وی با 

Frank Knox eet the machinery in motion for a full 
chronicling of the Navy's World War II story.  Bowever, چھ‎ 
we have seen, stringent security measures and a lack of 
understanding and appreciation for public relations by many 
naval officers seriously handicapped its telling. perticun 
larly in the early and middle stages of the conflict. 

in retrospect, with the Pacific fleet severely 
crippled at Pearl Harbor and the Germans mounting a 


d 
atere سرسا هت ده‎ sias ARA AA KI 
وی‎ Map ام اص‎ wattts bocis wms یي‎ "Lg uU 
— tte اوښوسوعیمېا‎ ty al onion eae سی د‎ 

wee i mn wt e pisri a) 

— گے “فی e mee een n A‏ ا 
سپمحعف اف كج مہ ص ات لم "Emu aa ONT Amo sm‏ 
ol‏ ته سا س رپ —— 30 )14 
پوت Te el mii el‏ تسسا baotaat‏ ند نس فد ive‏ 

— :ہد تو رس مہ‎ tn" s (MI 

اسیو ومیس عم ےج سو بو ند ہے خد - 


0 cow 
—i ſ 


bee) Midd 5 ین‎ 
شد‎ « woa moia ai مس مسا‎ Fm om للم‎ 


















uibs MERECE RS 
io = © ooo enna هدڅ‎ LORD OUP کو وو‎ 





346 
potentially disastrous submarine campaign in the Atlantic, 
it ia most difficult to disputes the sagacity of Admiral, 
King’s tough security etance early im the war. Neverthe- 
less, it was inevitable in our democratic society that such 
rigid censorship would seen run at cross purposes with the 
public's appetite for news. which nad been aided and 
abetted for years by a highly competitive free press 
insistent on full and speedy disclosure. The problem was 
compounded in World War II by the messive parsonal involve” 
ment of the American people in the prosecution of the war 
and the recent advances in communications technology that 
served to make it tha most widely reported conflict in 
history up to that time. 

it is doubtful whether the degree of necessity for 
military secrecy in wartime ever will be satisfactorily 
resolved for either its proponente or opponents. In aii 
probability, the issue will hinge in Zuture wersg--es it has 
in the past--on the special wet of circumstances operative 
in each case. Secretary Knex pinpointed the dilemma when 
he said in 1941 that security versus publicity is “not 2 
conflict between right and wrong but between two rights-~- 
the right of the public to know 211 about its HEY e a 
and tbe right of the Navy to presorve national safety by 
Bot revealing anything of value to à potential amay. "t? 

For the most part, the public amd press concedes 
the latter right to the Navy at the beginning of World 





bH 

سا یوی ظقاموعغوف انا اج سموساف ته بل دز مسر 
لها كو سم سس« 
فا wanare Qisesas dus?‏ مان cane mds di‏ سوي 
mod: Wiii ner si a‏ او suum dad) vieler‏ 
Rigas‏ ورس ول سالك ممما جه هد baion‏ سا acs Like‏ 
مهه واه tet e , xad‏ سی ساسا میا 
هام دت وم ع « لول amen abut UpLilvoqes‏ 
هه بښ دد سر یسال لسر ووو u ls E‏ 
مم ےہ سوج کې عا هې iat oe aio quer‏ 
wd Gmer majat ads to ۶‏ ہقف بسن نت i-e «i lo‏ 
مە ت سی ٠‏ فق ناو ةل ےس u Wi‏ 
e oad‏ تو as‏ دیس 

.ره .ا نو تجن كدر عضن اننا mi gruia pe w add‏ 
entrees al orris qubilis‏ ونس لول | ss‏ سن ot) seven’ ol‏ 
Aud 9+‏ دا نف ot alipata stl‏ ق (nat‏ 
تفہ تعیہ Lite‏ ونس E‏ 23 وو نے ہیف 
څک اد — ساب 
sem dna ad‏ دہ نع ew‏ دنه oft‏ بی حصسدہ ami‏ 
مه ١ه‏ )خر مهه سای ü‏ 
Sa‏ ندر سم mae n‏ 
می ار کا Ur‏ ووه n^» Fm cH,‏ 
1 — مع نو سل سا 
bn‏ ×ش — سے ۰۔۴ 
— — 
ata w‏ —— 












347 
War II. Yet, it must be conciwiedc that at the very outset 
of hostilities the gea service instituted an unnecessarily 
restrictive set of censorsbip rules. Furthermore, it 
failed to educate the public and presse properly @s to the 
reasons for these rules and did not make sufficient provi- 
sion for tbeir períodical review and iiberelization-- 
despite the steady improvement in the tactical situation. 
The public information portion of the official wart ime 
history of the Pacific Fleet command contained the admis- 
sion that "after èn initial vital need for security, the 


20 An Elmer Davis, 


brekeg were not taken off fast enough," 
in his postwar report to the President, "observed . . , 
that Naval officers, in Geciding on what informetion weuld 
give aid ani comfort to the enemy, ‘leened over backward 
in interpreting the phrase in the interests of security. 4 
This attitude. of course, had its genseis in the 
longtime tradition of reticence on the part of navel 
officers and the related “security syndrome” evolving from 
the isolationist environsent of naval operationgco- both of 
which were personified in Admiral King. With this poliey 
emanating from the very top, it is not surprising that a 
Certain “fear complex" over the release of inforsstion 
developed in Navy commeanders, Censorg an? even public rela~ 
tions officers. In the case of the latter. the decision by 
the sea service before the wer began to include the respon- 
sibility for security ln the information function created a 


tik 
zeuu pwe wia ار ١ه مه تہ موتا ښوا دہ‎ د٤‎ NN 
i Laem ید می‎ Ta اندم تعد سه هت نه‎ $o 
۱ 1س ات‎ auam سمتتے۔‎ fo fre »v)imisqem 
سی مل ہچ بے ته‎ ima sirg set meteta ge balea 
ها االجنم مو ل-‎ siin mn مه اله‎ pas ropie =e چجمجی‎ 
— eet. iesilses ومس ا سس نہ دے‎ acy همون‎ 
دم هنت وھداس ,نھ‎ tilag esu 
— — tilia ads ke هلوج‎ 
نہ‎ ilana ما کی‎ bals هه له 4عة‎ werhe” sate مسب‎ 
كسا — تی‎ "٢ penne ooh سم سم ود سم .دا‎ 
"mmm وسم‎ sads 
ات۱‎ tees Deal" eta m اد‎ smia toa bba wel 
سی ہے ا‎ te PPP "ade m unisce xwatA ad 
دوه هه فد اف‎ bad ow Q6 maie mio بر‎ 
مس ذا نس مذ‎ ate am somal te "bAlbett لومم جم‎ 
cot nai viro ° niye qiiem soje وحچٹمم مسا قاس‎ 
In nar a age see Là one ml iain) ,وک‎ 
ylle فاعم نه‎ pua ibaa el e my سج‎ Mide, 
سوسیا‎ 
زدسمصط اس‎ tu omaia «ds وسو" سو‎ 
— — لم اد‎ 
مت د‎ — — 2 


"ste m وه‎ 













































348 

“aplit personality” in its public relations officers which 
inhibited their natural inclination to fight for 4 more 
liberal approach., “We are inclined to be ‘No’ men,“ said 
۷ speeker t one of the Navy's public reletions officer 
conferences, ". . . While . . . WS Ought to realize that we 
are the ‘Yes’ men. „22 

A aignifisant factor in perpetuating the Mavy's 
wartime intransigence in security matters was the epparent 
justification of reey in the light of certain opera” 
tional events. For instance, the strict silence mainteined 
on the breaking of the Japanese naval code early an the war 
led to the ambush of Admiral Yamasoto over the Solomon 
Islands in April 1943 through the Geciphering ef an enemy 
message. 2 And Admiral King cemained convinced as late as 
May 1944 that his withhelding of the fect that two adi- 
tional American cruisers were sunk in the Battle of Savo 
isiand in the summer of 1942 saved the day for our embattled 
Marine forces on Guadalcanal. He claimed in his first 
report on the war, “The Japenese did not take advantace of 
this opportunity to engage in a fleet battle with the 
balanse of power on their side, probably bacauae they did 
net know--and we did net let them Xncw--how severe our 
losses were. 4 

A begrudging ecceptance of and in some cases whole~ 
hearted support for stringent security measures by the news 
media, combined with the public's general approval cf such 





.حر 
فو یوېیوعديل در دل یدل اساهایس ونم dalda‏ 
دی هوی مسوا md a auti‏ وس د com‏ 
مس سیمېسب یس و Sa‏ ند اسا ' سو " سنہ 
همع © aw‏ دا yea ws‏ ’+ بسا اداد ملا 
سنهیر لتر mu aiiwerogé: Teo We.‏ - 
m‏ و gel‏ ^ ہیر 
٭ — as ttre, al wüwt Tc/Tbeip*‏ او 
مل دی عام و نذا مسب سر سم reves Se‏ 
moi mas "a oec $4 Û EI‏ 1 فندوغله -srm‏ 
فص le lasab»e oux. 4» rim i <O T a‏ 
Ge uda ۸۸ vitse ebco Dev» esed uc 487 te Wiese WES d‏ 
وت وہ rey Laed Ja deste a‏ ہے تد او نزجھیں 
۵ تہ 1 14€ دنه ده اند اچد ون سن سر 
ونوم ٤٣‏ ےم a siil e bhainis ubain pih hun‏ 
Sia QUE‏ سس 
کان ÛÛ Ae ie vem?‏ بے سد (vel yo‏ 
بسچ سس 
سم emu‏ نح ات تمسق ساسا اه sont) ale‏ 
aa‏ 0 که ټم ۶وب ووی «ند سم اد اس تن ۷ 


apii a d axem cs didis O‏ سو مرو ہی 
























کان یا موس minésed pbg die aai sé‏ سو وب 

















349 
policies, alse contributed to the Nevy’s reluctance to 
abandon its strict stence on operational secrecy, A patri” 
etic fervor permeated the entire nation, consicerabiy 
diluting the hue and cry reieed by à vocal minority for à 
freer flow of war news. Ray Daniell of the Kew York Rinas 
Lonácn Bureau typified this undercurrent of patriotisa when 
he exclaimed in 1943, “There isn't any story in the world 
that is gooó enough to justify rigking the life of à single 


American soldier, «2S 


And Dale Miner wrote long after the 
war that “the preas more or lees voluntarily constricted 
its own rele, am abetted by the military, which gave them 
not only uniferms but officers’ ranks ami prerogatives to 
go with them, reporters went to war more as Civilian 
adjuncts to the Public Information Office than جع 8ه‎ 
sentatives of the public's right to know, p 

The Navy, ín consonance with the Office of لي ډو هزیا‎ 
ship anc OWI, dió attempt to balance the need for secrecy 
against the morale benefits to be derived from releasing 
certain information, even though classified. As eariy as 
Labor Day., 1942, Seereteary Knox decided to widely surlicigze 
the isunching of new shipse--data of osvieus value to the 
enemy--in order to boost the incentive of shipysró workers. 
im October 1944, the vice chief of naval operations. Vice 
Admiral 2. &. Edwards, elaborated en this pelicy: 


št is of great importance to us to publicize the 
accomplishments of ships and individuals because it 


نيه 
oait batalia‏ ہسی ریہ ہی ربب ova‏ سوم يم هه 
کم لاب ×× ون به “aang A pea LoM‏ 
مز viisemde Dese: e w oain yot es con one o‏ ہمہ د 
ههو کله ور سو (ob wee ote Jo Liss qua ls‏ سږي 
bellique. ooume saimi?‏ کاله امد e-docdsdéq bo sts‏ نكسو 
«wb Website wj‏ )244. اې لوا دوو اسم لغ رنه لا 
ab Suite‏ ججج اص ك اسا زتها که cients © 26 WSL)‏ 
wi mam: YI TASA? heed VO vraa diam w” Sante wwe‏ 
Cote iy9*04 Dm £T qu boo Fads w utoy aio wl‏ جس oer‏ 
we des rue, MA ae ‘anes mo mY A qiio SOR‏ 
ې فا (ue s oooy and?‏ بښد يس a Co‏ 

M- ams w سی‎ un بہت‎ Fp h6 

samê to iO ly Ole eee al ray ژ٦‎ 
rm. veh Ress eir im or sowara Aiò (Ey had ای‎ 
ہہ اص‎ cord (eio ہہ ہے‎ tl cod aina ats Raye 
لم حول سی‎ J heel leet fo سی‎ quer «mileti dh 
slice rises ون‎ Gull Cth ارحس لكب بیس‎ gbil quA قب‎ 
wii ay وب دهمی یمو غه مل وساپمسانوه عا شمغس پاټ‎ 
۰ ."310- -70 
يي سوسس نه ا‎ 


۱ 
| 
























359 
Goes keep up . . . morale; and I am always well aware 
that news xeapa tbe public in a mood to bask the war 
effort in general and to appreciate what the Mavy is 
Goiig. Kow we have to balance that against how mech 
benefit we ace going te give the enemy. 27 
Óf course, as we have seen, the Wraps Were removed 
from pr&cticaliy all classified subjects toward the «end of 
the war, when victory wes no longer in doubt. It is 
Gebatsh5le, however, Whether this would have been done if 
the tactical situation had suddenly reveraed itself. Elmer 
Davis claimed, "The attitude of the services sight have 
been very different 1م‎ in the wags in the cage. way, of 
à great naval cisasters; especially if it had occurred in 
. . « & Right battle, or an air-sea battle at long range ~ 
When it was doubtful if the enemy know tho extent of his 
$uccesS. . >» 429 
Such speculation raises the question of whether the 
Navy, even with the spur of tha wergers threat and the 
prodding of Secretary Forrestal, would have been able to 
pucsue ag aniightened a public relatione course aa it did 
in the final stages of the war if operational secrecy nad 
still been as vital a determinant in the release of infer- 
mation. The weight cf evidance from this study would seen 
to indicate that it could mot have. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that security considerations were the major foree 
in ehaping Navy public reiations polícios throughout the 
entire war. 


Aside from the need for secrecy, the very nature of 








nu: مه مضيس سے‎ oom ai we wanes . & 
ټس یس‎ ac beer ویوا فلا سپیښانې‎ LA^ viec mee Ma 
a4 6o ch e et) m mem OA e مهام‎ 





tà سه‎ ae e lad س‎ r ——⸗⸗ 
با اک وی‎ uiam Wes macie Leoirund que 
je مون‎ «us se sd Vue me چېا نومس اصد له‎ bê 
ot ern 9 4 Dà ووی ددد اوسر سای ی‎ ۶ 
——-—-M -— ^8 ab s-» D-14— m ce Lu OVO O "دمه‎ 
mit po سب ےی ہمہ‎ — odii DA اتا‎ mov ۵ 2٤0 
سوس . ربا‎ 

ہے Ai omire anitis S‏ اد دا وې ده 
nd‏ سم دې St‏ وس -p be moa eee at Se‏ 
e e‏ ء«ماییسمه د kA cdi m,‏ مس Cibo d4 m x‏ 
له c vmm LAcOAIP egt P) ue ma y Lend ate‏ 
[dde‏ نس cd cesse a Lemke oe‏ یس سرءہس -aiai pa‏ 
ndm‏ تہ be SÉpbem‏ ننس درم رمام lag vem‏ سس 
sd sem P. mtr ——‏ 

















get engagements in itself played a prominent cole in 
Gelaying news of naval batties. Sepecially early in the 
war, the Navy wea often unfairly criticized for short” 
comings in its releasing policies that were Gue in no smali 





pert to this basic problem, The kew York Eezald 
emphasized this point in a postwar editorial: *. . « the 
conditions of naval warfare in the Pacific mado it 
extremely difficult to judge losses, This wae perticulerly 
true in the first frenziec months efter Pearl] Harbor, put 
it clouded the war picture-~so fer ag the public was 
concerned--for virtually the duration of the رهب‎ 
Within the perameters of censorehip and security, 
the sea service developed a sophisticated end et times 
highly effective public relations program during the war. 
in this regard, the hypothesis stated in the introductory 
chapter: that its efforts were primarily responsive rather 
then creative until circumstances dictated a more enlioht- 
ened stence toward the end of the confliet wes not 
completely borne out by the evidence. It is true thet 
attempts to "sell the Hevy" were ruled out in the prew&r 
mobilisation period and the dissemination of information to 
the publico wes stressed as the Navy's main public relations 
mission after hostilitieos began. However, tho cempsigns on 
behalf of rocruiting anû industrial morals, the ozto0blishment 
of combat photography nd cambar art progrems, tiw wogilng of 
the mage media through extensive services ami contacts, and 











سه وکو سو نه زنموعلا وا«ېسه ه mi epai mim‏ 
onan‏ صمي سس« ووسنن ں- من نہ «ls‏ 
وو جات نی بت دیدن شاوی موسمسما شه مو 
Cati?‏ دی ادیو prms àid baiio Putni‏ نې al‏ س line‏ 
صسصسصسصصصصسصسس«س««سس« ota.‏ 
- ادمه jasso bo‏ سد جم بم ے ۹ سی یہ ہس یہ 
۔یںسسن 2429448545 هه d et‏ ټلو سو ورول 
rot . eer 1599 ongoa aiima bàlsesgt zwTÀ) ats a) aoe‏ 
سس ہے aiz Bo ire es lke‏ سن ۲۲۰ 

iw نډیښدن کات وبري وز ایا نت سے‎ 
وسوی‎ d» D bek s kel ork aD A اعم‎ 
بھی ہلال‎ orib ۵ ده و۲۲‎ aliu si2032- موف‎ 
لانت کووودرےغعودب دادااسښا اه دل دووومام- هدو‎ «Dongen MAMI SE 
Ares ات وا اناد شا وس اب‎ erectso ata fale Carga — 
duis s والنصستر دد له‎ at! y fre t9 qRasalamam " 
wea mM? Al too abn raw yma ہے‎ Lint" oF aogentse - 
ریم ےہ مو اسف‎ 9k ol ue ihale, Oifesllbéte 
amiji sildega nies spaa oD a become w siit att 
يدو‎ aloe wu ELR I mamo ow» yia 059 16 — 
bes smao تہ سم سوه مرسوويه معدو ات سم سے بط‎ 


352 
other تع‎ service information activities Curing the sarily 
and middie stages of the war definitely fell within the 
realm of "image-DuilóGing" techniques. The fact that these 
methecs became more overt and expansiva in the last pect of 
the conflict under the dynamic leadership of James 
Forrestal ard in the face of the unification menace does 
mot detract from the creative nature of the earlier efforts. 

Still, it was not untii the finai ph&se of thes war 
~~when the Navy entered the public relations arenan in foll 
force and in direct computition with the other services-- 
that its progxrem produced the kind of results it desired. 
The previously cited accolades from and increased cover aye 
in the media, the wide public end press appreciation of the 
highly innovative hometown news prograas, and the internal 
reports of accomplishments and other in-house correspondence 
&ll attest to the consiGerable degree of success &tt&sinec 
by its information efforts in the last year of the wer. 

Although Secratary Forrestal and Admiral Miller 
both were pessimistic at times thet their intensified دو‎ 
paign to get the Navy's story across to the Amricen people 
was “too little and too late,” it is the authox’s opirion 
that the ultimate Ciapesition of the unification plan-~in 
which the Department ef the Hevy retained not oniy its 
Separate identity but also ita Marine anû aviation arka” 
ean be attributed at least partially to the aura of good 


will and faith in its Zighting ability created in the 









cam) m نتوين يمس‎ wabeiviine® cabinets) mise nm om 
امد سس ووس‎ Bo omen — — 
ta ag لہا سا و ؛ نے (بوع‎ 0۳ T mG اه‎ 
= me, P adi me ét 50 اخم‎ AT A haa CRORES 
داتس د‎ mitane ورسم سا ته‎ — ea cam وم پحصسد‎ 
يدس‎ amc Wa تن ان غو دی ٢ه سسټ ہیں ہو موب ند جات‎ 
fiat cA nae ب اوه‎ alo مرریټس وټه‎ qe a مه‎ 
فص نت چا تا‎ Los merita solde, wi WE 
—— Le S bes du Sticke Que toms A^ tARloé e m qued 
ipgeee didus mss > + 
zisizo y antam ma ai 3e "o! -- Se aórrid w^ 7 
oth مسب م ملو‎ aub sib سم‎ 
رګ رن جر وبا ھب‎ 

















353 
public minó Decaugo this was exploited by effective public 
reistions. The message of the HNavy's role in winning the 


Pacific war wae comunicate “loud gnd clear." IR addition, 





the extensive homatown publicity given to individual combat 
achievements gxeatiy enhanced the traditional image ef the 
ena servico as @ uniquely advanturasone military activity. 
Of course, the return of mteaive numbers cf Navymen to 
Civilian life at war's end contribute @ great deel to this 
78۷0 تت‎ (0*8 1۵2 

Two objectives of the ses service's long-range 
public relations plans in 1945 were aot achieved. As st 
the end of World War I, both the Army and Navy were 
unsuccessful in their attempts to forestall postwar cis~ 
armament; and tha Navv fnlled to gain public support for 
GOompulsory silitary training. @ program it strongly 
fostered, 

How close Ġid the Navy's wartime public relations 
approach the Cutlip amc Center definition of the function? 
There was much evidence that by war's enti the sea servise 
wes well-equippged and motivated to undertake “the planned 
effort to influence public opimien through secialiy accept- 
ebi per format 
basic steps for an effective public relations procesas-- 
resgeaárch-listeninjg, planning-Qecision meking, communication 
and evaluatíon--had Lesn established. 





6 besed on two-way commanicstion." The four 


The necesgity for xaesearch-listenirm; was recognised 





cen 
aan مود‎ r arog awe انا‎ fuia VEA 
aw paum نم‎ laa eyre m? ta qaa WP تست‎ 
mibin E tomi) € سه ادا تا تا‎ wer واووائرےہ‎ 
وسور كمسر مسد دن‎ vo cei geri Dope فص مت‎ 
san قیم)م پوهغنه دوکنتا یف حا ہیاس +جہہ ہہ‎ 
سدس ددرو سکاو‎ el o os ساو فد‎ Nb 
چ ن‎ o riso سوہ‎ O uapa wis v 
it مه‎ laaa roy © اسیو‎ moe موا قفا‎ 3e ستہنتافہ للت‎ 
— 4——“ 
marry tme w w De eres ہ تت سم‎ 
وارقت تو ری سی د صتا دد ٭‎ Pus MER 
کی سب ډو ډوه سو یق تد اما نس ما سج سد‎ 
نسو در ات اد الا اسم داي‎ İi) هد ےم‎ ———P 
مر سو اج‎ P ciem o^ سزے بیس ہو مڈوفے,‎ (oe A 
سياه ماق پات رن ہم رم‎ ony tI ap — 
CA—- m cm be» c4 ہم ےب‎ semaine ey ویب‎ 





























354 
an early ae the fall of 194G when an analysis section was 
set up in OBÍ's public relatiens branch to previdas a daily 
digest of pertinent media comment to naval leaders am 
public relations officers. Trenda in pews reparting anc 
publie opinion subsequently were moniteres throughout tyè 
wêr by GPH in coordination with thea Army am OWL. 

Planning also was stressed in the mobilization 
stage of Navy public relations, but this phage of the 
process received far less emphasis than it should heve in 
Gecision-meking during the carly لمعه‎ widdle years of the 
war Que to a lack of tine and personnel and the sagpidiy 
changing events. in Decesber 1343, ioilowing a tour of the 
European theater by Gecretary “nox. GetalileG plasás fer 
censorsaip anó pubiic reiationg hailing of tho Normany 
invasion were formulated by the Wavy in conjunction with 
the Army and the british. Also et thin tim, tha firsc 
long-range plans fox the postwar pariol began to te &auspe 
in GFR., When Forrestal reorganized kavy public relations 
án the fall of 1344. primary importance wag attaches to 
planning with the issuance of monthly policy statemonte 
containing specific objectives aad pragraas. 

The third step, Cammunicetion, was probably the 
biavy’s “Lomg-suit* in the public relations process, From 
the very beginning, aided by the sagercness of the یف دا لم‎ 
report the war ang cooperate in the war effort, OFS ard? the 
fieló offices utilised all the avenues of mass 








څوو 
لا e‏ ل e‏ وسردم ساس مدن نات بس غه غ س- هنم 
في مد« سنسنم» سن Deeem el‏ شمه as‏ 
cd SUD QU AP‏ ان با Do we quid‏ 
asida a a kemn e» o mA | -‏ 
000 سر تےد دس (P ae) adamugqee ee‏ وی wed‏ 
mb o gue isum‏ سسس نا فسنم Ww oo‏ وس 
۰ب سس mny tiir‏ 8 
heee‏ سا په ده نہد ہے بس ہے mi) je‏ — 
manda: oo ene‏ د lake aû ge mé)‏ اس Cle‏ 
MUN‏ می مش نس win eee alle‏ ب ei‏ 
اوي kk eo‏ نس GÀ‏ سم dco aee‏ سو بد وس سے 
ES quif. — —‏ حمسو سا سن كد سهاغه سے 
خم د د٤د‏ 20 لاف guise‏ امس ماسب م Mi RAs‏ ہد 
یسوم .یی عاسم بد مسسشتو پسزهجي e‏ ورس 
نه quem‏ ی کے کک اہ که مسد سر ده داه e‏ 
ww Ee‏ رس 
Un LAN, nidi. D‏ شم ص ملاسو سے 


























355 
communication--thàe Dress, r&edio, xag&zines ani books, stili 
and motion pictures, newsreels, acvertigin:, and act and 
postere -in publicizing Navy activities. Furthermore, 
except for the eriticigm levele at its early news <¢ lease 
policies am hanidiing of war correspondents, the ses 
service enjoyed mostiy favorable media relations. A report 
to the Secretary of the Navy in the fall of 1944 claimed: 

We can, as a result of thg excellent rei&tions 

fostered by this office /OPR/. express the Wavy’s view 

via civilián Gutlet wiwüever necessary. We have 

obtained millions of dollars worth œf free advertising 

visa radio anû press end pictures which eould not have 

been Obtained otherwise. . . o This “good will” hag 

beon secured in a large pert As 2B result of direct and 

personal contact and by fair and impartial treatment of 

all media. . . لال‎ 

Finally, the fourth phase- -evaluation -was iselwdeñ 
in the public relations structure when an ¢valuation branch 
was established às part of OFR'gs reconstitution in the fal] 
Of 1944. Detaileóc monthly reports of actions taken in 
Support of oblectiíves were provided by #11 public relations 
Gffices in the field and summariged for Secretary Forrestal 
by Admirals Mercill amd Miller. Ad@icionally. OFS 
furnished questions on subjects of concern to tho Navy for 
public opinion polls by George Galiup and the National 
Opinion Research Center and conducted its own centent 
analyses ani other surveys of newspaper coverage, 
The oxbent of the influence of the “uniformed 

civilians” employed in the Navy’s program during the war is 
difficult to xzaseas. These professionals wire brought inte 


an 
.م11‎ wid ie sinima ارے-ییت پوتوتھ, وہرو۔‎ hel melio 
 _ى.--2--‎ 0 — es r 
mar uni نع چ‎ ei Gai وه کرو‎ 
ss اس‎ noD gii tonî hm ais bog 
— — — سا‎ Tos Mon m 
(‘t+ asm) سا مھم‎ EE EE E E ee 











m ws vj 
ve 





Li — وویم‎ Adir: 4)4 ai à 
iiai e u ور‎ ٠١ اسح دز سن‎ . 
درو سے دہ‎ Tu ores, عات‎ ast ۵ 
ووه‎ raian ir p عام پو نس‎ ditata fa یم‎ 
وس سد‎ uis = masc هوو وونسى سم وو سهاره ۶ل‎ MA 
ج ہدس‎ eb نس بدن‎ vem ام‎ ig سمت‎ 

— — ko ee سا دش‎ Ê 
دنمس دا که ساسا‎ AME مو‎ thts UN سم د‎ 
ee 
موی مسعسمہہ‎ ate aiaa Et Sr 


















— 


33% 

ite inforsation offices on tha premise that public 
Xelat lions “csequired a certain sort of expertise that 
Officers of the Regulars Navy were uniikeiy to possess. 431 
The stedy has shown thet reserve public relations officers 
in GPR, the naval cietricts. fleets and other comands 
helped to pave the way for good wedia ralations awi 
provided much of the ispetus &nü ide&s for an effective 
program. Moreover, the Inlisted Kaval Correaspondents and 
eollateral duty parlie information officers in the recafic, 
the majority of whom were naval reservists. were the vary 
bsckbone of the hometown newa system. Yet, it is striking 
that throughout the wer thes positions of director anc 
assistant director in OPR were filled by Segular Kavy 
officers. Apparently, the reservist experts were relegated 
to functional ané advisery rolee aad played & relatively 
inaigniticant part in deeislon-waking. James Sttalaen, 
publisher of the 5ashviile ,عسسمعظط‎ hinted at this possibili- 
ity in an editorial prepared for his newspaper in January 
1945: “My ole friend Paul Smith has gone back in the avy. 
د‎ hope the top-side is سوت‎ enough to give him leeway ta 
handle Keevy mews from the Pacific as it should be 
hanê led. 2 

Tho eivilianë at the top, however. the two wart ime 
Secretaries of the Navy, exercised great influence aa the 
thrust of the Nkvy'a information efferts~~as we have goen 


throughout the thesis. in particular., ها مها‎ Forrestal was 








ہت جح تنس sri m o dne‏ 9 >“>'/۔) 
PT ——‏ 
len c wh e eC m Gale‏ —— — — 

وهو لن em c e! de sedexme c) Ve dirae‏ 5 ای ات سب 
مد ل tiet‏ نان نمنمسسننمہ ہت نمو له elise ame‏ 
امقممہ miuto M U Je mm ma p — — (e‏ 
l aah ra‏ تسو paa aiy ye nL uuw‏ 

` سول‎ e ساس دا‎ cede tlr نت‎ u miii 
— i aten 942 ma) Aen vw, ‌موپه!‎ sm ad qui 
ud blaeit zi œs aliari ec cel De قحب‎ dimi 

i » - ٢٢ وس‎ 
ee 0 
افدوومدوقعہ ونه ٥٥ء“ 9 —— — — اا‎ 
سے پد‎ e ا‎ e n A O ek a S 
wr ee ee — 



































357 

a shining example of e sasic truism for any effective 
public relstions polioy--those at the highest level of wan” 
agement must want it and support it, or it Cannot succeed. 

Prank Knox wanted it as much as Ferrestal, but. as 
has been mentioned, the latter enjoyed certain advantages 
in hís pursuit of the goal that Knox id not have. Tiret 
0f all. Forrestal was not &s hung up on the horns of the 
security clilemue as his predeces@qr. He believed thet 
publicizing evento which had already occurred wouid not 
adversely affect the Navy's fatare operations. Moreover, 
if it had been nocessary, Forrestel was more willíng an 
ühle to successfully chellenge Admiral Ring on security 
matters. Of course, eg we have soon, King's twugh security 
stance hal been considerably softened in the spring of 1844 
by tha nation’s faversble strategic position. As s vesait, 
a direct confrontation betwsen ths admiral end secretary on 
ceneorship policies was averted. 

Secondly, the sudden emergence of the uni fication 
iasue shortly after Forrestal became secretary gave hin a 
powerful lever for galvanizing tbe Navy‘a military leader 
ship inte action on the public relations end political 
fronts. He was helped in this regard by the wartime rise 
هع‎ positions of authority of naval aviators, whe Ġid net 
Shaze the pubiie relations inhibitions of their surface and 
&ubmarcine counterparts. Also, duae to the ailing health in 
1944 and the death in 1345 of FDR--who often acted as his 


"e 

و ge = n mani a De ian a‏ اسار يد 
س۳ ۰ 
یېس مه موس داد ست »یم دم سم اد وسم تست 
ee ee‏ سا ده 
په سی datha‏ لنم ww nitie arma ADÎ‏ مرو ۲ 
م cmt Lus d^ A diim‏ ص نف ہم مې تددن 
مه «دی اا ج مسل په ge em‏ ے ke ere! wt‏ دب 
مهسمږ mone‏ نه مہو موی eneas miaa‏ 
فد IJ‏ هوه میا ba miis an AY‏ 
ela‏ تک «جچبسصسس 
T-—I x Ll.‏ 
"enfe ciarla pomi — —“‏ یہ aff‏ دوښ ات bht, Ao‏ 
بر Amma A AA Dam aoa s mim‏ 
[rl wo pae — — ⸗‏ سه um cerme‏ 
— یہہ ۔ھ مه ےی 

Ol E s s NN 
— mill erê ms we)táss cios P) rA Jaguar 
iamiam ولاسم ود‎ miig ai دم‎ aaide gaah pU 
oe wb of mpn eh al aga e E 
am ib mie enii ہس‎ 1e o Ae ase ae — 
Pes mà res tí راسم فا‎ oe وسر و‎ D م‎ 
ä— ووس‎ 
— ټوو ور ویار‎ 


عم سښت پس اا 


























358 
own Secretary of the Navy Guring Xnox's tenureée-c-Forrestal 
wae abie to assuse firm control and leadership ef ail 
aspects of naval affairs. Because of thie, he quickly 
eerned the respect ari confidence of naval officers to a 
much higher degree than thet experienced by Knox. 

Even with these assests, however, Forrestal pronabiy 
would not have been able to effect the turnabout in Navy 
public relations in the final stages Of the war if it hadi 
net bern for his personal direction of the proyram and his 
intense campaign to change the long-standing negative akti- 
tudes in the gra service toward the function. 

How much were these attitudes truly changeé? What 
were the forces behind their change? And how permanent wes 
the Change? The last two questions axe predicated on the 





assumption that there was inóesO sane 
consequence of the wartine experiences., The bulk of evidence 
in this study supports this supposition. 

The very dynasice of World War II force? the Navy 
to consider the public relations implications of this 
unique conflict concurrently with its operational aspects 
from the very beginning. At first, as hed been the Navy's 





practice in the past, there waa 4 noticeable tendency smong 
the military leSderghip in the sea service to leave the 
handiing ef information to Frank Knox and his uniformed 
civilians, despite the directive by the Chief of Naval 
Operations in 1941 making it a function of command. 


ont 
۱ گس وه‎ commi diem im ممم جب‎ 
iis ٠١ اس‎ up uuem ai anm اس تو‎ 
pene of puds iu ams etek deem in مص‎ 
eo Ale Jems اننښته د؛‎ e+ e od: bureee 
یو‎ Gs PRL em ام‎ ees cmm opidi Kam 
دو یی دس ل‎ read omen sal A) و . . هسو‎ 
(meh ذس ضس لسم‎ ot — وهم وس‎ hiro 
کې نس دا پل سد‎ ete LT ae يدينه مهه لی‎ 
eis ها‎ ae ped امیس .: اد‎ l6 وود سے ےت اښه هه هت‎ 
iasa mtag callous a0 aC له یکت‎ pûan 4 
mg (Tupay pints دمام ايم‎ oto 
LUI T Eu x Au uU 
UE) o9 ke Tani, vs CO Twp am Hel wc? c ته‎ 
٠ ٠+ eee eh sum bem) p" weet too mired 
مہ ںسہہ‎ le کی یا‎ (Dc morum — —— 
ESL EL Msi E 
ہد ہے جوم‎ iI Mone! ۱۰ تھے سے نات‎ 
sads ———— sabia جم‎ 
ا‎ ot? aimi مد وجنممند۔ د نوج ہے معط‎ mif avai 
هووب ږو چی ووي مب به ر ساسهه سممس» سس‎ 
OM! ات نږ یی مه ماس ته زبس‎ 


سح وز پرسوءونمم به مه سب سا مب سی وس 


مردوسابو بو می ہیں و( iem»‏ 


سم له ومد ومو نو — — 






























359 
However, the eariy Gemanós by the pross an? public for 
faster anàí more cowpiete Qgr&Lion&l news; the admonish- 
vants from Secretary Keon, OWI and later the President 
himself; êê the vital necessity for recruiting, industrial 
and other support on the home front @bligad thease leaders 
to view public relations in a different light from the fail 
of 1942 on. This begrudging obligation in itself served as 
the initial catalyst for attitudinal change, 

But, “evolution within the Navy is necessarily 
éeliberate," $$ was pointed out by a poetwar study of Envy 
public relations, 33 "In Building a ship, fer instance, toc 
much is at stake to articulate it hurciediy. So there is 
that curious, end generally estimable, caution against 
accepting something new without complete underatancing end 
. «© » & Missouri man’s kind of proof." Thus, in the middle 
years of the war, the sea gervice’s enthusinem for public 
relations was restrained, to say the least-~particuler iy 
among the Operatora et sea, who only cecagionaily were 
"bethered” by an information officer or war correspondent. 
and when these operatora wers reluctantiy invoived in 
public relations, thelr natura] remetion often was one of 
loathing toward anything not direetly Sonnectec with thes 
fighting effort. William Brinkley humorously portrayed 
this "revulsion" in the following outburst from the 
fictions, Admiral Bostwrighti: 





صسبه: دوه موا مسن cere) ca! ph‏ سد الم أت 
اهتنا حم وس ضر UCD (ete Lae‏ مہ 
LAC N FO coe CT cored eee‏ جے Aube‏ 
Bie weir 8‏ مکو سی لك هر فاکر نلیتا کس نس rias‏ 
oot SE 6‏ منة شا اس نا 09۵ s ists tial cl‏ 
فت اسرد مجه د تمهس حص 

تا سم wee AAO dR ert‏ |« ای 

o bwi trae "70596331‏ مع د پوس سیف lu‏ ۸ہ 
مون و تسر بصو ° e”‏ عنم ء سو اھ سعویس۔ ہد 
تع ده @ .مس د e‏ د ص اه هن السو لد 
2 22 9 انس eg VY a one‏ > انسل لز ہب bhns‏ 
i SRA‏ كلم مدا ae‏ سس p hur‏ ہسسو عو ود يراع إن 
Aia o‏ کے سن هته لوعو و نسم 
qv dS"‏ دی اه قاجا شنت malu eT wee ro aitia‏ 
Th eee Wey‏ بعیئندػھ؛ ences‏ لاكسب ليحن Je me‏ 
4 مہہ لد ecd‏ سال mt?‏ 
toys uda viecwosswe pulsabus maALIAS dps hiryê)‏ 
trid‏ مص سس ae) seme‏ 

ا ۰ ۷ #۰ — 


















360 


i've got a plan cooked up. Bext island we invade I'm 
going to put 411 the corresperiients on one ship and ali 
these Public Relstiens legions over there on another. 
Then I'n going to issue secret orders to the skipper 
that will steer the two ships inte Tokyo Bay. where the 
Japs vill capture them both and be obliged to take 8 
ef all the correapondents an? Public Relations edcballe 
and freaks fox the rest of the war,  It'11 drive the 
Jape nuts, tree our سمب‎ ve fight the war and get the 
War over à yeer earlier. 


The merger conflict in 1944, however, affordeé a 
“Missouri man‘e kind ef proof" of the necessity for the 
function. Vincent Davis observed: 


The attitude of the officer corps of the Regular 
Navy towerós public relations . . . began te change 
perceptibiy in the spring of 1944. The reasons for the 
change, . . . were the cawniny awareness of the 
dimensions amd apparent stakes of the snowballing 
political bettie between tho Navy and the other 
g@axcvices on the reerganization issue and the emerge noe 
ef the '£ new جا ج84‎ ٦ ary moss Forrestal. as its 
fighting political leader, 5 


Fzom this point on to the end of the war, aa the 














thesis has demonstrated, thers wea cetensibly a drawatic 
attitudinal chanzo among the admirals toward the viability 
of information activities. With the exception of Admiral 
Spruance end a few others, theso Navy leaders were eager to 
jump on the public relations bendwagen in search of ways to 
Salvage the ses service's strength and separate identity in 
the postwar period. Furthermore, as a direct result of the 
new "respectability" and sense of urgency attached to the 
function by the top leadership. there was a shift of opinion 
all the way down the line. Also, by this tine, wany Regular 
Navy officers had performed public relations duties or 
experienced interfaces with the press as briefing officers, 




















cu — —‏ — = 
م. اط انت دہ 
وت + اموت هام پچ سپ “irs a be‏ 














> A 


نه لاه د AM) eM dà Qs uj M‏ فس ole‏ 
لوک ih‏ ام iesu‏ اس d ubilimerim ede‏ ايله 
meen eer) eee E 3 8‏ 
6 سنیمک صولوب. مر مب من م 
هغ اا ولت بک ہقف paimi g%‏ سب مسوم دو 
on‏ اش اه cla‏ پبسقسودم oi Tew (o Jomis a!‏ 
e‏ سه وسم کا مومت افم ده 
t at tmt nt —‏ اس ۷1۷ 10 may‏ 











ama i "quii‏ 14 — ·— دس 
A‏ 26 مج نوب نس «m‏ د So file‏ محفت 
ee‏ فس فة فا حف ت فق سرس 

4سا انا رڈ 


سر یسر 
—- ا ال صا اه راو سس 


361 
cengers or roommates of correspondents. Such familiarity 
with the functien tended to at least dilute their sstrange- 
meant from it. The boost to morale provided by the hometown 
news program in 1945 further served to solidify attitudinal 
chenges toward public relations at all levels in the Navy. 

Just bow "solid" were these changes, however? 
Admiral Miller wrota to Captain Fitehugh Lee in October 
1945, "We sre having tremendous rusberse of requests to fili 
v5cocanciea, 211 cf which is & heslthy sign indeed, ami K 
hope &nd an sure that the fleet at jast has cows to realise 
that the Public Information Officer can be of use to 
than. «36 Despite this aote af optimilgm, however, there wes 
& predictsble letdown in enthusiasm for pubiic relations in 
the Navy when the uniformed civilians begen returning home 
in the immediate months following the war amî ths opper“ 
tunities for ¢ranatic coverage in the hometown and national 
media diminigsheé. What’s more, the letóown cecurrced in the 
face of the “heating up" ef the unification controversy in 
the fall of 1345, 





Ray Goil, Jr.. writing in the Henolulu Advertise 
Blerted the Navy to thie situation and cautioned against 
it: 


During the course of the war the Navy grudgingly 
relaxed frou its long-held @ntipathy te publicity ani 
cerresponmients for the moet pact were cordially 
raceived and given valuable material end faets. An 
elaborate public relations .. . sarvice was catabiiehed 
anû the service bacane hüs&nizec as well &as giemorissé 
in the public press. 





ا 
سو دد مم سجس سر سی صووربے اح 
um mf utr oa) dm‏ سو هگ لل — 
(v ۳ ۱۱ cm - wt.‏ اليم يسان 
vibhifes có Com snm Kul al cm t med‏ یور tata‏ 
loal [1t Id‏ زج pest sa‏ 

fw‏ یہ m ol g»^‏ و مس 

سسدل دز ریو مسر large‏ سے بے نمو چیا 
oier girs a a MM‏ >حے ٭ہ ہمہ ,+ [AFP‏ 
A NN sl‏ اھ e‏ ا pede‏ ار سا ع 
سم غه c PM am‏ مه semi sh‏ پس جم ain a‏ 
سسب لښب يټسنسگ نک و د Je v‏ ب 
baho Um‏ — “سب ہی 
ہ "i mesa‏ — —— مر سم نہ 
لع ais‏ —— ټسټ وراج ےم 
quo ta iD uA — —‏ بے Serpe‏ یھ (didi‏ 
clt‏ ډ«الومد حم مس toes meni mt‏ ںہ 
r mm‏ ⸗ ان سب د —⸗⸗ — 
وه اعت aet ye‏ 
وړو نس د مس en uni Gm CN termite iM mi‏ 





















262 


It is hoped that this pleasant relationship hetween 
the Navy and the press wili not pe e to cis. 
سے ا‎ 
مسا سب دوو یه سرب‎ MARIS جس سوچ سس‎ 
Iit is this correspondent’s .. . Opinion that the 
Heavy is going to need & goo press, ls» the months, vos. 
in the years to cûme. î 









The ssa service heeded this warning by taking مه‎ 
of the actions alxwady deuseribwd to preclude a regrasaion 
to its prewar negativise toward public relations, it 
greate a gpecializoó corps of public information officers 
ami maintained the complement and functional obiestives of 
the Office of Public Infexmation at near wertime levels, 

It retained the Fleet Hometown News Center and the Enlisted 
Wavy Correspomient rating, and inatituted هه‎ training 
program for beth information officsre ami eniigteG 
journaliste. In the imediate postwar yeare, when the 
merger issue wea stili on the "ourner," it even convened 
epecial confexvences om public relations for the benstit of 
commanding officers frons fleet and shore units. it also 
continued the annual wartine seetings of information 
Officers and mado the public relations aunexes perménent 
appendages to operation plans ami orders. 

All of these actions were the Girect consequence of 
the Navya World War Ii experience with public relatione. 
Further evidence of the impact of the war on the function 
ín the sea service is contained in à December 1945 Wafa. 


ac tic ie e The butnüor, Lae ا گت 2 جا ئک‎ 





Williem H. long. UGIR, declares that “during these war 














| : | 
"T Mane mis M موم ہس‎ mt 


^ - 





mx‏ امام سح 
فلا eat‏ خاس نمب ج اسا < ,سسا مها é‏ راء دمم 
چ تشخ مخت وودد دس فسا مانا A los‏ 

imac abata er he 
حر ۔۔۔‎ ab MA کت مامكا الف تسوس ات اس هد‎ 
ine Sine ıa د‎ Ad د‎ t> mv نک‎ 

N ml beats 0‏ .بب پت سے اس وښ má?‏ وررے ۔ 
udi‏ ——— 

ادس نلك ل مث تفه سیسات -D co wine‏ 
oe‏ ایس ee ae Lise ose‏ سا ° زد yu‏ سس ریا 
فتاه مسکمس مہ سددال jo sinwe t x». edbgelet‏ 
اھ ف اکس وبې یسٰ ہب ,یب سات ع ووه 
فف selia ee ee a ee‏ 

— وو 3( شف وې تھھ ہت ٠١ mn rh‏ 
ilh‏ وو ای ودي مہ تر مسد تدصت بصع iim‏ سن 
| وه russvum* AP so "V ord)‏ 
0 زوا 5 aha) (eg vmware‏ 
— — —— — — 







































2101 
years certain beginnings heve been wade . . . toward 
continuing a strom; ond weli-balamend naval public rele- 
tions poliey, 99 Ke cites the followimnm; indicators: 


(a) a Navy public relations structure does exist in the 
Bavel Districts and in most of the Larger comeancs 
aficet wid asnore; 

)5( officer anc enlisted personnel assigmed tc public 
relations duty have feniliarived themselves with 
primary elements of constant Newy polacy: 

(c) the press and’ other ¢loments .. . have héecom 
accugtemed to obteining their information fram 
official Nevy sources. . . rather than from 
ecuteide sourcos Or hearsay: 

(d) the Mavy occupies & unique place in the public pind 
ami econsciousness, and therefeve c&n soxa easily 
maintain thie position: 

{fe} many neva] peracnnel have contr ributed to national 
publications ami have taken part in هه دوب‎ 
reaching the public, thereby gaining faverahie 
attention fer the Favy among millions of citizens. 


These positive conditions did exist ot the em of 
the war.  Hevertheless, ths attitude of many senior naval 
officers toward the function regrettably relapsed te the 
prewar state of disinterest, ignorance and even entsjoniem. 
Captain Arthur W, Ashton. one of the original gpecialiy- 
designated Wavy information officers, rewinisomd Ln 1967 
About the difficulties encounterec by this group in the 
immediate postwar years: 


These pleneer PIOs were not alwnys crevgardad as bone 
fide staff officers ami in some instances they hac 
neither direct access to the “eld man" nor a seat io the 
Staff mectings. $00 froQuently they received the roils 
of a fire department effieclal and were called to the 
scene of a public affairs problem oniy after it wes out 
of control. 

There was à generrl inclinetion to refuse media 
requests for information about the Navy if even the 
Slightest unfavorable publicity might result. "Mo 
Comment” wee the formula in some public affairs ج2‎ 8 








tm! od ۱ 1 "Tet‏ —- هه لاس 
سا مال مينسا لماوع يعدي ری > 


Pumas‏ سر و الم ای vee‏ ماس 


اه 
* د 1 onnu r‏ چوا« ها نه بست ا 


athe evry) == ووس زی اسا‎ 
(Y oo v mee ا‎ | 


mre مه‎ ۰ ETÀ 
ETT سس‎ rudis)" «Mut 
— سب با‎ -je bar 


x m —‏ ا و ت 






























a A 


— — E, 

l= ame بی‎ sa dele وت پوساااس دشن ان‎ — $5 
(heme mim mma ۱۰ ندرا ند‎ ee | 
مال وہ یوون يس إلا‎ eT 
بيد‎ Abe s PAM iso c^); e فیس‎ ٢ A AAE 
(of! را‎ 
نټ‎ U Pm AC p ramo nal ASSAD A00, A 





364 


for coping with the crises that attracted the preas. 
The Nevy Public Infermation «anual lacked authority, 
an command directives concerning PIOS often proper ined 
more یوی وو‎ than dos for the conduct of their duties, 


Vincent Davis, in an analysis of the ups and downs 
in Wavy public relations since World War II, lists many 
examples of dafinite interest ami attention being paid to 
the function. However, he stili concludes: 


Hotwithgtanding these evidences of an increased 
belief by the naval officers in the political ispor- 
tance of a continücus and active public relationes 
campaign on the Navy's behalf, other evidence Suggest 
that thís belief nevar became percmenentiy streng nor 
widespread within the officer corps. The intentional 
seeking of publicity remained odious to many, and 
probably most, sea service officers. The olO conwic- 
tion persisted that tho M&vyv's rccord and its 
۳۳۳۹ سو‎ importance to the nation would “speek for 

tself." 

e « e This attitude was the seme as it had been tradi~ 
tionally throughout most of the Navy's histery; selling 
the Navy'g cose to the public should net be necessary 
and, in any case, it was uncomfortably political in 
nature. mot in accordance with the dignity of the pro~“ 
fession. The inhibitions were evercome only when the 
officers were ao fearful fer the continued existence of 
the Wavy that this anxiety transcended the subcultural 
restrictions, t 


The last sentence ir Davis‘ observation would seem 
to indicate that the attitudinal change toward public rela- 
tions on the part of the admirals and others in the Kary 
uring the latter stages of World War II was more èf an 
accommodation with the dynamics of war, particularily the 
merger threst, then a true “shange of heart.” 

The author, after eight continuous yeara of 
personal experience as a naval public affaires officer en 


active duty, mast agree in essence With Davis’ conclusion. 






pot ad‏ نات 4 — سے rdi II‏ سر 
em) mide) E e en) qum‏ ا مالسا سات فش ام 
نه 7ب سس 











"peret? sums had à) m^ anta 


214 سر Pu mi‏ وا anm‏ صششع سا مس له شه — 
7 — — — ,—— 11 ت مد 116 كه 





365 
Certainly, for aome twenty years after the war, the 
impassioned piesa of Janes Forrestal to the new ensigns at 
the Naval Academy in June 1945 to “consider yourself & 





purveyor of information about the Navy” wag not hee 

any significant degree. However, it must be stated in 
closing that the present civilian ang military heads of the 
Wavy have instituted in the last several years an increas~ 
ingly enlightened public relations progres that is rapidly 
making inroads inte kthe last vestiges of the siient service 
tradition. It is the auther's opinion that the World 

War IIZ experience, which served to institutionalize the 
function in the Navy for the first tíme in its history, set 
the stage for the present day climate. Although tbe spot- 
Light on Tokyo Bay has bean dimmed in the intervening years, 
the blackout at Pear] Harbor definitely hee been 

۷ 647 





Due to the wide ecopes of this thesis and consequent 
peripheral treatment of many facets of Navy public relations 
in World War II, & number of subjects relevant to the 
history of was communications were only touched upon. 
Several of those @ce deserving of anë presant interesting 
opportunities for more detailed anl critical investigation. 

For instance. the entire area of Navy media vela- 
tions ie, in the author's opinion, fertile ground fer 
additional study. ‘The sea service'g use of and cooperation 








مش سو eem sunto‏ نع سو نہ 
ںںںەںںككؤٔ mises me‏ چا 
هه Devan‏ مهم له hûr‏ — 
«mme UDALL te MEVS‏ لوم نس" #ټښو سه Bee‏ ان 
وي em ee ie‏ قھج-.,,. ا come‏ ےہ وات ها شك 
dn nm) ale‏ وسو Ue Bama Quid ALAS Aem td debe‏ اس 
Anam) cmd c‏ | بے .در لسعم ةا SAAL E yyl‏ 
piod‏ تن یقمستۂ am see) band Unas able‏ سو ین :یں 
میتی يش دده نت بسح ut 77 mmn‏ ۸ ۱۳۷ — — 
لحف ةم نهم ٹر ھ ee‏ وښ ووست وه بي MIX"‏ 

دی د s» emit ti «OMA‏ نص نل مس شي ليس D‏ 
سیک ده الت ےن وی جب مې oai ai D ab‏ سم 
LI c 18 7. 1 M 7 DL.‏ 
qw mill‏ مين جس ہی ae) elmer miz rà umd ames‏ 
موم مناد نوی اسن aia)‏ نہ پ هو — 















. 06 ۰ بعر ون عسو Deppa i — aus) i‏ 
Lah Pey‏ ووس مد سم تسه را نكن ر)حدانه mei‏ 
n E‏ 





366 
with the still fledgling radio anê motion picture indus- 
tries, including the newsree] companies, eapecialiy falls 
into this category. But the extent of its utilization of 
and liaison with the priat media. and its cooperation with 
comercial advertiserg--a topic not demit with at all in 
the thesis--31s0 are of special interest end importance. 

in the case of the print media, a gaperate etucy on 
press coverage of the Navy's wartine activities would have 
value not only in detailing the scope and direct.ion of 
wertime reporting but also in measuring the effectiveness 
of the sea service's information program and, conversely. 


the limitations isposed ky ita cansorship policies. In 





this regard, the views and experiences of war correspondents 
assigned primarily to the Navy would pe quite illuminating 
if recorded cn meene. Rear Admiral Harold B. (Min) Milier 
hag maintained close liaison with many of these corre 
apendents through en informel organization Known as 
“Uschuckers, Unlimited.” 

Referring to security restrictions on the flew of 
World War II informetion, fecherlah Chafee. dr., wrote in 
1947, "I hope that a scholarly &ocount will eventualiy be 
given of the practical operation of military censorship 
during this wer . .. 1 To the best of the &uthor's 
knowledge, such = study RES not heen completed. ‘Lamar 
Mackay discusses military release of information policies 
in his Ph.D. dissertation, "Domestic Operations of the 








Mec 

(6 گت‎ pnd As — »بر‎ suom AC ORA 
mà DES am شید ساد‎ Dee و- مومبد‎ —âú— 
وتسم هه‎ o» mm = Aikso عب دای‎ 956 oum wi* d - 
UN I M a ULIB S 2 
deca dati co nd jedosea m Al atijo tot صت دای‎ aisom 
, کد سس وچ مدي‎ tet re idi 23ھ‎ e ' er Aes ats Ae 
yeílk* lomi) A doc iet weed mau mr Pebycom B4 
EI 10 "UTE UU یتقو‎ 
ده‎ -— mi aaa lamad سب‎ (yeas ore 
"Winia aana 

tb it eb x maimiuso ماو‎ 4i pimûsi 
"RESI 
wi qildednere [he تع‎ 6۳ JOU 
هه پو دا مسسحاشل‎ 
ست‎ edi Và Puy air dw 7575... . un d DUE 
Viam! „dahilan mot dai کنبا عم د ما ال‎ 
SRA ICE SON Oe 
ىہ سی نیپ دد اوه‎ 



















367 
Office of War Information in WorlO War II," and the Navy's 
role in censorship has been covered in considerable detail 
in this thesis. Hewever, thig vitai aspect of the sea 
service’s wartime public relations stery merits more 
thorough individual investigation. 

The Navy's efforts, beth overt ani covert, to 
Quitivate favor&ble public, presa and conmyresedional opinion 
for its views on the Armead Forces merger iesue during ané 
after World War If provide a perticularcly feeclnating area 
of study for future public relations researchers. The 
subject haa received Only superficial tre&tment in this 
thesis, primarily as the catalyst for tiw Wavy's punlic 
relations renaissance ín the final stages of the war. It 
ig deait with in greater depth in Viacent Davis’ Tha 
سنسعنسقة‎ lobby end & 
Wavy. 1243-1946. However, many specific detalie of this 
interesting lobbying campaign atill remain to be uncovered 
end published, & certain amount of material on tho topic 
ia gont@ined in Boxes 157 and 153 of the Philibert 





Collection and in the Porrestal Papers deposited in the 
Neticnsl Archives. 

lnextricably tied in with the merger related 
endeavors, of course, is the strong iniluence of James 
Porxestol on Navy publie relations. Although his role in 
this regard during World War II is woven throughout 
Chapter Five of the thesis, his information actavities on 


cae 
سصس<س<س<س<«<س<س<س<س<سس<س<<<:‎ 
ص۲۲«‎ 
- ماج‎ Gu cases diet’ asla ہے نے کت سواه‎ 
— اش‎ LL ۶ میٹ دکرتے‎ 
ببسدصدصصسصصدددپسدسسس9ٍِِِ_«۱‎ 
4$ .-— Ami Ro Remo eed? Of) هصمو«نسم| هبوص ند‎ 
— 4 Ceqes Saee? e; dum د هتا‎ 
ہے جد مسرن دد رام‎ qon . — 
orome وم‎ miles Lis حمېولی‎ eek وود ابس‎ 
uyv o ma Dabaeiss bo sre-ee iia A Abib ce 
mis oi کےے ریس‎ wre! (newer sa os a bes 
mm tire- ما‎ 
شه مسوېۍ-مامعهد‎ Glee ob by mcam پآ تت‎ 
— — — — غه نو که‎ 
ےو نہ سو ممیت‎ W&D مع سوچ‎ ô شه‎ 
cs amissis omite: Ms یی چرچ مد لہ می‎ 

































8د 
behalf of the Navy after the war anê during his tenure as‏ 
the nation's first Secretary of De Senso ave worthwhile‏ 
topics for further study. Vincent Davis, in the above‏ 
mentioned books, qoes into some dergil akont Fforrestal's‏ 
great interest in end personal direction of publie relations‏ 
while Secretary of the Bavy, but does not cover hls period‏ 
ae head of the Defense Department. Also, Desis’ treatment‏ 
of tha subject ig intertwined with many other facets of the‏ 
Secretary's leadership. As has heen stated, Forrestai's‏ 
was unique for à‏ 





Getelled attention to public relations 
Secretavcy of the Navy and race for any head of a major 
Gevexnmentai agency. It is the author's belief thai nig 
reimstionship with the information faunetion throughout his 
career would be 4 most suitable and valuable aubject fox 8 
completely independent study 

Other pertinent topies for further investigation 
are the BRavy'a cesbat photography and combet art programs 
Guring the wax, its internal relations activities-~incluing 
the development of Ail HAG anû other تسس یہہ‎ information 
publications, the publicity on behalf of naval recruiting, 
the industrial incentive efforts in both military services, 
and the naval digtrict and other field conmanc public rela“ 
tiens offloes--especiailly that of the Pacific Fleet in the 
lest year of the war, 

Ihe establishuent of the Fleet Hometown News Center 
ang the Dnlisted Naval Correspondent rating ûn 1945 also are 


wt 
وه‎ Á o oed ota ver cot نو و لف وھ‎ ad 
— وښو چب ډوم — —— د ہس‎ 
‘vu saw tite وه او پوه دمه مس‎ 
vei els مداد‎ u mimand — چم‎ 
tamine Celes oti seme bos m) je e CD 
ee سے ومسا‎ Geb .باه‎ a | 
i UO! smi. ad انس‎ tg a فس مشاه‎ 4444 
“an 4 Tu Aw Wes GU عا اې ۷0۷ بد وس‎ Publ ld 
TEIL eI un یټین‎ 
OC سور دسح هم‎ ak omc وف ار عسنمن ید ٦د زہ‎ 
a c- موه یږ ١د سا راهسد کی مقرل میس‎ Vile 
کا نس نسم مارحا‎ ap sly وروت منت(‎ A 
جہ نے — اس اد‎ aoai el قف لمع حك ېر‎ 
ته فلك جاع نه اسلا ۵ بی — سس واا ځا‎ 
ھڑز ن(افی مه0 کس‎ A سسوم مالاسون ون‎ ۱ 
I1 پسدالح‎ esses (Ios re Lo T9648 fnm میا دک‎ 
t- مو رع وروت‎ 



















369 
Subjects deserving of epecial ettention. Histories of the 
FuUNC and the current Bavy enlisteód journalist specislty, a 
continuation of the ENC system begun in World War II, have 
never been written. Yet, both are integral parts of the 
همیس‎ service's public affairs program today. 

The Bavy‘s attempts to publicise the activities of 
its Negro members through the cretion of the guall group 
Of Black Enis and publie relations officers toward the end 
of the war, mentioned only briefly in the thesis, is 
a finitely worthy of additional covera&ge--especially in 
light of the modern day emphasis on minority relations in 
the — 

Finaliy, the World War Zi public relations progres 
of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.9, Coeést Guard, anc che 
establishcent efto: the war and subsequent operations of 
the Navy Office of Legislative Afisirse, are speciei topics 
that should be consicered for separate study. Robert 
Lindsay in thie High aes gives an overview of the Parine 
cembat correspondent and other pheses of Corps information 
efforts during the war, but his coverage is within the 
Context Of the entire history of darine Corps public rele~ 
tions and Gows not go inte sufficient: detail. The author 
is not aware cf any history of Const Guard public relations 
ever having been written. Yet. this service was quite 
active and avocessful in this field during World Wer if. 


tac 
که‎ a shati aS iog e piian kratta 
د‎ pban airea "otmi vaa aee فقو سا م‎ 
ښپ نل 0( سی ہی سو‎ mere o قب‎ Ww aiaia 
>” 9 uges Depo) ست‎ CUI فص 9 ییکپ'‎ 
بنصعب۔‎ caye alris idg miaa 
ür eàlib«ires eo wickiceq c «peu» ace #ېي‎ ۳ 
ws, (leew ہے نیہ جو کے‎ ad) Gavel تن نتم‎ dii 
مها‎ ar isaer iodio bajaros bijde tis GF was Vå 
— سرو اتاتب اہ اله‎ Liia uev ولا‎ 
مد دس نے سواوا بر‎ JP 
کم دد حم عب سریسن م می ان تات یہ‎ 
۱ ope cle e 
isthe) edo hey oe ee ws SW ۳٠ 
=< ut WCU نې‎ AD bem aque auicm دد‎ 
————— 0 0 صوعت‎ 
لکشت تچ عوراو وم فانم سه د تون‎ quad ale 
مہ ب ووم دف‎ s4 لم هتسد‎ edi دې‎ 
vussa ننس ته هن نت دې پش س سنس بر ف‎ 
ü اش یتنا مس ول‎ 
س‎ cai a سمه‎ «hd oe! eee ed) pile ناد‎ 
سروه الله دعل‎ end we Pe ci a NV 
































370 


NOTES TO CHAPTER VI 


iviiigeam Brinkley. Don't Ge Sear the Mater (Mew 
York, 1956), 325-17. 


B. Mllier, USN, to Cmár. R. D.‏ ها مق مگ 
Thompson, USNR, October 25, 1945 {Seriel 92732400R},‏ 
CGont&inec in person&kl fiie of A2hàün. Harold E. Hiller,‏ 

UBN (Ret.), entitled "Capt. Lee & Pacifice,” Hereafter 
cited as “Miijlex File~~Paoi fie. * 


)t&r.. RAdm. Harold B. Niller, USK, to Capt. 
Fitzhugh Lee, US, September ll. 1943 {Serial 511229002}, 





Tuir., RAm. Harold B. Hiller, UBN, to Capt. 
Fitzhugh Lee, SS, August 13, i945 (Serial 96937008), itid. 


ud. Navy Papas tue nat, Commands ٧ ka Chief, Sofe 

Pacific Fleet, SE EF n 1 2990 ۴ لوی‎ te 4 
August 15, 1945, pe 4. Merebfter cited as PRERLEET Salier 
Rate OALPAC 142, à message from Admixvral Nimita to all 
Peeific Fleet commands isaved © few days after the 
Japanese surrender, directed an &liv~out effort by 
Commanding offieere ani public information personnel to 
secure "recognition of the accompliehwents of the بب‎ and 
its —— personnel and officers of the lower ranks” 

hetin: We. S, Septremmer l, 1945. p. 3).‏ سو 


۱ Wo. 6. September 15, 1945, P» 3. 


7miá.. 9o. 8, Hovexber 1945, p. 4. Ten thousand 
ballots were mailed out, and in the first wek more thea 
3,000 were returmed. Some 3,100 newspapers iíindicetad they 
Wanted to continue raecolving avy howetewn news releases, 
while only 11 said "no." One hundred ten cadio stations 
said "yes" compared tc just ten negative regiies. 


Wa. 7, 0۵۵۲ ۸ 1945. pp. 4-6. end Moa. BS.‏ , اپ 
Yovewbar 1945. n. 4. Sae also, & wemorandue from Capt.‏ 
Fitzhugh tee, USE, to multiple addressees, December 21.‏ 
contained in U.9. Navy Dapartment, Office of Inforsa-‏ ,1945 
tion, “Kistexical Reeerce of the Havy Office of Inivrwation,‏ 
dep Order Gi-A-2740, Item 19, Bex i57.‏ ",1919-1951 
Washington Hational Recerds Center, Suitland, "à. Hereafter‏ 
cited ag *Philibert Collection.”‏ 


4, 


























Le a مو تست‎ 


وليم اسر — نیس ري وشو بسا م 









وھ یہی ففف حیرص ف a exile‏ 
— وب اعد 


373 


&RAGm. Harold D. Hiller, USE, te Capt.‏ اب 
Fitzhugh Lee, USE, October 22, 1945 (Serial 92176003),‏ 
Miller Pile-~Pacific. For details om the Navy Day visit of‏ 
fleet unies. see "Fleet En Route to Mew York,” Army nad‏ 
y 2eciater, October 13, 1945, P ie‏ 





Vincent Davis, Ph | oy {Chapel Hill, 
N.C., نس‎ 285-96. Hereafter cited as Davis, Lobby» 
other members of the committee were Rear Admirala Thomas X. 
Robbins, Or. Robert D. Carney end Forrest Sherman, and 
Captain Walter Karig of OPI. The group was calied "The 
Secretary's Committee om Research and Reorganization," or 
SCORER as it was infosmally known, 


Lluer., RAdm. Harold R. Miller, UGN, to Capt- 
Fitzhugh Les, USN, Decembor 17, 1945 (Serial 9570525050), 
Killer File~~Paci fic. 


RAdm. Herold B. Miller. UBN, to Capt.‏ ,ونو د 
Fitehugh Lee, USE, October 22. 1945 (Serial 92175000),‏ 














l?pavis, Lobhy. 269. 


"t 

tier., RAdw. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. 
Fitzhugh Lec, VEN. Geptewber 1, 1945 (Serial 88271008], 
Miller File--Pacific. 
1 seo nm 2 “The proposed spociél designator fer 
kavy public information officers ani the assignment: of 
Regular Navy officers to such duty after the war aiso are 
discussed in various letters from Admiral Miller te Captain 
Lee from September 135, 1945, ta Januery l0, 1946, contained 
ín the same file. Fox further citing of action taken on 
the special designator, see Davis, lay. 272-73. 
تب‎ Seexetary of the Mavy to Chief of Naval 
Personnel, March 15, 1946 (Serial 1103008), contained in 
personal papers of Jeunes V. Forrestal, Nationazi Archives. 
lashàington, D.C., fíle 70-i-10. 






V'$usn training was initiated in ^priil 1946 wien an 
eight-waek course for Enlisted Mavy Correspondente was سر‎ 
in Chicago (Lt. Cmdr. Gilbert Shaw, USCO, pergonal inte 
view, Indianapolis, Imi., March l4, 1972. Lt. êz. chew 
wag an ENC in 1946.). In the summer of 1946, ten Navy 
officers were sent to the University of Missouri Scheol of 
Journalism for a two-month imloctrinatien clase in ews- 
paper makeup, magazine article writing, photceraphy ané 
public relations (Lt. j.g. Gerard A. Donehus., USN. “Public 

















"T 





a! سب‎ 


say vallit © ween wee mul.‏ تن 


-eg 


— 


e 








— ⸗ 


مد ٭. 


AM veta 
fh mn) 


سو 


te 








372 





Relations Training.” HU. 
7211347 (1946)). 


18 من«‎ — of Public Inforsstion (O0R)," a table of 
organization Gated July l1. 1946, &»mhd ltr.,. Director of 
Public Relations to multiple adéresseeces April 9, 1947. beth 
contained in Philibert Collection. Box 19593. 


199 rank Knox, "Navy News and Defense Secrets,” a 
speech mede in Juiy 1941. A typewritten copy of Mr. Knox’s 
notes for the speech is contained in Philibert Collection. 
Box i55. 
200.8. Navy Department, Offica of tne Chief of 
Naval Operations, Naval History Division, "United States 
Haval Adiminietration in Worid War Ii,” unpublished narxa~ 
tive history of Commander in Chief, U.S., Pacific Fleet and 
Pacific Ocoan Arasg (CINCPAC and CINCPOGA), 401. 


21 mer Davis, "Aeport to the سس سيو‎ Sub~ 
committee on Government Operations," Hr eur s M. n 

“ جو‎ Pla : ہم‎ | Ark 2. 3th ae ist 
Session (1963). 228-29 (hereafter cited as Davis, “Report *) « 
quoted in Lamar &. Mackay, "Domestic Operations GË the 
Office of War Information in World War IXI,” unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966. ©. 41l6. 
Hereafter cited as Mackay, "OWI," 


Art. Cais. Stuyvesant B, Wright, USM, "The Newe- 
reels,” remarks maže before a conference of naval district 
public relations officers in Washington, D.C.. July 286731. 
1941, secorded in mineographed minutes of conference, 

p. 122, Philibert Collection, Sox 155. 


255.8. Hayy p "a - the Chief of 
Haval Operations, Piel KELAR Se dg, © 
5530.5AÀ of June 1967, p. 19. 

















JÁxdm. Exnest J. King, USN, quoted in "Out of the 
Darkness,” Time, May 1. 1944. p. úl. 


25, Ray Danieli. quotad i^ Lt. Cmür. Le Rohe Weiter. 
USRR, nias Relations in Wax end Peace,” U8. هس‎ 
۴:۲۰8 linga, 698: 1590 (1943). 





“Meare Minor, 


(Mew York, 1970), 





ما 


2 ہز‎ S5. 0103008, VON, remarks meade to the 
press, October 6. 1944. A minsographed copy ia contained 
dn Philibert Collection, Box 157. 


cre 


— I 
مهد‎ "ur 








373 


“Report,” 229, qeoted in Mackay, ۰‏ ,وزبسيوةة 
.416 


29 وه‎ “Statistics ef Victory.” an editerial in the New 
York BASAL tribune, December 19, 1945, A reprint ig 
contained in Philibert Collection, Box 157. 
3 emo. « Director of Public Relations te Secretary 
Of the Navy, Philibert Oollection, Box 157. Although this 
HORO ÊR is undated, its subject is a review of the Navy 
HanBgement Engineerg' aurvey of OPR, whioh strongly sag” 
geste that it was written in the fali of 1944. 


Slyevis, ARAL و‎ 267. 


G, Stahlean, "From the Shoulder," om‏ 7 اب 
eciterial in the Kashville (Tean.) Banger, January 30,‏ 
A reprint is contained in personal fila of RAG.‏ .1345 
Harold B. Miller, UE (Rate), entíitied "Public Relations‏ 
Policies and Directives."‏ 
and e Johan *‏ پا رہہ nét. VARS C,‏ 33 
AUC] DI 5‏ له 7 Shipman, USE (Ret.),‏ 
U.S. Navy Department, office of — * Washinston,‏ 
D.C. 1952, Pe 41.‏ 


Den'k.‏ جب 


.268 تہ ,و ېووا 


ud 2 RAGNO — — B. Miiller., USE, to Capt, 
Fitshugh Lee, YER, COR (Serial 90514008), October 9, 19435. 
Miller سس وہر‎ 


- Coll, Ov... Honoluia Advertioax. quoted i 
6ھ‎ LIRR, NO. 9, Movember 1945, De 3e Tha m 
date of dz. اس جب‎ article is met given, but it is identi- 
fied as a "recent story. * 


- PI NH. Long, USNR, “Public Reistions end 
the Peace time à LEA ا‎ ProwuepA mum, 
وس‎ (1945). / 
cept. Arthar He Ashton, USN, “Navy's Senier PAO 
Reviews Busy Yosrs," Directian (August 196 il. 


(nevis. Lahbg, 279-283, DARAAN. The analysis cf 
Bavy public relations after Woriój War II is contained in 
pp. 272-293, Phil G. Goulding. former Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Public Affairs, becks up Davis’ contention 
that the attitude of naval officers towar publio relations 











58-17 


























mls‏ نی په سم 


UU لف‎ 
^ 
pt 


274 


was still comparatively negative as late as the 129608. in 
his book, Sentixm.ac Renny (New York, 1970}, Goulding 
states: "If Lt wes a Navy problem, . . . We were less con~ 
figent of being read into the picture that rapidly. . . o 
the Navy was not always overiy anxious te share its private 
bad news even with the Secretary of Defense. . . . It is 
simply a little withdrewn from the rest of tho world anc 
even à little peculiar." (p. 141). 


‘lgechariah Chafee, Jr.. Government Bod Masa 
Commaunicationg (Chicago, 1947), Vol. i m 457. 








— 





& ROTE ON SOURCTS 


A major portion of the primary source documents 
cited in the thesis were found in the Helene Philibert col- 
lection of materials pertaining to Navy public relations 
before, duríng and after World War II, With an eye toward 
its historical potential, Miss Philibert carefully compiled 
this data through almost thirty years of continuous service 
as a Navy civilian information assistant, beginning with 
the Navy News Burgeau in World War I and ending in 1947 when 
she moved with Jaxves Forrestal to the Defense Department, 

The Philibert Collection was of immense value to 
the &uthor because it included in a single source much of 
the information neeced to detail the evelopment of Ravy 
public relations policies, procedures and organization. 

Its contents represent a true cross-section of Reavy activ” 
ities in the information field, encompassing materials of 
considerable variety anó acope. Many of the documents 
contained in the collection~-~sech ae the GPR and Pacific 
Fleet public relations bulletins, minutes of the annual 
information officer conferences, and personnel directories 
anû telephone iists--were not foung elsewhere. 

Officially titled “Historical Records of the Navy 
Office of Information, 1919-1951," the collection consists 


375 





a —‏ 
|| یہ فی اھ کے می می ے۔ 
سص  E‏ نتت = اسم سل اه 
ph ,comted‏ ما sana‏ ون ای در ی صم ا س 
یه الما وسیتسن مل يلیم مسممرزل سم ری 
»= 6 ۳ لفات لسشسعه نونو aliw paiya mauan‏ 
aed qum cdi‏ تاه له شیو مو 2 مسا مضانتوی لے Cnt‏ و 
— — جاور ni) oh ener‏ امد وی سیر 
N‏ انه ص بر لص os caller‏ 
نه س تا دا وانرد کر و dme axes aüwnis‏ 1 
باتش مدشن liódsk dd‏ عا دوو لوسر ores te‏ 
bbei mii E‏ — 
SH‏ ات دوومحصودء ہہ یسنہ یا سوب irs‏ 














376 
OË six bones numbered 153-155 in Job Order 621-A-2740, 


National Records Center, 





item 10, at the Washington 
Suitland, Md. The contents are not indexed in any mening” 
ful manner and are arranged only in a loose chronological 
order, with the early materiais in Box 153 ané the post- 
World War II data in Bow 158. Access to the collection 
must be obtained through the Operational Archives Branch, 
Haval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, located at the Bavy Yard in faghington, D.C. 

In addition to the Philibert papers, many other 
administrative files and materials kept by the Navy Office 
of Public Relations during World War II are on deposit at 
the Suitland recordas center. These inclue library refer- 
معدي‎ material; Kavy Department and CINCPAC comeunicues enc 
news releasss; speeches and press conferences by Frank Knox 
and Janes Forrestal; deta on censorship, films, radio 
Programs, combat photography andl war correspondents; sarer~ 
books of Navy Day activities; general correspondents of a 
elassified ami unclassified naturs; press clippings con“ 
cerning the Navy's part in the war; source material fer the 
neval administrative histories; end naval district public 
relations activities. Job Order information and access to 
these records also can bs obtained through the Operational 
àzehives Branch. 

Classified filas of the offices of the Bacretary of 
the Navy anc Chief of Naval Operations from 1939 through 





, of mno a al MU baning t ale د‎ 
۲۰ء‎ ettones Laochseu no$yliutUs* m$ 49 01 adi 

ومس c à Dad n U-o Pee oop Jw‏ س ملس 
0 بس caa! * 4b vim peer vh Tas‏ قىن تەپ ل1 
emireelbee sr c? «mene Q4 c AR urb ۹ diss‏ 
Kam sû parion fem err WES eui) "ah *tAfe «d CUM‏ 
دش Lewes to Sebd$ mf* Yo mite .rubmox)4 quere ١‏ — — 
of ere’ creel at a "edem .-—dg‏ هلام 2.32 

JH NU LA EE gl a 
oY eM kee انام هع‎ minn lale 
١ ۱: £€ 04 Et ww RO» kû وډ خوزله اسهد اهس‎ 
mos A y — easy وب جمنعصوی‎ 
غد اسم همح نروه س چم اسن :یس سد‎ 
ست ۰7 مینست هده" م‎ jary مسب تنس ےی ینمی‎ Qo amm 
Tm malig lae seang mater Simail jme Saidi imal 
w i lecion sose re --صى9‎ +1 7 - 
— — nater ed rez Gal وه صدرمېی موعلۍ زمر‎ 
۱ مسس سور‎ 


کید جک مد »ټیاس به سے تس ۰ 
Salm tom qvww adl‏ سم نت EL‏ ند ا 











377 
1946, catalogueC under the general subjects of public 
relations and public informetion, are located at the Opera- 
tional Archives Branch itself. Unclassified files of these 
two offices under those headings are depositeñð at the 
National Archives, War Records Branch. Naval Records 
Section. Also at the Archives are unclassified general 
files of the Office of Public Relations ({8-117, Record 
Group 80) and the restricted set of personal papers collected 
ny James Forrestal. 

The Forrestal Papers were extremely beneficial in 
helping to set the tone and spirit of the secretary's great 
influence on Revy public relations in the final stage of the 
war. The portion of the collection relating to public 
relations consists of only four boxes, but contains personal 
memorand& and other documents not available elsewhere. 
Permission to peruse the Forrestal Fapers must he granted 
by the Secretary of the Navy, and they can be examined only 
under close monitoring and supervision. The point of 
gontact is Mra. Mildred €. Baruch, Chief of the Records and 
Reference Unit of the Office ef the Secretary of the Navy. 
Room 4D706 in the Pentagon. 

Supplementing the Forrestal] Papers as the focal 
point of information for the lest year of tha war was the 
personal interview with Rear Admiral Herold B. (Min) 811: 
USN (Retired), and his two personal filee~-"Public Zelations 
Policies and Directives" and "Capt. Lee & Pacifio." The 








ret 

7 انیت كم تہ مس Wi acabas‏ سا 
didy w a‏ امي لمم سم لمسب ———X wd?‏ 
a Diis‏ سه سه سم وله وج ماس 
کی ملف سن نل تایه wal‏ مووزعه غه وله 
rel‏ قلس = as rini al‏ مت )هعورلوناد جن 
لن 6 سا ۵۹ mci aia aliat ie‏ مه — 
سی ۷ غه بعر وجب د ا ص وم سلسم 

چک اسمس am kva‏ سیل ضس ذاحلعز لہ 
8 او Ow‏ دو sisip fus aco‏ ج5 یس عسي ايساو deem‏ 
o‏ سے بسانت یدن د چيا وینو اوو wht te‏ 
MN‏ پو نت مخ هوات مان ته تشن 
هرت مب ٤٢‏ سب نس سا < na alam‏ 
صس سه سا »نس zod Mhm‏ سحتتتعت دنسصفہ۔ 
E cm‏ سم نوت سوه که موصوب 
lo quxdenr ui Wi‏ کش السب عم Quis‏ خو vise aies w?‏ 
Gald S‏ تدای سا ېټم &s omaes s‏ 
تا که ای w moa aD he Paks omen > Genki‏ 
ads ho expe wi Vo AA amai‏ ست po‏ ص جب 
دک هلال بب vapi‏ 
۳٧‏ تیا ی اسما دوهی س iasa «d»‏ 
سل US‏ ټکټ ف بد لاه پا ٥ه alls wow mae ed)‏ 
رات ا سو jaszmA wbed‏ عند ی بها ماتا 
ود سدقا ا نا فا سمت کش هی مات نے 
لک CE TOA‏ کټا AAA‏ بت 























378 
letters from Admiral Wilier to Captein Lee and others, 
contsined ín the latter file, were especially valuable as a 
source of specific details on the accelerated public rele- 
tions campaign in the Pacific. Admiral Miller retired from 
the Navy in December 1946 and became Director ef Public 
Relations for Pan Aserican World Airways. Ee vesigned from 
that position in the late 1960s enó is presently eerving as 
Vice President for Public Helations at Hofstra College, 
Mempetead, N. Y. 

The interviews cited in the footnotes are listed in 
the Bibliography, along with descriptive informetien on the 
interviewees. ‘The author gained further background data 
through persona] and tele; 
following individuals: Mr. Daniel D, Kísball, who served 


xonie conversations with the 





in the reference and research section ef OPR from May 3 
to the end of the war; Mrs. Harry E. Thurber, widow of Vice 
A&mirai Thurber, USN (Retired), who headed the Public 
Relations Branch in the Office of Naval Intelligence from 
July 1940 to May 1941; Vice Admiral W. G. (Slin) Beecher. 
FE., USE (Retired), who sexved in various capacities in 
OKI's public relations branch and in OPR from 1942-1045; 
and Commenter Merle Macbain, one of the first specialir~ 


designated Navy public information officers in the postwar 





period, 
At the Library of Congress, the euthor screened the 
Frank Knox personal papera daposited in the Manuscript 





et 

ري نر نک توعد os AD‏ وېسوروژل جم 
دم eng SP‏ مسا esca tsm c a‏ رب مه ه- 
iagat omi‏ یپ رس — 
ده نہپ نم amc‏ باد cou dae‏ هوس هذ hive?‏ 
دک اغ هم که افده غه mw ۱۳۷۰۱ xirsemec« gi toe‏ 
هزم هنما کې ja mlre alin‏ وسلود الاما 
tt‏ 4 1. 

A — o‏ الهس ا 
paveida na‏ اسن عدبد ضلالی اا hee.‏ د شت 
ومو أنه Kren‏ معفئت waoga acto‏ تورم 
سم Ge Gams Seg‏ دم )هسل چووجحم 2 ۵ ۱۳ “ay‏ 
vod elec eke 1199009‏ حسیہ؛ 10 نم ) بي Dee‏ 
فھ يې سس ده ومهم سب رم — —- qe‏ لادد 
وع بط جو Cue ur‏ مين ات he T‏ هد رس 
ahs pana laiat‏ پر باېټا ILAS w ete! Oc‏ 
سصلعام هسد -an ampile] Leet So mid at ad‏ 
دوس الہ عو سے siti‏ افده منوس < ھ زلف wene‏ 
گئی FEN‏ مسا mí‏ مسا اد جبداست ودې )اذه ای 
وت Il‏ داضت نوی عصا ب ٩٣‏ ہے یمر میں 
مه جنټم ab st‏ سه دږ le ae‏ الت اوه 114و 
Rafsacrtak‏ قد ات اون ما اس STUNG, ASI Os‏ 
s. Oo ^‏ " 
ار jo arid MAPAS‏ 005 حر مہ لہ 
8ه کو پس ومس وت ہجوم اہ لم وہ میں 











379 
Section. Being a journallat who reliet sore on memory 
rather than the written record, Knox's collection is 
limited to eleven smell boxes contéining miscelileneous cor~ 
respondence, speeches and newspaper clippings. However, it 
did turn up several interesting letters to friends andi 
colleagues which provided aiditioankl insight into his 
public relations-oxionted philosophy. 

Also screened were the personal papers of Prank E, 
Kasen, the gpecial assistant for public relations to 
Secretary Knox, which ave located in the Kass Communications 
Bistory Canter of tha Wisconsin Historical Society in 
Madison. This collection revealed little of value to the 
thesis other than the transcripts of esveral Knox press 
conferences. 

Public information sections of the unpublished was- 
time narrative histories ef Navy comands, contained in tho 
Navy Library in Washington &s a series entitled “Ynited 
States Kaval Administration im World War If," furnished 
many details on the operations of the neva] district, fleet 
aná other field publie relatione offices. A partial manu” 
script on the history of the Navy’s Office of Public 
Relations was prepared in the last year of the war by 
George Marvin, a civilian specialist in OPR., However, an 
íntensive search of Navy and other government records and 
nwserous inquiries by the author to persons zgtsocistec with 
OFR ané the Office of Naval History during and after the 








جم 
Nease œ vian siler S aiai * wd — ambtaeb‏ 
وس مود ab miem aoa loam: mehin ama‏ 
⸗ — — —— — — 
n A‏ ا دوښو دنسم دیلو — teh‏ مدا 
AY ae ADO‏ ریہ ملس 4d qnd luda)‏ 
eee ae 1‏ چم ام ieee‏ موِو um TR d‏ ۹, 
ات جو یر دضو حو نه مود مارم ډې 
sida mii‏ ورامصم Se sirai) alee‏ طلست بد حه 
nm eh lieo mii Le edi ameta) ie}‏ 
err ⸗‏ و (WV‏ وااتیستاور مس رجا لہ ا 
«دممم سور ووس یغ نم موند eua gums t9 l€9—‏ 
سو DLE T EN Un...‏ 
ire aa‏ کدف وی ریم س ت۱۳ ELI 4 „omitto‏ 
nouam‏ سم یلم داوممې مد stt‏ ہے fe mats?‏ ہد دہ 
لسو نوس دمه وسور ده we vem wit be Sry fend oot)‏ 
یم miv a ieee‏ پر ریجہ أب IFO‏ —— 
نو مهفده 1e excama‏ صب uma‏ — — — — 
paaie at aipe csl Cd Oe) OCTET‏ موم اوی ټک 























380 
war have failed to uncover any part of this manuscript. 

The unpublished master’s thesia by PF. Donald 
Scovel, “Helm‘s A Lee: Histery of the Development of the 
Public Affairs Function in the United States 11» 
1861-1941" (University of Visconsin, 1968), traces the 
evolution of wavy public relations from its emeryonic 
beginnings in celonial times to the period immediately pre- 
ceeding World War Il. It includes pertinent beckgrounc for 
this study and providec specifie daka thet served as 8ج‎ 
natural lead-in to the start of the World War II Nevy 
public relations story, i.e., the establishment of tha 
Office of Public Relations in Mey 1941. 

The doctoral] dissertation by Lamar $. Eackay. 
"Domestic Cperations of the Office ef War Infermetion in 
Worid War II" (University of Wisconsin, 1966), covers in 
considerable etail the coordination of militszy ط1‎ 55078.70 
activities with those of OWI. Of particular vaiwe to this 
thesis was Mackay’s treatment of the difficulties 1 
Director Elmer Davis had with the Navy over releasing; 
policies early in tho war. A velated Ph.D. Gieserteotion, 
"The Overseas Branch of the Office of War information," by 
Robert L. Bishep (University of Wisconsin, 1966), deals 
with American propaganda efforts overseas during the war 
and the coordination of these efforts between the OWI awd 
the Army and Navy. 








ont 
eiu” ماما‎ 19 gemm qe سے‎ nf bailia وي ووی‎ 
tae s y miae بي میټ سو‎ ٣ 
مه عدا تست 4 ہف‎ Ve quale yeu! واه د‎ teed 
we moiri basie am) ai miwat ouod WIN 
en ens , اشبطا‎ alioi yo وره سلا‎ IMP 
اپ لس اله‎ sens c— An bo ifr vw o wiide 
تین تیا ایتناز لاله لا نت اج نحمنشانسنو پس‎ 
اس‎ facie تا‎ a E منم مو تق تک‎ 
t سرد كد‎ wets siin aia bak oo î kor 
كوا لاوح مو ہب سال خو زا وم‎ 4 a4 Coe 
û ve tometer. ay , كت‎ | pee eli CT 
Leek pat ولوت می ان اوح ملاس نه‎ 
— کے مور ننحہ یہ ون لست یو‎ 7 
el alamesshlad i9 ۱۰ ہر ہے وزذورہ‎ emire e 
ورور م با اعدد ۲ 1ذ۲۸, سس لہ‎ "LI سی‎ Bilvew 
minra qisib O ہے خستااساف‎ lide ات نی‎ 
ohed oo شد پصحلوعلهد اښاه‎ DeO wn As aiii 
ااا ضوف بعد‎ en متا سای اج جمد ما‎ disd 
ied o4 سن سال لما مات اغ اعم سه‎ ok 
سسسک په د همه له ودس راښ‎ 
T4 ^od dues uh a ue باو اف خاش دا‎ Meee deere al 
الت تین س‎ Te Cie Ge وو‎ 
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سسښلیکتن ٩ښېمسسمسم جد س‎ 


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382 





Berry, Robert W., RAdm., USN (Ket.). Telephone Interview, 
March 17, 1970.  Acwmirsl Derry gerve as prast 
officer im tiw Public Relations Branch of the 
Office of Naval Intelligence from April 1946 te May 
1941 and held various positions in the Navy's 
Office of Public Kelationa throughout World Wax if. 


Eller, R. M., RAdm., USH (Ret.). Personal Interview. 
Washington, Dele, April 10, 1968. Admiral Eller 
was 5 postwar Director of Nevy Public Information 
anê Director of Naval History when this interview 
waa coniucted, 


Forrestal, Janes V. Personel Papers. UMational Archives, 
Washington, D.C. Access to thie reetricted set of 
papers can be obtained only by permission of the 
E Of the Navy (see “A Bete on Sources, “ 

Pe 75]. 


nox, Prank. Fergonal Papers.  Xenugscript Beetion, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C. 


Mackey, Lamar Seal. “Domestic Operations of the Office of 
War information in World War II." Unpublished 
Ph.D, Gíssertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966. 


Wertz, 7. I. Personal Interview, Washington, Doo 
April 16, 1968. Hiss Merta was & civilian informe” 
tion assistant in the Navy Office of Public 
Relations during World Wax If and served as 
edministrative and information aide to tha Director 
of Naval History at the time of this interview. 
She retired fron government service in January 
1971. 


Miller, Harold 28., RAÓm., USN (Rete? e Personal Interview. 
New York. N. Y., dune 16, 1968. Admiral Miller was 
public relations officer for Commander in Chief, 
U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Gcean Areas, from 
October 1944 to March 1945 and served as Navy 
Director of Public Information from May 1945 to 
December 1946. 



















00 م e‏ .(. اد »لسن 
تنج olsa shti ma AÛ‏ سم عا یت 
چا 1 قسج 1ل اوعدو ard‏ یوزد DAAI‏ سه yet‏ 


EEEE عون — ۵ بلس‎ he) 
Ki ze اماس سام وله‎ let ۸ 1١١ 


۰ 































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یرم (ه«سجسحډیه‎ quie yrorsde (oven 


b سوت‎ 
Oe 















283 


Miller, Herold 2$., RAdm., USN (Rot.). Personal files 
entitled "Public Reletions Policios and Directives” 
and "eet. Lee & Pacific” {eee “A Note on Sources," 
Be 375. 


Philibert, Heleme. Telephone Interview. June 13, 1963. 
Miss Philibert served oe a civilian information 
assistant for the avy from World War I until 1947. 


Bay, Mavoid Bradley, Capt., WER (Aot.). Fersonsi Inter“ 
view, Weshington, D.C., June 13, 1968. Captain 
Say wags & security review officer in the Havy 
Officea of Public Reletions during World War II. 


Scovel, F. Donald, Lt. Cmir., USN.  "Hela's %4 Loa: Kistory 
of the Development of the Public Affaire Functien 
in the United States Navy, 1861-1941." Unpublished 
Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1968. 


Shaw, Gilbert, Lt. Cmór., UNG. Personal interview. 
Indienapolis, Inó., Harch 14, 1972. Coameandear Shaw 
Waa وه‎ Lnlisted Naval Correspondent M in 
1946 awi currently is attached to the Division of 
Public Informstion, HesdQuarters, U.5. Coast Guerc, 
Washington, L.C. 





Smith, Jay B., Capt., VEAR.,  Porsonal Interview, 
indianapolis, Tnd., May is, 1970. Captain :ھ‎ 7 
was a public relations offiser at various Navy 
Tomas throurhout World War Ii and a prese 
briefing officer foy the Commander. U.S. ۸ 
FKorco&, Lurepe, Guring the Mermandy invasion. 





Davis, Elmer. "Report to the Fresióent." Mouse Sub- 
موا نمی‎ Ot — GOparetions, قمصلتفصفا‎ 


7+ Let Session (1963). 


King, Ernest J., FAdn., USN. U8... Heavy ot. Wan. 1941-2124-. 
Y Reports to the Secretary of the Nevy by 
he Commander in Chief, 9.8. Fleet amd Chief of 

Operations, Washington: Government Printing‏ د 












Shaw, James C., م و ان‎ USE, &£nd ٣ اس‎ John Bes om 
usu (Rat.). یه‎ ox aw fub format 
3.8. Pon Depar tment, Office of Susa Ad, 












324 
U.S. Bureau of the Budget. یا چ بسيسروسب ما‎ Jota 
Washington: Government 








Printing Office, سيج‎ = 


U.S. Navy Degactment, Bureau of Naval Personnel 
ممصشا ششصووي‎ 1 & Q. Navy Training Garos (MAYPERS 
10295). Washington, 1961. 


» Offiee of the Chief of Naval Operations. Field 
ee - وا‎ (OPRAVINGT 8530.5. Washington. 
dune 1967. 








Office of the Chief of Ravel Operations, Naval 
History Division. “Unito States Saval Adwinis~ 
tration ín World War II."  Unpublished narrative 
histories in the Navy Department “Library, 
Washington, D.C. 


—— Uffice Gf the Chief of Naval Operations. Reval 
History Division. Operations] Archives ranch, Navy 
Yard, Washington. D.C. Classified Files of the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Piles 
of the General Beard, Series 441. References cited 
from this series of files were ceclagsified for the 
author by a uevBl security review officer at the 
Operational Archives Branch. 


— — 2. Office of Information. Administrative Files. 
Washington National Records Center, Buitiand. ۵ 
Job Orders 76-À592140, 62-h-2502, 63-h-2506 anc 
61-h-2:7460. Job Order 61-Àh-2740, item 19, Boxes 
153-155, conteine the “Historical Seecorde of the 
Navy Office of Information, 1919-1951," unofficisally 
known as the “Philibert Collection.” Access to 
this group of records nust be obtained threugh the 
Operational Archives Sranch, Naval Hiatorv 

Division, Office of the thief of Reval Operations. 





. Office of information, Liaisen Branch. An 


| al Chranolaggy..af£ Worta Kar LI 
(BAVSO P-3024). Washington, June 5, 1967. 


, 01116 of Public Relations. General Files 
(23-117). Record Group 80, War Records Branch, 
Kaval Recoróg Section, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C. 











— — 5ه‎ of Publíc Relations. U,8. Heavy Public 
Belationa "anual. Washington, 1943. A copy of 
this manual is contained in “Philibert Collection,” 
















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385 


Box 157 (see aheve bibilegraphical entry on U.&. 
Navy Department. Office ef Information, Adminiatra~ 
tive Files}. 


U,S. Mavy Dapartment, Office of the n of the Bevy, 
Incentive Division, The Fig] i 
Washington, August 7, 1944. 








UG. Office of Consorship. 





the رجا مخ نها‎ en ieee T 
Printing Gffice, 1942. 


U.S. Office of War Information, News bureau. victory 
Vol. 3, December &, 1242. 
رو‎ 454 
Chácago Bua. 1841. 
Ghicego Tribu. 1941. 
Columbia ($.C.) Racax 1944. 
Honolulu Advsrkiaux, 1945. 
Little Rock 1944. 
Leng Beach (Calit.) Exess Jelagukaa, 1942. 
Nashville (Tenm.) RANMA. 1945. 
Mew Haven (Comn.) Journal Gaurdes. 1938۰ 
New York Timea, 1942-1945. 
Hew York Mexkla Crinun 1945. 
Omahe acid Maral. 2942. 
San Francisco Qhronicla. 1944. 
ME. L941. 





Seattia P. 

Tulsa Tribuni i942. 
Washington iweniag Akak. 1941-1945. 
Washington TimacHecald, 1941. 











BAA aom در مر‎ ١ سی‎ 





BuO 


Albion, Robert — and Connery. Robert Howe, 
۱ À | New York: Coilumoia 






University Press, 1962. 
EKEN Ka blow Forks 





Random Houses, 1956. 


Burlingame, Reger. Rani ane XAOS, Che. td fe «nó 
کرد وید د‎ AS. Philadelphia and New York: 
J.B. Lippincott Co., i961. 











Chafee, Xechnriah, Jr,  QavsrDeeni. and J ۱ نا‎ 
2 vols. 216 M of Chicago — 
1847. 





GCutiip, Scott K., and Genter, Allen BH. Effects Medio 
Reletions. 4th ed.  Englowood — "RECAP 
Prentice-Hall. Ine., 1971. 


Davie, Vincent. Tim Admiris Laway. Chapel Nill: 8 
University of North Carolina Press, 1967. 
1941-1945. "Chapel milli Tha Gelvensity of Bocth 
Carolina Press, 1962. 





Forestel, E. P., VAdm.. * (Ret. }. 





— 8 ۲پ‎ —— — — 
Cove x rae rit کچ‎ Offices, 1966. 





Tarer, Julius Pre t — & ous — * ٭ ۸ سے‎ a def 
ihe Eavy Department. ¥ ld Wax il. — t 
Government Printing Office, 1959. 


Gouldiny. Phil Ge لت تع مكمه‎ j me the E 
f Be) SBmscoritv, Now York. سوه‎ and poA 
Barper 5 Rew, 1970. 





x 











hiikAxx. anc Naval count e وس باهش‎ — 
us. Naval institute, 196€. 


King, Ernest J.,. Fh ء‎ USN (Ret.), ené انس و‎ Waiter 





E - | 7 Ei 4 ar ag 
York: W, W. es تا‎ Qe. , — B 


Leahy, Willies D.e, FAdm., UBBH (Rete. د‎ ERA. DOD. o 
ramion: Vietor Gollancs,. 1950. 





20 eet eae عسبہ:‎ 


"T1 rama اھ ده‎ renti EM 


د دص کش Aud S‏ 
SE 2‏ 
— ا وتاو l‏ 








387 






Lindsay, Robert. This Hig! k Lat 3 es 
U.S. Marine Corps. مسرب‎ "he — r7 of 
Wisconsin Frese, i956. 


books, inc. +é 1979. 





ew Yorks: Hawthorn 






Rappaport, Armin. T FT ب‎ id ۷۳ وی وا‎ e 
Detroit: Wayne State livers ltr Pakê, 1962. 





Rosenman, Sanusi I., ed. 
wt $ 





Harper & ürethers, 1936 and 1956. 


+1945 ء ہبوت Publishing‏ شش .9.8 York:‏ 


Foundation سس‎ Int. ; 1944. 


Thomson, Char ies 2 Ba IS OX CT AE Es ER 
init —X NE 4 washington: che 
Brookings Institution, 1948. 





Ghicago: Tbe 









"All Black Crews Recalled in Boox.” avy Times 
(September 9, 1970), p. x 


Aehton, Arthur Ak, Capt., USN. “Savy'’s Senior PAO Reviews 
Busy Years," لصف‎ (August 19607). Bp. Li. 
ation ia a monthly — for Wavy oonmand ing 
officers and public affeirg stafies publisheód by the 
internal Reletíions Division, Offloe of Intecmetion, 
U.S., Navy Departuent, Washington, D.C. 


bourgin, Sinon, ap Relations of S&val Expansion," 
^ Mio, — ion b. oci i e. UE olo eter ie YO ls 3, No. 4 (January 
1939), Pp. 113-117. 









Bruner, daroma 5, “OWI anā the ہوسئے۔۔‎ Public." Pubic 
id. iion . Vol. 7, Ho. 1 (Spring i543), 





A 515. n 


Darroek, Michael, and born, Joseph P.  "Lovis aw; Golistnh: 
The OWE and Its Gigantic اس م‎ HeXQI تع‎ 
Heagasing, Vol. 186, Bo. 11123 (February 1243), 
pp. 2257237. 





Davis, Elmer. "Flew of War Information.” BEM And wavy 
Journal. éepecial edition entitled “United States at 
War: December 7, i1942-December 7, 1943" (Decenber 
1943), Be. 89+. 


“Davis and the Navy.” Beseweek. Vol. 20, He. 19 
(November 9, 1942), pp. 29-39. 


Donohue, Gerard Be e Dt. (3. ہی‎ um. ی سےا‎ 
Training." j 4 Ps beatae Drean ۱ 
Vol. 72, Wo. 524 (1946) , Pp. 1346-474 








Doug las. رس‎ » “Pub uer — United States Mary.” 
(1941) د‎ pe 1432-37. 


"Pleet En Route to New York.” Acay and Hary Deglatex 
(Octeoner 13, 1945). pe do 


"Foster Hailey Lends Navy's New Policy.” gisas M 
ERukliaher. VOl. 75, No. 5i MEL. 18, 1943), 
pre tie 





Marling, Albert. A xeview of Stanley Johnsten's Augen. gf 
۱ ۸ سب‎ Forks Eo Pe Dutton & CO. 
19423). 


ifM و‎ 389 i سڈ‎ 4 Vol. 19, Ho. A 
(December 1942), pP. 395-96. 





Hawkins, Lester G., Jr., endi Pettee, George » سو‎ 
Orgenigation and Probleme." LA Quin 
GBBT SELLY « YOl. 7, NO. 1 (Spring 1943). * 15-33. 


Humphreys. Rebezt, "Row Your Hews is Censored,” The 
AturdAy جسکھسھراز.‎ Fock. Voi. 215, Ho. 13 
(September 26, 1942). pp. i6-17*. 








Kafka, Roger. “Publication Kot hetowsended." SERBS 
Vol. 3, Mo. 9 (Septeuber 19423). pp. uM 
BRASS A à ده‎ magerzine published by tha 

Kevy League of the United States. 





Lindley, Zrneet K. “Maechkcthur and the Savy.” Bowewoek. 
Vol. 25, Bo. 10 (Mareh 5, 1945), p. 44. 


Long, Williams Hae. Litaa USNR, "Publis Relations — the 
Foacetine Bavy." U8 metitute Praceedingd 
Val. 71, We. 514 (1945), 9p. 1469-72. 





Lovette, Leland Y لس و‎ UGN. “hlawy Public Kelationea. “ 
ny .,لھ۸معمنستک تفه قھم‎ special edition entitled 
“United States at Wass becember 7, l942-December 7, 






U a a 


كام إن يف على 





3059 
1943" {(Decesber 1943), p. 179. 
Hanning, George iie “Lovette Seya اس‎ Preae Releeses Hust 


Se Factual, * « ¥Ol. 75, No. 31 
(August 1 1942). p. 5. 





MeCamy, Jemes La "Variety in the Growth of federal 
— — y." عل(ضنڅ‎ Opinion یا۰ عاجھگ.‎ Voi. B, 
2 (April 1939). pp. 295-92. 


2 2 2 2 0 ه‎ eos ga E. "Government 022 and tne Impact 
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Hiller, HMaroiód دظ‎ . HAm., USN {Reto}. “Types it tere uni the 
Wavy.“ 8:۷7۳ (October 1965), pp. 11-13. 
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Ma. 
Mock, damea HÄ.. end Larson, Cedric. “Public lations cf 
the U.S. Army.” Publig Opinion QuatLeriy. Vol. 5, 


No. 2 (June 1941), pp. 275782. 


“The "-— amd the Navy: It Fights Superbiy, هه‎ Kaway 
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"Havy Censor RKeiaxes." KAILA. M buslisu6x. voi. 796, No, 41 
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“Navy Mews For Your wewspaper." baericgn Pxass (Joly 
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1944), p. 8932. 





"Out of the Darkness." Time. Vol. 43, NO. i8 (Nay i, 
1944), PE. 61-62. 


"Pearson Charges Washington Uses Gestapo Tactics, | 
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1 wd az GA Uf. وھ‎ — * —— 


لس سل وی دی ux 7 CE‏ 


i = te * 


hr ro cd | 

















390 


“Press vs. the Navy, EY ERR. Vol. 13, No. 8 
(Pebruary to, 1942), p. $6. 


"Prompt Saws is Worth 190,900 Sermons, Says Heyt.” di 
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Resch, F. A. "Photo Coverage of the War ny the Still 
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wi ۱ . Nol. 20, No. 4 


Donde TE ۰ 311-314. 


Say, Harel’ Ereéliey. Cexir., USMA. Censorship and 
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- 


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“A Tight Lip Loosens: NOvy's Growing Press Sense." Time- 
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Welter, Le Rone , Lee CEK o — “Public اس‎ im Wer 


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1943). pp. 5-6. 





me 














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